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Abstract  
The aim of my thesis is to reconceptualise the English School of International Relations 
according to what I describe as the history/theory dialectic. The origins of this dialectic are 
sought in the thought of E. H. Carr, Herbert Butterfield, and Martin Wight, who drew 
attention to the interpenetration of history and theory. In their capacity as historians, the 
writers examined in my thesis struggled with problems normally associated with theoretical 
work in International Relations and elsewhere and tried to combine personal and 
impersonal accounts of history. They also emphasised the role of the historian which is no 
different from that of the theorist in attributing meaning to a series of apparently unrelated 
events. As international theorists, Butterfield, Wight and Carr underlined the historicity of 
international theory, and offered a historicist conceptualisation of international change that 
assigned priority to European interests and values. Their belief in the co-constitution of 
history and theory, has important consequences for contemporary English School debates 
concerning the proper definition of the relationship between order and justice, international 
society and world society, pluralism and solidarism. What lies at the end of the 
history/theory dialectic is not an unproblematic combination of opposites but the recognition 
of the need to be cautious towards the categories we use in order to capture and analyse a 
multidimensional reality which is subject to change.  
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        Introduction: Debating History and Theory 
 
Despite its importance for the founding English School thinkers Herbert Butterfield, 
Martin Wight and E. H. Carr, the relationship between history and theory has not 
yet been fully elucidated.  In The British Committee on The Theory of International 
Politics: The Rediscovery of History Brunello Vigezzi (2005) emphasises the 
precarious and contested nature of this relationship for the British Committee 
scholars. However, what he describes as a crisis of historicism provides at best a 
background against which the views of the leading British Committee participants 
can be understood. In the form conceptualised by Vigezzi, historicism is a 
nineteenth-century doctrine which has to do with a simplistic belief in progress and 
the possibility of drawing a sharp distinction between subject and object. The 
notion of neo-historicism, which Vigezzi introduces in order to clarify the point of 
view adopted by Bull and Watson in The Expansion of International Society, is 
poorly defined and includes phenomena such as “the lack of any recourse to 
providence, the constant sense of alternatives, the care taken in noting the variety 
and the often controversial formation of values, the frequent mingling of 
subjective and objective elements, the focus on both structures and perceptions...” 
(Vigezzi, 2005: 89). For Ian Hall (2008), the problems with Vigezzi’s otherwise 
commendable book have to do with its narrative mode of exposition and the fact 
that the writer is more interested in what the members of the Committee did and 
less in why they did it. The fact that Butterfield and Wight wrote a lot about history 
and the philosophy of history before joining the Committee complicates the matter 
further. In any case, Vigezzi’s admission that the words “the rediscovery of history” 
were added to the title of the book after some hesitation indicates that his work 
provides only a starting point for understanding the relationship between history 
and theory without fully clarifying it.   
    Any successful attempt to evaluate the theoretical importance of the work of the 
English School thinkers discussed in this thesis presupposes the recognition of the 
fact that their self-understanding does not always provide the best guide to 
understanding what they were doing, and that no interpretation of their work can 
do justice to the many—and not always congruous—dimensions of their thought. 
Butterfield’s self-understanding as a technical historian is contradicted by an 
intellectual career devoted to historical criticism, the philosophy of history and 
International Relations. Wight’s self-understanding as a Christian intellectual does 
not always explain the ebbs and flows of the importance of his religion for his 
politics and his academic work. Although the ideas examined in Chapter 4 cannot 
be understood independent of his commitment to historical Christianity, his 
international views are not reducible to it.  As the most methodologically self-
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conscious among early English School thinkers, Carr can be more easily interpreted 
and classified. However, even in his case, there are tensions between Marxism, 
liberalism and socialism, which are explored in the relevant chapters. The aim of 
these remarks is to show that the importance of the English School contribution to 
the study of history and IR cannot be inferred from the self-understanding of its 
leading members and the personal or other connections existing among them. For 
Vigezzi, and those thinking along similar lines, Carr’s non-participation in the British 
Committee means that he cannot be considered a member of the English School of 
IR. For me, however, this is a problem which ex post facto can be addressed only by 
considering the intellectual affinities that exist between him and some of the 
participants in the Committee, in particular Butterfield and Wight. As I will argue, 
the crucial role that Butterfield, Wight and Carr played in the development of the 
history/theory dialectic justifies their presentation as the founding members of the 
English School of International Relations.  
    In the case of Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2000), the meeting of history and 
theory takes place with the help of the notion of international systems. This notion 
replaces the Waltzian anarchy as a way of studying international relations across 
history. Despite their justified critique of the Westphalian assumptions that 
permeate mainstream international theory, Buzan and Little use the notion of an 
international system in a rather ahistorical way in order to describe the patterns of 
interaction taking place among barbarian tribes, city states, empires, and modern 
sovereign states. Although writers such as Martin Wight and Adam Watson are 
favourably mentioned in the book and the English School as a whole is praised for 
avoiding the dangers of Eurocentrism, ahistoricism, and presentism, Buzan’s and 
Little’s theoretical ambition to offer a theoretical framework applicable to a 
60,000-year historical period brings them closer to neorealism than they probably 
realise. They also do not altogether avoid the problems arising from treating 
“history” and “theory” as separate entities that can be combined in more or less 
successful ways. Although particularly useful for world historians, their approach is 
arguably less useful for those IR theorists who understand international theory 
itself as bound to particular historical experiences and periods. Their reference to 
Bull regarding the dangers of pushing a historicist line of argument too far also 
indicates that their understanding of “theory” does not depart from mainstream 
interpretations of this concept as a set of neutral conceptual tools that can be used 
to study a given set of historical data. Navari’s (2000) emphasis to the adoption of 
a Participant Standpoint avoids some of the pitfalls of positivism, but still leaves 
open the question if the theorist accepts the values of those he is studying. Her 
observation that in English School circles there is little agreement regarding what 
history and historical approaches actually involve is an accurate one, but it does 
not really help to show how exactly history and theory could be synthesised.  
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    The most detailed discussion of history and theory from an English School 
perspective can be found in Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami (2006) and 
especially in Suganami (2011). Linklater and Suganami (2006) note that one 
important link between English School writers has to do with the recognition of the 
importance of history for the study of international relations. However, from their 
point of view, the very belief that historical knowledge is important to the study of 
international relations is based on the recognition of their different nature and 
scope. The examination of the work of Hedley Bull, Adam Watson and Martin 
Wight leads the writers to distinguish among eight different propositions 
summarising English School attitudes to history and theory. These propositions are 
by no means presented as a coherent set and include a belief that the subject 
matter of IR is historical by nature, that the search for historical generalizations is 
legitimate but it should not be carried too far, that historical knowledge does not 
always provide an adequate guide to political action, and that it can limit available 
political options by indicating what is possible and what not. Although Linklater and 
Suganami mention the English School belief that historical interpretations are 
necessarily theoretical and therefore reading histories of international relations 
and comprehending international theories are one and the same thing, they argue 
that these ideas have not yet been adequately discussed from an English School 
perspective.  
     In Suganami (2011) the eight different propositions regarding the English School 
understanding of history and theory are summarised according to two general 
principles. The first principle states that the attempt to offer theoretical 
generalisations faces serious limitations, but it may produce some results; the 
second principle states that historical knowledge can deepen our understanding of 
international affairs, but it also faces serious limitations. Despite their careful 
examination of early and later English School authors, Linklater and Suganami are 
unable to arrive at any definite position on the relationship between history and 
theory. Indeed, Suganami’s two propositions manage to offer only a negative 
understanding of the relationship between history and theory: history and theory 
need each other only because of their imperfections and mutual limitations, and 
not because their union can lead to something promising. Suganami’s (2011) 
proposals for the addition of new areas of research into the English School 
research programme appear only at the end of his interesting article, and suggest 
that English School theorists have so far neglected to examine how historical 
narratives relate to Schools of international thought, and how historical 
interpretations and international theory complement each other.  
    The inability to offer any conclusive definition of the relationship between 
history and theory from an English School perspective, and the problems that 
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according to their own admission Buzan and Little (2000) faced in finding the right 
mix of history and theory, can be attributed to the understanding of history and 
theory as separate spheres of intellectual activity that can be combined at will. This 
depiction of theory and history as different and separate intellectual enterprises 
provides the general background of Hedley Bull’s (1966) defence of the classical 
approach, where philosophy, history and law are presented as old traditions of 
thought from which international theory can derive inspiration in order to answer 
some fundamental political and moral questions. Such questions concern the 
legitimacy of war, the right to intervention, and the very nature of international 
society. Apart from not showing how exactly the recourse to history can help 
international studies apart from contributing to self-criticism, Bull relates 
philosophy to the adoption of an arbitrary point of view when discussing 
fundamental moral questions. Although clearly different from the American search 
for strictly verifiable propositions, the kind of international theory to which Bull’s 
defence of the classical approach hints at seems to be interested in history 
understood only as the history of thought; such history teaches humility and helps 
the international theorist to understand that he is part of an intellectual project 
that precedes him and will likely continue to exist after him. Despite the fact that 
Bull’s confusion of philosophy with the adoption of an arbitrary point of view could 
hardly be accepted by professional philosophers today, the way in which he 
describes international theory actually brings it closer to philosophy than either 
history or lawi.  
    The pitfalls of Bull’s methodological separation of history from theory will be 
more fully analysed in the first chapter, which also argues that his anti-dialectical 
mentality is responsible for some of the most problematic aspects of his major 
contribution to the study of IR, The Anarchical Society. This chapter introduces as a 
working hypothesis the idea that Alain Badiou’s (1982/2009) dialectic of scission 
provides a suitable point of departure for understanding the workings of 
Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s history/theory dialectic. By depicting every 
ideational, material or psychological entity as fundamentally split, Badiou provides 
a powerful alternative to Bull’s dichotomous and deeply anti-dialectical logic. 
Although Badiou’s formulation of the dialectical method is not entirely devoid of 
problems, he certainly provides a philosophical background against which the 
historicity of theory and the theoretical dimension of history can be better 
understood and evaluated. Badiou’s important philosophical insights are later 
complemented by an overview of Slavoj Zizek’s engagement with what he defines 
as dialektika after the Greek word politika. Zizek refuses to reduce the dialectical 
method to one simple truth or idea but he ultimately arrives at a more positive 
understanding of its role. The fact that Zizek (2014) consciously offers only studies 
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in and not on dialectics means that he cannot be used as a point of departure for 
understanding dialectical logic. However, he retains his value as a point of arrival.  
    Contrary to the understanding of history and theory as separate domains—which 
inspires Bull’s delineation of the classical approach and still influences English 
School attempts to bring history and theory together—the aim of the 
history/theory dialectic in the form described in this thesis is to show that history 
and theory form a dialectical unity. Although history and theory may be distinct in 
principle, in practice they refer to very similar forms of intellectual activity. As 
writers such as Thomas Smith (1999) and Richard Little (1991; 1995) have pointed 
out, both historians and international theorists find themselves obliged to find a 
balance between offering generalisations and paying attention to contextual 
factors and considerations. Far from being opposites in the sense of excluding one 
another, history and theory should be understood as the two ends of a continuum 
within which the vast majority of actual works of history or theory occupy 
intermediate positions, since they contain both historical and theoretical elements. 
Although taken as a whole works of history may be considered to find themselves 
closer to the history end of the continuum, and works of theory may be considered 
to find themselves closer to the theory end, the difference is one of degree and not 
kind. More importantly, the difference between prioritising generalisation or 
particularisation does not have to do with whether one is a theorist or a historian, 
but rather with how exactly one chooses to do theory or history. The way in which 
the writers examined in this thesis chose to engage in conceptual thinking when 
working as historians, and to emphasise particularity and context when working as 
theorists, shows that, if taken literally, the distinction between history and theory 
is unsustainable. This  understanding of history as theory, and of theory as history, 
is an expression of the essential dialectical principle of the unity or 
interpenetration of opposites, which in different forms is accepted by Heraclitus, 
Hegel and Marxii . 
    Among early English School thinkers, this dialectic can de distilled from the 
writings of Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight and E. H. Carr who all saw history as 
an inescapably theoretical enterprise and theory as a historical one.  Like Badiou 
and other dialectically inspired thinkers, Butterfield, Wight and Carr refuse to treat 
“history” and “theory” as internally homogeneous entities, and are particularly 
interested in the ways in which they can be considered to contain their dialectical 
opposite. Instead of trying to bring together apparent opposites, as those inspired 
by the classical approach are trying to do, Butterfield, Wight and Carr help us 
realise that the historical is already theoretical, and the theoretical can also be 
historical. My discussion of their historical work in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, aims to 
provide an overview of their contribution to narrative history, the methodology of 
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historical writing, and the speculative philosophy of history.  What emerges from 
this discussion is the acknowledgement of the important fact that that there can be 
no historiography without a theory of historiography, and that the role of the 
historian is akin to that of the social scientist in trying to illuminate and analyse the 
personal and impersonal forces that mould human history. Historiography both 
presupposes and leads to assumptions and hypotheses of general interest which, 
as Carr (1961/1987) aptly observed, are not interested in the unique but rather in 
what is general the unique. For the writers examined in this thesis, the individual 
events of the past that are frequently described as “history” acquire their meaning 
only within the framework of wider historical narratives which are influenced by 
religious, philosophical, and other ideological considerations.  
    Although Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s  theoretically informed understanding 
of historiography brings it close to the social sciences and their effort to know the 
causes of events, their historicist conceptualisation of international change 
examined in Chapters 6, 7, and 8,  brings international theory close to history in the 
sense of change and  the cultivation of an interest in the particular rather than the 
universaliii. Like Robert Cox (1986), the English School thinkers examined in this 
thesis believed that theory is always for someone and for some purpose. Their 
historicist conceptualisation of international change confirms Peter Wilson’s (2012) 
belief that English School thinkers are empiricists without being positivists. 
Although Butterfield, Wight and Carr derive their normative ideals from the real 
world, they are very sceptical about causal statements of universal validity and 
especially the possibility of formulating universalizable laws of action. Their 
interest in causality does not make them lose sight of the human factor and of 
what is usually understood as a normative orientation in international politics. By 
presenting the founding English School thinkers as deeply immersed in the 
international politics of their time, I put into question the mainstream 
interpretation of the English School as an apolitical enterpriseiv. I also challenge the 
equally widespread assumption that English School theorists are primarily 
interested in continuity and therefore underestimate change in international 
affairsv.  The question of whether the end product of the history/theory dialectic is 
a theoretically informed form of historiography, a historicised form of international 
theory, or something else, will be answered in Chapter 9 which will also offer some 
thoughts on the relevance of the history/theory dialectic for contemporary English 
School thinking. For better or worse, this thinking seems to have abandoned Bull’s 
dichotomous and ahistorical logic in favour of a dialectical conception of societal 
forms and a historically grounded account of international institutions.  
    The importance of the history/theory dialectic for understanding not only the 
English School but also intellectual production in general has led me to adopt the 
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method of biographical contextualisation of ideas employed by intellectual 
historians such as Marci Shore (2006; 2014) and Mary Gluck (1985)vi. Although this 
method should not be confused with a fully-fledged research program, such as 
those offered by the representatives of the Cambridge School of intellectual 
history or the idealist historians, it aims to do justice to the complex phenomenon 
that could be described as the intrusion of life in the realm of ideas. For Shore and 
Gluck, this intrusion does not assume the form of a one-dimensional determination 
of the public by the private.  It rather means that ideas do not exist and circulate 
independent of people and they necessarily occupy a particular place in space and 
time. From the point of view of intellectual historians interested in the non-
determinist  biographical contextualisation of ideas, human history should be 
understood as  both underdetermined and overdetermined: underdetermined in 
the sense that different outcomes were possible if individuals had made different 
choices, and overdetermined in the sense more than one causes are frequently 
responsible for the same resultvii. It is for this reason that attributions of causality 
are always fraught with danger.  
     In the framework of my  research, the recourse to the method of biographical 
contextualisation has meant that before starting writing about my chosen thinkers 
I familiarised myself with the course of their lives in the way narrated in their 
biographiesviii. Although I have consciously avoided establishing causal connections 
between their personal and social experiences and their intellectual output in the 
way that, for example, Robert J. Richards (2004) has done in another context, my 
engagement with biography enabled me to develop a more holistic understanding 
of my subjects. In particular, this engagement helped me realise that what 
primarily distinguishes Butterfield (1900-1979), Wight (1913-1972) and Carr (1892-
1982) from other writers of their generation, is their dissatisfaction with both 
history and theory in their established forms. During their working lives, my 
subjects travelled constantly between History and International Relations (IR) and 
it is very doubtful whether their intellectual oeuvre enables one to classify them as 
either historians or theorists in the conventional meanings of these terms.  
    Wight’s decision to leave the Department of International Relations of the 
London School of Economics (LSE) in order to become a Professor of History at the 
University of Sussex is a personal one, but it also deserves further theoretical 
consideration. Likewise, Butterfields’ choice to withdraw from the British 
Committee on the Theory of International Politics in order to devote himself to the 
study of history, and Carr’s decision to abandon IR for Soviet History, show how 
divided their academic loyalties were. Despite the fact that Butterfield’s, Wight’s 
and Carr’s  academic background in History and shared British citizenship do not 
explain their methodological views, they certainly help one to understand their 
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trajectory understood as series of successively occupied positions by the same 
agent in a space which is itself subject to transformationix. Briefly, although life 
does not explain ideas, it provides the indispensable background against which 
ideas can be understoodx. Prioritising life over ideas or vice versa would be to 
succumb to the kind of reductionism and dogmatism which are the very negation 
of dialectical thinking, and also to lose sight of the complex phenomenon that Marx 
has described as dialectical movementxi. The way in which Butterfield, Wight and 
Carr travelled between history and theory as narrated in their biographies, cannot 
be dissociated from their belief that history is theory, and theory is also history. 
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CHAPTER 1 
On Alain Badiou’s Dialectic of Scission and Hedley 
Bull’s Anarchical Society                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
As we saw in the Introduction, what separates the intellectual oeuvre of Herbert 
Butterfield, Martin Wight and E. H. Carr from conventional interpretations of the 
English School, is their appreciation of the historicity of theory and the theoretical 
presuppositions and consequences of history. What I would like to discuss in this 
chapter is the ways in which their belief in the interpenetration of history and 
theory can be further understood and corroborated by reference to Alain Badiou’s 
(1982/2009) idea of dialectic of scission. This idea provides a plausible ontological 
foundation to the history/theory dialectic of Butterfield, Wight and Carr by 
assuming that every identity is by definition split. By dividing everything into two 
parts, Badiou offers a background against which the historicity of theory and the 
theoretical dimension of history can be better understood and evaluated. The 
reason why history and theory cannot be separated from one another is that each 
of them already contains its dialectical opposite. After analysing and critically 
evaluating the workings of the dialectic of scission as developed by Badiou, I will try 
to show what is wrong with Bull’s methodological separation of history from 
theory.  
    Far from accepting the Badiouian insight that history=theory+history and 
theory=history+theory, Bull’s defence of the so-called classical approach takes 
place within the conceptual limits of an unproblematic logic of identity which takes 
for granted that history=history and theory=theory. Within such a restricting 
conceptual framework, history and theory are employed as weapons against the 
scientific pretensions of the American students of IR, but no sound foundations are 
laid for a new discipline. Indeed, by identifying history with objectivity and theory 
with subjectivity and the exercise of judgement, Bull’s classical approach seems 
very well suited to the early period of the discipline described as “the golden age of 
the amateur” (Wilson, 1995: 17). The problems inherent in any non-dialectical 
approach to IR will be further analysed in my discussion of how Bull separates 
order from justice in The Anarchical Society. The inconsistencies and contradictions 
that can be found in both his methodological and substantive writings show that 
thinking about the world in terms of binary oppositions such as order versus justice 
and history versus theory has its price and an alternative conceptual framework 
might be necessary.  
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Alain Badiou and the Dialectic of Scission  
 Badiou’s reading of Hegel in his first book Theory of the Subject (1982/2009) 
provides a plausible starting point for thinking about the relationship between 
history and theory. As one of Badiou’s most dialectical works, Theory of the Subject 
provides philosophical support for the thesis that everything already contains its 
dialectical opposite within itself, and the aim of dialectical reasoning is to break an 
entity into its constituent parts. Far from accepting the validity of the triad thesis, 
antithesis, synthesis, the early Badiou suggests that what lies at the end of 
dialectical reasoning is nothing else than the engendering of a new scission. The 
writer’s anti-idealism and rejection of the facile hope that we can in some way 
overcome alienation, make him base his argument not on The Phenomenology of 
Spirit but rather on the Science of Logic. Although the relationship between the 
two books is a complex one to the extent that they both belong to the same 
philosophical project, Howard Williams (1989) is justified in associating Hegel’s 
Science of Logic not so much with the exposition of any particular philosophical 
doctrine, but rather with the attempt to offer a grammar of dialectics. Lenin’s 
belief that one should master that book before starting to analyse any particular 
issue was by no means unfounded, since its range of application exceeds by far the 
writer’s points of reference, and the philosophical tradition to which it objectively 
belongs. In the same way that his former teacher, Louis Althusser, broke Marx into 
two parts, Badiou breaks Hegel into two parts while, at the same time, putting into 
question the belief that the subject is a by definition bourgeois category. The kind 
of political subject delineated in Theory of the Subject is interested in actively 
creating its own history and not simply situating itself in history understood in 
Althusserian fashion as a process without a subject.   
    In order to protect Hegel from the appropriation of his work for essentially 
conservative political purposes, Badiou claims that one should distinguish between 
two different dialectical matrices in Hegel: an idealist dialectic, which explores the 
conditions of overcoming alienation and restoring the original unity of a thing at a 
more concrete form, and a materialist dialectic of scission, which assumes that 
every term is fundamentally split. In the first case, the opposite of something is 
assumed to be something else; in the second case, however, the opposite of 
something should be found within itself, and every hope of achieving some form of 
unproblematic synthesis between opposites drops out of the picture. For example, 
contrary to what philosophical idealists such as Gavin Rae (2011) argue, 
consciousness cannot ultimately overcome alienation because, from a Badiouian 
point of view, it does not find itself opposed to something else—in this case the 
objective world—but it rather emanates from a fundamentally divided 
psychological subject. Scission as the operator of the dialectical matrix favoured by 
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Badiou concerns both ideational and material phenomena, and it functions within 
a materialist framework in the sense that it assumes that dialectic is the law of 
being and not just an argumentative strategy. 
    In order to provide support for the thesis that there is no entity that is not 
fundamentally split, Badiou draws attention to Hegel’s discussion of Something and 
an Other and especially of Being and Nothing in the Science of Logic. According to 
Badiou, by arguing that Something is also an Other, Hegel shows that dialectic 
presupposes and underlines division. The workings of the materialist dialectic of 
scission are revealed with particular clarity in Hegel’s masterful analysis of the 
relationship between Being and Nothing at the very beginning of the book where 
he makes the remarkable statement that Being and Nothing are the same thing 
posited twice. Additional examples provided by Badiou concern the dichotomous 
existence of the working class under capitalism as, on the one hand, a necessary 
productive force and, on the other hand, a revolutionary political subject, and the 
fundamental Christian belief that God=Father +Son. In all these cases, Badiou 
reduces dialectics to two terms, and denies that a third dialectical term is 
necessary or desirable.  
    It should be noted that, apart from limiting his attention to the Science of Logic 
at the expense of Hegel’s overall philosophical system, Badiou offers a selective 
reading of this complex work by failing to mention, for example, that, for Hegel, 
the difference between Being and Nothing is ultimately erased by the movement 
encapsulated in the notion of Becoming. Although Hegel notes that both in heaven 
and in earth every actual thing contains both Being and Nothing and therefore is 
fundamentally divided within itself, the notion of Becoming seems to point 
towards some form of dialectical synthesis, which, however, is achieved 
diachronically rather than synchronically. To the extent that, pace Badiou, Hegel is 
not a conservative in disguise but rather shares the interest of all dialectical 
thinkers in the phenomenon of movement, the unity of Being and Nothing cannot 
be understood independent of the core dialectical idea that all things flow and are 
necessarily subject to change. Therefore, it could be plausibly argued that in his 
reading of Hegel Badiou misrepresents a temporal relationship as a logical one, and 
attributes to the nature of things qualities that derive from their position in time 
and not in space. Acknowledging this problem, Badiou makes the point that Hegel 
examines the scission of a given entity not statically but within the context of a 
movement the direction of which is determined by the entity’s in question divided 
and bifurcated nature. It is this emphasis on an original scission within an entity 
itself that makes Badiou particularly relevant for my purposes here. Although 
within the framework of an idealist dialectic history and theory are opposed to one 
another before the desired synthesis ultimately arrives in the form, for example, of 
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the so-called classical approach, within Badiou’s dialectic of scission history and 
theory are seen as fundamentally bifurcated entities that already contain their 
dialectical opposite within themselves. From the point of view of the Badiouian 
dialectic of scission, history=theory+ history and theory=history+theory. The 
divided nature of all ideational and material entities means that, in order to 
conceptualise anything at all, it should be split into two parts. For example, as 
Badiou goes on to argue, theory and practice, the letter and the space in which it is 
written, are one and the same thing, or, to be more precise, one thing split in two. 
The same applies to the complex intellectual activities known as history and 
theory.  
    What the Badiouian dialectic of scission does not consider is the possibility of 
using a third dialectical term that would make dialectical reasoning something 
more than a process of division. As it will be more analytically argued later in the 
thesis, the Badiouian emphasis on division as the primary dialectical law is not self-
evident and can generate problems of theoretical but also practical nature. 
Badiou’s rejection of the possibility—or even the desirability—of a third dialectical 
term that would make division something different than an end in itself, is not 
unrelated to his Maoist political background and the fact that the Theory of the 
Subject is clearly inspired by Maoism understood as a form of post-Leninism 
(Bosteels, 2009). Despite his methodological debts to Althusser, Badiou never 
completely rejected the Maoist belief in destruction as a creative process and his 
overall understanding of dialectics is saturated with negativity. By suggesting that 
one part of Hegel should be retained and another part should be discarded, Badiou 
forgets that, as Marx (1900) pointed out, approaching a phenomenon dialectically 
means approaching it in its totality and not mechanically separating its “good” 
from its “bad” side.  In the final analysis, Badiou’s distinction between a good and a 
bad Hegel is equally problematic with Althusser’s (1965/1990; 1970) distinction 
between an early Marx who should be ignored and a mature Marx who is idolised 
in a rather unhistorical way. From the point of view of the non-reductionist 
biographical contextualisation of ideas followed in this thesis, a thinker cannot be 
easily separated from his cultural and material environment or be read selectively 
in the way that Althusser and Badiou do for Marx and Hegel respectively.  
    What is more, despite the lip service that Badiou is paying to the subject, it is 
very doubtful whether his dialectic of scission overcomes structuralism. In the 
same way that Lacanian teachings confirm the primacy of the structure, and 
Althusser (1965/1990) employs the notion of overdetermination in order to locate 
each and every contradiction within what he defines as a pre-given complex 
structured whole, Badiou invents the neologism “splace” in order to describe the 
structural element that accounts for the development of Something and ultimately 
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explains its contradictory nature. For Badiou, the opposite of Something is its space 
of placement (or “splace”), its position within a spatial, temporal, or even fictive, 
structure. By attributing such a privileged role to structure, Badiou offers an 
addition and not a challenge to the structuralisms of Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Lacan 
and Althusser. Although Badiou’s subject is by no means as passive as Althusser’s 
subject, it is only in his later work that he engages seriously with a notion of 
subjective freedom that owes a lot to Sartre (Pfeifer, 2015). However, as we shall 
see later, by the time that Badiou comes to celebrate the moment of freedom 
encapsulated in what he describes as the event, he also expresses doubts 
regarding the importance of dialectics. In a nutshell, despite that the Badiouian 
dialectic of scission as presented in Theory of the Subject offers a useful point of 
departure for thinking about history as theory and theory as history, it does not 
exhaust the problem of the form of their interpenetration. This problem can be 
properly addressed only by considering what might be positive in the negative and 
challenging the established definition of terms. By associating what could be 
described as a third dialectical moment or term with idealism, and not paying 
proper attention to the Hegelian idea of the negation of the negation, Badiou fails 
to see that the dialectical method should be understood as something more than a 
process of division or destruction. After all, as the course of the Cultural Revolution 
in China proved, when division is not placed within a wider dialectical context, it 
can continue ad infinitum, and it can easily be transformed from a means to an end 
to an end in itself.  
The Dialectic of Scission as an Alternative to the Classical Approach 
Although not entirely devoid of problems, Badiou’s dialectic of scission can provide 
a methodological alternative to Bull’s classical approach, which depicts history and 
theory as separate spheres of intellectual activity. From the vantage point of the 
dialectic of scission, history and theory can be considered to be the same thing 
posited twice, and to be divided not so much among but rather within themselves. 
In other words, what Badiou’s dialectic of scission can help us realise is that before 
one tries to see how history and theory can be combined, one should try to take 
into account the ways in which history is already theory and theory is already 
history. The mutual constitution of history and theory completely eludes Bull’s 
discussion of the classical approach which, as Richard Little (1995) points out, 
primarily offers a justification for the exercise of judgement when studying 
international politics. Although Bull explains the reasons why International 
Relations cannot be a “scientific” enterprise in the way that his rivals on the other 
side of the Atlantic wanted it to be, he by no means offers an adequate 
methodological basis for studying international relations from an English School – 
or indeed any other— theoretical perspective.  
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    The best place to start in order to understand Bull’s methodological views is 
probably his discussion of the development of the theory of international politics in 
The Aberystwyth Papers. According to Bull (1972a), what unites the various 
theoretical approaches that developed during the twentieth century, giving birth to 
a new discipline, is their opposition to history. Although history familiarises us with 
the facts themselves, theorists of all stripes stand united in their belief that in and 
of itself history cannot provide the tools necessary for the theoretical 
understanding of a problem or situation. The body of general propositions 
comprising the theory of international politics does not necessarily claim universal 
validity in the sense of covering all places and all times. However, according to Bull, 
it should be clearly distinguished from the merely factual statements pronounced 
by the historians. These statements always aim to explain particular events, such as 
why Germany attacked Belgium in 1914, and are not supposed to explore the more 
general significance of an event, and in its relationship with other similar events 
taking place in a different context. At best, history provides a laboratory for testing 
the various general propositions put forward by the theorists.  
    The clear separation of history from theory also provides the backbone of Bull’s 
(1966) famous defence of the classical approach which, as I argued in the 
Introduction, tends to reduce history to the history of thought, and does not 
adequately explain how the thorny questions that comprise the usual stuff of 
international politics can be analysed and evaluated from a theoretical point of 
view. To say that the exercise of judgement is necessary in order to evaluate a 
particular intervention or to judge a particular war is different from providing 
theoretical grounds which will make the theorist’s judgement something more 
than an expression of personal opinion. Like all theorists and historians who guard 
the borders of their artificially separated domains, Bull does not consider how 
theoretical understanding can build upon historical understanding and constitute 
an extension of it. History, theory, and law, are not presented by him as different 
aspects of a promising new discipline of IR, but as different academic disciplines 
which should somehow be combined and co-operate with one another while 
retaining their separate logics and institutional bases.  Even Morton Kaplan’s 
(1961) admission that historians necessarily deal with theoretical concepts, such as 
that of the balance of power, is missing from Bull’s impoverished understanding of 
the relationship between history and theory. The classical approach in the form 
adumbrated by Bull expresses the academic background and the philosophical 
sensibilities of those influencing the development of IR in Britain during his 
lifetime, but can hardly be seen as a research programme able to challenge the 
American mainstream. Indeed, by putting undue emphasis on the exercise of 
judgement and arguing in favour of a poorly defined interdisciplinary ideal, Bull’s 
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classical approach seems to continue rather than to reject what Peter Wilson has 
portrayed as “the golden age of the amateur” (Wilson, 1995: 17). Like the thinkers 
of the twenty years’ crisis, Bull’s international theorist derives from a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives in order to address the problems of his time in a rather ad 
hoc way. Keene’s (2009) observation that Bull’s position may be considered to 
represent a denial of method as such may sound harsh, but it shows the difficulties 
that Bull faced in placing IR within the existing academic map consisting of history, 
the social sciences, and the natural sciences.  
    What the classical approach apparently disregards and what the dialectic of 
scission can potentially help us realise when applied to the problem of the 
interaction between history and theory, is that, as Thomas Smith (1999) and 
Richard Little (1991; 1995) have pointed out, the tension between generalisation 
and historical context does not characterise the relationship between theory and 
history understood as separate and autonomous entities, but it rather 
characterises both history and theory in themselves. In accordance with the 
presuppositions of Badiou’s dialectic of scission, Smith and Little depict history and 
theory as divided not with regard to their dialectical other, but rather as divided 
within themselves. The attempt to find the right combination of generalisation and 
attention to contextual factors influences the work of historians and theorists alike. 
For Little, the aspiration to explain particular events and to address general 
tendencies makes the social sciences divided within themselves and not with 
regard to historiography. The problems facing social scientists in their effort to 
meet apparently contradictory expectations are also shared by practising historians 
who, according to Little, can argue that they are concerned with unique events 
only to the extent that they lack awareness of what they are actually doing. 
Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s conceptualisation of history as theory and vice 
versa makes especially evident how misleading the conventional criteria for 
distinguishing between history and theory are. Like Smith and Little, Butterfield, 
Wight and Carr do not argue in favour of completely abandoning the distinction 
between history and theory, but they rather argue in favour of drastically 
rethinking and re-examining that distinction. The past events that concern the 
historians and the present and future events that concern theorists acquire 
meaning only within larger intellectual constructions which assume the form of 
theories and historical narratives.  
    Such a critical re-examination of the relationship between history and theory is 
crucial for both the English School of IR and the social sciences in general, and it 
cannot happen so long as one continues to think in the non-dialectical terms 
offered by Bull’s classical approach. As John Lewis Gaddis (1997) has argued about 
academics in general, this approach points in the direction of interdisciplinary co-
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operation in the feeble way that sovereign states call for international co-operation 
while, in reality, jealously guarding their own borders and interests. Apart from not 
showing how exactly history, philosophy, law, and IR, can co-operate with one 
another, Bull’s understanding of those disciplines in their individuality is also 
problematic. History is identified with absolute objectivity and with a form of 
unmediated access to the “facts” that completely disregards what Smith describes 
as a constructionist view of historiography. With regard to international theory, 
Bull wants it to speak a timeless and politically disinterested language which, at the 
same time, will offer plenty of space to the theorist to voice his personal views and 
anxieties regarding the issues under discussion. The only place where Bull displays 
a genuine awareness of the problems posed by the interpenetration of history and 
theory is his 1972 article “International Relations as an Academic Pursuit”. His 
frank admission that every historical study contains intellectual hypotheses and 
arguments is starkly at odds with the methodologically naïve understanding of 
history espoused earlier.  
To sum up, far from accepting the dialectical equations history=theory+history and 
theory=history+theory, the defender of the classical approach adopts the 
identitarian logic history=history and theory=theory. At best, the classical approach 
in the form elaborated by Bull expresses the need for bringing together history and 
theory, without, however, showing the way in which this can be done and 
providing grounds for anything else than a marriage of convenience between 
history and theory. Although equally threatened by the American proponents of a 
scientific approach, traditionalist international theorists and empiricist diplomatic 
historians felt quite comfortable within the boundaries and the distinct 
institutional bases of their artificially separated disciplines. The image of a grand 
discipline of IR which would put under the same umbrella international theory, 
international history, and international law, is clearly missing from Bull’s vaguely 
interdisciplinary argument which treats history, theory, and law as unproblematic 
concepts externally related to one another.  
    Although as James Richardson (1990) mentions Bull’s greatest contributions to IR 
are substantive and not methodological, what I intend to show next is that his anti-
dialectical philosophical predisposition accounts for the most problematic aspects 
of his magnum opus, The Anarchical Society. In the same way that as 
methodologist Bull separates history from theory, as international thinker he 
separates order from justice. Despite that the apparent problem in Bull’s 
argumentative strategy is the prioritisation of theory at the expense of history, and 
the prioritisation of order at the expense of justice, his primary intellectual failure 
lies in refusing to recognise the impossibility of separating order from justice and 
history from theory. Despite that the kind of theory defended by Bull already 
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includes history, and the kind of order inspiring him already includes justice, Bull 
fails to recognise this important fact. Ultimately, it is the internal inconsistencies of 
his arguments that primarily show the limits of any non-dialectical approach to IR 
and emphasise the need for an alternative methodology. The contours of such a 
methodology are delineated in my discussion of Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s 
history/theory dialectic.  
The Anti-Dialectic of Bull’s Anarchical Society  
The substantive equivalent of Bull’s separation of history from theory in his 
methodological writings is the separation of order from justice in his major 
contribution to the study of IR, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics. As John Williams (2006) points out, the book’s subtitle is both indicative of 
what can be found between its covers and intriguing for a number of reasons. The 
discerning reader is first of all surprised by the writer’s claim in the Preface that the 
book does not follow any particular theoretical paradigm, and it is not based on 
any particular form of historical research. This declaration should not drive 
attention away from the fact that The Anarchical Society is based on the anti-
dialectical separation of the element of order from the element of justice which is 
fully reflected in its subtitle.  Although the rhetorical brilliance of Bull’s The 
Anarchical Society is analogous to that displayed by Carr in The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, what I would like to argue in this section is that by artificially separating 
order from justice the writer does a disservice to both concepts. He also proves the 
limits of any non-dialectical attempt to conceptualise international politics. Despite 
Bull’s apparent debt to Wight and the rather superficial similarities that exist 
between The Anarchical Society and Systems of States, what has actually shaped 
Bull’s approach is the teaching of John Anderson at the University of Sydney and, 
perhaps more importantly, H. L. A. Hart’s particularly influential The Concept of 
Law (1961/1994).     
    Despite that Bull remained quintessentially Andersonian throughout his 
academic career, the influence of Anderson’s philosophical intellect should be 
mainly sought in the way in which he understood academic inquiry as a particular 
form of intellectual activity, which possesses its own morality and its own internal 
standards, and should not be corrupted by direct contact with other spheres of 
social activity, such as that of politics. Of more direct significance is Hart’s 
(1961/1994) attempt to develop a theory of law which would be both general and 
descriptive. In the same way that as a legal theorist Hart dissociates the notion of 
law from particular legal systems and cultures and avoids any explicit normative 
commitment, Bull chooses to portray order as the basis of every form of society, 
and also abstains from assigning to it explicit priority when it collides with the 
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pursuance of other values. Hart’s refusal to identify international law with morality 
is also echoed in Bull’s scepticism towards the natural law tradition, and positivist 
understanding of both international law and all the other institutions which 
together comprise his anarchical society. As it will however become evident, Bull’s 
positivism is not absolute but it is rather tempered by a personal commitment to a 
historically contingent form of international society. As Buzan (2006) has argued, 
Bull’s commitment to pluralism not only interferes in various instances with the 
internal logic of his argument, but also accounts for his unnecessarily pessimistic 
evaluation of the future prospects of international society.  
    The internal problems in Bull’s separation of order from justice stem in part from 
his own choice to reject a neutral definition of order which would identify it with 
any discernible pattern in the arrangement of things. According to such a 
definition, everything that is not haphazard and determined by pure luck could be 
reasonably described as orderly. For example, assorting one’s books according to 
subject would be orderly in the same way with arranging them according to the 
last name of the author.  In cases such as these, “order” is simply the opposite of 
luck or randomness. However, as Bull explains in the course of his rejection of such 
a morally neutral definition of order, the fact that states behave in patterned ways 
when conducting war with one another does not mean that they behave in an 
orderly fashion. The kind of order that Bull analyses and supports is by its nature 
value-laden in the sense that it consciously aims at the realisation of certain values: 
security against violence, observance of agreements and respect of rules regarding 
property rights. The reason why the goals and aspirations encapsulated in Bull’s 
ideal of order do not fall within the domain of justice is simply that, according to 
him, their value can be objectively confirmed. What separates order from justice is 
not that the first is morally neutral and the second is value- laden, but the 
assumption that the values encapsulated in the idea of order are objective in a 
sense that the various goals falling under the rubric of justice are not. 
     Bull’s meticulous distinction among different forms of justice in an Aristotelian 
fashion is starkly at odds with his identification of order with goals that do not 
inspire this or that society but rather define society as such. To the extent that all 
known societies have to some extent recognised the importance of protecting the 
life and the possessions of their members, as well as the importance of generally 
observing agreements, these values in Bull’s eyes lose the subjective character that 
all values as values have, and are being treated as the constituent parts of a 
transhistorical and morally unproblematic idea of order. Of course, Bull’s idea of 
order is in reality derived from a contractual type of society which has little in 
common with some of the pre-modern forms of society explored in the work of 
Wight and Watson. In the same way that, as C. B. Macpherson (1962) has shown, 
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the individuals described by classical liberalism correspond to historically 
determined actors and to a historically contingent form of society, the goals that 
Bull identifies with social co-existence apply primarily to a liberal form of society 
which, however, can by no means be identified with society as such (Buzan, 2006).   
    As regards international order, Bull presents it as coterminous with the kind of 
international society that emerged in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and was based on the respect for the sovereignty and nominal equality of 
its constituent units. Despite facing both nationalist and cosmopolitan pressures, 
and therefore being in retreat during the twentieth century, Westphalian 
international society is according to Bull still preferable to its alternatives. As 
Edward Keene (2009) has noted, the very assumption that international society is 
in decline would not have been possible if Bull viewed it simply as a fact and not a 
value. It is interesting to note that in the course of his critical examination of 
alternatives to the contemporary international political system understood as a 
society of sovereign states, Bull uses arguments similar to those employed later by 
Kenneth Waltz in order to defend the relevance of state-centric thinking in a 
changed world. Like Waltz (1979; 2000), Bull essentially makes a distinction 
between changes in the system and changes of the system, and actually tries to 
minimise the importance of the first type of change, while systematically 
questioning both the existence and the desirability of the second type of change.  
    Regarding change that takes place inside the system, Bull discusses and 
evaluates critically a number of alternative forms of states system which are 
broadly compatible with the principle of sovereignty. These alternatives examined 
in chapter 10 assume the form of a disarmed world, the strengthening of 
international organisations, a world with many nuclear powers, and an 
ideologically homogeneous international society. With the exception of the 
pursuance of ideological uniformity, which is clearly rejected at the end of his 
examination of alternative forms of states system, Bull shows some understanding 
towards all the other changes that do not fundamentally challenge Westphalian 
international society. To be more specific, the pursuance of a less heavily armed 
world is not rejected in principle, the empowerment of international organisations, 
such as the UN, is presented as something that could happen in the future, and 
even the advent of a world of many nuclear states is portrayed as a realistic 
expectation. In a nutshell, changes within the confines of the system are portrayed 
by Bull as incomplete, to some extent premature, but not as fundamentally 
misguided.  
    It is in the discussion of changes that do not represent a transition from one 
historical phase of the system to another but they rather signify the supersession 
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of the system itself that Bull’s defence of Westphalian international society 
becomes obvious. By rejecting world government as a matter of principle, Bull 
echoes the Waltzian belief that, if freedom is desirable, the insecurity associated 
with the existence of a multiplicity of sovereign states must be accepted. Even the 
divided loyalties and overlapping authorities that could define a neo-medieval 
international order are portrayed by Bull as inimical to international order as we 
know it. By also rejecting the desirability of a new isolationism and the advent of 
an international system which would lack the rules and institutions constituting a 
society, Bull completes his defence of the modern international system conceived 
as a society of sovereign states. Although in the course of his examination of 
moderate and radical alternatives to the states system Bull makes a number of 
valid observations, one cannot help but feeling that his evaluation of change is 
coloured by status quo interests and anxieties. For example, more recent English 
School scholars, such as Andrew Linklater (2007), have offered a more positive 
evaluation of neo-medieval ideas without presenting them as a panacea of global 
application.  
    The deep-seated scepticism towards all forms of change is very much at odds 
with Bull’s positivist understanding of international society as constituted around 
rules and institutions created and maintained by states. To the extent that for Bull 
even the primary societal institutions of the balance of power, international law, 
diplomacy, the great powers and war are not self-sustaining and self-serving but 
they rather promote the common goals of states, one could expect a more 
sympathetic evaluation of both changes within the system and changes of the 
system itself. What stops Bull from engaging creatively with the problem of 
international change is a feeling that his preferred form of international society is 
under threat and that the pluralist institutions he identifies with it are gradually 
losing their importance in international politics. Although a general balance of 
power continued to exist at the level of the international system, particular areas 
of the world were heavily penetrated by superpower competition rendering the 
freedom of small states a remnant of the past. The contribution of international 
law to international order had actually been reduced and, as Bull admits, 
consensual diplomacy had been replaced by open political welfare. The very 
existence of the kind of international society within which the balance of power, 
diplomacy, the great powers, international law, and even war, could perform their 
proper functions was therefore being called into question. Bull, on the one hand, 
related the ability of the modern international system to contribute to order to its 
ability to retain its societal dimension of common rules and institutions, and, on 
the other hand, doubted the very existence of an international system which was 
still a society. Even at the purely analytical level, Bull does not explain in detail 
25 
 
where the international system ends and where a system-plus-society emerges 
(Buzan, 1993). Distinguishing among not only more or less advanced models of 
international society but also among different forms of international society would 
have enabled Bull to see that justice is not ultimately so different from order in the 
sense that they both can assume a variety of expressions and forms, and they 
cannot be separated from one another in the name of their supposed objectivity 
(order) and subjectivity (justice). Without being ideal, the Cold War international 
society within which Bull found himself was still distinguishable from a 
mechanically conceived international system, and not all the political initiatives 
associated with the United States or the Soviet Union were dismissible. Despite the 
obstacles they had to overcome, attempts at disarmament and control of the 
nuclear weapons were pretty understandable in a world where an actual military 
confrontation between the superpowers was not simply wrong but actually 
unthinkable.  
     Leaving practical considerations aside, to the extent that the institutional 
morphology and culture of co-operation that Bull associates with international 
society was in crisis, the type of order defended in The Anarchical Society acquires 
the subjective and aspirational character of justice. Since the type of order 
adumbrated by Bull corresponded more to a value and less to a fact, the very 
grounds on which he separates order from justice are being called into question. 
Like the separation of history from theory, the separation of order from justice 
proves to be unsustainable in practice. Despite his critique of liberalism for 
promising to bring together order and justice, Bull moves within the confines of a 
liberal philosophy of history, which assigns positive change to the past and denies 
it to the present. In the same way that for domestic liberals political progress stops 
with the advent of the liberal democratic state, for international liberals, like Bull, 
international progress stops with the advent of the Westphalian international 
society. By clinging to the European past, Bull was unable to address satisfactorily 
the problem of institutional change and to analyse the relationship between 
international and world society. By separating international society from the 
international system that provides its material basis and the world society that 
provides its moral basis, Bull ends up depicting it as a precious but very fragile 
entity. The post-Cold War English School scholars examined in the ensuing chapter 
were right to doubt the contemporary relevance of his main institutional 
recommendations, but maybe these recommendations were inapplicable to his 
own age as well.  
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Conclusions 
What I have argued is that the problems inherent in Bull’s separation of order from 
justice show the limits of any non-dialectical approach to the study of IR. Apart 
from the various external criticisms that will be discussed in the next chapter, Bull’s 
unwillingness to identify order with any kind of pattern in international affairs 
constitutes an indirect admission of the fact that order cannot be separated from 
justice for purposes of social or international analysis. Bull’s personal allegiance to 
a particular form of international society stops him from recognising that those 
who speak in the name of states are frequently more flexible from the intellectual 
representatives of the Westphalian order. To the extent that the primary 
institutions of international society serve the purposes of states and not vice versa, 
these institutions are inevitably subject to change as the environment and the 
preferences of the actors develop. Apart from the early post-Cold War 
international developments analysed by writers such as Nicholas Wheeler (2000), 
Bull’s rigid conceptual framework cannot fully address even the historical period 
from which it is derived, since the important phenomenon of colonialism does not 
receive proper attention (Keene, 2002).  
    The game of states can assume a variety of forms, and other English School 
writers have treated in a different way the problem of the primary institutions of 
international society (Buzan, 2006; Wilson, 2012). Bull’s failure to discuss 
colonialism, sovereignty or nationalism as primary institutions of international 
society does not mean that he was wrong where other English School writers were 
right; it means, however, that any analysis of primary institutions is necessarily 
subjective and is also tied to particular historical contexts and self-understandings 
(Wilson, 2012; 2016).  Bull’s reification of a particular set of pluralist institutions 
was to some understandable within the historical context in which he found 
himself, but it shows an indifference towards the essential dialectical insight of the 
inescapability of change. Contrary to what Bull believed, this change does not 
always reflect the agendas of certain academics or political activists, but it 
frequently occurs as a result of the action of forces internal to the system. By 
identifying international society as such with a historically contingent form of 
international society, Bull appeared to be unnecessarily pessimistic regarding the 
future, and virtually ignored the possibility of actually strengthening international 
society by taking advantage of material forces and moral ideas that apparently 
undermine it.  
    A more dialectical approach would break the confines of formal logic and would 
enable Bull to realise that, to the extent that, as Badiou argues, every identity is 
fundamentally split, order= justice+order whereas justice=order+justice. The 
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interpenetration of history and theory, order and justice, does not mean that they 
are identical or that in each and every particular case they correspond to exactly 
the same thing or course of action. It means, however, that they cannot be 
conceptualised, develop or progress without taking into account the fact that their 
dialectical other is already present. Adopting a dialectical point of view would have 
enabled Bull to see that the kind of choice actually facing statesmen is not one 
between order and justice, but one of finding ways to recognise in practice their 
interpenetration and mutual constitution.  
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CHAPTER 2 
The English School as a Historically Constructed Entity 
 
Although the definition of a school of thought is never an easy matter, it becomes 
even more complicated in the case of the English School of International Relations. 
Conjured into existence by one of its most famous critics in 1981, the English 
School creates questions different from those concerning the development of the 
Frankfurt School in Germany, or the emergence of the Annales historiographical 
movement in France. Without having an undisputed institutional basis or an official 
journal, its main characteristics can only be recognised ex post facto and are 
therefore the object of considerable dispute among both friends and critics. 
Starting from Andrew Linklater’s and Hidemi Suganami’s (2006) conceptualisation 
of the English School as a historically constructed entity, this chapter aims to 
present and evaluate the competing academic discourses which have been central 
to its development and self-understanding. As Suganami (2011) has admitted, the 
different stories that have so far been told about the School and its origins do not 
represent more or less accurate depictions of the truth, but they rather represent  
a reflection of where the narrator stands in relation to it.  My own version of the 
English School as a historically constituted entity is not an exception to this.  
    The recognition of the fact that the international society cannot be understood 
independent of particular historical contexts leads me to search for the School’s 
origins in a complex history/theory dialectic which is based on the interpenetration 
of history and theory. This dialectic was initially analysed by E. H. Carr but was 
further developed by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. As historically inspired 
theorists and theoretically informed historians Butterfield, Carr and Wight provide 
the grounds for reconceptualising the English School and curtailing its links with an 
ahistorically conceived international society. As the next two sections of this 
chapter make evident, these links were largely taken for granted by all those 
writing about the English School during the 1980s and 1990s. An alternative image 
started to emerge after the ending of the Cold War and presupposed the rejection 
of the internal discursive approach favoured by the proponents of international 
society. Although indebted to the contextually informed views of writers such as 
Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (1996), my reconceptualisation of the English School 
departs from them to the extent that I do not portray the history/theory dialectic 
as a means to an end, i.e. understanding international society, but rather as the 
School’s most important characteristic and contribution to the study of IR. By 
substituting a substantive understanding of the English School for a methodological 
one, I contribute to the School’s methodological sophistication which, as Martha 
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Finnemore (2001) has argued, should be further cultivated in order for it to acquire 
a global audience and strengthen its cooperation with other research programs.  
The 1980s: Suganami and Wilson  
During the 1980s, the English School was identified with the idea of international 
society by both critics and allies. For Roy Jones (1981), who first referred to a 
distinct English School in IR, its essence lied in the investigation of the nature of 
international society. The main protagonists of such an investigation were Charles 
Manning, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Michael Donelan, F. S. Northedge and Robert 
Purnell. Jones admitted that there were differences between Manning and Wight, 
with the first to focus primarily on the workings of international law and the 
second to rely on historical scholarship, but he argued that their common 
commitment to the study of international society outweighs their differences. For 
Jones, the methodological holism associated with the investigation of the nature of 
international society was deeply problematic in moral and political terms. By 
focusing on the collectivity of states, English school theorists were unable to 
recognise the importance of the particular frameworks within which individuals 
live their lives; they were also unable to protect the individual against the state. 
Indeed, the representatives of the English School occupy a strange place in the 
academy since they find themselves alienated from modern liberals, classical 
political theorists, and the proponents of a scientific approach to the study of IR. In 
the first positive evaluation of the School Hidemi Suganami (1983) reinterpreted 
the intellectual oeuvre of Manning, Bull, Northedge and Alan James without, 
however, challenging Jones’ main methodological or institutional assumptionsxii.  
    For Suganami, what distinguishes the British “institutionalists” from other 
schools of thought is their preoccupation with the degree of order that exists in the 
international system despite the absence of a central authority. In particular, the 
“institutionalists” are defined according to five factors or characteristics: their 
aspiration to intellectual impartiality; the rejection of behaviourism; the 
employment of sociological methods; their belief in the independence of IR as a 
discipline; and the firm rejection of utopianism. Their aspiration to intellectual 
impartiality made them unwilling to engage in overtly normative theorising and led 
them to adopt the kind of legal positivism common to Manning, Bull and Alan 
James. The rejection of behaviourism was the logical consequence of the belief 
that mathematical precision is unattainable in the study of IR and sociology 
provides a more adequate model from the natural sciences. Sociological methods 
refer primarily to the empathetic understanding associated with the notion of 
Verstehen and are integral to Suganami’s overall understanding of the English 
School. The kind of institutions with which Suganami is concerned have a strong 
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normative dimension, and this dimension cannot be grasped without seeing what 
is going on in the minds of those speaking and acting in the name of states. This 
understanding of IR as an autonomous discipline is very closely linked to the 
“collectivism” with which Jones associated the English school. The 
“institutionalists” portray IR as independent discipline precisely because of their 
belief in the existence of a rule-governed international system which should be 
clearly demarcated from both individual states and domestic political phenomena. 
Finally, the belief in the rejection of utopianism as an essential feature of the 
English School echoes some of the criticisms that Jones levelled against Wight and, 
in particular, his supposed indifference towards changexiii.  
    Suganami certainly captured some of the intellectual habits and beliefs 
characterising Manning and his followers. But his version of the English School is 
very distant from any kind of historically informed inquiry into international 
politics. It is also worth emphasising that not all aspects or characteristics of the 
“institutionalist” approach fit together as harmoniously as Suganami suggests. The 
belief in the autonomy of IR as a discipline cannot easily be reconciled with the 
reliance on sociological methods, and the opposition to normative theorising is at 
odds with the explicit defence of the idea of international order. One cannot help 
but notice that what Suganami included in his original account of the English 
School or the British institutionalists is less important from what he failed to 
mention regarding either ideas themselves or the academics responsible for those 
ideas xiv. Although Suganami’s 1983 article might be acceptable as an inquiry into 
the British institutionalism of the period, it is by no means adequate as an account 
of the English School in the sense conceptualised in my thesis.  
    Sheila Grader’s (1988) critique of both Jones and Suganami was motivated by the 
belief that they were wrong in assuming the existence of a discrete English School 
united by common principles and methods. The fact that writers such as Manning 
and Bull discuss – or even defend—the idea of international society does not mean 
that they refer to the same thing. For Grader, Bull’s empirical and normative 
inquiries have a different character from Manning’s speculative engagement with 
linguistic philosophy, whereas Northedge preferred to talk about the international 
system of states instead of referring to an international society. Therefore, for both 
historical and practical reasons, the notion of an “English School” should be 
abandoned in favour of assessing the importance of the work of the individual 
scholars associated with it.  Grader was neither negative nor positive towards the 
English School because she believed that no such school exists. Although she made 
a number of valid points, such as emphasising the historical determination of the 
notion of international society, Grader did not manage to move away from the 
1980s consensus regarding the link that exists between the English School and the 
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international society. In the same way that Jones had called for its closure based on 
the undesirable implications of the notion of international society, Grader claimed 
that no English School exists because no acknowledged definition of the 
international society exists.  
    The 1980s understanding of the English School found its most systematic 
exposition in the thought of Peter Wilson (1989). In his response to Grader, Wilson 
rejected as largely meaningless the accusation that there is no single conception of 
the international society claiming the allegiance of all the members of the School, 
and analysed the link that exists between its methodology and its substantive 
arguments. The reason why its members seek the interpretative understanding 
encapsulated in the notion of Verstehen is precisely that the international society is 
a notional one, and therefore its existence cannot be substantiated without 
considering what goes on in people’s minds, and especially in the minds of 
statesmen.  
    The idealism of English School writers is tempered by the belief that notions 
which become prevalent in the minds of men acquire an autonomous existence in 
the real world. For Wilson, where Bull differs from Manning is not in 
acknowledging the ideational nature of international society but in refusing to 
identify it with world politics in toto. For Bull, the Grotian tradition of thought to 
which the idea of international society belong is an important aspect of modern 
international relations, but it should not monopolise the interest of statesmen 
since it has to compete with other elements in the international scene. In any case, 
the significance that the members of the English School attach to the idea of the 
international society differentiates them from other schools of thought such as 
structuralists, pluralists and realists. As far as it concerns the membership of the 
English School, Wilson widened the list offered by Suganami to include not only 
Manning, Bull, Northedge and Alan James, but also Wight, R. J. Vincent and James 
Mayall. He also consciously placed it within the LSE Department of International 
Relations and drew attention to the element of personal relationships and 
connections out of which a common outlook eventually emerged despite various 
minor disagreements.   
    Although internally coherent, Wilson’s presentation of the idea of international 
society as a master signifier does not fully explain why one should keep talking 
about an “English School” and not about an “international society approach” or 
even about certain “institutionalists”. By identifying the English School with the 
ahistorical exploration of the conditions of international order, the writers of the 
1980s devalued its intellectual strength and potential, and failed to realise that 
international society cannot be effectively conceptualised outside particular 
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historical frameworks. Despite its important limitations, the 1980s understanding 
of the English School proved much more resilient than one might imagine, and 
continued to influence the School’s academic representations even during the 
1990s. As we shall see next, the writers of the next decade amended the list of the 
members of the English School, and transferred its institutional basis from LSE to 
the University of Cambridge, without, however, challenging the core assumptions 
of the writers of the 1980s and the primacy of the idea of international society.  
The 1990s: Tim Dunne and the British Committee  
The 1990s understanding of the English School found its most clear expression in 
Tim Dunne’s  Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (1998). 
As Linklater and Suganami mention, the book did not come out of nowhere but it 
reflected an interpretation which had already emerged in some quarters, and had 
led Richard Little (1995) to identify the English School with the British Committee 
on the Theory of International Politics. Contrary to the writers of the 1980s, Dunne 
put forward the interesting idea that the English School’s institutional base should 
be sought at Peterhouse, Cambridge, where the members of the British Committee 
on the Theory of International Politics met between 1958 and 1968. Its father was 
not Charles Manning but Martin Wight, who put ethical concerns at the centre of 
intellectual inquiry and developed an interpretive approach to international 
theory. Although the writers of the 1980s had related the English School’s 
interpretive approach to the attempt to analyse the values that inform the actions 
of statesmen, Dunne also drew attention to the need to recognise the link that 
exists between the subject (scholar) and the object (world). He also discerned the 
debt that English School thinkers have to European history in the sense of ideas 
and institutions that are immanent in the European diplomatic community. As 
Dunne succinctly put it, the “Committee’s view of theory was one that was driven 
and constrained by practice” (Dunne, emphasis in the original, 1998: 106).  
    Although Inventing International Society offered to the English School a more 
plausible institutional basis than the LSE Department of International Relations and 
contained some intriguing remarks regarding the importance of history for English 
School theorising, Dunne’s attempt to launch a new interpretation without in 
essence rejecting the old one generated a picture that is arguably less coherent 
than either Wilson’s robust defence of the idea of international society, or 
Suganami’s early account of the work of the British institutionalists led by Charles 
Manning. Despite the fact that Dunne has been criticised for the radicalism of his 
approach, and in particular for his inclusion of Carr and exclusion of Manning, what 
he essentially did in his reconstruction of the English School was to put old wine 
into new bottles. The book’s title does not leave many doubts regarding the 
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centrality that the author attributes to the idea of international society, which is 
also explored by the writers of the 1980s. For Dunne, the English School’s 
exploration into the nature of international society is widely and rightly seen as its 
most important contribution to the study of international affairs. As his critics 
pointed out, this effort to retain the general ideological framework offered by the 
writers of the 1980s, while modifying their assumptions regarding the School’s 
membership and institutional affiliation, led to a rather confused interpretation of 
the past and future of the English School.   
    For Tonny Knudsen (2000), Dunne’s identification of the English School with the 
British Committee on the Theory of International Politics prevents him from 
offering a convincing account of its origins. According to Knudsen, the exclusion of 
Manning came at a heavy price since his legal philosophy is an important 
intellectual source for English School theorising. Samuel M. Makinda (2000) also 
made the point that Dunne should have found a way to accommodate Manning. 
Like the writers of the 1980s, Makinda offers a defence of what he defines as the 
“International Society tradition”, but he claims that as an inherently pluralistic 
enterprise the English School can also accommodate history and morality.  
However, the most devastating response to Dunne’s reconstruction of the history 
of the English School came from Hidemi Suganami (2000).  
    For Suganami, the way in which Dunne reinvented the English School in order to 
include Carr and give a central role to Wight is fraught with difficulties. These 
difficulties primarily arise from the fact that what Dunne depicts as a “School” is in 
reality a cluster of thinkers who share certain family resemblances. Echoing 
Makinda’s call to respect pluralism and diversity, Suganami argues that the English 
School consists of three overlapping groupings united by a common commitment 
to Rationalism. The first group is primarily concerned to identify the institutional 
prerequisites of international order. The second takes a more critical approach, 
and wants to debate the merits of the existing institutional order. Finally, a third 
group of English School scholars adopts a historical point of view and wants to 
investigate how the institutional framework of international relations developed—
and changed—over time.  Although Carr cannot be placed in any of the three 
groups and his commitment to Rationalism is dubious, Manning played an 
important role in the process which Dunne himself describes as the “invention of 
international society”. 
    Apart from excluding Manning, while at the same time continuing to depict 
international society as the master signifier in the discourse of the English School, 
the biggest problem with Dunne’s understanding of the School is the degree to 
which he consciously or unconsciously projected a number of ideas derived from 
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Hedley Bull and R. J.  Vincent onto Butterfield, Carr and Wightxv.With regard to 
Butterfield, Dunne does not hide his belief that what qualifies him as a member of 
the English School is primarily the role he played in creating and directing the 
British Committee during its first years. Contrary to what Dunne argues, 
Butterfield’s engagement with the problem of prudential statecraft does not 
necessarily make him a Rationalist, since historians and political theorists from 
Thucydides onwards have engaged with the same issue. The fact that Wight was 
something more than a supporter of Rationalism can be seen from his complex 
intellectual journey and, more importantly, from his understanding of Realism, 
Rationalism and Revolutionism as different aspects of the same complex 
international reality. By contrast to the methodologically convenient international 
society approach, Wight was not a monist and his personal sympathy for 
Rationalism did not make him forget that Realism and Revolutionism are equally 
important for understanding international relations. Finally, saying that Carr was 
influential upon founding members of the English School, such as Wight, or even 
later thinkers, such as Bull and Vincent, is not tantamount to saying that he was a 
member of the School.  
    Carr’s actual relationship to the English School cannot be inferred with certainty 
from Dunne’s account, since sometimes he is depicted as an insider, sometimes as 
an outsider, and sometimes as belonging to a vague middle space between insiders 
and outsiders. In a nutshell, Dunne’s insistence to interpret the intellectual oeuvre 
of his chosen thinkers through the lens of international society does not really 
illuminate the origins of the English School. Including Butterfield for mainly 
institutional and not theoretical reasons, reducing the complexity that 
characterises Wight’s thinking to an unqualified defence of Rationalism, and  
evaluating Carr according to a standard to which he did not believe, leads to highly 
contradictory account of the origins and development of the English School. The 
fact that in later publications Dunne (1999; 2008) either downplayed the 
importance of Carr’s intellectual contribution to the English School or excluded him 
entirely from it, is not so much a concession to the justified concerns raised by his 
critics, but it basically represents the logical consequence of his own defence of the 
idea of international society.  
    Dunne’s ambivalence towards Carr is echoed by Barry Buzan. In an influential 
1993 article, Buzan included Carr in the English School along with Manning, Wight, 
Bull, Watson, Vincent, James and Gerrit Gong. However, in later publications Buzan 
(2001; 2004) decided to pay less attention to Carr, who in his 2014 book appears 
simply as critic who denies the importance of international society on both 
methodological and normative grounds. The rather uncertain status that Buzan 
and Dunne attributed to Carr within the English School is the logical consequence 
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of their identification of the School with the so-called societal approach. As we 
shall see next, the link between the international society and the English School 
was critically re-examined only by writers who understood the ending of the Cold 
War as a turning point in both international relations and International Relations 
(IR).  
    Among the writers of the 1990s, Little (1995) came closer than anybody else to 
depicting the English School as a methodologically pluralistic and historically 
informed theoretical enterprise. For Little, the celebrated distinction between 
international system, international society, and world society, makes sense only on 
methodological grounds and does not involve giving ontological priority to any of 
those elements. Little does not deny that there are members of the School that 
view the idea of international society with more sympathy than others, but makes 
the important observation that the choice between Realism, Rationalism, and 
Revolutionism expresses a policy preference and should not divert attention away 
from trying to comprehend and analyse the international arena in its entirety. The 
way in which policy preferences influence not only the choice between Realism, 
Rationalism and Revolutionism but also the content of Rationalism itself, was only 
appreciated and analysed by the writers examined in the next section. For them, 
Rationalism does not stand above the international reality it purports to describe 
since it changes along with that reality. In a nutshell, the 1990s were a transitional 
period in the understanding of the English School with many fundamental issues to 
remain unresolved or to be the object of significant controversy among English 
School scholars. Although the existence of the School was now taken for granted, 
its relationship to the societal approach was not extensively debated and the 
concepts of “history” and “morality” were simply added to what remained 
essentially a state-centric way of examining international relations. 
International Society after the Cold War  
As we saw in the previous section, the writers that succeeded the ahistorical 
structuralism of the 1980s owe more to their predecessors than it is often 
acknowledged. Their depiction of the English School as a broader church than the 
LSE Department of International Relations did not challenge the hegemony of the 
idea of international society within English School thinking. Although the attention 
given to this idea cannot be attributed in any one-dimensional way to external 
reality, it is a fact that the end of the Cold War made possible a more critical 
examination of the idea of international society and its relationship to the English 
School.  Although Buzan (1993), Little (1995) and Dunne (1998) were all writing 
after the end of the Cold War in 1991, they did not attribute any particular 
theoretical importance to it.  Little noted that he was too close to the actual 
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historical events to appreciate their significance. For Buzan, the real historical 
change had occurred after World War II with the emergence of a universal 
international society. As regards Dunne, his  open rejection of contextualism and 
declared intention to trace the footsteps of academics who were carrying a 
theoretical conversation independent of real-world developments, did not enable 
him to grasp the ways in which history has shaped developments within IR and also 
been present in its very creationxvi.  Although there is no doubt that contextualism 
can lead to simplifications, it is implausible to suggest that cataclysmic political 
events, such as the beginning or ending of major international conflicts, have no 
consequences for IR. Pace Dunne and Brian Schmidt, the development of the social 
sciences in general cannot be easily separated from what is happening in the real 
or non-reflective world (Halliday, 1994).  
    Contrary to those who treated the notion of international society as an 
ahistorical construct, the post-Cold War writers discussed in this section placed the 
idea of international society within the historical context of the Cold War. What 
emerges from their contextually informed examination of international society is 
not the imperative to abandon this concept, but rather the need to realise the 
ways in which its actual content is at any particular moment determined by 
possibilities created by actual historical development combined, of course, with 
the policy preferences of scholars studying those developments. Far from being an 
alternative to the history/theory dialectic, international society can only be 
understood as a product of this dialectic. As such, it can provide neither the basis 
for a disinterested study of international affairs, nor an alternative to the 
particularistic commitments and loyalties which I see as essential to English School 
thinking.  
    For Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (1996), the state-centric version of 
international society defended by Bull and others is clearly an intellectual and 
political product of the Cold War. Its particular policy implications mean that it 
cannot be identified with international affairs in general or with the so-called 
international community. As a result of the extensive political changes brought 
about by the end of the Cold War, institutions such as the balance of power lose 
their primacy in international society. The same applies to international law whose 
importance is open to question in a world no longer regulated by the balance of 
power. The novel forms of economic and technological cooperation developed 
among North America, Western Europe and East Asia encourage us to rethink the 
notion of a great power. In the aftermath of the Cold War, power itself is no longer 
depended so much on military capacity but on the possession of attributes which 
are not fully taken into account by the traditional English School understanding of 
the international society. The aim of Fawn and Larkins is not to challenge the 
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validity of the notion of international society per se, but to show how its content 
and institutions should be redefined as a consequence of developments taking 
place outside the walls of the academy. They also note that from a purely 
intellectual point of view Bull’s formulation of that notion can considered to be 
outdated since it does not fully utilise the insights of theoretical currents such as 
neorealism, normative theory and post-positivism. 
    This historical determination of the content of the notion of international society 
is also illuminated by Martin Shaw (1996). For Shaw, the concepts used by social 
scientists are always part of the social or international reality they purport to 
describe. Their fundamentally ideological character does not mean that they are to 
be compared to forms of supposedly objective knowledge, but it rather means that 
they can be considered to be true or false only within a particular social or 
international context. For example, despite the fact that the idea of international 
society performed a useful political function during the Cold War by emphasising 
the element of international cooperation instead that of conflict, its end has 
revealed its serious weaknesses. According to Shaw, international society in its 
traditional English School form is characterised by an unjustified state-centrism 
which takes for granted that relations among states are more important than and 
analytically distinct from relations within states. To the extent that in the post-Cold 
War era what happens within states, in the sense of human rights abuses, 
determines what happens between states, in the form of humanitarian 
interventions, the primacy of foreign policy is seriously challenged taking with it 
the analytical value of the notion of international society. Shaw is also sensitive to 
some of the inherent conceptual limitations of the idea international society, which 
make IR specialists forget that for all other social sciences a “society” can only be 
comprised by real persons and not state entitiesxvii.  
    It is important to note that these criticisms of the notion of international society 
in its traditional English School form do not emanate from writers inimical to the 
English School or to the idea of international society per se. What Fawn, Larkins 
and Shaw help us realise is that the way in which English School writers from 
Manning to Bull used the notion of international society was a historically 
contingent one. The ongoing debate between pluralists and solidarists within the 
English School also serves to show how amorphous the notion of international 
society is, and how it can be organised around the most diverse institutions which 
range from state sovereignty to the promotion of human rights and the protection 
of the environment. Buzan’s (2014) assumption that there is a real historical trend 
towards solidarism, and that this historical trend determines which institutions will 
play a dominant role in the future, also serves to show how international society 
and its definition are influenced by developments taking place in the non-
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theoretical sphere. Far from representing an alternative to history, international 
society is a product of history. Its alternative definitions by pre- and post-Cold War 
writers are not the expression of different intellectual allegiances but of distinct 
policy preferences and changing international relations. In terms similar to those 
that Wilson (1995) has used to dissect the category of inter-war “idealism” or 
“utopianism”, international society is a powerful concept which performs a 
number of political functions, but it obfuscates rather than illuminates what it 
purports to describe. To that extent, it belongs to the world of rhetoric and politics 
and not to the world of academia.  
    Freed from the need to treat international society as an answer to a problem, 
namely the problem of delineating the contours of the English School, Fred Halliday 
(1994) was able to show the different meanings that international society can 
assume within different research programs and also to highlight its inherent 
conceptual limitations. Far from being the monopoly of the English School, the 
term “international society” is also employed by those working within a 
transnationalist paradigm to refer to cultural and economic exchanges that take 
place independent of the state. The ways that societies interact independent of the 
state have been further explored in globalisation literature, which also employs the 
term “international society”. Despite its frequent use by IR scholars, the term 
“international society” can create confusion between what sociologists define as a 
“society” in order to distinguish it from a “community” and also between what 
they define as a “society” in order to distinguish it from the state. As we saw, the 
excessively idiosyncratic way that the term “society” is employed by IR theorists 
has also concerned Jones (1981) and Shaw (1996).  
    Despite these conceptual ambiguities, Halliday does not call for the total 
abandonment of the term “international society” but rather for understanding the 
contemporary international society as homogeneity. The intellectual resources for 
doing so should not be sought in the thought of the supposed father of the 
international society approach, Hugo Grotius, but rather in Burke, Marx and 
Fukuyama. In accordance with the contextualist point of view adopted by the post-
Cold War critics examined in this section, Halliday consciously rejects the attempt 
to separate academic disciplines from their social environment and to define 
academic concepts without considering history in the form of real-world 
happenings and developments. His preferred version of international society as 
homogeneity is based on the ontological assumption that in order to compete 
effectively with one another different states end up adopting the same societal 
models.  It is also interesting to note that whereas conventional English School 
understandings of international society ascribe to this term a descriptive and 
normative meaning, Halliday uses international society as homogeneity as an 
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explanatory device in order to account for the end of the Cold War and subsequent 
historical developmentsxviii.  
     Perhaps the most fundamental and far-reaching critique of traditional English 
School conceptualisations of the international society was formulated by Edward 
Keene (2002). Although Fawn, Larkins, Shaw and Halliday challenge the state-
centric understanding of this notion from the point of view of present and future 
historical developments, Keene appeals to history in the sense of the past, as well 
as the present and the future. For Keene, the tension between national sovereignty 
and human rights, between a state-based form of international order and the 
promotion of civilisation and good government, is not something that suddenly 
appeared after the end of the Cold War but it rather is an essential element of 
modern international order as such. The kind of international society defended by 
Hedley Bull is very different from that delineated by the supposed father of the 
international society approach, Hugo Grotius. Indeed, Grotius’ belief in the 
divisibility of sovereignty and the importance of individual rights separate him not 
only from many English School figures but also from the understanding of the state 
that can be found in Hobbes, Bodin and other representatives of political 
modernity.  
    According to Keene, what separates our international order from that of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is that the goals of toleration and the 
promotion of civilization are pursued within the same social and geographical 
space. Although between the seventeenth century and the outbreak of World War 
I the promotion of civilisation and of what was understood as good government 
took place in the extra-European world only, from 1914 onwards both Europeans 
and non-Europeans are being subjected to the same civilising process which 
frequently challenges sovereignty in the name of other ideals and principles. 
Although in the thought of Fawn, Larkins, and Shaw, and of course in the views 
expressed by many English School solidarists in the post-Cold War period, there is a 
tendency to welcome the advent of a human rights-based form of international 
order, Keene recommends more modesty and restraint. The follies of imperialism 
and colonialism do not automatically cancel the achievements of modern West or 
the promotion of human rights, but they ought to make us think very carefully 
about how our ideals can be implemented in a diverse world. Keene’s critique of  
Bull and those who adopt a similar point of view reveals not only the bifurcated 
and contradictory nature of modern international order, but also that there can 
never be a value-free definition of international order which would command the 
assent of Europeans and non-Europeans, aliens, citizens and barbarians. For Keene 
it is not international order which determines our ideals, but conflicting ideals 
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which determine the course that the pursuance of international order should take 
under modern circumstances.  
    Contrary to what applies to my discussion of the writers of the 1980s and the  
1990s, I do not claim that the authors examined in this section present the same 
argument, or versions of the same argument. Certainly, Fawn and Larkins, Shaw, 
Halliday, and Keene, have different points of departure and different destinations; 
they also find themselves in different positions with regard to the English School. 
For example, although Keene is usually associated with the English School, Halliday 
is not.  His understanding of international society as homogeneity refers to more 
general processes of competition and convergence among societies than most 
versions of English School solidarism, which do not really deny the importance of 
the state in international society (Buzan, 2014). Shaw’s Marxist background 
influences his understanding of the role of the social sciences, but it does not stop 
him from arriving at policy recommendations which make international society 
seem more like a global angel than a global gangster and bring him close to English 
School solidarism. To the extent that they contribute to a common discussion, the 
figures discussed in this section are united by the realisation that the notion of 
international society is not an answer to a problem but rather a problem in itself. 
This realisation does not make them abandon entirely this notion, but rather to 
emphasise the ways in which it is affected by history, and cannot be defined 
independent of history in the sense of past, present and future developments in 
the non-contemplative sphere. Apart from their critical examination of the content 
and the validity of the notion of international society, it is this engagement with 
history that separates them from the authors of the 1980s and the 1990s.  
    To the extent that international society is not an independent variable, which 
can be used to define the contours of the English School, but rather a dependent 
variable that is determined by social and international developments, defining the 
English School would require recourse to something more fundamental and 
general than a historically contingent idea. The notion of human rights employed 
by English School solidarists in order to question the moral credentials of the 
ahistorical structuralism of the 1980s, cannot perform the role that international 
society once performed for the English School, since it is widely used by others and 
it is also determined by history. As Linklater and Suganami (2006) point out, since 
the degree of solidarity among states varies considerably from one group of states 
to another, and from one historical period to another, neither solidarism nor 
pluralism can be considered to express a timeless truth about international 
relations. Indeed, the same criticisms levelled at the ahistorical structuralists of the 
1980s could also levelled at the so-called solidarists, who tend to abstract the 
notion of human rights from its Western political and constitutional framework, 
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and use it as a criterion for evaluating the behaviour of states in general. Although 
defending ideas derived from the Western political theory and practice might be 
perfectly legitimate as a normative position, it cannot be seen as the politically 
neutral expression of a social-scientific interest in the conditions of international 
order. To the degree that, as Buzan (2014) notes, the position of English School 
pluralists is no less normative in essence than that of the solidarists, both pluralism 
and solidarism should be examined from a historical perspective and be 
understood as an expression of contingent and not absolute ideals and principles. 
Such a historicist examination of pluralism and solidarism might lead to the 
conclusion that, as Buzan has argued, their actual differences are less pronounced 
than ordinarily assumed. In any case, since both structuralists and functionalists 
have serious issues with history—which is widely recognised as one important 
dimension of English School thinking—it could be assumed that what is currently 
described as the School’s historical orientation should gain further ground. 
    However, as I showed in the Introduction, historically informed English School 
scholars have not so far been able to arrive at a constructive definition of the 
relationship between history and theory. Even the more advanced and 
methodologically conscious among them continue to describe history and theory 
as separate domains, which can be combined in a rather superficial and external 
way. Also, the kind of historical knowledge required for the writing of books such 
as Buzan’s and Little’s International Systems in World History, or Watson’s The 
Evolution of International Society, means that this type of work will always be 
confined to an academic elite able to use multiple research assistants or having 
benefited from many years of personal research. Finally yet importantly, the 
historically inspired scholars, who are associated with the School’s historical 
orientation, are still working within the confines of a positivist epistemology that 
assumes that the study of the past can help us realise certain “truths” about 
international affairs.  
    What this positivist epistemology disregards is that our interpretations of the 
past are necessarily distinct from the past itself, and that the concepts we 
introduce in order to study the past are derived from our own historically 
determined vocabulary. To the extent that both the functionalists and the 
“historicists” among English School scholars remain engaged to methodological 
assumptions that bring them close to mainstream international theorists, I believe 
that any understanding of the English School as an intellectual challenge to 
established theoretical paradigms should start from the acknowledgement of the 
importance of the history/theory dialectic. This dialectic could help place the 
concepts of international society and human rights within their proper historical 
contexts, and could potentially give rise to novel forms of philosophical 
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historiography. It is also well-attuned to an academic scene where “history” is no 
longer a term which can be used unproblematically and where different houses of 
history not only exist but also proliferatexix.  
Carr and the Origins of the History/Theory Dialectic  
The origins of the history/theory dialectic should be sought in E. H. Carr’s conscious 
and systematic exploration of the relationship between history and theory. This 
exploration creates a link between his two most important books: The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis (1939/2001) and What is History? (1961/1987). Although more than 
twenty years separate the two books, it could be argued that the second is a 
corrective to the first. The harsh cynicism of The Twenty Years’ Crisis is mitigated in 
What is History? by a largely benevolent understanding of the historical process. 
Despite their differences and imperfections, these books are the natural place to 
start for anyone interested in the ways in which history and theory meet with one 
another in International Relations and beyond.  
    As far as it regards The Twenty Years’ Crisis, one could distinguish among five 
different senses in which the history/theory dialectic inspires and animates its 
pages. To begin with, contrary to the discursive approaches which seek to rewrite 
the history of IR in order to isolate it from social and international developments, 
Carr saw that both the emergence and the direction of the discipline of IR were 
influenced by developments taking place outside the walls of the academy. So long 
as international affairs were considered to be of interest only to professional 
soldiers and diplomats, no systematic and public inquiry into international politics 
was possible. The whole discipline’s idealist origins had to do with the fact that it 
was created after the war in order to stop a similar catastrophe from taking place 
again. In this IR was no exception since in the same way that political science had 
been created to solve domestic political issues, IR was given birth in order to 
address and mitigate international problems and tensions. Indeed, what separated 
Carr from his so-called idealist opponents was not an interest in the real world per 
se, but rather that his realism had a passive dimension which took the world as it 
is.  In their desire to avoid a new world war, the idealists had brought it closer by 
not paying enough attention to the real causes of the problems they were 
addressing. What separated “realism” from “idealism” was not the desire to 
influence political developments but the search for a solution and not a utopia, 
which tries to mould reality without being anchored in it. For Carr, moreover, the 
problems facing IR were similar to those confronting all other sciences, whether 
natural or social. In the most different disciplines, from medicine to social and 
political theory, intellectual developments are influenced by social ones.  
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    Secondly, Carr made the point that his utopian opponents harboured a 
fundamentally flawed understanding of international theory which can never 
aspire to describe the common interest. Adopting a quasi-Mannheimian sociology 
of knowledge which emphasises the importance of the position of the observer 
without excluding intellectuals from its purview, Carr claimed that the interwar 
international theorists were not only writing from English-speaking countries but 
they were also writing for English-speaking countries. Their support for peace, free 
trade and international law, was not equally advantageous to everybody but 
reflected the interests of those in possession, especially Britain and France. By 
portraying the determination of thought as a largely subconscious process, Carr 
avoided criticizing his opponents from an abstract ethical point of view and called 
them to consider how their historically determined position influenced their ideals. 
As we shall see in Chapter 8, Carr did not ultimately deny the possibility that the 
interests of different actors can be combined, but he claimed that this cannot 
happen so long as the satisfied nations identify their own interests with the 
common good.  
    Thirdly, despite drawing attention to the international crisis of the years 1919-
1939 in the title and the subtitle of his book, Carr had the ambition to delineate the 
contours of a more general and all-encompassing historical crisis which put into 
question many aspects of pre-World War I political and moral thinking. The 
dividing line that he draws between, one the one hand, the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and, on the other hand, the twentieth century means that 
social and international issues can never be discussed in the abstract and that 
different historical periods require different modes of thinking and acting. To be 
more specific, Carr argued that the doctrine of the harmony of interests in the 
form developed by Adam Smith and others reflected eighteenth-century social 
conditions, and required the existence of a pre-capitalist social structure 
dominated by small producers. During the nineteenth century, this doctrine 
survived only because economic growth temporarily obfuscated the unequal 
distribution of wealth, and colonialism provided chances and opportunities to 
those not reaping the benefits of progress at home. During the eighteenth century 
the doctrine of the harmony of interests was close to the truth, but it later 
assumed the form of a myth with a distant connection to reality and was 
completely transformed during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and 
especially after 1914. What had originally been a truthful idea and later a plausible 
ideology became a pure utopia with no links to social or international reality.  As a 
result of the cataclysmic social and international changes that World War I 
triggered, Carr’s generation had to do their own thinking for themselves and not to 
rely on the utilitarianism and liberalism of their fathers and forefathers. The 
essence of historical crises ultimately lies in the fact that old institutions and ideas 
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become obsolete before suitable replacement can be found. As Chapter 8 argues, 
Carr himself had a significant debt to the liberal tradition criticised in his work 
since, while dismissing the possibility of a natural harmony of interests, he firmly 
believed in the possibility of an artificial identification of interests through mutual 
concessions and the display of goodwill.  
    Fourthly, far from pretending to be above the social or international structure, 
Carr admitted that his own ideas were also the product of a particular situation and 
therefore their validity was only relative and not universal. The differences 
between the first and the second editions of the book, as well the author’s 
changing views on nationalism, mean that for Carr international theory always tries 
to assess a particular situation and that the theorist is primarily writing for his 
contemporaries. As Chapter 8 shows, Carr believed that nationalism is not good or 
bad in itself but rather that it has different consequences in different historical 
periods and a different relationship with internationalism. Ultimately, the reason 
why the theorist cannot provide a suprahistorical definition of phenomena such as 
nationalism is that no such definition exists.  
    Finally, in discussing the forms that the history/theory dialectic assumes in the 
pages of The Twenty Years’ Crisis, one should mention Carr’s belief that all 
solutions to political problems are temporary and ultimately unsatisfying. The 
corrupting influence of political reality upon ideals and institutions means that new 
ideas should regularly be put forward and that their institutionalisation represents 
only a partial victory. Old ideas and institutions should frequently be replaced by 
new ones in a vision of the world which, without being tragic in any deep sense of 
the term, certainly defies easy solutions and prescriptions. The ways in which the 
historicity of theory is analysed in The Twenty Years’ Crisis would make it not only a 
point of intellectual departure but also a point of intellectual arrival, if the author 
had managed to offer a positive program of international change. As I claim in 
Chapter 8, Carr’s vision of peaceful change is not without its merits but is too 
liberal to be applied in world inhabited by rational, less rational, and also irrational 
actors.  
    If The Twenty Years’ Crisis is the first conscious and detailed investigation of the 
history/theory dialectic from the point of view of international theory, then What 
is History? is the most well-argued exploration of the same dialectic from the point 
of view of a practising English historian. As I show in Chapter 5, Carr was very much 
interested in the links that exist between history and the social sciences and he 
believed that historiography is an inherently theoretical enterprise. The theoretical 
presuppositions of historical writing are revealed in his critique of nineteenth-
century historians, who took progress for granted. This belief in progress, without 
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being explicitly stated, provided the ideological background necessary for their 
discussion of more particular topics, and enabled them to focus on historical 
details assuming that a hidden hand takes care of the historical process as a whole. 
The belief that history is no less theoretical than, for example, sociology, as far as it 
regards its ideological presuppositions, and interest not in the unique but in what is 
general in the unique, enabled Carr to defend it from those – like Isaiah Berlin and 
Karl Popper—who viewed it with condescension and portrayed it as a sui generis 
discipline. Wilson (2001) is certainly justified in seeing What is History?  as Carr’s 
second attack against the liberal academic establishment of his day, the first attack 
being The Twenty Years’ Crisis. However, what separates the two books is a faith in 
the future and a search for objectivity that owe much to the writer’s liberal pastxx.  
Taken together, The Twenty Years’ Crisis and What is History? represent a 
systematic exploration of the reasons why theory cannot escape history, and 
history cannot escape theory. Using this insight as our point of departure, we will 
now try to offer a positive definition of the history/theory dialectic in the form 
developed by Butterfield, Wight and Carr. 
     In the same way that Howard William’s (1989) investigation of the role of 
dialectic in the philosophical systems of Heraclitus, Hegel and Marx does not 
assume that they were identical thinkers, my reconstruction of the history/theory 
dialectic in Butterfield, Wight and Carr does not presuppose that there are no 
differences among them. Certainly, Butterfield’s and Wight’s Christian background 
and Carr’s Marxist inspiration explain why so far they have been read and 
understood independently from one another. One of the advantages of the 
history/theory dialectic in the form reconstructed here is that it offers a more 
pluralistic framework than Marxism, and does not exclude the possibility that the 
impersonal forces shaping human history might be of celestial nature and origin.  
The interesting thing about Butterfield’s and Wight’s Christianity, and Carr’s 
Marxism, is that they enable them to see human history as something more than 
the result of the conscious actions of individual human beings, but they do not 
make them fatalists or determinists. Despite their religious and other differences, 
Butterfield, Wight and Carr do not stop to draw attention to the interpenetration 
of history and theory, and the need to employ a synthetic approach when 
analysing a multidimensional and subject to change world.  
English School and the History/Theory Dialectic  
In order to make evident the interpenetration of history and theory, Butterfield, 
Carr and Wight emphasised the generality of the first and the particularity of the 
latter. The belief that historiography is an inherently theoretical enterprise in the 
sense that it both presupposes and produces theory—understood as 
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methodological and substantive assumptions of general value—distances Wight 
and Butterfield from other participants in the British Committee, and brings them 
close to Carr who saw history as an embryonic social science. Although the 
differences between the authors discussed in my thesis and traditional narrative 
historians such as Michael Howard and Geoffrey Hudson are relatively easy to see, 
the case of Donald Mackinnon is a more complex one. Despite the fact that his 
engagement with moral philosophy and declared interest in the philosophy of 
history seem at first glance to earn Mackinnon a place in my thesis, his 
methodological and philosophical views are very far from those espoused by 
Butterfield, Carr and Wight. Despite his interest in the philosophy of history, 
Mackinnon never rejected the British empiricist tradition, which played an 
important role in his intellectual upbringing. At the same time, his commitment to 
the absolute moral standards embodied in natural law, and belief that the task of 
the philosopher is to search for the “truth” as such, separate him sharply  from the 
historicists discussed in my thesisxxi. Although Mackinnon struggled with 
methodological and philosophical problems similar to those concerning Butterfield, 
Wight and Carr, his answers to those problems were distinctively different. For the 
writers examined in my thesis, engaging with problems that fall within the 
theoretical jurisdiction of the philosophy of history is not something optional but 
rather something necessary in the sense that there can be no historiography 
without a theory of historiography, and that historians arrive at conclusions which 
are not essentially different from those reached by social, political and 
international theorists. Both historians and international theorists are searching for 
the causes of events and are not interested in the unique but what is general in the 
unique. Among contemporary historians, Toynbee certainly provides an interesting 
case but, as I show in Chapter 4, his understanding of history as theory was not 
accompanied by an understanding of theory as history. In other words, despite his 
support for a philosophically informed form of historiography, Toynbee eventually 
distanced himself from the values of the European civilisation, and adopted a point 
of view which brought him close to religious syncretism and political 
cosmopolitanism. Mackinnon’s empiricist epistemology, and Mackinnon’s and 
Toynbee’s moral universalism and negation of historicism explain why they cannot 
be placed alongside Butterfield, Wight and Carr. For the founding English School 
thinkers examined in my thesis, subjectivity is important in both methodological 
and substantive grounds.  
    Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s attempt to show the theoretical presuppositions 
and significance of historiography, would be incomplete without their equally 
important and consistent effort to make evident the historicity of international 
theory, and to provide support for the thesis that theory is always for someone and 
some purpose. Apart from challenging current understandings of the English 
47 
 
School as an apolitical enterprise, Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s historicist 
conceptualisation of international change shows that international theory can 
never be neutral in its assessment of international developments, since it is heavily 
influenced by the theorist’s standpoint and location in space and time. The clear 
political implications of Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s analysis of international 
politics and understanding of theory as history differentiate their point of view 
from that of American behaviourists and game theorists, and reconnect twentieth-
century international thought with the concern for practical results that, as 
Morgenthau (1967) mentions, dominated reflections on international relations 
between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and World War II. Echoing the Marxian 
belief that the mission of theory is not to understand the world but to change it, 
the English School writers discussed in my thesis are not primarily interested to 
describe the various changes taking place around them, or to offer something 
resembling a general model of international change, but to advocate particular 
changes and international reforms. Their support for non-ideological diplomacy 
and the establishment of a global balance of power within which America, the 
Soviet Union, and a strong Western Europe would play an equal role, though not 
completely utopian, corresponded to a  rather marginal historical possibilityxxii. The 
fact that, as the case of Carr makes particularly clear, they ultimately abandoned 
the hope that Europe could continue to play the role it played in the past, shows 
that normative considerations should always be combined with structural ones in 
order to avoid the trap of utopianism and/or political irrelevance.  
    Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s theoretically informed understanding of the past 
and historically informed understanding of the present are underpinned by a 
pluralistic methodology which refuses to separate international politics from 
moral, social and ideological considerations. The kind of changes they describe as 
international theorists are not limited to one particular sphere of social action, but 
show how interlinked are the domains that conventional international theorists 
separate from one another. Especially with regard to the past, they offer a canon 
of historical interpretation, which states that the action of identifiable individuals 
cannot be separated from the influence of the deep impersonal forces criticised by 
Berlin in Historical Inevitability (1954).  Contrary to the nineteenth-century liberal 
historians criticised by Carr, they refuse to make a choice between the freedom of 
human beings and the workings of what Friedrich Carl von Savigny described as 
“silently operating forces”xxiii. In the same way that they abstain from portraying 
historical development as the result of conscious decisions taken by individual 
human beings, they also hesitate to adopt the type of structuralism that would 
render meaningless any notion of human freedom and responsibility, and, as Berlin 
correctly points out, would end up depicting the universe as a vast prison. To the 
extent that as Halliday (1994) observes, structuralism involves a form of 
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determinism that denies freedom of action to the elements in the structure, the 
writers discussed in my thesis were not structuralists. Their attempt to explain 
historical events by taking into account both the personal and impersonal forces 
shaping human history has important consequences for contemporary English 
School thinking.  
     Ultimately, it is Butterfield’s, Carr’s and Wight’s  rejection of monism and  
commitment to pluralism that stops them from offering any “philosophy of 
history” or “international theory” in the conventional meanings of these termsxxiv. 
In the same way that they abstain from interpreting the whole of human history 
through the prism of a single concept, they also refuse to offer the kind of 
theoretical prediction or explanation, which is based on the erroneous separation 
of one particular element of reality from the rest, and the subsequent 
interpretation of a complex reality through its prismxxv. In the form developed by 
Butterfield, Wight and Carr, the history/theory dialectic puts into question many of 
the dichotomies that are taken for granted by mainstream historians and 
international theorists, who tend to see history and theory, agency and structure, 
freedom and necessity, as mutually opposing concepts and not as aspects of the 
same evolving dialectical unity xxvi.  Their use of history as theory and theory as 
history has far-reaching implications for historiography and international theory 
and offers a particularly promising way to reconceptualise the English School of 
International Relations.  
.  
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                                   CHAPTER 3 
     Herbert Butterfield on History as Theory 
 
Herbert Butterfield retained an interest in history, theory, and their mutual 
interaction, throughout his life. He was a historian suspicious of theory and yet 
very much interested in the hidden methodological assumptions and philosophical 
presuppositions of the historical profession. Contrary to most historians, he did not 
take the rules of historical study for granted and was extremely cautious of the 
different approaches that one can adopt in his study of the past. One of the 
paradoxes of his work is that, despite his praise for cool and scientific history, he 
remained first and foremost a philosopher of history. His much celebrated but also 
criticised The Whig Interpretation of History, originally published in 1931, can be 
considered to be the first major twentieth-century contribution to the philosophy 
of history in England.  
    As Kenneth Thompson (1980) points out, the term “philosophy of history” can 
refer to the methodology of history, the metaphysics of history, or the logic of 
history. In this examination of the history/theory dialectic, I am interested in 
philosophy of history in the two distinct senses of the methodology of history and 
the philosophical inquiry into the logic or meaning of the historical process. In the 
Whig Interpretation of History and elsewhere Butterfield not only discusses the 
problems raised by philosophy of history in these two different senses, but also 
shows how difficult it is to separate them in practice. In criticising moral 
judgements in history from a methodological point of view Butterfield ultimately 
invokes a particular philosophical understanding of the historical process. It is 
Butterfield’s belief that history is a dialectical process where different social and 
political forces strive for supremacy that makes him to doubt the ability of the 
historian to condemn political or religious leaders on moral grounds. Although the 
methodological inquiry into the role of the historian and the philosophical inquiry 
into the meaning of history constitute separate fields, they often meet in the actual 
practice of historical writing. 
    As a critic of the Whig theory of history, Butterfield argued in favour of 
understanding the past in its particularity and against applying to it ideas and 
assumptions derived from the present. As a constitutional historian, he argued 
against the Namierite understanding of eighteenth-century political controversies 
and underlined the significance of moral ideals in politics. This emphasis on moral 
factors and the ways in which they intersect with practical considerations is an 
expression of the methodological pluralism, which I associate with the 
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history/theory dialectic. As a religiously inspired thinker, Butterfield claimed that 
secular history couldn’t be understood without taking into account the role of God 
and Providence in history. To these important methodological and religious 
insights, one should add Butterfield’s direct appeal to the European past which 
offers a very clear example of how in his thinking history assumes the form of 
theory. The political experience of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are 
used by Butterfield in order to criticise the present and to show that there are 
certain historical lessons which one can disregard only at his own expense.  
     Finally, as a historian of historiography, he explored the merits of a comparative 
approach which aims to show how different countries and civilizations end up 
caring about their past.  Although he did not manage to provide final answers to 
the set of methodological problems he discussed or even to fully reconcile the 
various different aspects of his thinking, Butterfield proved that recording the 
events of the past does not exhaust the mission of the historian who necessarily 
brings his own philosophical and theological beliefs in the understanding of the 
human drama. The active role that the writers discussed in my thesis attributed to 
the historian is the natural consequence of their theoretical understanding of 
historiography. Like theorists, historians search for the immediate and more 
general causes of the events they describe, and organise their narratives around 
particular themes. In this process, the use of judgement and imagination are 
unavoidable.  
 
I) THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY AND 
BEYOND 
 
Despite its brevity, The Whig Interpretation of History (1931/1965) is a complex 
book which represents the first major twentieth-century English contribution to 
the philosophy of history. E. H. Carr’s What is History? was published much later 
and Collingwood’s lectures on the subject were published almost twenty years 
after they were originally given. The various differences that exist between The 
Whig Interpretation of History and What is History? should not hide the fact that 
both books belong to the same genre since they are essays on historical criticism. 
In the same way that Carr criticises his nineteenth-century predecessors for 
implicitly incorporating their belief in progress in their historical narratives, 
Butterfield is concerned with the general tendency of English historians to praise 
politically successful revolutions after they have taken place, to project certain 
principles of progress into the past, and ultimately to “produce a story which is the 
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ratification if not the glorification of the present” (Butterfield, 1931/1965: v).  
Despite the fact that Butterfield’s book can only be understood within the 
framework of debates peculiar to English historiography, his intervention does not 
have exclusively local significance. As he understood well, the problems created by 
the Whig interpretation are not of local significance to the extent that they concern 
the historians of every generation. It should be emphasised that both Butterfield 
and Carr do not condemn the expression of opinion as such, but they are rather 
concerned with the ways in which ideological assumptions and presuppositions can 
be hidden into ostensibly objective historical narratives.  
Against the Whig Interpretation of History  
Despite appearances, Butterfield’s critique of the Whig theory of history is not so 
much an attack against a particular political tradition, which he himself appreciated 
to a considerable degree, but rather a demonstration of the weaknesses of a 
particular form of organisation of the historical material. The main problem with 
the Whig theory of history has to do with viewing the past through the eyes of the 
present, and thus denying its relative autonomy. As Butterfield argued later in The 
Englishman and his History (1944), bad history can easily go hand in hand with 
good politics, and showing the problems inherent in the first does not involve 
denying the positive consequences of the second. What is more, in Man on His 
Past (1955) Butterfield reiterates the belief that the methodological fallacies of the 
Whig interpretation are to be distinguished from its beneficial consequences upon 
British politics and society.  
     For Butterfield, the Whig interpretation could be described as the historian’s 
original sin. All historiography tends to acquire Whig characteristics and to adopt 
the point of view of the present when the historian is called upon to analyse and 
evaluate complex historical developments within a relatively short space. For this 
reason, it could be argued that “Clio herself is on the side of the Whigs” 
(Butterfield, 1931/1965: 8). In other words, there is a tendency for all history to 
succumb to presentism and read the past on the basis of values and criteria 
derived from the present. However, it should be noted that, for Butterfield, the 
Whig interpretation is not equivalent to presentism as such but rather to a 
particular approach that is “the ratification if not the glorification of the present” 
(Butterfield, 1931/1965: v). Whig historiography is invariably on the side of the 
status quo and its support for the revolutions of the past does not necessarily 
extend to those of the present. By subjugating the past to the present and its 
requirements, those adopting a Whig perspective do not do proper historiography, 
and make historical inquiry dependent upon extra-scientific considerations.  
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    Although Butterfield’s positive historical vision is not clearly elaborated in The 
Whig Interpretation of History, what underlines his critique of Whig history is a 
demand for an unmediated access to the past. The past should not be studied for 
the sake of the present, or be treated as a source of moral and political lessons. To 
the extent that Butterfield claims that the past should be studied for the sake of 
the past and that historical knowledge is not instrumental, he seems to make an 
argument in favour of the autonomy of history. Contrary to Carr, he does not try to 
establish any kind of relationship between history and the social sciences, and 
seems eager to exclude all current concerns and preoccupations from the study of 
the past. Despite the fact that this argument in favour of treating history as an 
autonomous field of study and respecting the past undoubtedly adds to the 
rhetorical force of Butterfield’s intervention, it is doubtful whether it can be easily 
harmonised with his own emphasis on historical imagination and the role of the 
historian examined next. The only way to reconcile the first chapters of The Whig 
Interpretation of History with the later ones is to take into account the fact that 
they criticise distinct attitudes to historiography. The presentism of the Whig 
approach which Butterfield severely criticises is very different from a kind of 
presentism which he not only accepts but also endorses as necessary to the fruitful 
study of the past. It is precisely because his rejection of positivism and search for 
the deep causes of events that Butterfield deserves a place in my thesis.  
Historical Imagination 
Butterfield’s critique of his predecessors assumes the twin forms of an emphasis on 
the importance of historical imagination for understanding the past and a well-
founded scepticism towards the importance of moral judgements in history. For 
Butterfield, the appropriation of the past involves a creative act of the historical 
imagination. The historian does not stand as a neutral arbiter between the past 
and the present but uses his imagination to translate alien circumstances and ways 
of life into something that would be intelligible to his contemporaries. Indeed, 
using the imagination is crucial not only for understanding the past but also for 
understanding the present. As Butterfield goes on to argue, imagination is 
necessary to understand even the behaviour of our present day neighbour.  
    This acceptance of the role of historical imagination leads the major critic of the 
Whig theory of history to praise it for enabling historians to introduce their political 
and philosophical assumptions into the study of the past. The problem with the 
Whig approach is not that it permits to historians to use their imagination but that 
it does not enable them to use it enough. In other words, Butterfield blames Whig 
historians not for their act of imaginative identification with the political actors of 
the past but for using their imagination in a restricted way to understand only the 
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one part of the conflicts they describe. Their sympathy is reserved for political 
liberals and religious Protestants and is explicitly denied to political conservatives 
and religious Catholics. For Butterfield, this makes the work of the Whigs especially 
easy since it is exactly when the historian approaches unpopular political causes 
and personalities that he must use extensively his imagination.  
    Although the Whig tendency to be emotionally involved in the historical 
narrative is preferable to the supposedly scientific approach of the common-sense 
historians, it remains one-sided and incomplete. The ideal for Butterfield is to use 
historical imagination to understand all the participants in a political or religious 
conflict and in this way to arrive at a new form of objectivity. This demand for the 
combination of objectivity with subjectivity is also expressed in his statement that 
the art of the historian lies in a particular form of historical abridgement. All history 
is selective and the historian can never include all the events of the past in his 
work, but his functions of selection and organisation of the historical material must 
be carried out in a spirit of faithfulness to the past. 
Moral Judgements in History  
Butterfield’s dialectical understanding of the historical process makes him to doubt 
the validity of the individualistic moral judgements which were popular among the 
historians of the past and many of his contemporaries. His opposition to moral 
judgements involves more than one claim and deserves systematic consideration. 
First, Butterfield argues that by assuming the role of the judge instead that of the 
detective, the historian cannot develop the imaginative sympathy which is 
necessary to understand the actors of the past. Secondly, the moral indignation 
that it is easy for the historian to express ex post facto does not always take into 
account the importance of the conditioning circumstances of human action. For 
example, accusing a ruler for engaging in religious persecution ignores the 
possibility than such persecutions were a commonplace during his time, and were 
considered to be necessary for the protection of the state or of what was then 
understood as the one true faith. Of course, Butterfield goes on to argue, this does 
not mean that religious persecution in itself can ever be accepted or justified, but it 
rather means that the persons of the past had different views regarding this issue 
and were acting under the influence of a different set of political and religious  
assumptions. Although one should condemn the sin, he must also show 
understanding towards the sinner.  
    Thirdly, Butterfield suggests that moral judgements are rather redundant and do 
not add something to the whole historical picture. By providing evidence that one 
ruler lied and another persecuted, the historian enables the reader to form his or 
her own opinion regarding the historical figures involved in these acts and probably 
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to condemn them on moral grounds. If the reader does not feel indignation after 
having read about the actions, he is not going to feel it because the historian 
expresses his own personal disapproval. Ultimately, Butterfield feels obliged to 
reject moral judgements as applied to individuals because of his dialectical 
conceptualisation of the historical process. To the extent that both Protestants and 
Catholics were necessary to lead to religious freedom in the world, and both Whigs 
and Tories were needed to create the British constitution, the historian cannot 
absolve the first and condemn the second. For Butterfield, different political and 
religious forces are required in order to create a tolerant and harmonious world.  
    As is the case with Carr, Butterfield’s opposition to moral judgements in history 
applies primarily to the kind of moral judgements employed by historians against 
political leaders for not respecting the moral code. In the same way that Carr 
argues that the actual policies employed by rulers can be evaluated according to 
the degree to which they were historically progressive, Butterfield notes that 
political principles themselves can be an object of criticism. What concerns 
Butterfield is not if political and religious freedom is desirable or not, but if 
evaluating political actors according to a universal standard can contribute to 
genuine historical understanding. It is his negative answer to that methodological 
and philosophical question which makes him to reject the belief of Lord Acton and 
others that the historian has the right and the obligation to be the judge of 
historical personalities far removed from him in time. Morality itself is embedded 
in history. To conclude, Butterfield’s rejection of Whig tendency to idolise the 
present at the expense of the past and to search for the present in the past has 
diverted attention away from his critique of positivism and the empiricist fallacies 
of his predecessors.  By drawing attention to the role of the historian in the 
creation of the historical narrative and basing his rejection of simplistic moral 
judgements upon a dialectical understanding of the historical process Butterfield 
manages to show that proper historiography is based on a number of 
methodological and philosophical assumptions that are far from self-evident. 
History presupposes theory.  
II) BUTTERFIELD AND NAMIER 
As Michael Bentley (2005) points out, the debate between Herbert Butterfield and 
Lewis Namier deserves careful consideration not only because of their alternative 
understandings of the eighteenth century but also because of the more general 
questions they posed regarding the nature of the historical enterprise. By offering 
contrasting readings of eighteenth-century British politics Butterfield and Namier 
proved that the kind of objectivity to which the average historian aspires is an 
illusion, and that the way one approaches the events of the past is influenced by 
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his whole personality and ideological  beliefs. Partly as a consequence of his own 
experimentation with psychoanalysis in Vienna, Namier refused to take political 
ideas at face value and argued that they must be understood as the expression of 
deeper psychological operations that sometimes elude the actors themselves (Hall, 
2009). In particular, Namier was anxious to dissociate the appearance of 
eighteenth-century politics from its essence, and to show that the reasons why 
men enter into politics have very little to do with the promotion of the common 
good. As he characteristically argued, the parliamentarians of the eighteenth 
century “no more dreamt of a seat in the House in order to benefit humanity than 
a child dreams a birthday cake that others may eat it” (Namier, 1929: 4). British 
political life was more or less a reflection of its economic foundations and the 
changes that occurred in the composition of the Parliament had to do with 
processes such as “the rise and fall of various branches of commerce, the 
development of modern finance, and the advance of capitalist organisation in 
industry” (Namier, 1930/1961: 5). Contrary to the Whig historians, Namier did not 
idealise the Parliament or any other centre of power and, as his critics suggested, 
tended to present a rather grim picture of political life in general and ultimately to 
take the mind out of politics.  
     Butterfield’s critique of Namier was motivated by a variety of considerations 
which were not only intellectual in nature but included professional and even 
personal reasons as well. Even his most sympathetic biographer does not hide the 
fact that Butterfield felt somewhat uncomfortable with Namier’s widespread 
success and recognition, and saw in him his most important competitor in the field 
of eighteenth-century English constitutional history (McIntire, 2004). However, 
whatever his ulterior motives might have been, Butterfield raised a number of 
intriguing questions which do not have to do exclusively with Namier, but concern 
the definition of the relationship between ethics and politics. For Butterfield, 
political actors are more free and responsible than Namier wants us to believe, and 
their actions cannot be fully explained in terms of economic or other constraints. 
Although Butterfield did not deny that material self-interest and party discipline to 
a certain extent influenced the actions of eighteenth-century statesmen, he 
painted a more complicated and ultimately a more realistic picture than Namier.  
George III, Lord North, and the People  
Butterfield’s views on eighteenth-century political struggles in England can be 
found in  George III, Lord North, and the People, 1779-80. For Butterfield, moral 
principles not only matter in politics but they are horizontally distributed across the 
political spectrum. Despite his limited practical success, George III was motivated 
by a desire to unite the nation and fight corruption, while his critics also had “their 
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egotisms, their vested interests, their pettinesses and their wilful ways” 
(Butterfield, 1949a: viii). Contrary to Namier, Butterfield pays attention to the 
political debates which were taking place at the House of Commons, and makes 
the point that the value of Lord North as a prime minister lied primarily in his 
ability to respond effectively to the various criticisms of the opposition. North 
admitted the general validity of the ideals promoted by his political opponents, but 
argued that they were actually irrelevant to the particular cases he was dealing 
with, or that he had already taken them into account when designing his policy. 
Butterfield shows that the House was not indifferent to the force of the better 
argument, and notes that many of its members determined their attitude to the 
government according to the course of the discussion. Therefore, for Butterfield 
ideas clearly matter in politics and political men are not indifferent to the way in 
which the adoption of certain policies is justified.  
    This emphasis on the ideational aspect of politics does not lead Butterfield to 
adopt a reductionist form of historical explanation as Namier does. The attention 
that Butterfield devotes to economic and population figures in George III, Lord 
North, and the People exceeds anything he had done in the past. In order to 
explain the increase in corruption during the reign of George III, Butterfield appeals 
to economic and political factors, such as the development of commerce and 
industry, and the spread of empire. In order to show the reasons behind the unrest 
in Ireland, he emphasises the problems caused to Irish trade by the War of 
American Independence. The emergence of an oppositional public sphere outside 
London is related to the more general development of the countryside expressed 
in the creation of large urban centres such as Bristol, Norwich, and Manchester. 
Although this interest in socio-economic issues and demographic developments is 
not enough to turn Butterfield into a social historian, it represents an attempt to 
combine the traditional interests of the constitutional historian with the new 
historiographical trends that emerged after the Great War. In his effort to refute 
the kind of economic reductionism employed by Namier Butterfield does not deny 
the importance of economic factors in general but rather shows how complex 
political reality actually is.   
     Probably the book’s most interesting dimension has to do with Butterfield’s 
appreciation of the importance of the role of the popular factor in politics. 
Contrary to Namier, Butterfield does not limit his historical account to the actions 
and omissions of professional politicians, but is especially interested in the role of 
various organisations of the civil society. Indeed, the popular factor and its 
involvement in politics determine the book’s chronological limits and underlie 
Butterfield’s overall argument. For him, the last months of 1779 and the early part 
of 1880 are especially interesting to the historian because of the development of 
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novel forms of political conflict which lead to the emergence of a quasi-
revolutionary situation in England and Ireland. It is during this period that England 
came close to something resembling the French Revolution. Butterfield’s 
appreciation of the importance of the popular factor in politics does not lead him 
to embrace political extremism. Organisations of the civil society such as the 
Yorkshire movement are praised for their moderation while Butterfield makes clear 
his fear of violence and revolution in his discussion of among other things the Irish 
movement and the Gordon Riots.  
     Independent of his evaluation of particular figures, it is important to note that 
Butterfield’s overall attitude towards extra-parliamentary political activity is 
positive and he does not see any fundamental gap between official and 
oppositional politics. Especially in times of crisis, the Members of Parliament listen 
to public opinion since they do not want to estrange themselves from their voters. 
The different spheres of political action that Butterfield depicts are therefore in 
regular contact with one another. The modernisation of state and society emerges 
as the result of the osmosis between social movements and professional politicians 
and is not to be attributed exclusively to the one or the other. Therefore, George 
III, Lord North, and the People shows how political history can assimilate certain 
insights of social or economic history without becoming reductionist and denying 
the relative autonomy of politics or other spheres of social action. For Butterfield, 
the task of the constitutional historian is not to present political men acting in a 
social vacuum but rather to portray the ways in which political actors manage to 
gradually modify the external conditions of their action. Political action does not 
aim only to the reproduction of existing hierarchies but also to social change and is 
by no means the privilege of professional politicians. As Butterfield help us to 
realise, the problem with Namier was not that he showed the various 
considerations influencing politicians, but that he tried to interpret politics through 
something else.  
George III and the Historians  
Butterfield’s various disagreements with Namier are also discussed in George III 
and the Historians (1957). Although he sees in Namier a pioneer whose work is 
something more than a reflection of twentieth-century cultural developments, 
Butterfield expresses dissatisfaction with a number of omissions that characterise 
Namier’s approach. First of all, Butterfield accuses him for ignoring parliamentary 
debates and for paying too much attention to social structure and vested interests.  
In George III, Lord North, and the People, Butterfield had already shown how the 
Members of Parliament were influenced by the course of debate in the House, and 
frequently acted under the pressure of popular feeling or a sense of national 
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emergency. Secondly, Butterfield argues that Namier has very little to say about 
the work that ministers carried out in their departments and the ways in which 
they arrived at important decisions. Finally, he castigates Namier for not properly 
assessing human beings in their double dimension as repositories of interests and 
carriers of ideas. The ways in which men conceptualise a particular situation and 
their feeling of right or wrong are among the factors which determine the human 
behaviour and make it something not susceptible to easy scientific prediction.  
    Although Butterfield does not fully abandon the hope that something like an 
impartial approach to the past is possible, or at least that certain historical 
interpretations are preferable to others, he admits that the relationship between 
the historian and his evidence is a rather complex one and that “knowledge in itself 
is never enough to save us from sin” (Butterfield, 1957: 9). The most interesting 
point made in the book is that historians are clearly influenced by the environment 
in which they work and therefore “in different periods new historical outlooks are 
liable to emerge” (Butterfield, 1957: 39).  Namier is not the only historian who 
misapplied certain contemporary ideas to the interpretation of the past. 
Nineteenth-century historians like Erskine May made a similar mistake when 
evaluating George III and his system of government according to the political ideas 
of their own age.  
    Despite their important differences discussed in this section, Butterfield and 
Namier also had a number of interesting similarities. Both historians chose as their 
preferred field of study eighteenth-century British constitutional history and tried 
to apply to political history the insights of social and economic history. The fact 
that Namier went down that road further than Butterfield ever did is undeniable, 
but he did so at significant cost. Showing the social and economic foundations of 
political life is very different from reducing political life to those foundations. As 
Keene (2008) has noted, Butterfield’s opposition to Namier and his followers had 
ultimately to do with the way in which they portrayed the individual as a mere 
appendage of familial and economic structures and denied his relative autonomy. 
The emphasis on different spheres of social and political action that underlies 
Butterfield’s critique of Namier is supplemented by the recognition of the 
existence of different levels of interpretation for historical events, which is 
analysed next. As a theorist of history, Butterfield managed to show that the kind 
of individual actor concerning mainstream historians, economists, and 
international theorists is only part of a multidimensional historical reality.  
 
 
59 
 
III)      GOD AND PROVIDENCE IN HISTORY 
 
Butterfield’s belief in Providence is an important aspect of his opposition to 
methodological individualism and provides the clearest example of how his 
Christianity—and especially his Methodism—influences his understanding of 
historical events. As we shall see in Chapter 6, despite his frequent public appeals 
to Christianity, Butterfield was particularly reserved when elaborating on its 
political implications. For him, Christianity primarily taught humility and abstaining 
from the harsh judgement of others. However, in searching for Providence and 
God in history, Butterfield shows how a Christian intellectual can express optimism 
and faith in the future without losing sight of the limitations and imperfections of 
human nature. Indeed, in his own version of the Christian dialectic, good and bad 
are not mutually exclusive concepts, since many times in history good arises out of 
events that might be bad in themselves. The link that he tries to establish between 
certain political institutions – such as the balance of power—and the existence of a 
Providential order might be a questionable one, but provides a clear case of using 
history as theory, of trying to derive practical lessons from the experience of past 
generations.  
God in History 
For McIntire (1979), the best place to start in order to understand Butterfield’s 
religious ideas and the way in which they intersect with his work as a historian, is 
the essay God in History which was originally published in 1952. There Butterfield 
argues in favour of the existence of three different levels of explanation for 
historical events. These levels do not contradict one another, but rather aim to do 
justice to the complicated nature of the historical process itself. After criticising the 
fundamental fallacy to put God outside history and to assume that He is not able to 
influence the course of things, Butterfield argues that history unfolds at three 
different levels. In the first place, history is a realm of freedom where the actions 
and decisions of individual human beings make a huge difference. As Butterfield 
puts it, men have free will and they are responsible for the kind of history they 
create and the world in which they live in.   
     The type of freedom they enjoy in the world, however, is made possible only 
because nature and history represent a realm characterised by regularities that 
make human action relatively predictable in its development and consequences. 
After the events have taken place, Butterfield says, the historian is able to describe 
the economic or cultural processes that finally led to the Industrial Revolution or 
the French Revolution. Although Butterfield’s suggestion in this essay that history 
and nature are structurally similar domains is somewhat at odds with his more 
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general views on the subject, he emphasizes the fact that freedom and law are 
mutually interlinked. Freedom is made possible only within a framework of natural  
laws  and one could not imagine even God acting out of sheer caprice in a world 
were everything and nothing could be possible at the same time. The existence of 
certain laws and regularities in history accounts for the existence of the second 
level of explanation for historical events, which depicts human freedom as 
bounded by those causal processes and natural laws that make it possible in the 
first place.  
    The most interesting argument put forward by Butterfield in this essay is that the 
Providence of God represents a third and more general level of explanation which 
includes the other two. Divine Providence does not operate against human 
freedom and natural laws but through them. The existence of this third level of 
historical explanation means that God is present and influences secular history in 
ways that are generally compatible with the individual freedom of will or certain 
laws of  causation. God works through the good and bad aspects of individuals and 
within the framework of natural laws in order to realize His purposes in history. 
Contrary to those theologians or political scientists who seek God’s presence in 
history in the miracle as a retreat from the existing natural or social order, in his 
essay Butterfield adumbrates a distinctively liberal theology, where God’s action in 
history is not incompatible with human freedom and the normal operation of the 
natural laws. The conclusion which Butterfield reaches is that Providence uses 
human beings and natural laws in order to achieve its own purposes, but it does 
not deny their autonomy.  
Christianity and History 
The aims and direction of Divine Providence are more analytically explored in the 
lectures included in Christianity and History (1949c). This book inaugurates 
Butterfield’s career as a public intellectual who uses his historical and religious 
education in order to address crucial social and international issues. Contrary to 
the ideas expressed in The Whig Interpretation of History and God in History, 
Butterfield recognises that not all unintended consequences of human action in 
history are positive ones, and therefore that the historical process in its 
independence from human will and design is not necessarily benevolent. For 
example, according to Butterfield, secular liberalism, despite its intentions, has 
actually strengthened the executive part of the government and paved the way for 
the modern war between peoples. The national state has been formed not 
according to the dictates of secular ideologies, but according to the requirements 
of modern war and its successful conduct. The very scientific achievements which 
gave birth to the modern world are also responsible for the creation of the atomic 
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bomb. Therefore, what Butterfield suggests here is that, although history 
frequently develops in forms not consciously designed by men, the result is not 
always a positive one. Independent of even benevolent human intentions, what 
actually decides the course of events is a certain unfortunate aspect of human 
nature which “draws the highest things downwards, mixes them with earth, and 
taints them with human cupidity” (Butterfield, 1949c: 39). 
    It should be noted that Butterfield’s account of human nature in Christianity and 
History is characterised by a fundamental tension between a historicist and an 
essentialist understanding. On the one hand, writing a few years after the end of 
World War II, he presents the problem of modern barbarism as a historical 
problem which is not susceptible to an easy moral or legal interpretation.  During 
the war, he notes, the usual material from which human nature is made found 
itself under extraordinary pressure, and responded in ways which would be 
unthinkable under normal conditions. Describing certain acts as crimes or moral 
errors is not going to help us understand what actually caused them under such 
extreme historical circumstances. The civilized type of human character which we 
take for granted in the West is in reality the product of systematic education and 
discipline which produced their positive results in the course of centuries. Through 
arguments such as these, Butterfield leads the reader to the conclusion that good 
and evil in human behaviour can be attributed to the power of the circumstances, 
and not to an unchanging human nature.  
     On the other hand, however, Butterfield treats human nature as an 
independent variable which poses severe limits on what can be realistically 
achieved in politics and society.  Human beings are characterised not only by 
acquisitiveness and an unjustified pride, but also by the tendency to promote their 
own conception of the good without consideration for the views and sensibilities of 
other people. This is evident in the sin of self-righteousness which is the most 
politically relevant sin and the most clearly responsible for the religious and 
political conflicts that determined the development of the modern world. As a 
result of self-righteousness, cupidity, and various form of egotism, ambitious 
political projects, such as that of the League of Nations, are condemned to fail. 
Because of human nature as we know it, Butterfield claims, it is unrealistic to 
believe that violence can be permanently eliminated from human relations. Even 
the best human inventions and institutions are sooner or later being corrupted by 
the dark underside of human psyche. Interestingly enough, although Butterfield at 
various points urges his readers to recognise the futility of creating an organisation 
such as the League of Nations, he nowhere mentions in detail the diplomatic and 
institutional problems that led the League to failure. His prescriptions are based on 
anthropological and not on sociological premises and therefore acquire a dogmatic 
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and abstract dimension which is essentially alien to his more general 
methodological outlook.    
    The tension between these two different understandings of human nature and 
their respective consequences for international history is apparently resolved by 
Butterfield’s recognition of the role of Providence. For Butterfield, the existence of 
a providential order is something that must be taken for granted by the Christian 
and the non-Christian alike and represents the best way to find meaning in 
mundane history. Providence’s main function is to create good out of evil in 
history, and to enable one to come to terms with disastrous or painful experiences. 
For example, The Fire of London enabled the people to rebuild the city according 
to a better plan, and therefore not only to continue their everyday life in the same 
way as before but also to improve it. In a similar fashion, the loss of the American 
colonies during the reign of George III made the British to realise the faults of their 
own ways and to produce a more inclusive ideal of Empire. The role of Providence 
is not to substitute human actors for the almighty but to enable human beings to 
reconcile themselves with their own history and to make the best possible use of it. 
The belief in a superintending intellect does not cancel human freedom in the 
world but only makes it more meaningful. Indeed, Butterfield’s belief that good 
comes frequently out of evil in the world puts into question the very existence of 
evil, at least as it is conventionally understood. It could be claimed that, for 
Butterfield, as for Augustine, the most unpleasant side of human nature and 
history is “like the shadows in a painting, with the contrast enhancing the beauty of 
the whole, though we who are entangled in life are not in a position to see it” 
(Butterfield, 1981: 183-184).  
    From the point of view of international history, Christianity and History’s most 
important characteristic is the link that Butterfield tries to establish between 
Providence and particular institutional mechanisms, such as the balance of power. 
The political legacy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is presented by him 
as consonant with certain essential aspects of human nature and God’s plan for the 
world. According to Butterfield, although eighteenth-century writers drew 
attention to the perfectibility of human beings, their contemporary statesmen 
were rather unwilling to base their diplomacy on such precarious assumptions. For 
them, placing a great power in a position in which the pursuance of hegemony 
appeared to be meaningful, created a great temptation, and even a hitherto 
righteous nation could not be trusted not to take advantage of such a position of 
strength. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the limits between a 
righteous and an unrighteous nation were understood to be historically 
determined by the balance of power. Only the existence of a balance of power 
discouraged the appearance of immature statesmen willing to take unreasonable 
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risks in order to pursue hegemony at the expense of other powers.  What is more, 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, wars were not fought for the 
dissemination of political principles or religious ideas, but rather for the 
achievement of practical goals such as conquering a particular piece of land. As a 
result, the wars of the past were limited in their objectives and their character. The 
statesmen knew very well that when your war aims are too ambitious or 
undefined, it becomes especially difficult to give an end to the conflict. Disguising a 
territorial conflict as an ideological or religious one makes the participants to fight 
with more ferocity and therefore increases the number of the victims on both 
sides. 
    Therefore, Butterfield concludes, fighting for a province, such as Alsace, is 
preferable to fighting for a grand ideological end, such as those which defined the 
wars of the twentieth century. Wars of righteousness are rarely susceptible to 
compromise because they have already triggered the moral indignation of the 
citizens who require a decisive victory against the enemy. Instead of trying to 
change radically the international environment, the statesmen of the past were 
inclined to co-operate with Providence in order to promote certain limited 
interests in a way compatible with international order. This idealisation of the 
political legacy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provides a further 
example of how Butterfield uses history as theory. Apart from underlying the 
methodological presuppositions of historical writing, and introducing the idea of 
Providence as a device through which we can explain the past and think about the 
future, Butterfield uses the European past in an explicitly normative way in order 
to derive lessons that can be applied to the present. The political implications – 
and limitations— of this idealisation of the European past will be further explored 
in Chapter 6.  
IV) TOWARDS A HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Like Carr, Butterfield believed that the modern Western civilisation has a unique 
relationship with history. Although other civilisations, for example the Ancient 
Greek one, showed an interest in history and produced distinguished historians, it 
is only in the West during the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth century 
that history becomes institutionalised as a distinct field of scientific inquiry. The 
twin questions how exactly history emerged as an autonomous field of study and 
which is the relationship between modern historiography and its non-Western 
antecedents apparently concerned Butterfield for a long time. The first question is 
addressed in Man on His Past where Butterfield discusses a number of German 
developments and focuses especially on the role of the University of Gottingen in 
the decades immediately before and after 1800. The second question preoccupied 
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Butterfield during the last quarter of his life and is partially answered in the 
writings which Adam Watson included in The Origins of History, named after 
Butterfield’s The Origins of Modern Science. Despite that Butterfield’s engagement 
with the history of historiography in different cultures and civilisations never led to 
the magnum opus he had intended to produce on the subject, it is interesting 
because it shows how different he was from the average historian. After 
castigating the Whig interpretation of history, engaging in a debate with Namier, 
and examining the role of Providence in history, Butterfield devoted himself to the 
study of how long- forgotten civilisations had approached their past. His 
examination of that problem was not exhaustive, but shows how Butterfield 
remained an intellectually anxious and theoretically engaged historian throughout 
his life. It also shows that like theory, history has its own history.  
The Pre-Classical Empires and Ancient Israel  
As McIntire (2004) points out, Butterfield’s choice to begin with Mesopotamia is 
important because it differentiates him from the average British scholar who 
would normally begin his account of the development of historiography from 
Greece. In Mesopotamia, history took the form of lists which described the 
succession of kings. Butterfield says that military successes were vital to the 
development of historiography in the region, and that religion had a generally 
limited role in both politics and culture because of the absence of a belief in after-
life. In Egypt, on the other hand, the importance of religion in both historiography 
and the running of the state could hardly be overemphasized. The search for 
immortality was not confined to the king, and made the members of the ruling 
elite in general to try to keep their memory alive after death. A lot of things were 
dependent on the attitude of the children towards the parents, and the extent to 
which the living mentioned and celebrated the names of the deceased.   
    Butterfield draws special attention to the Hittite success in historiography, which 
had to do with their attempt to depict the true nature of military conflicts without 
exaggerating their military feats or obfuscating their responsibilities for the 
outbreak of hostilities in the first place. When a war broke out with one of their 
vassal-states, the Hittites recognised the right of the other party to introduce its 
own account of the events in the new treaty that replaced the old one after the 
war. Contrary to what happened to Germany after the First World War, Butterfield 
claims, the Hittites never asked from the losers to sign a war-guilt clause in order 
to make them assume full responsibility for what had happened. It is through 
statements such as that that Butterfield continues to use history as theory in the 
sense of appealing to the past in order to criticise developments that are more 
recent.  
65 
 
    Despite their interest in history, both the Egyptians and the Hittites limited 
themselves to a form of contemporary history which did not have any special 
philosophical significance. The first to see history as something more than the 
repetition of the same cycle were the ancient Jews, who organised their national 
memories around the event of the Exodus from Egypt. Contrary to many ancient 
and modern civilisations, the Jews did not see history as a futile repetition of the 
same events but as a linear and irreversible process. In spite of the difficulties they 
had to face as a small nation located among empires, the people of Israel stayed 
true to their belief that Judgment does not cancel the Promise, and attributed their 
hardships to their own sins and God’s intention to use them for a higher religious 
purpose. Although according to Butterfield their understanding of history did not 
include the modern notion of progress which took shape in the seventeenth 
century under the influence of a variety of scientific and social developments, it 
provided the general outlook out of which such a notion of progress could later 
emerge.  
Ancient Greece and China  
Butterfield’s careful discussion of the development of historiography in ancient 
Greece and China helps us appreciate a number of important differences between 
the two civilisations. Like theory, history is not the same thing for everybody but 
can assume different forms in different cultures and historical periods. In Greece, 
historiography developed mainly in opposition to philosophy, which was concerned 
with the eternal and the unchanging. Contrary to the philosophers whose aim was 
to describe the ideal life within the city, historians were mostly interested in war 
and foreign policy. As Butterfield notes, in Greece there was no historical writing 
before the fifth century B.C., and when it appeared it sought inspiration in 
cataclysmic political events such as the abortive rising of the Ionian cities against 
the Persian rule, and the later invasion of Greece by the Persians under the 
leadership of Xerxes.  
    This invasion was successfully confronted by the Greek city-states and especially 
Athens, which due to its actions during the attack rose to a position of supremacy 
among the other Greek cities. The unsuccessful rebellion of the Ionian city-states 
against the Persians provided the object of the work of the historian Hecateus who 
was a contemporary of the events. Herodotus sought to describe the Greek 
defensive war against the Persians and he wrote a few decades after the event had 
taken place. Thucydides described the Peloponnesian war and tried harder than 
any of his successors to offer a secular and based on evidence historical narrative. 
Although philosophers were primarily interested in political theory and historians 
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in international events and military conflicts, they both accepted the same cyclical 
view of time from which the notion of progress was virtually absent.  
    The generally different routes that historians and philosophers followed in 
Greece were very much at odds with the complementary relationship that existed 
between philosophy and history in ancient China. In almost all of the civilisations 
discussed so far, historiography is older than the recording of events by clearly 
identifiable authors. Greece is a typical case of that, since the epic provided the 
legendary history of the Greeks, and was organised around generally accepted 
conventions. In China, however, history and the historians had always kept a 
privileged position in the nation’s collective conscience and political life. As 
Butterfield notes, historians were amongst the most important functionaries of the 
state, and were supposed to offer an impartial account of political events without 
hesitating to criticize the emperor when they considered it necessary. The popular 
belief that dynasties lose their power and collapse because of moral failures 
assigned to the historian the difficult mission to judge and criticise the rulers even 
at his own personal risk. In general, however, both historians and philosophers 
were tied to certain influential families, which exercised political power at either 
the national or the local level. Philosophy did not have the abstract and deductive 
character, which it acquired in Greece, but was mostly concerned with the 
requirements of social and political reform, and in many cases derived examples 
from history in order to make its arguments more persuasive.  
    The close relationship that existed between philosophy and history in China is 
evident in the case of Confucius whose work can be placed at the intersection 
between the two disciplines. Confucius used an idealised version of the country’s 
past in order to buttress his political arguments which were conservative and 
aristocratic in nature. His defence of the autonomy of certain principalities within 
the country and opposition to central government, Butterfield notes, was ill- suited 
to the realities of his own age, during which a transition had already started to take 
place from feudal to modern forms of social organisation. His aristocratic 
sympathies gave to his preoccupation with history a distinctively political 
dimension, and his exhortation to study and learn from the country’s past made his 
teaching dangerous for the political dynasty which in 221 B.C. managed to unify 
China.  
    Their decision to order the Burning of the Books made China’s relationship with 
its past especially difficult, and probably even more so than in the West after the 
fall of the Roman Empire, since many important books were irretrievably lost.  
Ironically enough, the rehabilitation of the Confucian philosophy was carried out by 
another political dynasty, that of Han, which was de facto opposed to feudalism 
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and managed to conquer power in 206 B.C.  From that point onwards, the study of 
Confucianism and ancient history became an established intellectual orthodoxy 
with decisive consequences for the country’s overall intellectual development. 
China’s troubled political history gave rise to a number of techniques of 
documentary criticism, which aimed to assess the authenticity of historical 
documents, and to ascertain the proper meaning of words and phrases used in old 
texts. Despite his engagement with Chinese history and interest in the alternative 
forms that historiography assumed in different civilisations, Butterfield is not 
particularly interested in identifying ways in which modern historians could benefit 
from ancient ones. Even though his history of historiography is to a certain extent 
limited by a Whiggish evaluation of the past through the eyes of the present, it 
exercised significant influence on the later work of English School authors like 
Adam Watsonxxvii.  
V)      CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, I put particular emphasis on the ways in which Butterfield’s 
methodologically and philosophically informed vision of historiography earns him a 
place among the English School dialecticians examined in my thesis. Like Wight and 
Carr, Butterfield made the point that no history is possible without a theory of 
history and devoted a large part of his intellectual energy to debates with other 
historians. As regards The Whig Interpretation of History, I argued that its 
importance lies primarily in addressing questions not relevant to a particular 
country or political tradition, but rather relevant to historical study as such. 
Although Butterfield condemns and criticises the kind of conservative presentism 
that accepts and glorifies the political present, he is much more open to a different 
form of presentism, which draws attention to the role of the historian in the 
creation of history. The exploration of the consequences of this second form of 
presentism makes the critic of the Whig theory of history to argue that every 
generation produces its own history, which is different from that of past or future 
generations.  
    Butterfield’s examination of the role of God and Providence in history also has 
considerable methodological value, since it rejects unsophisticated forms of 
methodological individualism, and argues that human freedom is necessarily 
exercised within the framework of given laws and is also tempered by Providence. 
Although relating particular institutional and political arrangements directly to a 
Providential order might be not only a use but also an abuse of history as theory, 
Butterfield’s depiction of the European past certainly deserves serious 
consideration. The era of peace and prosperity that he describes depended on 
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conditions which cannot be considered as natural, but should be studied—or even 
actively recreated—by all those interested in the creation of a more humane 
world.  
    Finally yet importantly, Butterfield’s engagement with the history of 
historiography proves that what one understands and describes as historiography 
is relevant to his culture and intellectual environment. Like theory, history has a 
history in the sense that it is subject to change, and that it should not be identified 
with any particular paradigm. Butterfield’s admiration for a particular—Western—
approach to historical writing did not enable him to fully appreciate the 
contributions of other civilisations, but his work as a whole provides a promising 
point of departure for thinking about history as theory. Even putting aside the 
tentative answers he gave to difficult problems, the very issues with which he 
grappled are beyond the scope of those who believe that history is just one thing 
taking place after another thing. The way in which he tried to explain historical 
events by drawing attention to the most different levels of interpretation and the 
most divergent sources of individual motivation is one of his most important 
methodological achievements and makes the tension between agency and 
structure, subjectivity and objectivity, which McIntire has observed in his thought, 
a fruitful one. Like Wight and Carr, Butterfield was unwilling to see human history 
as the expression of a single force or essence and remain firm in his defence of 
pluralism.  
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                                         CHAPTER 4 
                  Martin Wight on History as Theory 
 
The inclusion of Martin Wight in my study of the history/theory dialectic and its 
relationship to the English School is something that ought to be explained. 
Contrary to Butterfield and Carr, Wight never produced a systematic treatise on 
the philosophy of history, which would resemble either Butterfield’s The Whig 
Interpretation of History or Carr’s What is History?. His philosophy of history was 
very closely related to his Christianity, and it is only by considering the second that 
we can start to understand the first. Although—at least in principle—Butterfield 
was keen to make a distinction between his religion and his history, and Carr was 
able to hide his policy preferences under the guise of realism, no such road was 
open to Wight. Despite the fact that the political implications of his religion are 
more obvious in his early writings than in his mature ones, his intellectual oeuvre 
as a whole cannot be understood independent of his Christianity, which is 
analytically explored in this chapter.  
    To the extent that Wight’s support for Christian pacifism during World War II, his 
engagement with the thought of Arnold Toynbee, and his critique of totalitarianism 
as an extreme form of secularism constitute an expression of the same idea, this 
idea is no other than his understanding of Christianity as a historical religion. This 
understanding is analysed within the framework of his critique of Arnold Toynbee 
and calls for the recognition of the historical basis and uniqueness of Christianity. 
As a historically based religion, Christianity imposes unique duties upon Christians, 
who ought to lead a particular way of life. This Christian philosophy of history helps 
to explain Wight’s pacifism during the World War II and the disagreements he had 
with Toynbee. It also conditions his conceptualisation of political totalitarianism, 
which, far from celebrating liberalism and political modernity, involves a critical 
attitude towards all modern societies. As regards his views on history in the sense 
of historiography, his admiration for Toynbee and systematic engagement with his 
work are a very good point of departure for understanding what he wanted and 
what he expected from it.  The tension between objectivity and subjectivity, which 
is present in both Butterfield and Carr, is resolved in Wight’s case in favour of 
subjectivity. If Carr wanted to place history among the social sciences, and 
Butterfield to use it for criticising the present and identifying the deep causes of 
events, then Wight saw it as a form of art. Historians, like other artists, derive their 
first materials from the real world but they use them for their own purposes and 
according to their own vision. What stops Wight from drifting into relativism is 
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precisely his Christian faith, which provides the key for understanding his complex 
thought.  
    For Wight, the limit to what a Christian intellectual should accept, lies in the 
recognition of the fact that the political sphere should not be idolised and the 
sacred should not be subjugated to the secular. Although particular statements 
that he makes within the framework of his defence of Christian pacifism have a 
determinist dimension and show the limits of politics, his Christian philosophy of 
history seen as a whole provides grounds for struggling for a better world. Without 
conceptualising Providence in exactly the same way that Butterfield does, Wight 
also emphasises that the secular should always be interpreted through the prism of 
the sacred and vice versa. The results of conscious human action might not be 
unlimited, but they are certainly important and show that individuals are largely 
responsible for their own history.  
I) CHRISTIANITY AND WAR 
 The most direct statement of Wight’s pacifism can be found in an article published 
in July 1936 in the journal Theology. Writing a few months before him in the same 
journal, Otto Piper (1936) had put into question the existence of any Christian 
political principles, and claimed that all political decisions are a matter of practical 
expediency. Piper’s scepticism towards political ideologies concerns not only 
liberalism and socialism but includes pacifism as well. In his view, reconciliation 
between different nations and social classes is a worthwhile goal, but should not 
divert Christians from focusing their energies within the Church to create an 
organisation characterised by mutual love and understanding among its members. 
The problem with Christian politics is that no Christian principles can be applied to 
the political field without the necessary compromises, and that, since the spirit of 
love and sacrifice is missing from most men, “no real change can happen in the 
political sphere” (Piper, 1936: 136).  
    For Wight (1936), however, pacifism is not just a secular political ideology, but 
constitutes the only choice available to Christians as Christians in times of war. 
Wight is careful to point out that Christianity does not condemn force as such, 
since even Jesus resorted to violence in order to expel the money-changers from 
the Temple, but emphasises that taking a human life is incompatible with Christian 
ethics. Since only God can give life, only He can take it away, and to assume the 
opposite is tantamount to giving the state powers which it should not possess. 
Wight’s clear condemnation of lethal force leads him to put in the same category 
war, abortion, and euthanasia, and to claim that they are all incompatible with 
Christian principles.  
71 
 
    He is also particularly critical towards the doctrine of the Just War which was 
originally formulated by St. Augustine, and further elaborated by St. Thomas and 
Grotius. According to this doctrine, legitimate war is not different from police-
work, and the public and the private spheres can – in principle—be separated. In 
his public capacity, the Christian political leader can take decisions, which would be 
unacceptable if he had taken them as a private individual. For Wight, however, no 
such distinction between public and private morality exists, and taking a human life 
is equally unacceptable in both realms. Indeed, the doctrine of the Just War 
represents nothing more than the essence of hypocrisy, “the legalization of the 
second-best, the low morality that becomes a cloak for the sins that it condemns” 
(Wight, 1936: 17).  
     In his article, Wight’s rejection of the principles espoused by St. Augustine and 
other Christian realists is complete. He says not only that the state has no right to 
take a human life in order to defend itself, but also declares that the aim of all 
Christians should be the sanctification of what Augustine described as the City of 
Man and distinguished it sharply from the City of God. For Wight, abolishing war 
should go hand in hand with action that promotes social justice and helps 
disadvantaged individuals and areas within national borders. He puts the misery of 
unemployment and the British prisons in India in the same category as Germany’s 
ghettos and concentration camps in Russia. Although Wight is initially careful to 
distinguish between lethal violence and other forms of violence which do not have 
the same irreversible effects, in the end he broadens his definition of violence to 
include various forms of oppression and deprivation which, in the final analysis, are 
inextricably linked to the “dynamic of bourgeois society” (Wight, 1936: 20).  
    According to Ian Hall (2006), Wight’s pacifism at this point was heavily influenced 
by that of the leading Christian pacifist of the day and father of the Peace Pledge 
Union, the Reverend Dick Sheppard. In his famous 1934 letter to the press, 
Sheppard described war as an outright denial of Christianity and a crime against 
humanity, and had asked from all those agreeing with him to write a letter stating 
“We renounce war and never again, directly or indirectly, will we support or 
sanction another” (Morrison, 1962: 100). As Hall notes, by 1940 Wight was a 
member of both the Roman Catholic Group Pax and the Peace Pledge Union. For 
both Wight and Sheppard, Britain’s unilateral disarmament was necessary to set a 
new example in international relations and finally put an end to war as such. As 
Wight boldly argued, no real change in international affairs was possible “until one 
nation at least has offered itself as a voluntary sacrifice in the cause of peace” 
(Wight, 1936: 21).   
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The Church, Russia and the West 
Wight’s preoccupation with the issue of war and the dilemmas it poses to 
Christians is also evident in an address given at a conference of Christian politicians 
at the Ecumenical Institute, Bossey, on June 1948. Wight is concerned with the 
cultural origins of the Cold War, and what he saw as the inevitability of World War 
III. The speed with which former allies found themselves confronting each other 
makes Wight to trace the origins of the Cold War in the apostasy of Christendom. 
According to Wight (1948), Russia and the West are ex-Christian civilizations and 
the conflict between them is due to the decline, or, as he puts it, death of 
Christendom. Christendom is defined as a form of society where the majority of 
citizens are practising Christians and the Church is the most influential institution. 
    However, the social influence of Christianity in Russia and the West was reduced 
as a result of the Russian and the French Revolutions. The result of the apostasy of 
Christendom is that in these two different civilizations Christians are a dwindling 
minority and they are called to adapt themselves to a form of society which is 
either non-Christian or anti-Christian. Marxism came to occupy in the East the 
intellectual gap left by the suppression of Orthodox Christianity, and secular 
liberalism came to fill in the West the gap left by the withering away of other forms 
of Christianity.  
    As Butterfield also points out, the organisation of society along non-Christian 
lines in both the East and the West gave rise to the all-powerful state and the 
emancipation of political power from ethical restraints. For Wight, “Leviathan is a 
simple beast: his law is self-preservation, his appetite is for power” (Wight, 1948: 
30). Russia and the West are nothing more than neo-pagan concentrations of 
power, which effectively divided the globe between them leaving outside their 
political control only China and certain parts of the Islamic world. Under such 
adverse circumstances, there is virtually “no part of the earth that lies beyond the 
range either of the American business man or of the Communist Party organiser” 
(Wight, 1948: 28).  Contrary to those religious and political men who believed that 
a modus vivendi could be reached between the East and the West, Wight argues 
that World War III is, humanly speaking, unavoidable. Russia’s population growth 
and prospect of acquiring nuclear weapons give to it a considerable advantage over 
the U.S., and, even if a balance of power were established, it could not last more 
than a generation. The inescapable World War III would be fought with the most 
lethal weapons and with the smallest moral restraints on the part of the 
belligerents.  
    From an ecclesiological point of view, it is interesting to note Wight’s distinction 
between the mystical Church and historical churches. The first consists of all 
73 
 
Christians that have ever lived with Christ as its head. The historical churches, on 
the other hand, are mostly human creations, and have various institutional flaws 
and contingent hierarchies. The Roman Catholic assumption that the empirical 
church can be identified with the mystical Church is nothing more than a heresy 
since these “two aspects of the Church can never coincide, and in the course of 
history the emphasis between them swings and swifts” (Wight, 1948: 34). The 
more the church becomes a part of this world and participates in secular history, 
the less it is able to influence social developments and provide the necessary bases 
for a Christian society. By submitting to the state or acquiring state-like 
characteristics, the church becomes a part of the problem rather than a part of the 
solution. The promise of a final victory, Wight notes, was given to the mystical and 
not to the historical church.  
    These conceptual distinctions and clarifications are necessary to understand the 
meaning of Wight’s declaration that hope is a theological and not a political virtue. 
Hope is to be distinguished from optimism, which is the result of the concrete 
analysis of a given situation. The fact that a world conflict appears to be inevitable, 
does not cancel the possibility that God’s grace might lead in a different direction. 
Therefore, independent of the various initiatives undertaken by the institutional 
church in the West, it is only the mystical Church which “abolishes the Iron 
Curtain” (Wight, 1948: 34).  
    To the extent that there is a thread connecting Wight’s declaration of pacifist 
principles in “Christian Pacifism” and the more realist analysis of world politics in 
“The Church, Russia and the West”, this has to do with his abiding belief that 
Christians and institutional Christianity can do relatively little to mould secular 
developments. The most one can do is to safeguard personal integrity and not 
abandon hope in God’s grace and benevolence. In the final analysis, hope is not 
related to God’s actions and omissions within the framework of secular history, but 
to his very existence. Even God’s non-intervention in secular affairs does not 
eliminate hope, since “the object of hope is not particular things God may allow in 
history, but God himself” (Wight, 1948: 33). Although Wight’s exploration of 
Christian eschatology and the doctrine of the Antichrist are not particularly 
relevant to this study, it is important to note his theological scepticism towards the 
world state. Far from offering a solution to human problems, the world state would 
come only after the ultimate conflict between Russia and the West, and would 
represent nothing more than the “final concentration of Satanic evil within history” 
(Wight, 1948: 41).  
 Thoughts on Violence  
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As various published and unpublished writings show, Wight kept thinking about 
Christianity and war throughout his academic career. In “Development of Christian 
Thought on Violence” (1971), he argues that the term “violence” should be used to 
signify only the arbitrary use of force, and consequently it is not applicable to the 
cases of war and revolution. War is an act of adjudication to which opposed 
political communities resort when there is no other reliable way to solve their 
differences. In the absence of a global political order, war enables particular states 
to discover God’s will and it is this ideal that historically inspired the practice of 
trial by battle. Like war, revolution cannot be a priori dismissed because its aims 
are the liberation of the oppressed and the overthrow of tyrants. Far from 
repudiating war, in this unpublished paper Wight comes close to presenting it as a 
matter of practical expediency for which no general and binding judgements can 
be made. His conclusion is that war is justified when the harm it causes is more 
limited than the harm which it averts, and this was clearly the case in World War II 
which stopped the Nazis from conquering Europe. Contrary to his wartime 
declarations of pacifism, Wight adopts a utilitarian perspective and suggests that 
the employment of force in particular cases should be judged by its consequences.  
    The break with the views Wight expressed as a conscientious objector to World 
War II can also be discerned in the undated paper “Christian Politics”. In this, he 
argues that no Christian politics really exists, and that Christianity does not contain 
any specific political theory. Empire and national particularism, communism and 
free enterprise, are equally valid from a Christian point of view, since historically 
they have all been presented as the expression of Christian principles. The crux of 
Christian politics should be sought not in any particular political doctrine, but in the 
understanding politics as subordinate to religion and as a means towards a 
particular end.  
    Christian charity is applicable only to personal relations, and cannot decide 
questions of public policy.  The difference between charity and justice is not only 
that the first is bilateral and the second multilateral, but also that charity has to do 
with self-sacrifice, whereas justice often imposes duties and sacrifices on others. 
The fact that Wight chose not to make public these thoughts is important, but their 
existence suggests that he was fully aware of the objections that could be raised to 
the absolute and unconditional Christian pacifism that he espoused as a 
conscientious objector to World War II.  
    What is more, in “On the Abolition of War: Observations on a Memorandum by 
Walter Millis”, Wight (1959/2003) argues that any attempt to abolish war as an 
institution of international society must take into account its valuable functions. 
Despite the fact that war has always triggered the reaction of sensitive and 
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reasonable men on both moral and political grounds, it has also performed certain 
indispensable task related to the promotion of desirable change in international 
affairs, the establishment of political independence of hitherto subjugated nations, 
and the protection of a benign balance of power within Europe. The real 
alternative to war is not the disarmament of otherwise sovereign and independent 
nations, but the creation of an international authority possessing the monopoly on 
nuclear weapons. In other words, Wight presents the eradication of war not as a 
simple choice made by otherwise sovereign states, but as something that requires 
the radical transformation of international politics.  
     Wight’s engagement with pacifism can also be seen in his international theory 
lectures.  Pacifists such as Tolstoy and Gandhi are presented as bearers of a 
perfectionist ethic that denies the distinction between love and justice. Love is not 
to be restricted to the private sphere of interpersonal relations, but should infuse 
the public sphere as well and therefore transform justice into the realisation of 
love. Despite his generally positive presentation of pacifists and other “inverted” 
revolutionists, Wight is fully cognisant of the contradictions and problems inherent 
in their attitude to politics. First, as the representatives of a perfectionist ethic, 
pacifists often assume the role of an enlightened minority and distance themselves 
from the majority of the people, whom they intend to lead and guide according to 
their own ideals. Secondly, eventually, pacifists are called to choose between 
quietism and revolution. Between withdrawing from the political sphere and 
keeping their own personal integrity or promoting ultimately unrealisable ideals 
and losing contact with political reality. Although for Wight both attitudes are 
problematic, he shows greater sympathy towards the first choice. Relinquishing 
politics altogether and adopting a passive attitude towards life is understandable 
to the extent that:   
    The political sphere obviously offers nothing but insoluble predicaments; there is  
    inevitably going  to be a third world war which will destroy civilization; for political   
    incompetence and buffoonery  there is nothing to choose between the political parties  
    so there is no point in exercising one’s  vote; all one can do is to retire within the sphere  
   of private life and personal relationships and cultivate one’s garden (Wight, 1991: 257).  
 
This Augustinian distrust of politics helps to explain how Wight ended up seeing 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) as “one of the heads of the many-
headed beast” (Wight, 1966: 123). For him, as for Butterfield, pacifism does not 
make sense as part of politics but rather as an alternative to it. Although if and to 
what extent Wight remained a pacifist after the end of World War II  is a moot 
question, it is beyond doubt that he continued thinking about the relationship 
between Christianity and war, and that he considered pacifism as a legitimate part 
of the study of international affairs and international history. The fact that the 
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practical results that it produces might be limited does not mean that it should not 
be considered as an option. Christians should do what their conscience dictates to 
them, and hope for the best. Perhaps the reason why Wight did not manage to 
provide a very satisfying definition of pacifism and its political importance has to do 
with the fact that politics remains undertheorized in his thought. By drawing a 
dividing line between politics and religion, Wight fails to see how the notion of the 
Christian statesman could be used to provide a normative horizon for politics 
under modern circumstancesxxviii.   
II) MARTIN WIGHT AND ARNOLD TOYNBEE 
Despite the fact that Wight never produced a great work of narrative history or 
historical reflection, he had strong views on the subject. Ian Hall (2006) analyses his 
scattered thoughts on the role of the historian and presents Wight as a critic of the 
assumption that there can be a history without a theory of history. It is this 
emphasis on the theoretical background and consequences of historiography that 
makes Wight to portray history as theory, and places him in the same group of 
thinkers with Butterfield and Carr. For Wight, the accomplished historian is like the 
great artist who brings his own imagination and moral purpose in the handling of 
the material.  As Hall mentions, one of the very few contemporary historians who 
met Wight’s exacting criteria regarding historical study was Arnold Toynbee. Wight 
cooperated extensively with him at Chatham House where Toynbee was Director 
of Studies between 1929 and 1956 and in the production of volume VII of A Study 
of History, where he contributed an Annex and numerous notes.  
    Although as it will be shown in this section Wight was not uncritical towards 
Toynbee whose religious views changed considerably over time, he was impressed 
by the philosophical depth of Toynbee’s work and the revolution in historical 
perspective that it brought about. Wight’s study of modern history at Oxford had 
left him with the feeling that conventional constitutional history does not touch 
several important issues, and that adopting a strictly national point of view when 
narrating historical events is clearly inadequate. Toynbee’s decision to start not 
with nation states but with discrete civilisations, and to search for similarities in the 
development of ancient and modern civilisations, triggered Wight’s interest, whose 
later critique of Toynbee was prompted more by religious than by strictly 
historiographical considerations. The question if Wight’s portrayal of Christianity as 
a historical religion is inherently superior to Toynbee’s defence of religious 
syncretism cannot of course be answered within the framework of my study of the 
history/theory dialectic, and of how Wight used history as theory. It should, 
however, be mentioned that Wight’s defence of the uniqueness of the Christian 
Revelation fits well with his historicist conceptualisation of international change, 
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and explains why Toynbee could not be included in this study. Although historically 
conditioned by a variety of personal and social experiences, Toynbee’s thought, 
especially in its post-World War II manifestations, is intrinsically anti-historicist. It is 
for this reason that, despite his philosophically informed version of historiography, 
Toynbee cannot be placed in the same group of thinkers with Butterfield, Carr and 
Wight.  
The Study of Civilisations and the Obsolescence of the Nation State 
In the first three volumes of the Study, which were published in 1934, Toynbee 
makes a case in favour of the obsolescence of the nation state and the relativity of 
historical thought. He describes nationalism and industrialism as the harbingers of 
the modern age, but claims that from the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
onward industrialism had begun to undermine nationalism and to organise its 
operations on a global scale. For Toynbee, the economic and political parochialism 
of the nation state had become acutely obvious after the end of World War I and 
the creation of the League of Nations. The progress of international organisation, 
along with the renunciation of war as an instrument of foreign policy, meant that 
economic interdependence had been finally supplemented by political and military 
co-operation among states. Under the impact of such tremendous political 
changes, Toynbee claimed, it was time for historians to abandon their nationalistic 
outlook, to stop depicting great powers as self-sufficient entities, and to adopt an 
alternative point of view which would be concerned which societies or civilisations 
in their entirety.  
    Despite the fact that the terms “society” and “civilisation” are not exhaustively 
defined, Toynbee appeals primarily to geography and religion to substantiate the 
existence of these multinational entities. Western civilisation coexists in space with 
the Islamic civilisation, the Orthodox Christian civilisation, the Hindu civilisation, 
and the Far Eastern civilisation. Historically, Toynbee distinguishes between 
twenty-one successful civilisations which from the historian’s point of view are 
virtually equivalent. For Toynbee, It cannot be said that Western civilisation is 
superior to those civilisations that came before or the civilisations that might 
develop after its probable future disintegration. Despite the complacent attitude 
that most westerns tend to adopt towards their own culture, no particular 
civilisation can be legitimately identified with civilisation per se. Toynbee appears 
especially critical towards the West for disregarding ancient civilisations, such as 
the Hellenic and the Chinese.  
    Wight and the majority of contemporary critics provided a warm reception to 
the first three volumes of the Study, which substituted nation states for 
civilisations and explained how the latter emerged as successful responses to 
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challenges posed by the natural environment. However, the second and third 
instalments of Toynbee’s work were not received with equal enthusiasm. As Elie 
Kedourie (1979) notes, Wight was especially critical towards volumes VII-X for a 
variety of reasons. Despite the fact that he was not troubled by what critics such as 
A. J. P. Taylor (1956) presented as Toynbee’s supposed repudiation of rationalism, 
Wight felt uneasy with Toynbee’s political cosmopolitanism and religious 
syncretism. Although he followed Toynbee in treating great powers as parts of a 
wider whole, and was fascinated by the investigation of Western civilisation, he did 
not believe that the value of Christianity should be relativized in order to hasten 
the advent of the world state.  
Religious Syncretism and the World State 
Despite the fact that Wight’s religious critique is particularly applicable to volumes 
VII-X of the Study, it is worth emphasising that the political tendencies which 
worried him were already present in volumes IV-VI. In these intermediate volumes, 
the sovereign state is no longer depicted as the constituent and necessary part of 
larger civilizational units, but rather as the arch-enemy of human security and 
freedom. Ecumenical law and order cannot be guaranteed by a conventional 
international organisation, such as the League of Nations, but only by a new 
comprehensive world order which would resemble either the British 
Commonwealth of Nations or the Soviet Union. What is more, in these volumes 
democracy is no longer portrayed by Toynbee as simply impotent to resist the 
horrors generated by industrialism and nationalism, but as a destructive force, one 
which has been absorbed into nationalist politics and finally given birth to a more 
potent and dangerous form of nationalism.  
     In volume V Toynbee makes clear that he no longer sees the notion of distinct 
civilisations as positive and adequate in itself. Rather, he uses the notion of 
separate civilisations only as a convenient and temporary alternative to the 
national histories written by other historians. According to Toynbee, trapped into 
the political and intellectual prison of the single state, the best that a historian can 
do is to “peer over the battlements and extend our field of vision…as far as the eye 
could reach” (Toynbee, 1939: 374). Ever before the publication of the final four 
volumes of the Study which primarily concern Wight, Toynbee had started to 
search for a more comprehensive point of view. The Communion of Saints, which 
he now advocated, required the creation of a universal political framework that 
would transform war from a material activity to a spiritual one, from one taking 
place among individuals to one taking place within individual souls struggling for 
salvation.  
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    Toynbee’s ecumenical anxieties and explorations become particularly evident in 
volume VII of the Study (1954), where he argues that the worldwide expansion of 
the West makes the political unification of the world extremely likely on either a 
voluntary or a non-voluntary basis. The real question is not if, but how, the world 
state would emerge. His general abhorrence of force leads him to argue that 
creating a world state on a consensual basis would be preferable to seeing one 
imposed upon reluctant parties. Indeed, the creation first of the League of Nations, 
and then the United Nations, offers for the first time the possibility of creating a 
Universal State without violence and catastrophe. In any case, independent of the 
way in which the world state would be created, “the spiritual atmosphere of a 
politically unified world would be likely to have much the same effect on higher 
religions exposed to it” (Toynbee, 1954: 436).  
    Abandoning his pre-World War II sympathies for Roman Catholicism, Toynbee 
presents the four higher religions of his day as variations on a single theme and as 
different routes to the same spiritual destination. Far from being exclusive in their 
insights, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam and Buddhism complement one another 
since they appeal to different psychological types. His evaluation of the world’s 
higher religions is based on the degree to which they are tolerant towards their 
religious competitors, and on his own philosophical assumption that God is Love. 
These two different criteria make him particularly ambivalent towards Christianity. 
On the one hand, Christianity is at the top of Toynbee’s list, because in Christianity 
feeling is the predominant faculty and God is, more than in any other religion, 
portrayed as Love. On the other hand, Toynbee is particularly critical of 
Christianity’s historical intolerance towards alternative religious viewpoints, and, 
along with Islam, he castigates it for assuming the existence of a jealous God.  
 The Crux for a Christian Historian 
The fullest exposition of the arguments that Wight employs against Toynbee’s 
scepticism towards Christianity can be found in an essay that is included as an 
Annex in volume VII of Toynbee’s Study. For Wight (1954), Toynbee is wrong 
regarding both his overall methodological approach and the particular conclusions 
to which he arrives regarding Christianity. Wight argues that Toynbee adopts a 
philosophical point of view, which is primarily concerned with discovering the true 
character of God instead of seeing and recognising His action in history. According 
to Wight’s historical-theological point of view, the main truth about God is not so 
much that He is something but that He “has done something in history; He has 
acted in history to show the meaning of history” (Wight, emphasis in the original, 
1954: 737). Therefore, the quest for discovering the nature of God is rather 
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subordinate to acknowledging his historical incarnation in the second person of the 
Trinity, Jesus Christ.  
    Wight does not deny that Love is an essential aspect of Christianity, but claims 
that the kind of Love with which God should be identified is something more than 
mere benevolence. Holiness and Justice are also essential parts of God’s Love, and 
the notion of the Wrath of God is not missing from the New Testament. With 
regard to Toynbee’s belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence among the 
world’s higher religions, Wight underscores the fact that, even in Christianity, God 
makes exclusive claims. Despite the historical disagreements among Christians 
between seeing other religions as a preparation for Christianity or as its 
antagonists, the fact remains that the Christian Revelation is both universal and 
unique, and therefore Christianity cannot share its place in the world on an equal 
footing with other religions.  
    Furthermore, even if a modus vivendi among different religions could be 
established, it is difficult to see why this should be limited to the four higher 
religions identified by Toynbee. His philosophical approach to religion stops him 
from assessing the prospects of the various religions sub specie aeternitatis, and 
makes him attribute to existing religions a finality that does not help one to 
anticipate future developments. Without denying the importance of a comparative 
approach to religion, Wight draws attention to the fundamental differences 
between the prophetic and world-affirming religions of Christianity and Islam, and 
the non-historical and world-denying beliefs of Hinduism and Buddhism. His most 
serious charge against Toynbee is therefore not that he does not take into account 
the uniqueness of the Christian revelation, but that he never really attempts a 
comparative exploration of the world’s higher religions because of his tendency to 
draw attention to their similarities at the expense of their fundamental differences.  
    Although in the essay Wight does not directly address political issues, his 
dissatisfaction with Toynbee’s cosmopolitanism can be inferred from both 
published and unpublished material. In an evaluation of Toynbee’s work, Wight 
notes that Toynbee’s natural optimism leads him to combine acute political insight 
with various instances of political unsophistication. His moral directness does not 
always do justice to the complex dilemmas facing political leaders, and gives his 
moral judgements “copy-book simplicity” (Wight, 1976: 12). The general rationale 
behind Wight’s post-World War II disagreement with Toynbee is expressed with 
exceptional clarity in an address written for a German radio station in 1969. For 
Wight, Toynbee’s Study represents a curious case where the whole is less valuable 
than its parts, and the promises given at the beginning are not fulfilled. Despite the 
apparent similarities between the work of Toynbee and that of Oswald Spengler, 
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the real counterpart to Toynbee’s A Study of History is not Spengler’s The Decline 
of the West, but Hegel’s The Philosophy of History. As Wight (1969: 9) claims:    
    Hegel’s system, like Toynbee’s, embodies a dialectical principle. The movement of  
    Hegel’s Spirit from east to west corresponds to the sequence of Toynbee’s civilizations.  
    Hegel, like Toynbee, believed that his philosophy made articulate the spiritual content of  
    Christianity, hitherto confined within corrupted forms. Hegel provided a historical  
    justification for the national state; Toynbee does the same for the coming world state.  
    Each is uncritical of his end-product, and gives the impression that history will dissolve in  
    some trans-historical sunshine-the realisation of freedom for Hegel, the saintly society  
    for Toynbee. 
  
It is worth emphasising that Wight felt dissatisfied not only by the particular 
political positions espoused by Toynbee in the post-war years, but also by his 
decision to complete the Study and give to his intellectual categories a finality that 
they should not ordinarily possess. As he mentions in an undated draft entitled 
“Obituary”, Toynbee’s reputation would probably stand higher if he had limited 
himself to the first six volumes of his magnum opus, and avoided becoming a 
captive of his own theoretical system. Although Wight’s belief that Toynbee should 
not have completed his Study is somewhat paradoxical, it shows how wrong Croce 
(1966) is to identify philosophy of history with the search for a single idea or 
principle. Engaging in philosophizing about history might be more useful than 
trying to present and interpret history through the prism of a single ahistorical 
principle. Moreover, the very development of Toynbee’s views, shows how 
misplaced is the attempt to identify history with a particular philosophy of history. 
To the extent that the myriad events comprising human history can give rise to the 
most diverse interpretations, Wight is correct to see the historian as an artist who 
recreates the past according to his own subjective vision of the past, the present, 
and the future. In any case, the disagreements between Wight and Toynbee did 
not concern only the past and the future, but they also extended to the present. 
Wight’s understanding of totalitarianism is no less influenced by his Christianity 
than his pacifism or his criticism of Toynbee. Although a less systematic thinker 
than Butterfield or Carr, Wight emerges as one of the most important Christian 
intellectuals of his generation.  
III)   TOTALITARIANISM 
The differences between Wight and Toynbee did not concern only the past but 
covered the field of international politics as well.  One of the most important 
consequences of Toynbee’s eventual estrangement from any form of particularistic 
commitment was his refusal to recognise the moral superiority of the West in its 
struggle against first German fascism and then Soviet communism. As noted by 
William H. McNeill (1989), at some point before the outbreak of World War II 
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Toynbee considered the possibility that even the violent unification of Europe by 
Germany might be preferable to a new general war. In volume VII of the Study 
Toynbee (1954) castigates the hypocrisy of the ordinary Westerner who believes 
that his own allegiance to the state is qualitatively different from that of a German 
or Soviet subject. For Toynbee, liberal nationalism and submission to the 
totalitarian state are just two different forms, one Apollonian and the other 
Dionysian, of the same reproachful idolisation of the parochial political community. 
In Hellenism (1959) Toynbee projects his reading of twentieth-century 
totalitarianism in classical antiquity, and accuses the ancient Greeks of seeing in 
man the measure of all things, and worshipping their city states instead of the One 
True God. Their man-worship contaminated the modern West, which, from the 
Renaissance onwards, chose to idolise parochial states and disregard the 
fundamental message of Christianity and other higher religions. Referring to this 
unacceptable idolisation of the local political community, Toynbee notes in the 
closing lines of Hellenism that “the Modern World must exorcise this demon 
resolutely if it is to save itself from meeting with its Hellenic predecessor’s fate” 
(Toynbee, 1959: 253).   
    Contrary to Toynbee, who relates political totalitarianism to the idolisation of the 
local political community and to the absence of any reliable distinction between 
Church and State, Wight emphasises the historical novelty and particularity of the 
totalitarian phenomenon. For Wight (1954), totalitarianism cannot be understood 
outside the framework of modernity, and any links between the totalitarian 
regimes of the twentieth century and ancient Greece are far-fetched.  As he argues 
in one of the numerous footnotes he contributed to Toynbee’s volume VII of the 
Study, the ancient Greeks never succumbed to the lethal combination of political 
fanaticism and intellectual coercion which is the essence of modern totalitarianism. 
For Wight, the totalitarian political movements of the twentieth century can be 
explained only within a post-Christian framework, where the exclusive claims of 
religion have been transferred to a debased secular doctrine. What is more, he 
questions the extent to which Christianity and individual liberty are identical to one 
another, and therefore could be opposed to the supposed political absolutism of 
the Hellenic city-state. For Wight, the differences between Western and Eastern 
Christendom show that Christianity is compatible with different political regimes, 
and that the kind of individual freedom prevalent in the West after the 
Reformation cannot be attributed exclusively to its religious heritage.  
 
Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia 
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Wight’s most analytical discussion of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth 
century can be found in the special volume of the Survey of International Affairs 
entitled “The World in March 1939”. This volume was published after World War II 
and its aim was to present the world through the eyes of the main protagonists, 
especially the so-called “aggressor Powers”. In his examination of the social and 
political situation in Germany before the outbreak of World War II, Wight (1952a) 
argues that fascism represents a historical innovation the origins of which should 
be sought in the Industrial Revolution, and the severe social dislocations it 
produced. These phenomena of social dislocation where large sections of the 
population lose their traditional place in society without acquiring a new one 
became particularly acute in the first half of the twentieth century as a result of the 
Great Depression.  
    According to Wight, despite the fact that the Nazi Party in Germany never 
obtained a clear electoral majority, and established a system of government by 
terror after its ascension to power, it satisfied many wishes of the population 
under the guidance of a messianic leader. Contrary to revolutionaries like Cromwell 
in England and Lenin in Russia, Hitler is a typical example of the uprooted and 
alienated individual which the Industrial Revolution, along with the twentieth-
century economic crisis, had created. Having no public or private existence outside 
the movement, Hitler is simply a symbol of the mass man, and his unrelenting 
pursuance of power offers psychological compensation for all those commitments 
and loyalties that are alien to him. According to Wight, Hitler managed to utilise 
several techniques used by communist parties for his own purposes, and 
cooperated with German supporters of communism to destroy the feeble political 
foundations of the Weimar Republic.  
    If German fascism with its emphasis upon a chosen people is a perversion of the 
Old Testament, then communism with its promise of the establishment of the 
Kingdom of God on Earth is a perversion of the New Testament. Wight does not 
examine in any length the problems that the construction of socialism was 
inevitably facing  in an industrially backward country such as Russia, but adopts 
Michael Polanyi’s idea that, despite their differences, fascism and communism 
“might be represented as gradations in a single phenomenon of militant national 
Bolshevism” (Wight, 1952a: 304). For Polanyi (1940), the difference between 
Russia’s quest for justice and Germany’s search for national power is one of degree 
and not one of kind, since in both cases the result is a political regime controlling 
social life in its entirety. Although Wight is right in underlining the reasons which 
made countries such as Russia and Germany vulnerable to the totalitarian threat 
because of their ambivalent relationship with Western civilisation and important 
military defeats, his suggestion that German Nazism and Soviet Communism are 
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two different versions of the same societal model is seemingly contradicted by his 
own presentation of the subjective truth of the time as essentially triangular in 
“The Balance of Power” (1952b).  
The Balance of Power 
In the imaginary dialogue that Wight creates among the great powers in “The 
Balance of Power” (1952b) he shows that each of the three groupings of nations 
that take part in World War II has its own set of political beliefs and material 
interests. As a result of their different ideological constitution, any alliance could 
only be temporary, and could not offer any reliable and long-term solution to the 
problem of peace. Each of the three main protagonists, the Western powers, the 
Axis powers, and the Soviet Union, understands reality in its own way, and 
presents its values as universally relevant. What Wight makes evident in his 
imaginary dialogue is that the tendency of the Western powers to denounce 
totalitarianism in its different guises finds its natural equivalent in the Soviet 
rejection of capitalism in all its forms, and the Nazi assumption that liberalism and 
Marxism are symptoms of the decline of Western culture.  
    Although from the point of view of England, France, and the United States, 
absence of political democracy and rule of law make Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia  seem similar despite their different social foundations, the Soviet Union 
presents itself as an ideological alternative to both the Western and the  Axis 
powers. Especially after the 1938 Munich agreement, Wight emphasises, the Soviet 
Union makes the point that England and France abandoned their policy of 
collective security in favour of non-intervention. The various concessions of 
Western powers to the Axis do not damage their own national interests but those 
of small nations, such as Abyssinia, and Czechoslovakia, that are sacrificed to the 
Axis.  In the final analysis, argues the Soviet Union, the weak resistance offered by 
Western powers against the Axis is an indication that Western governments 
represent the same social forces that in Italy and Germany found their political 
expression in fascism. For the Soviet Union, Western powers and Axis powers are 
part of the same capitalist bloc and their internal antagonism is due to the severe 
crisis of the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, war cannot be averted 
without social revolution and the radical transformation of established social 
relationships.  
    From another viewpoint, Axis powers have their own political reasons to feel 
inimical towards both Western powers and the Soviet Union. Justice is not to be 
obtained through peaceful change and the use of established diplomatic channels 
but through naked force. The various  ideological pretexts used by the Western 
powers and Soviet Union are not enough to hide the timeless truth that the strong 
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rule where they can and the weak have no choice but to obey. Despite their 
various disagreements, Western liberalism and Soviet Marxism are two aspects of 
the same ideological coin, and, especially under contemporary circumstances, the 
first tends to adopt many of the egalitarian features of the latter.  As a result of 
their anti-humanistic and anti-egalitarian ideology, the Axis powers see their 
political opponents as belonging to the same decadent group of nations which 
refuses to recognise certain important truths regarding human nature and society 
and will therefore inevitably perish.  
    For Western powers, the privileged position they enjoy within the international 
system is justified by their plans for the future and, in particular, their intention to 
replace international anarchy by rule of law. Although the military means by which 
they acquired their overseas possessions and their spheres of influence can no 
longer be justified, the League of Nations promises to establish a reasonable 
measure of justice and to transform international affairs. Wight’s own conclusion 
here is that any alliance between the Western powers and the Axis powers is 
extremely unlikely, and that therefore in this particular historical context Russia is 
the holder of the balance of power.  
     Reading Wight’s thoughtful presentation of the thinking of each of the three 
main protagonists along with his earlier rejection of totalitarian government shows 
that his own conscious adoption of the Western point of view in discussing 
international problems does not render him impervious or indifferent to 
alternative conceptualisations of the social world. His approach to the totalitarian 
phenomenon is guided by the belief that the concepts we use constitute rather 
than reflect social reality, and that the more we enrich our understanding of the 
past, the more we realize our potential as agents in the present and the future 
(Kratochwil, 2006). Far from neutrally depicting a given reality, the notion of 
totalitarianism makes sense only within a particular political tradition, which 
emphasises constitutional government and individual freedom. In his discussion of 
international politics, as in his examination of theological problems, Wight does not  
adopt the view from nowhere – which represents Toynbee’s ideal—but  assumes 
the role of the spokesperson for particular traditions. This historicism does not 
however render his political thinking an uncritical one. Apart from the 
denunciation of capitalism and imperialism which we discussed in the first section 
of this Chapter, Wight’s presentation of both America and the Soviet Union as 
post-Christian societies in “The Church, Russia and the West” urges us to think very 
carefully about what we define as “totalitarianism”. Although depicting the United 
States as a totalitarian country would be far-fetched, still Wight draws attention to 
the fact that economic power might be equally oppressive with political power. 
Therefore, for Wight, the fight against different expressions of totalitarianism does 
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not have to do with the defence of the status quo but rather with the struggle for a 
more humane societyxxix. Butterfield’s emphasis on the need to avoid the sin of 
self-righteousness certainly influences Wight’s understanding of totalitarianism.   
IV) CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this Chapter was to present Wight’s Christian philosophy of history. As I 
argued, Wight’s understanding of Christianity as a historical religion, which is based 
on actual historical events and involves particular historical duties and obligations, 
provides the key to understanding his whole thinking. For Wight, the Christian is 
embedded in history and must act within history. As a conscientious objector, critic 
of historiography and political thinker, Wight used history as theory in the sense of 
appealing to a historical-theological point of view in order to criticise contemporary 
ideas and institutions. The kind of Christianity that concerns Wight is not a 
philosophical construction or an expression of timeless generalities, such as that 
God is Love. On the contrary, the Christianity that Wight defends is organised 
around particular historical events and its content can be derived from particular 
historical texts, especially the Old and the New Testament. In order to apprehend 
the content of this Christianity, we must not engage in logical and philosophical 
exercises, but we should rather study the particular in order to arrive at the 
universal. The dialectical character of the Christian religion as both unique and 
universal means that the Christian does not have obligations only towards a 
particular state, but also towards a wider whole. 
    Although during his pacifist phase Wight seemed to identify this wider whole 
with humankind in general, in his mature thinking, and especially in his critique of 
Toynbee, he accepts the view that the idea of distinct civilisations should be used 
when thinking about the past or the present. This historicism does not make him a 
proponent of the status quo, since he understands that European countries have 
various problems to face and alternative conceptualisations of the political scene 
are possible. Finally, the tension between agency and structure is an important 
aspect of Wight’s historical thinking and, as is also the case with Butterfield, it is 
acknowledged without being fully resolved. Presenting Wight as a supporter of 
either personal or impersonal theories of history would be equally misleading. In 
the final analysis, for Wight, humans pay for their own sins. His harsh evaluation of 
the superpowers of his age, and his dissatisfaction with the European past of 
colonialism and imperialism, mean that the catastrophes of the twentieth century 
were not the result of any ineluctable logic of history but of human errors of 
omission and commission. The wider forces present in the historical drama do not 
render Christians and others irresponsible for their own history.  
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CHAPTER 5 
E. H. Carr on History as Theory 
 
 
According to Wilson (2001), the complexity of E. H. Carr’s thought and contribution 
to different debates during his long academic career have with some justification 
generated the impression that there is not only one but there are two or even 
three distinct E.H. Carrs. Recognising the different intellectual personas that Carr 
assumed in the distinct capacities of the IR theorist, the Soviet historian, and the 
social critic, is according to Wilson a positive development, since it corrects the 
initial simplistic interpretation of his work as that of a pure realist. Although as I 
intend to show in Chapter 8 Carr’s international thought is influenced by a certain 
form of liberalism, and the ideas he expressed as a social critic are primarily 
inspired by socialism, his work on history discussed in this Chapter could be best 
interpreted through a Marxist lens.  
    Since the appropriation of Marx’s legacy is a complex process, it would be useful 
to see what one means by “Marxism” in this context. As Anna Green and Kathleen 
Troup (1999) mention in their discussion of Marxist approaches in historiography, 
in The German Ideology Marx offered a vision of historical materialism which is 
dangerously close to a materialist conception of history. By presenting the 
satisfaction of material and psychological needs as the driving force of history, and 
adopting the metaphor of base and superstructure, Marx presented human values 
and ideas as dependent variables which are determined by developments taking 
place in the field of production. A more humanistic and complex portrayal of the 
historical process can be distilled from Marx’s works of narrative history. In The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, for example, Marx acknowledged that 
men make their own history, though under given conditions.  
    The tension between Marx the philosopher of history, who superimposes a 
particular concept upon the whole of human history, and Marx the historian, who 
sees that in practice historical events are influenced by a variety of factors, has 
been analytically explored by the Marxist historians Eric Hobsbawm, Christoper Hill 
and E. P. Thompson, who in their work struggled with the problem of defining the 
relationship between human consciousness and social being. Although Carr did not 
participate in the proceedings of the Group of the Historians belonging to the 
Communist Party of Britain, he also tried to clarify the relationship between social 
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being and consciousness in a dialectical way that ultimately does not attribute 
priority to the one or the other.  
    As a biographer, Carr came close to applying the Marxian principle, expressed in 
the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, that it is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but rather their social being 
that determines their consciousness. However, although Marx understood social 
being in a rather crude way as the reflection of relations of production, Carr 
portrays social being in more complex way drawing attention to traditions of 
thought that develop within particular national contexts. Herzen, Bakunin, even 
Marx himself, are placed by Carr within different national traditions of thought and 
action, and their thoughtful biographies provide interesting insights into their 
historical environment.  
     As a historian of the Soviet Union, Carr emphasised the importance of the 
impersonal forces influencing the development of Russian communism towards a 
particular direction.  As I argue in the relevant section, Carr’s greatest contribution 
as a Soviet Historian was to show that Stalinism was the diseased product of a 
diseased situation, and not something that can be abstracted from the more 
general material and cultural environment in which it grew. Although it is true that 
at times Carr gives the impression that what happened in Russia had to happen 
and things could not have turned out differently, it is also a fact that he kept 
thinking about what could have happened if Lenin had not died so abruptly  and  a 
different person occupied the position that Stalin did. It also worth emphasising 
that, as Haslam mentions, Carr’s monumental reconstruction of the history of the 
Soviet Union arose out of an early fascination with the personality of Lenin and the 
idea of writing his biography. The fact that a book frequently criticised for its 
determinism arose out of the desire to write the biography of a statesman, 
illustrates how personal and impersonal understandings of history are inextricably 
interlinked in Carr’s thinking.  
    Finally, What is History? contains the conclusions at which Carr arrived as a 
biographer and practicing historian. These conclusions depict historiography as an 
inherently theoretical enterprise which belongs with the social sciences, or at least 
a particular version of them. Carr’s view that historiography should not be 
interested in the unique but in what is general in the unique, provides the ideal 
starting point for thinking about history as theory, and brings him close to the ideas 
expressed by Butterfield and Wight. Although Butterfield’s and Wight’s Christian 
background and Carr’s Marxist one make them emphasise different factors when 
discussing historical events, what interests me here is the ways in which they  
relativize the opposition between personal and impersonal understandings of 
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history, and therefore open a promising way of thinking about the past and the 
presentxxx.  It is in this in this combination of personal and impersonal accounts of 
history that the theoretical importance of their engagement with the past mainly 
lies.  
I) POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY  
At the heart of Carr’s engagement with biography lies a consistent attempt to treat 
individuals as products of their historical environment. The influences that 
primarily interest him are not material in nature but they rather refer to traditions 
of thought organically linked to particular nations. For example, Carr’s 
understanding of Marx’s theoretical system as the combination of British 
economics, French political ideas, and German philosophy, shows how Marx’s 
thought was shaped in and by the countries where he lived for long periods of 
time. Although this interpretation of the thought of Herzen, Bakunin and Marx, 
contains seeds of determinism, Carr’s outlook is complicated by the fact that his 
subjects are all revolutionaries. In other words, individuals shaped by society are 
also trying to change society. This complex dialectical relationship between society 
and the individual means that – pace Haslam (1999) and Halliday (2000)—Carr’s 
biographical work cannot be seen as a mere expression of his utopianism or 
romanticism, and it is not essentially different from his History of Soviet Russia. The 
biographer of Herzen and Bakunin is closer to the historian of the Soviet Union 
than it is frequently assumed, since in both cases he tries to examine the role of 
individuals in conjunction with that of wider social forces without losing sight of 
the one or the other. This is fully compatible with the differences of emphasis 
existing between Carr’s historical and biographical work.  
The Romantic Exiles  
In The Romantic Exiles (1933) Carr portrays Alexander Herzen and his circle as 
representatives of a generation which drew its political inspiration from the 
teachings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and its understanding of what is permissible 
and what not in personal relationships from George Sand. Although as Haslam 
notes the book is different from anything else Carr wrote in the sense that it can be 
read as a novel, Carr’s exploration of  the virtues and foibles of his protagonists 
does not make him  lose sight of the wider ideological and political  picture. Herzen 
and his circle belong to a generation of disgruntled Russian intellectuals who did 
not see the European or Russian revolution they expected to see and therefore 
ended their lives “in tragedy tinged with futility” (Carr, 1933: 421). Carr is especially 
interested in the particular historical experiences and conditions, which 
determined Herzen’s political development and led to his ultimate failure as a 
political reformer.  
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    Herzen’s transformation from a sentimental political idealist into an unrelenting 
opponent of Russian autocracy is attributed to his personal confrontation with the 
regime of Nicholas I. The years of Herzen’s greatest influence coincide with the 
early reign of Alexander II and the liberal impulses of the new regime in Russia. 
Herzen’s advocacy of a number of moderate liberal reforms, such as the abolition 
of serfdom and the ending of the censorship of the press were very well attuned to 
the character of the times and the aspirations of the new Russian ruler. Finally, 
Herzen’s failure as a political reformer is not explained by reference to any special 
personal characteristics but is rather attributed to the political environment within 
which he acted. As representative of the liberal centre in Russian political life, 
Herzen suffered the fate of moderate men in times of crisis and extreme political 
conflict. The cause of constitutional democracy, which he advocated, was very 
much at odds with the desires of the Russian people and the polarisation of 
Russian political life along conservative and radical lines. The same political 
programme which made him popular during the early reign of Alexander II 
rendered him politically irrelevant a few years later, when his political ideas were 
too advanced for the rulers and too moderate for the opposition. After the initial 
reformist tendencies of the regime of Alexander II were exhausted, and the 
opposition adopted an extreme political agenda, Herzen found himself in the 
position of a man to whom only one road is open and that road “leads to almost 
certain destruction” (Carr, 1933: 264).  
    The figures of Bakunin and Marx appear only fleetingly in the pages of The 
Romantic Exiles. With regard to Bakunin, Carr notes in the Introduction that he 
discusses his activities only where they intersect with those of Herzen and his 
circle. However, he makes the interesting observation that Bakunin’s revolutionary 
anarchism was much closer to Russian temperament than Herzen’s support for the 
cause of constitutional democracy. Marx is mentioned only in the last pages of the 
book and is not presented in a particularly favourable light. The monotony and 
respectability of Marx’s personal life offers a contrast to the “many-hued, 
incalculable diversity of the lives of the Romantic Exiles” (Carr, 1933: 423).  
    Contrary to Herzen, who was influenced by the form that the Romantic 
Movement assumed in Russia during his youth, and Bakunin, whose denunciation 
of all states and all governments was the logical conclusion of his political 
romanticism, Darwin and Marx chose to subordinate human nature to the 
workings of certain impersonal and scientific principles. Although Carr does not 
hide the fact that he feels extremely uncomfortable with certain aspects of the 
Marxist doctrine, he also recognises that the cause of revolution can no longer be 
the same after Marx. The conflict between Marx and Bakunin is further explored in 
their respective biographies where Carr continues to put his protagonists within 
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particular ideological and national contexts. Although in his comparison of Michael 
Bakunin with Karl Marx Carr displays certain sympathy for the first at the expense 
of the latter, this sympathy should not be taken for political support. Berlin (1951) 
is correct that in his biographical work Carr adopts an attitude of ironical 
detachment towards his subjects. Even when they appear to be remarkable or 
fascinating as human beings, they still are somewhat comical from the point of 
view of the average Englishman.  
Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin  
In Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism (1934) Carr tries to see the intellectual 
influences exercised upon Marx, and the way in which he managed to absorb and 
harmonise these influences in order to serve the cause of revolution in Europe. For 
Carr, Marxism is not just the personal creation of Karl Marx but a composite 
intellectual system comprised of German philosophy, English economics and 
French politics. Therefore, it cannot be understood without taking into account 
Marx’s political experiences in Germany, France and England. The charge of 
fanaticism which Carr formulates against Marx is related to the latter’s supposedly 
blind faith in things which do not exist. Carr makes the point that class 
consciousness is actually limited to a small part of the working class, and that it is 
artificially created by bourgeois intellectuals. As typical products of the Industrial 
Revolution, Marx and Engels overrated the role of the workers and gave very little 
consideration to the peasantry and the importance of agriculture. For both Marx 
and Engels, the countryside scarcely exists and peasants do not even constitute a 
proper social class. Although Carr approaches his subject with a critical attitude, he 
recognises that both the merits and the demerits of the Marxist system are 
intimately linked to a particular period.  
    Despite his criticism of Marx as a social scientist, Carr clearly draws attention to 
his brilliance as an ideologue, and argues that Marxism is an indispensable part of 
the twentieth-century intellectual revolution. This revolution is not content to 
examine the role of isolated individuals in history, but rather searches for the 
influence of wider social forces. For Carr, the Marxist belief in social progress 
through conflict and revolution does not necessarily involve determinism, to the 
extent that every interpretation of human history as something more than the 
result of individual choices would be equally open to same accusation. In a 
nutshell, the various problems that Marxism faces as a sociological description of 
existing reality do not mean that it cannot be useful as a moral critique of the 
existing society. For Carr, recognising the true value of Marxism involves 
acknowledging its debt to the so-called utopian socialists, who antedate it, and 
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who virtually share the same assumptions regarding the egalitarian and liberating 
dimensions of human history.  
    The differences between Marx and Bakunin are analytically explored in Michael 
Bakunin (1937/1975). As Carr argues, both Marx and Bakunin derived their initial 
political inspiration from Hegel, but interpreted his teaching in different ways. 
Under the influence of the Young Hegelians, Marx became a thorough materialist 
and came to see class conflict and the collision of economic interests as the motors 
of history. Bakunin, despite his long and varied career in radical politics, remained 
an idealist who combined anarchism with revolutionary pan-Slavism, and saw with 
distrust Marx’s belief in ideological homogeneity and the importance of the state. 
National feelings and antipathies were also a factor behind their mutual distrust, 
and their conflict for the control of the First International had an important 
national dimension, since Marx drew his support from England and Germany while 
Bakunin mainly enjoyed support in Spain and France. Although Carr mentions that 
Bakunin was the first to draw attention to Marx’s authoritarian tendencies, he by 
no means accepts Bakunin’s arguments at face value and claims that his critique of 
every kind of political hierarchy was hardly compatible with the unconditional 
loyalty he demanded from his own personal followers. For Carr (1950b), the 
conflict between Marx and Bakunin ultimately reflects the tension between 
Western and Eastern conceptions of revolution: Marx was influenced by the 
Jacobin belief of revolution through the state whereas Bakunin demanded its 
immediate destruction and its replacement by something completely different. 
Therefore, apart from political ideologies, even the phenomenon of revolution 
assumes different forms in different social and cultural contexts.  
    To conclude, as a biographer Carr places his subjects within ideological traditions 
that develop within particular national contexts. The kind of social being that he 
uses as a determinant of consciousness is not primarily economic, but rather 
political and ideological in nature. The fact that his subjects –apart from being 
formed by society—also tried to change society with varying degrees of success, 
means that the relationship between society and the individual is a mutual one.  
Indeed, Carr’s interest in actually changing society and not only explaining the 
behaviour of individual actors, subsequently led him to focus his attention not on 
social revolutionaries, like Herzen and Marx,  but on revolutionary political leaders, 
such as Lenin. Despite the fact that Carr’s engagement with biography did not 
always produce the distinguished results that his study of Soviet history didxxxi, it 
was based on the important methodological insight that the role of particular 
individuals should always be examined in conjunction with that of wider social 
forces. It was this insight that enabled Carr to place Stalin and Stalinism within their 
93 
 
appropriate historical framework and to challenge simplistic interpretations of 
Soviet communism.  
 
II) SOVIET HISTORY 
In A History of Soviet Russia Carr continues to place individuals, and especially 
political leaders, within wider national and economic frameworks. Although social 
being continues to determine the consciousness of actors, this time social being is 
defined in more orthodox Marxist terms as a set of material relationships that 
influence the views and actions of individuals. As mentioned, Carr’s magnum opus 
began as a biography of Lenin. Charismatic political leaders do not entirely 
disappear from the scene, but their actions are interpreted against a background of 
material necessity. Leninism and Stalinism are not the mere expression of the 
personalities involved but they correspond to different epochs. As I will try to 
show, the main problem with Carr’s approach is not the emphasis attributed to 
contextual factors in explaining Leninism and Stalinism; the main limitation in his 
reading of Soviet communism is that the appreciation of Lenin as a political leader, 
and the contextualisation of Stalinism, take place within an ideological framework 
that broadly accepts Marxism as a way of understanding society, but questions 
Marxism as a way of changing society. In other words, as Isaac Deutscher argued, 
Carr’s reading of the Soviet experiment is influenced by the belief that some of the 
most essential promises of Marxism—promises accepted by Lenin—were 
unrealisable in the first place. By rejecting in principle the ideals of the classless 
society and the abolition of the state, Carr offers a very pragmatic interpretation of 
what happened in Russia under Lenin and Stalin, but deprives himself of the 
intellectual sources necessary for criticising the most unsavoury aspects of 
Leninism, and especially Stalinism.  
The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 
The first three volumes of A History of Soviet Russia examine political, economic, 
and international developments in Russia under Lenin. Carr’s decision to begin with 
constitutional issues and after that to examine economic policies and the foreign 
relations of the Bolshevik regime reflects his priorities and beliefs at the time about 
what is important for understanding Russia. However, a careful reading of the 
volumes reveals that what really dictates the decisions of Bolshevik leaders after 
the Revolution is the need to cultivate the toleration – if not the support—of  the 
peasants. In the period under discussion, the peasant element represents the 
eighty per cent of the economically active population, and political decisions such 
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as the toleration of capitalism in the countryside reflect the need of the new 
regime to reach a modus vivendi with the peasants.  
     Lenin is portrayed by Carr not as a rootless intellectual or a revolutionary leader 
but as a Russian statesman with a deep understanding of the needs of his country 
and his people. The discussion of general theoretical questions within the Marxist 
tradition is clearly separated from the main body of the text, which assumes the 
form of detailed historical narrative. Carr’s discussion of the Marxist conception of 
the state or the attitude of the founders of scientific socialism towards the 
peasants provide a general intellectual background for understanding the decisions 
of Lenin, but they do not explain these decisions and certainly do not aim to 
provide general philosophical criteria for evaluating political action. As Carr claims, 
although Marx and Engels were writing under the illusion that the maturation of 
capitalism leads to its inevitable replacement by socialism and the subsequent 
abolition of the state, Lenin was soon obliged to reach an understanding with 
various  Russian bureaucratic functionaries and to abandon the hope of the dying 
away of the state.   
    The economic corollary of Lenin’s various political concessions to necessity and 
non-ideological thinking is the adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 
March 1921. By that time, the policies described as War Communism had clearly 
reached their limits and led to a series of peasant uprisings. According to Carr, the 
primary goal of NEP was to grant greater liberties to the peasants, who were until 
then barred from leasing their land or selling their surplus product in the open 
economic market. Although successful in the short term, NEP had many negative 
political consequences, and Carr makes clear the fact that the strengthening of 
party discipline within the Bolsheviks was related to the need to promote 
economic measures which empowered the peasants at the expense of the 
industrial workers, who theoretically represented the basis of the Bolshevik party.   
    Apart from the requirements of NEP, the transformation of the Bolshevik party 
to a monolithic political organism was the result of the operation of those 
widespread social tendencies which had already affected the German Social 
Democrats and the Italian Socialists. It should be noted that for Carr the 
identification of the Bolshevik party with its leadership and the identification of the 
Soviet state with the Bolshevik party is not a serious political pathology, since “the 
evolution of a revolutionary party into a governmental party has been a feature of 
all victorious revolutions” (Carr, 1950a: 185). Therefore, for Carr, already before 
the death of Lenin, the Bolshevik party had managed to monopolise political life in 
Russia, and to transform every social and political struggle to a competition for 
influence within the confines of the party. Although Carr shows that the 
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transformation of the Bolsheviks from a revolutionary organism into a monolithic 
political organisation had already took place before Lenin’s withdrawal, he 
suggests that under Lenin the Bolshevik party still expressed the different views 
and forces that could be found in the Soviet society. Despite the fact that the 
leaders had the last word, discussion was tolerated and the dissidents within the 
party were not automatically treated as enemies of the Soviet state. In the case of 
both the domestic and the international affairs, Carr does not argue in favour of 
the identity of the policies pursued by Lenin and Stalin, but rather in favour of a 
broad continuity in their policies, which is compatible with certain differences 
between them.   
    The third volume of The Bolshevik Revolution analyses the external relationships 
of Soviet Russia and the uneasy balance achieved between the two main pillars of 
Soviet policy:  national interest and the promotion of the world revolution. 
Although Carr claims that in general there is no fundamental tension between 
these two different dimensions of Soviet foreign policy, the Brest-Litovsk treaty of 
March 1918 is presented as an important turning point for the Bolsheviks who 
were obliged to accept the conventional rules of the diplomatic game and to make 
serious concessions to Germany. The status quo tendencies in Soviet foreign policy 
were further strengthened by the establishment of NEP, which among else aimed 
to offer concessions to foreign capital and cultivate commercial relationships 
between Soviet Russia and a number of capitalist countries. Carr shows that as a 
result of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement which was signed just a week after the 
announcement of NEP, and the Soviet treaties with Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey, 
Russia was transformed from an economic pariah into an almost normal 
commercial partner of the capitalist world.  
    What emerges from the examination of political, economic and international 
events between 1917 and 1923 is Soviet Russia’s gradual incorporation into the 
international economic and diplomatic system, and its empowerment as a state in 
a world of states. During that period, the Bolshevik party lost many of the elements 
of a revolutionary organisation and was transformed in ways which enabled it to 
support successfully the policies of the Soviet state. The Marxist belief in the 
possibility of a stateless society and the redundancy of foreign policy is not used by 
Carr as a criterion for evaluating Soviet policies under Lenin. Carr also minimises 
the tension between different aspects of Soviet foreign policy and is generally 
positive towards NEP.  For him, the dilemmas confronting Soviet policymakers 
between 1917 and 1923 can be comfortably reconceptualised as differences 
between short-term and long-term objectives. The Bolsheviks under Lenin do not 
forget the domestic goal of socialism or the international goal of world revolution, 
but they come to accept that the realisation of these ideological aspirations is a 
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long-term objective, which ultimately depends on the successes or failures of 
socialist movements in other parts of the world. The substitution of the Leninist 
combination of domestic and international revolution for the Stalinist 
preoccupation with domestic concerns is examined in Socialism in One Country, 
which provides the key for considering Carr’s History as a whole.  
Socialism in One Country  
After examining the period between the last months of Lenin’s illness and the first 
weeks after his death in The Interregnum 1923-1924, Carr comes to the heart of his 
topic in the three volumes of Socialism in One Country 1924-1926. The first volume 
contains some impressive thoughts regarding the relationship between continuity 
and change in the case of revolutions. Although the announcement of NEP had 
already signalled a turn to realism on the part of the Bolsheviks, it is during the 
period 1924-1926 that the Russian past enters the picture in a decisive way and 
comes to occupy a central place in the building of socialism. For Carr, one of the 
main features of great revolutions is that they demonstrate but do not resolve in 
any permanent way the tension between continuity and change, which had already 
been underlined by Tocqueville in his discussion of the French revolution. 
    Carr’s masterful analysis of the legacy of the past in the case of the October 
revolution draws attention to the external limitations under which political action 
takes place. The role of language and ideology in politics is not totally neglected, 
since Carr shows how the Stalinist doctrine of socialism in one country managed to 
make virtue out of necessity in a difficult situation, and to transform Russia’s 
imposed international isolation to a political choice and ideology. Carr’s reflections 
on  the relationship between continuity and change in the case of the Russian 
revolution help one understand the problems facing most revolutions, and indeed 
all attempts to radically transform the social and political present. As in the case of 
biography, he locates his subjects within national contexts and traditions of 
thought, but there is a strong emphasis on material factors and determinations as 
well. In a nutshell, the greatest methodological contribution of this third instalment 
of volumes is to show that the historian does not examine the action of free 
individuals, but of socially situated actors whose material and ideological 
environment poses severe limits on what they can realistically expect to achieve.  
    In particular, Carr analyses the influence of material, political, and international 
factors, in order to prove that the core of what came to be known as “Stalinism” is 
not something that explains Russian developments but rather something that 
ought to be explained. This attempt to place a political phenomenon within its 
ideological and material context shows how much Carr was influenced by the 
twentieth-century intellectual revolution which challenged the utility of examining 
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individuals outside and independent of wider ideological and material structures. 
Carr’s interpretative approach is not devoid of problems but it proves beyond 
doubt how futile it is to interpret a primarily political phenomenon in exclusively 
political terms. For Carr, any understanding of  Stalinism as a political system must 
start from the analysis of the legacy of the past in its social, political, and 
international dimensions. To begin with, as he points out, revolutions are made by 
men moulded in a specific material and intellectual environment and in a specific 
national tradition. Although the October revolution was carried out by Marxists, 
these Marxists were also Russians and their form of Marxism was clearly 
influenced by the material backwardness of Russia.  
    Secondly, all successful revolutions must create a government which is 
necessarily based on the important distinction between rulers and ruled. The 
members of a government always seem distant to the common man who feels no 
affinity with them. Thirdly, all governments must engage themselves in the conduct 
of foreign affairs and represent their country abroad. The national interests of a 
country do not change because of a social revolution, and there is always certain 
continuity between the foreign policies pursued before and after it.  For Carr, all 
these forces of historical continuity exercise a combined influence upon a 
successful revolution, and oblige it to disappoint those who most fervently believe 
in immediate social and international change. The freedom of revolutionaries is 
necessarily circumscribed by the legacy of the past in its various dimensions. 
Indeed, what Carr suggests is that the revolutionaries accept many of the domestic 
and international goals of their predecessors, and they employ different – and  
more effective—means for the achievement of these goals.   
    In the Russian context, all these considerations regarding the legacy of the past 
in the case of revolutions aim to provide support for the thesis that Stalinism and 
Stalin’s doctrine of socialism in one country do not constitute problems in 
themselves but they rather reflect a particular social, political, and international 
situation. As Carr persuasively argues, Stalin proves more than any other great man 
in history the view that what makes certain individuals great is  not their character  
but rather their unique relationship with their historical environment. For Carr, 
what distinguishes Stalin from the other Bolshevik leaders is not his particular 
ideological positions but rather an ability to associate himself with those policies 
that are destined to succeed anyway. Stalin’s adaptability to his material and 
ideological environment is sharply contrasted with Trotsky’s individualism and 
unwillingness to comply with the requirements of the current stage of the 
revolutionary process in Russia. Their international differences notwithstanding, 
Stalin managed to adopt many aspects of Trotsky’s social proposals and to make 
the rapid industrialisation of Russia a goal of primary importance. 
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    Indeed, Stalin’s support for industrialisation cannot be really separated from the 
doctrine of socialism in one country, since making Russia independent from other 
countries presupposes the ability to produce the means of production and not 
import them from abroad. By gradually abandoning his initial support for the 
peasants, and accepting those aspects of Trotsky’s agenda that were more relevant 
to the Russian situation, Stalin displayed a unique adaptability to his environment 
and established himself as a representative of the political centre within the 
Bolshevik party. His political campaign against first left and then right deviations 
made him appear something like the voice of reason within the party, while his 
doctrine of socialism in one country made him relatively popular abroad. To sum 
up, the gist of the argument in Socialism in One Country is that the essence of 
Stalinism and Bolshevik policy in general does not lie in the application of a 
preconceived ideological doctrine but in a series of successful adaptations to the 
social and international conditions prevailing at the time in Russia and abroad.  
    Carr admits that there is a certain tension between Lenin’s belief in a worldwide 
proletarian revolution and Stalin’s rather conservative international policies, but 
argues that the attempt to create socialism in one country was destined to succeed 
from the moment it became clear that no revolution was forthcoming in Germany 
and Europe in general. From that moment onwards, to insist in the view that the 
socialist transformation of Russia without help from abroad was impossible, was to 
admit that the October revolution itself had been a mistake. To conclude, in 
Socialism in One Country Carr aims to illustrate the domestic and international 
conditions which made Stalinism not only possible but in certain sense historically 
necessary. As Haslam observes, for Carr the form that the rivalry between Stalin as 
a representative of the centre and Trotsky as a representative of the left assumed 
within the Bolshevik party was dependent upon fundamental economic and 
international issues. The arduous progress of industrialization in Russia combined 
with the revolution that did not happen in Europe explain the outcome of the 
political struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. This contextualisation of the 
personalities engaged in the struggle for power is undoubtedly one of Carr’s main 
contributions to the understanding of the period, and provides an alternative to 
the tendency of individualist historians to treat great men as standing above 
history. Carr’s analysis of the circumstances that rendered politically influential – or   
even historically necessary—the doctrine of socialism in one county makes the 
third instalment of his History the most important from a methodological point of 
view and offers a vantage point for considering the work as a whole.  
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Foundations of a Planned Economy 
The fourth and final instalment of A History of Soviet Russia deals with the period 
1926-1929. Carr underlines the importance of the adoption of the first five-year 
plan by the Soviet Union in May 1929 and the collectivisation of agriculture a few 
months later. His analysis of the events which led to these dramatic decisions is 
apparently based on the distinction between two different definitions of socialism. 
To the extent that socialism involves the direction of economy according to the 
collective and long-term interests of society, the policies promoted by Stalin were 
definitely compatible with it. To the extent, however, that socialism means the 
eradication of social exploitation and the liquidation of the political distinction 
between rulers and ruled, the decisions of the Soviet bureaucracy signal a 
departure from it.  In reality Carr does not feel obliged to make a choice between 
these two divergent definitions of socialism, since his main argument is that every 
important historical process has a dialectical character, which makes it positive and 
negative at the same time. This ambiguity of important historical events is 
expressed in the contradictory character of Stalinism, which as a social and political 
system is revolutionary in some respects and counter-revolutionary in other 
respects. Following Engel’s dictum that a revolution always accomplishes its real as 
opposed to its illusory tasks, Carr shows how between 1926 and 1929 the 
Bolsheviks began to transform Russia into an important industrial power without 
necessarily implementing some idealised form of socialism.  
    Despite the emphasis on the economic dimension of the problems under 
discussion, the main contribution of this fourth instalment of Carr’s History is to 
make evident that the priority finally assigned to industry over agriculture is not 
the consequence of strictly economic calculations, but is rather the result of a 
conscious political decision serving the long-term national interests of Russia. 
Although in the first stages of his conflict with Trotsky Stalin frequently appeared 
as the defender of the peasants, making Russia an industrial power is in the final 
analysis the necessary consequence of the doctrine of socialism in one country. 
What is more, the competition between industry and agriculture as different 
sectors of the national economy is not to be identified with the conflict between 
empirically defined social classes, but has mainly to do with the clash between 
different sections of the Bolshevik party. The political rationale behind the decision 
to rapidly industrialise Russia is also revealed by Carr’s observation that the 
worsening of the international situation after 1927 played an important role in 
supporting the cause of the advocates of industrialisation.  
    Although during previous periods the leadership of the Bolshevik party had to 
face challenges emanating from the left, what dominates the period leading to the 
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first five-year plan is a clash with the right opposition within the party. According to 
Carr, after meeting successfully the challenge posed by Trotsky and the super-
industrialists, Stalin has now to face Bukharin and those who not only stress the 
importance of agriculture but also believe that private profit should be the norm 
guiding agricultural production. Although Carr overemphasises the degree to which 
Bukharin as the representative of the right opposition actually threatened Stalin, 
the exploration of this new political conflict serves to justify his more general 
description of Stalin as a man of the centre within the Bolshevik party.  
    The decision to confine the History to the period 1917-1929 has to do with the 
fact that after 1929 Stalin’s control of the party and the Soviet state is complete 
and the opposition in its left and right incarnations largely disappears from the 
picture. Apart from the scarcity of documents describing the activities of the Soviet 
leadership and the declining opposition within the Bolshevik party, one can assume 
that Carr also wanted to avoid discussing in any length the worst excesses of 
Stalinism as a social and political system which became painfully evident after 
1929.  The human costs of the forced collectivisation of agriculture promoted by 
Stalin can hardly be overstated, while Carr’s argument that after 1929 Stalin faced 
no organised opposition is apparently at odds with what came to be known as the 
Great Purge. The persecution of hundreds of thousands for alleged crimes 
committed against the regime does not disprove Carr’s thesis that after 1929 Stalin 
faced no organised opposition, but proves how inadequate it is to identify 
Stalinism with certain useful historical functions.  
        As Isaac Deutscher (1955) has persuasively argued, Carr is mainly a historian of 
the Soviet state and not a historian of the Soviet society. What really matters from 
his point of view is not the conflict of ideas or the competition between distinct 
social classes but rather the conflict between different sections of the Bolshevik 
party. Carr’s  decision to pay more and more attention to economic factors in the 
course of writing his History, does not change the fact that he is primarily 
interested in Soviet Russia as a form of state and not as a form of society. His 
depiction of Lenin as a better – socialist—version of Bismarck also misses certain 
important aspects of Lenin’s past and political legacy.  
    The answer to the question if Carr or Deutscher remain more faithful to the spirit 
of Marx and Marxism depends on how one sees this spirit. Carr (1968) was 
convinced that Marxism was the product of a bygone age; an age when objective 
economic laws were assumed to determine the course of history. Lenin substituted 
these laws for the action of the consciously organised political party, which 
expresses the interests of the working class. Stalin moved a step further towards 
this direction by stopping to rely on the active or passive consent of the workers, as 
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Lenin did. For Stalin, the role of the political party is not to express the real 
interests of the working class but to define those interests at will. Conditioning the 
behaviour of proletarians is no different from conditioning the behaviour of 
consumers through advertising in a capitalist society. What Carr suggests, is that in 
the same way that Leninism is the Marxism of its age, Stalinism is the Leninism of 
its own age.  
    However, one cannot help but feeling that something is missing from this 
equation of Marx with Lenin, and of Lenin with Stalin. Although as mentioned 
above Carr continued to think about Lenin and Stalin even after completing his 
History, his belief that Lenin was more willing to use persuasion and was also able 
to inspire the devotion of the masses, does not go deep enough. What really 
differentiates Lenin from Stalin is the fact that he genuinely believed in the 
Marxian ideass neglected by Stalin but also largely put aside by Carr himself. Carr’s 
identification of the most inspiring aspects of the Marxian doctrine with a 
nineteenth-century utopia, does not stop him from explaining what happened in 
Russia, but it leads him to minimise the differences between what happened and 
what could have happened, if different political leaders had prevailed and the 
international situation was slightly more favourable. Although the elements of 
agency and conscious human agency are by no means absent from Carr’s History, 
they appear to play a secondary role. The more agent-based approach inspiring 
Carr as a biographer and the more structure-based approach influencing him as a 
historian, are to some extent reconciled in what could be considered as the first 
lengthy English School investigation into problems of agency and structure, 
objectivity and subjectivity.  
III)    WHAT IS HISTORY? 
In What is History? (1961/1987) Carr criticises both the nineteenth-century 
conventional wisdom regarding the historical profession and certain contemporary 
philosophers of history who try to insulate history from the social sciences and 
deprive it from any practical and philosophical value. Although Carr’s emphasis on 
the relationship between the historian and his facts, and the presentation of the 
historian as a representative of the age to which he belongs, indicate a certain 
degree of relativism, the belief in the importance of objectivity in history and the 
optimism regarding the future of society and history create interesting similarities 
between Carr and the nineteenth-century historians who provide the necessary 
background to his thinking. In the same way that in The Twenty Years’ Crisis Carr 
shows that history is an integral part of theory, in What is History? he makes the 
point that there can be no historiography without a theory of historiography.  
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    According to Carr, nineteenth-century historians were wrong to ignore the close 
relationship between the historian and the historical facts. Historical facts 
constitute a minority compared to the countless facts of the past, and what 
distinguishes the first from the second is the important decision of the historians to 
attribute special value and significance to them. To the extent that only some of 
the events of the past acquire the status of historical facts, the element of personal 
interpretation is already present even before the historian starts to consciously 
interpret his facts. What is more, the arrangement and classification of historical 
facts are also decisions of the historian who is something more than a neutral 
arbiter between the past and the present. The most revolutionary proposition put 
forward by Carr is that the answer which the historian provides to certain basic 
historical questions, such as when a particular battle took place, is not what really 
qualifies him as a historian. Historical accuracy is necessary for the historian, but it 
does not constitute his essential function. The ascertainment of certain basic 
historical facts is the mission of sciences such as archaeology and numismatics and 
by no means exhausts the role of the historian. To sum up, for Carr the  facts 
themselves do not constitute history but only the first material out of  which 
history is made  by the historians on the basis of interpretation.  
    Like all individuals, the historian is a product of his historical period and his 
reading of the past reflects the needs of the present. Contrary to an overstretched 
sociology of knowledge which sees in the historian and the intellectual in general a 
mouthpiece for particular interests, Carr is not primarily interested to present the 
historian as a member of a closely knit group. What primarily determines the 
historian’s approach to the past are the age and the wider political environment in 
which he works. For example, as he argues, in nineteenth-century England almost 
all historians were inclined to see history as a manifestation of the principle of 
progress. This attitude changed dramatically after World War I when discerning no 
general pattern in history became the rule among historians. Historians, therefore, 
like the subjects of the biographer and the historical personas debated in History of 
Soviet Russia, should always be placed within their historical period.  
    However, as the case of authors such as Grote and Mommsen proves, more 
particular social determinations are not totally absent from the work of the 
historians. According to Carr, Grote failed to analyse the problem of slavery in 
ancient Greece as a result of the disregard of his social class for industrial workers 
in England, and Mommsen projected the political impasse of German liberalism in 
his reading of Roman history. Likewise, G.M. Trevelyan and Namier interpreted 
English constitutional history under the influence of their Whig and Conservative 
political beliefs respectively. Therefore, although Carr’s advice to study the 
historian before studying his work is certainly useful, there is a certain ambiguity 
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regarding what really determines the historian’s outlook. Sometimes Carr suggests 
that the historian ought to be interpreted as the representative of a social class, at 
other points he argues that what matters is his political commitments, and 
ultimately he makes the point that what actually determines the content of a book 
is the date of its publication. The ambiguity that characterises Carr’s discussion of 
the influences that are exercised upon the historian by his environment, show that 
determining the precise content and character of the wider social forces that shape 
the behaviour of individuals is a complicated process. In particular, it could be 
argued that no exhaustive sociology of knowledge can be provided because the 
kind of influences that matter differ from individual to individual and from case to 
case.  
Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin  
Carr’s conceptualisation of historiography as an inherently theoretical enterprise, 
which is based on methodological assumptions implicitly or explicitly accepted by 
the historian, placed him in opposition not only to nineteenth-century empiricism 
but also to contemporary philosophers who defended an inherently atheoretical 
understanding of both historiography and human history. Despite their differences, 
Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper present historiography as a mere compilation of facts, 
and deny that it could be included in the social sciences. They also challenge the 
idea that human history itself could be seen as a directional process within which 
patterns can be discerned and analysed. What is at stake in this debate is whether 
history should be included in the social sciences, and, if yes, what this inclusion 
means for morality and human freedom. Carr’s argument in favour of seeing 
history as a social science emphasises the broad similarities that exist between the 
natural and the social sciences, and presents human behaviour as causally 
determined. Although Carr argues that forging a link between history and the 
social sciences does not exclude moral judgement properly defined, Popper and 
Berlin claim that there is something fundamentally wrong in treating history as a 
social science. Their arguments are very much at odds with the actual development 
of historiography in the twentieth century, but they deserve examination because 
of the wider questions they pose regarding causation and  the exercise of human 
freedom.  
    In The Poverty of Historicism (1957), Popper argues that there is no unalterable 
historical destiny towards which mankind is moving independent of its will, and 
that any attempt to predict the future is methodologically misguided. Popper 
offers a broad definition of the concept of historicism, which includes a wide range 
of political phenomena ranging from Plato to Marx and from Fascism to 
Communism. Historicists of different sorts are castigated for their preoccupation 
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with the problem of historical change and for their attempt to predict the future. 
For Popper, the ambition to predict the future of man and society is wrong because 
of the way in which human knowledge develops over time. Since human 
knowledge grows in a non-predictable way, “we cannot anticipate today what we 
shall know only tomorrow” (Popper, emphasis in the original, 1957: xii). For 
Popper, sociology and history should be kept apart, since the first’s search for laws 
and regularities is unsuited to the second. Indeed, what Popper calls “historicism” 
refers to a problematic combination of history and sociology, which in its search for 
immutable historical laws is supposed to defy human freedom and ingenuity.  
    Although Popper rejects the search for regularities in history on primarily 
methodological grounds, in Historical Inevitability (1954) Berlin problematizes the 
existence of what he calls vast impersonal historical forces mainly on moral 
grounds. For Berlin, to assume that collective entities, such as social classes, 
nations and civilisations, are more important than the individuals who constitute 
them, is tantamount to denying human freedom and presenting the universe as a 
prison. Believing in the existence of historical laws is morally wrong because it 
deprives one of the ability to judge “Charlemagne or Napoleon, or Genghis Khan or 
Hitler or Stalin for their massacres” (Berlin, 1954: 76). Berlin’s interest in the moral 
dimension of the problem makes him state that the arguments in favour of 
collectivism and determinism are not necessarily wrong, but they have disastrous 
moral consequences and therefore cannot be accepted in principle. The most 
startling idea he puts forward is that the problems generated by the belief in the 
causal determination of human action need not concern the historian. Contrary to 
what applies to theologians and philosophers, “for historians determinism is not a 
serious issue” (Berlin, 1954: 34).  
    According to Berlin, history is not a social science, since historians do not utilise a 
specialised technical vocabulary and the average person can easily read their work 
in most cases. In one of the most clear and absolute defences of empiricism in 
historiography, he argues that  “there is no historical thought, properly speaking, 
save where facts are distinct not merely from fiction, but from theory and 
interpretation in a lesser or greater degree” (Berlin, 1954: 70). It is important to 
note that Berlin’s arguments are not directed only against the kind of sociological 
history advocated by Carr, but against every attempt to present human history as 
something more complex than the result of the actions of isolated individuals.  
    Toynbee’s belief in the importance of different civilisations and Butterfield’s 
belief in Providence are also interpreted by Berlin as indications of collectivism and 
determinism respectively. By not limiting his critique only to what Popper describes 
as historicism, Berlin leaves space only for the most elemental form of 
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historiography, which narrates the isolated actions of isolated individuals. The 
aversion that many past historians had for theory and for any conscious and 
systematic enquiry into the methodological presuppositions of history, is 
transformed by Berlin into a methodological ideal which all historians ought to 
follow. From his point of view, what defines scientific communities is not the issues 
they consciously discuss and debate, but what they take for granted and do not 
discuss at all. As he points out, what constitutes a fact or a piece of evidence 
should not be debated among historians, since issues like that are usually taken for 
granted within a given profession. In different ways, Popper and Berlin present 
history as a sui generis discipline isolated from philosophy, theology, and the social 
sciences. Berlin, in particular, presents theoretical unsophistication as an ideal for 
historians and explicitly repudiates every attempt to forge links between history 
and other branches of learning.  
    Carr’s response to the ideas of Popper and Berlin assumes the form of an 
argument in favour of including history in the social sciences and not viewing it as a 
sui generis form of discourse distant from philosophy and sociology. Carr is no 
supporter of historicism in the sense described by Popper, but argues that the 
belief in the existence of immutable laws has been effectively abandoned by both 
the natural and the social scientists. Marx, in particular, did not aspire to some 
ahistorical theory and was especially interested in the different results that similar 
events produce in different contexts. For him, the essence of a phenomenon could 
not be revealed by recourse to pure reasoning but only by comparing its 
manifestations in discrete historical contexts. As regards the issue of prediction, 
Carr admits that social scientists cannot realistically hope to achieve the precision 
that natural scientists have attained. However, he notes that the methods used by 
the social and the natural scientists are broadly similar, and that even social 
scientists cannot completely abandon the hope to predict the future. To the extent 
that social scientists are not interested in the particular for its own sake but rather 
in what is general in the particular, their study of the past necessarily leads to 
certain tentative conclusions regarding the shape of the future. As Carr point out, 
people do not ordinarily expect from a social scientist to predict with precision the 
outbreak of a revolution but rather to delineate the conditions which will make 
such an event likely in the future. Contrary to not only Popper but also 
philosophers of science such as Roy Bhaskar (1978), Carr views explanation and 
prediction as different aspects of the same process, and is by no means willing to 
abandon prediction as a legitimate part of the work of the historian and the social 
scientist more generally.  
    As regards the issue of moral judgements in history that concerns Berlin, Carr 
claims that explanation and the attribution of moral responsibility take place at 
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different levels and the one does not cancel the other. For example, searching for 
the social causes of crime does not deprive the penal system of the ability to 
convict particular criminals for committing particular crimes. The disagreement 
between Carr and Berlin does not have to do with moral judgement per se, but 
rather with the proper object of moral judgements in history. Berlin wants to see 
specific individuals, especially political leaders, condemned for their actions in the 
past. Carr, on the other hand, argues that moral judgement should primarily be 
applied to particular social institutions, social policies, and even whole countries. 
More generally, for Carr, interest in causation in history does not mean seeing the 
universe as a vast prison. Assuming that the actions of individuals have their causes 
is the only way of making sense of the world, and history has to do with the 
systematic search for the causes of historical events. This search is not limited to 
discovering causes, but also aspires to establish hierarchical relationships among 
them, since not all causes are equally important within a given historical 
framework. By arguing that there is no incompatibility betwee causation and 
human freedom, Carr puts into question the false distinction between society and 
the individual.  
    Although some of the disagreements between Carr and Berlin or Popper can be 
attributed to misunderstandings, and their different use of terms such as 
“prediction” and “historicism”, it is still true that they are inspired by very different 
visions of history. Carr’s search for the deeper causes of events and belief that 
history has not primarily to do with the study of what happened but with the 
examination of why it happened, make him a pioneer of the analytical approach to 
history adopted by the historiographical revolution of the late 1960s (Keene, 2008). 
On the contrary,  Berlin, and to a lesser extent Popper, continued to view with 
nostalgia the approach of the nineteenth-century school of historiography, which 
focused on isolated events without paying enough attention to their causes or 
consequences. Carr’s double move of first including history in the social sciences, 
and then minimising the differences between the social and the natural sciences, 
has its own problems, but is still preferable to isolating history from all other 
branches of learning as Popper and Berlin are inclined to do.  
History and the Future  
Any discussion of the views that Carr expressed in What is History? would be 
incomplete without examining the bond that he tried to establish between history 
and the future. Despite his disagreement with influential philosophers such as 
Berlin and Popper, Carr’s understanding of history as a social science was far from 
eccentric. Writing in the 1980s, historians such as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie argued 
that the attempt to exclude history from the social sciences had ultimately failed 
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since everyone had recognised the obvious. As Ladurie argued, building a 
comprehensive human science without taking account of the past is no more 
possible than studying astrophysics without knowing the ages of stars and galaxies 
(Lloyd, 1986: xiii). Other aspects of Carr’s philosophy of history, such as the role of 
the historian in the selection and interpretation of historical facts and the 
presentist concerns and determinations that inevitably infiltrate the historical 
narrative, might be radical by the standards of the Anglo-Saxon world,  but would 
not have triggered much reaction in Italy or Germany. In Italy, Croce had presented 
all history as contemporary history before Carr raised similar concerns in England, 
and in Germany, during the nineteenth century there was a long discussion 
regarding the relationship between history and other forms of learning, such as 
philosophy and art (Collingwood, 1946/1993).  
    The most radical and therefore essentially contested aspect of Carr’s 
contribution to the philosophy of history lies in the relationship he tries to establish 
between history and the future. Although orthodox historians present history as 
having to do primarily with the past and alternative voices within the historical 
profession have frequently raised presentist concerns, Carr is among the very few 
historians who argue that not only the time dimension of the future should 
concern the historian, but also that it is crucial for distinguishing between more 
and less objective accounts of the past. For Carr, belief in some form of historical 
progress is a necessary alternative to the twin dangers of mysticism and nihilism, 
which deprive history of its proper meaning. Religious mysticism searches for the 
meaning of human history outside human history itself, and cynicism assumes that 
history has no discernible meaning. For Carr, both mysticism and nihilism are 
incompatible with modern historiography, since only societies which believe in 
their future cultivate and encourage a systematic interest in the past.  
    What Carr calls a constructive outlook over the past starts from a hypothesis of 
historical progress which, however, is very different from the kind of progress 
taken for granted by nineteenth-century historians. The kind of progress envisaged 
by Carr is open-ended, non- linear, and is carried out by different groups 
throughout history. Contrary to nineteenth-century historians like Acton, Carr does 
not interpret human history in terms of the expansion of liberty but argues that 
different generations attribute a different content to the notion of progress. The 
fact that historical progress is subject to reversions and retrogressions does not 
affect only its development over time but also has important consequences for the 
historical forms it assumes and the actors that are responsible for it. According to 
Carr, when a certain social group stops performing a progressive function in 
history, it is replaced by another. Although nineteenth-century historians saw 
progress from the point of view of a particular class within advanced industrial 
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nations, Carr is especially interested in the role of the non-European world and of 
social groups which were mostly neglected by nineteenth-century historians. The 
anthropological foundations of Carr’s preferred version of progress should be 
sought in man’s use of language and his ability to take advantage of the experience 
of past generations. Every generation builds on the material and intellectual 
achievements of the previous ones, and man as a social being has every right to 
aspire to a future which will be better than the past and the present. Indeed, for 
Carr, such an open-ended formulation of progress is important not only for writing 
proper history but also for harmonising divergent social interests and aspirations 
within a given society. The sacrifices that people frequently make for their society 
or nation can be persuasively justified only in the name of a better future for them 
or their children.  
    Although Carr’s arguments in favour of progress in history have their merits, the 
relationship that he tries to establish between history and the future faces a 
number of important problems. First, it is not clear whether Carr argues that 
progress is actually taking place in history or it is just an intellectual device used by 
the historian to make sense of historical events. For example, Carr mentions that 
the people who fight to reduce social inequalities or to reform the penal code are 
working for the realisation of these particular goals and not for the promotion of 
the abstract ideal of progress. This could lead one to argue that progress is not 
something arising naturally out of history but something that the philosopher of 
history superimposes upon history when interpreting it according to his own 
preferences and presuppositions. Secondly, Carr’s sceptical attitude towards 
religion and religious interpretations of human history do not enable him to 
recognise that his own belief in progress also has a metaphysical element to it. 
Although he certainly employs rational arguments in order to justify his belief in 
progress, these arguments do not exhaust everything that can be said about 
human history, and Geoffrey Elton (1967) might be right when arguing that the 
advocates of secular progress are in reality trying to fill the vacuum generated 
when God was removed from history.  
    Finally, the link that Carr establishes between the time dimension of the future 
and the search for historical objectivity is tenuous at best. For example, one 
wonders if  Carr’s observation that the objective evaluation of Bismarck’s legacy 
would be easier for the historian of the year 2000 than for the historian of the 
1880s, is relevant to the case of  Russia and the eventual demise of socialism in 
that country. Contrary to what he suggested, the development and progression of 
human history do not necessarily bring us closer to the truth, since even after 
many centuries have passed alternative evaluations of the same basic historical 
events are still possible. Independent of these problems, the bond that Carr 
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establishes between history and the future is important because it enables one to 
avoid the parochialism of the present, and reminds us that, as E. P. Thompson has 
argued, “after all, we are not at the end of social evolution ourselves” (Thompson, 
1963: 13). Carr’s exploration of the relationship between history and the future 
brings him close to Marxist historians such as Eric Hobsbawm who have also 
analysed this relationshipxxxii.  
 
IV) CONCLUSIONS  
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the theoretical importance of Carr’s work as 
biographer, narrative historian, and a philosopher of history. As it should have 
become obvious by now, the above labels are only indicative to the extent that all 
aspects of Carr’s contribution to history have a theoretical dimension. For the 
historically inspired thinkers examined in my thesis, theoretical considerations on 
history do not belong exclusively to the domain of the philosophy of history, but 
are inseparable from the work of narrative historians, and even from that of 
biographers. In the capacities of the political biographer, the historian of the Soviet 
regime, and the philosopher of history, Carr aligned himself with the twentieth-
century intellectual revolution, which emphasised the link between the individual 
and wider social forces. Marxism is not identical with that revolution, but certainly 
is one of the main moving forces behind it. In Carr’s historical work, Marxism 
performs the same function that Christianity—in its Methodist and Anglican 
versions—performs for Butterfield and Wight respectively. In other words, it 
provides a source of inspiration and a general ideological background against which 
particular historical events can be understood and evaluated.   
     Carr’s Marxism does not have to do primarily with the emphasis on economic 
factors, but rather with a consistent attempt to investigate the relationship 
between, on the one hand, social being, and, on the other hand, individual 
behaviour and consciousness. This attempt creates similarities between him and 
historians such as Eric Hobsbawm (1998) who have argued that the elucidation of 
this relationship is one of the most important tasks facing Marxist historians. 
Especially in his early biographical work Carr described the relationship between 
social being and consciousness in a rather idealistic manner drawing attention to 
ideological frameworks and traditions of thought that develop along national lines. 
This rejection of economic determinism is not in and by itself a problem for 
classifying Carr as a Marxist.  
     As Green and Troup note, among the British Marxist historians of his generation 
only Hobsbawm comes close to accepting economic determinism in his discussion 
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of the political attitudes of the British labour aristocracyxxxiii.  Hill’s interpretation of 
the English Civil War attributes a fundamental role not only to social classes but 
also to religious and political ideas. Likewise, Thompson’s The Making of the 
English Working Class does not portray social class as a primarily economic 
phenomenon, but rather as a cultural product shaped by religious, political and 
other ideas and practices. The main reason why Carr should be described as a 
historian influenced by Marxism rather than as a Marxist historian, has to do with 
the importance he attributes to the political factor. In his discussion of the Soviet 
experiment, his point of view is clearly that of the Bolshevik leadership and not 
that of the proletarian, the farmer, or the intellectual. How successfully Bolshevik 
leaders from Lenin to Stalin cope with internal and external challenges is the main 
question that his History of Soviet Russia answers. Even Carr’s admiration for Lenin 
is one-sided and based more on What is to be done? than on State and Revolution. 
By problematizing the utopian aspect of Marxism Carr came close to offering a 
realistic understanding of the past, but he did not fully appreciate how Marxism 
can be used to change society.  
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 CHAPTER 6 
Herbert Butterfield on Theory as History 
 
My discussion of Butterfield’s presentation of historiography as an inherently 
theoretical enterprise in Chapter 3, would be incomplete from the point of view of 
the history/theory dialectic without considering his historicist conceptualisation of 
the phenomenon of international change. This conceptualisation helps one to 
understand that international theorists should not try to arrive at the timeless 
truths that Bull (1965) associates with “theory”, but they should rather try to 
assess and evaluate general international trends and developments from their 
particular standpoint. This standpoint is not given, but it is a combination of one’s 
particular place in space and time and his more general moral, religious, political 
and other ideas. In the case of Butterfield, this standpoint is a Western European 
one. Like Carr and Wight, Butterfield was convinced that he was living in an age of 
rapid and all-encompassing change. Although at times his writings give the 
impression that he was preaching some kind of mechanical and unreflective return 
to the past, Butterfield knew very well that no such return was possible. His age 
was an age of revolutionxxxiv, and the trauma of World War I rendered impossible 
any revival of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. After the changes that this 
war had brought about, the task facing European intellectuals was not to revive the 
past but rather to study it in order to reinvent the present.  
    Like Wight, Butterfield uses the political experiences of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in order to criticise the political exaggerations and follies of 
the Cold War.  As a critic of the Cold War, Butterfield dismisses what he describes 
as ideological diplomacy and argues in favour of an inclusive international order. 
The Western attempt to isolate communist states is for Butterfield the result of 
understanding international politics in terms of black and white, and confusing the 
problem of evil with the existence of an especially wicked nation, social class, or 
group of nations. The ideologization of the Cold War is not conducive to the 
promotion of Western interests and it rather serves the cause of communist states, 
and especially Russia. The differences between Russia and Britain were not the 
result of their different social models, but of the growing strength of Russia in the 
post-World War II period. The examination of these developments according to the 
standards set by the European past, and the conscious defence of Western 
European interests in a changing world, did not render Butterfield blind to what he 
understood as the requirements of international order. The reason why his 
historicism does not lead to chauvinism, or some form of European nationalism, is 
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that the raison de systeme that is usually associated with the English School is 
never entirely absent from his thinking. However, as I will try to show in this 
Chapter, what defines his international theory is a commitment to Western 
European interests and values. For some, the appeal to such interests and values, 
and the defence of the ideas of the balance of power and non-ideological 
diplomacy, might be seen as an expression of political conservatism. However, 
what one should bear in mind, is that Butterfield’s ideals were very far from the 
political realities of the Cold War. It is because of those appaling realities that 
conservatives and moderates, like Butterfield and Wight, turn into radicals, and 
radicals, like Carr, submit proposals for international change that are distinguished 
by their moderation. In a changing world, political and ideological boundaries are 
also subject to change. Although in this Chapter I am particularly interested in the 
historicist connotations of Butterfield’s international theory, and especially in his 
historicist conceptualisation of the phenomenon of international change, I start 
from his work on the theory of literature and diplomatic history, because it is 
closely related to the pluralistic methodological approach he employed as a scholar 
of international affairs. Butterfield’s interest in the variety of forces and 
developments that one should take into account when considering a particular 
problem, does not concern only the past but is also applicable to the present. 
     
I) THEORY OF LITERATURE AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 
 
In The Historical Novel (1924/2011), Butterfield argues that the usefulness of the 
historical novel as a form of history is not irrelevant to certain important 
disadvantages and limitations of the traditional academic history. Although 
historians usually focus their attention on particular historical episodes and 
protagonists, novelists are required to reconstruct an age in its entirety. Their 
object is not only the great political and military men of the past but also the 
common people whose life seldom finds its position in the official archives. While 
historians speak about the past, novelists enable the past to speak for itself and 
need to immerse themselves in it before they even start writing. 
     Probably the most important argument that Butterfield advances in favour of 
literature as a form of history has to do with its ability to depict human beings in 
both their private and their public roles. Contrary to historians, novelists are 
concerned with both the private and the public life of their heroes and tend to see 
an individual human being behind every great name. Even when they discuss 
political events and decisions, they do not explain them exclusively in terms of 
context and ideology, but connect them to the unique experiences and feelings of 
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particular historical actors. For the novelist, every consequential political decision 
is, in the final analysis, a private act which was far from inevitable. The ability of 
the novel to depict human beings in their multiple dimensions and to undermine 
artificial distinctions between the private and the public, explains why “historical 
novels are full of life and of people, where history is often bloodless and dead” 
(Butterfield, 1924/2011: 74). It should be noted that Butterfield’s praise for the 
historical novel is not unqualified, since he admits that his own point of view is that 
of the historian and not the novelist. He also says that the historical novel is 
beneficial to the extent that it leads one to the conventional history book, and that 
it cannot function as a substitute for history in its more scientific form.  
    Of special interest is Butterfield’s admission that there are particular historical 
periods which are especially favourable to the method adopted by the novelist, 
and others that are probably more amenable to conventional historical 
investigation. As he points out, a king who rules according to his personal whims 
and wishes provides a better subject to the novelist than a modern prime minister 
who must respect several political and institutional principles and conventions. The 
same applies to a bygone age where war was a game determined by personal 
valour and not a huge and carefully organised enterprise. Despite the fact that 
these arguments could lead one to the conclusion that the historical novel is 
unsuited to the circumstances of the modern industrial society governed by large 
bureaucratic organisations of various types, Butterfield puts forward the 
interesting hypothesis that, under modern circumstances, human personality 
continues to be as relevant as ever. The difference is that, although in traditional 
societies the influence of the individual personality was direct and easily traceable, 
today its influence manifests itself “in the last resort, and it does not show itself on 
the surface of life” (Butterfield, 1924/2011: 75).   
     McIntire (2004) sees in The Historical Novel Butterfield’s first serious public 
statement about life and history. What mainly interests Butterfield, he argues, is 
not to present the novel and the history book as mutually incompatible 
alternatives but rather to reconcile history with literature. To the extent that 
Butterfield emphasises the merits of the historical novel as a form of history, he is 
doing so in order to make clear his personal allegiance to a particular ideal of 
human personality. This ideal of personality as a combination of observable and 
immaterial elements frequently eludes the academic historian, who confines 
himself to the study of certain aspects of the behaviour of certain prominent 
individuals.  
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The Peace Tactics of Napoleon  
The question how academic history can depict whole personalities and address 
general situations in the past animated the research that Butterfield conducted in 
order to produce his first book of diplomatic history. The The Peace Tactics of 
Napoleon, 1806-1808 is based on the letters and dispatches of heads of states and 
diplomats, and focuses on the actions and omissions of particular historical actors, 
who act under the influence of both rational and irrational factors and 
considerations. The book begins with the abortive Prussian attempt to placate 
Napoleon after his victory at Jena, and reaches its climax in the alliance forged 
between the French Emperor and the Russian Czar at Tilsit. Butterfield sees in the 
Treaty of Tilsit the most impressive achievement of the peace tactics of Napoleon, 
and is particularly interested in the ways in which this treaty could be interpreted 
as the product of the interaction of individual personalities in history. In particular, 
he argues that Napoleon was able to take advantage of the utopian aspects of Czar 
Alexander I’s thinking and personality, in order to rearrange existing alliances 
according to French interests and to isolate Britain.  
     It is important to mention that Butterfield was conscious of the fact that he had 
selected a particular methodological approach to the exposition of historical 
events, and that his preferred method was not the only one possible. It is for this 
reason that he makes it clear in the Introduction of the book that he has selected 
to tell the story with particular reference “to the personalities engaged in the work 
of diplomacy” (Butterfield, 1929: vii). This choice is dictated by his desire to show 
how political outcomes can be influenced by contingent factors such as the 
“characters and the idiosyncrasies of ambassadors and ministers who were far 
from home” (Butterfield, 1929: vii). What we could describe as structural factors is 
not completely missing from the book, since Butterfield emphasises the 
importance of certain predicaments, such as the particular situation after Jena, and 
the situation before Tilsit. Although these situations are the result of previous 
human choices and decisions, they cannot be modified at will. For example, 
Butterfield makes the point that the erroneous Prussian decision to declare war 
against France had isolated Prussia and created an extremely complicated situation 
“which prevents her from turning back when she desires” (Butterfield, 1929: 30). 
Therefore, for Butterfield, the objective situations in which one finds himself is not 
something external and given; by their very actions individuals create situations 
which limit their future choices. In a dialectical fashion, the exercise of human 
freedom ends up circumscribing future freedom.  
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Napoleon  
Butterfield’s interest in the individual personality and the ways in which it interacts 
with general history is also evident in his biography of Napoleon Bonaparte. 
Although Coll’s  view that in Napoleon (1939) Butterfield says surprisingly little 
regarding the philosophical dimensions of Bonaparte’s statecraft and is exclusively 
interested in him as an individual might be exaggerated, it is still the case that 
Butterfield shows a remarkable sensitivity towards what defines the object of his 
study as a unique human being. According to Butterfield, his belief in family, strong 
work ethic, and interest in ideas, differentiated Bonaparte from many other 
statesmen and to a certain extent accounted for his political achievements.  
     In the domestic scene, Napoleon managed to provide solutions to long-standing 
problems and to address particular issues arising out of the French Revolution. His 
promotion of a successful educational reform, unification of local legal systems, 
and rehabilitation of the relationships between the church and state, showed 
Bonaparte as a shrewd statesman with an acute understanding of the needs of his 
people. What is more, during his first years in power, his foreign policy seemed to 
serve the traditional goals of the French state and to move within established 
diplomatic channels avoiding the danger of hubris. According to Butterfield, 
Napoleon’s imperialism was not something like the execution of carefully prepared 
plan, but a “curiously supple thing, taking its direction from the accidents of the 
time, conforming to the mobility of events” (Butterfield, 1939: 81). Indeed, it could 
be claimed that Butterfield’s admiration for Bonaparte makes him to attribute his 
achievements to what defined him as an individual, and his excesses and failures to 
the logic and dynamic of the historical situation.   
    Butterfield’s argument that for a time Napoleon conducted his foreign policy 
according to the diplomatic traditions of the French monarchy is important, and as 
we shall see, it is not irrelevant to his understanding of the Bolshevik regime in 
Russia as a more or less conventional and predictable form of state. In any event, 
Butterfield’s early investigation into the relationship between literature and 
history, consequent attempt to write diplomatic history as literature, and interest 
in biography, show a commitment to the idea of personality and its decisive impact 
on international history. This impact, however, cannot be separated from the more 
general historical circumstances, and is not exactly the same in all historical 
periods. Although Butterfield is clearly fascinated by the ideal of human 
personality, his belief, for example, that Napoleonic imperialism arose gradually 
out of the logic of the situation shows that, in the final analysis, even the more 
charismatic personality cannot be examined independent of its political 
environment.  
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II) FROM EUROPEAN HISTORY TO THE DILEMMAS OF 
THE COLD WAR 
 
Butterfield’s knowledge of modern European diplomatic history provided him with 
a number of criteria and ideas which could be used in order to evaluate the age in 
which he was living. Napoleon Bonaparte’s successes were explained by Butterfield 
by his adherence to an older diplomatic tradition, which characterised the 
eighteenth century and was only momentarily disrupted by the French Revolution. 
During his early years in power, Napoleon stayed faithful to this tradition, 
employing war only for limited ends, and when it was absolutely necessary. His 
downfall was the result of his very success, and his intoxication by power, which 
made him disregard diplomacy, and see in war not so much a means to an end but 
an end in itself. Napoleon’s fate could be easily explained by what Butterfield 
(1951b) describes as a scientific approach to international relations. Such an 
approach searches for laws or regularities in the affairs of men and states, 
beginning from general axioms, such as that power corrupts, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely. The opposite approach consistently criticised by Butterfield is 
the moralistic one, which assumes that certain actors are inherently good, and 
therefore they can be trusted not to abuse their excessive power under any 
circumstances. What Butterfield calls “moralism” is not very different from what 
Carr calls “utopianism” and in both cases a supposedly absolute and universal 
morality is used as a justification for the promotion of very particular political 
goals; goals that do not take account of the interest of others.  
 
    Butterfield’s engagement with diplomatic history provided a good starting point 
for developing a form of international theory that would be indebted to the past 
and would try to defend the interests of Europe in a changing world. Building on 
the methodological insights that Butterfield had gained from his study of the past, 
this theory would try to relate subjective factors to objective ones, and help his 
contemporaries to make the best out of a bad situation which had to do with the 
declining status of Europe in the world. As we previously saw, Butterfield’s 
engagement with international affairs can be traced back to 1948 and a number of 
important references to international problems can be found in Christianity and 
History which was published in 1949. To the extent that the tensions between East 
and West were becoming a permanent feature of world politics, and the West 
tended to examine these problems in moralistic rather than scientific terms, 
Butterfield decided that it might be useful to focus his attention on contemporary 
international problems in order to seek a way out of the sterile confrontations of 
the Cold War. For Butterfield, as for Wight and Carr, Europe should not be part of 
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the problem but rather part of the solution. In other words, after realising the 
deeper causes of the Cold War, the Europeans should try to see how they could 
play a constructive role in international affairs by retaining their own political 
autonomy and cultural values.  
The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict 
According to Butterfield (1951a), the wars and revolutions that determined the 
physiognomy of the twentieth century are not to be attributed to the criminality of 
a special nation or social class. The rise of dictatorships, fierce wars among 
peoples, and the transformation of science from a benevolent force to a servant of 
war had already been envisaged by those nineteenth-century thinkers who did not 
take for granted the optimism of their age. The Cold War could be understood as 
the result of a terrible human predicament, as a form of conflict which is “inherent 
in the dialectic of events” (Butterfield, 1951a: 14). For Butterfield, the impasse in 
which political leaders found themselves in both the East and the West was not 
something unprecedented in human history. Most human conflicts that have taken 
place in the course of history are not the outcome of deliberate wickedness, but 
rather of uncertainty and fear that are common to all sides. Although for those 
immersed in a particular struggle it is difficult to acknowledge their own 
responsibilities and abdicate their self-righteousness, the mission of the scholar is 
to teach people to feel “a little more sorry for both parties than they knew how to 
be for one another” (Butterfield, 1951a: 17).  
    Independent of the differences in political culture and ideology, what triggered 
the conflict between the West and Communism was what Butterfield described as 
a situation of Hobbesian fear. Although both the East and  the West were primarily 
concerned with their own security and did not intend to do any special harm to the 
other party, they had no way of knowing that the other side reciprocated their 
benevolent feelings, and shared their apprehensions. Indeed, within the climate of 
fear and insecurity that was the product of the historical situation itself, one could 
easily blame the other for the very existence of the predicament common to both.  
    According to Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2008), Butterfield’s discussion 
of the Hobbesian fear in international affairs makes him the first British scholar to 
contribute to the development of the notion of the security dilemma. This dilemma 
should be understood as an existential condition of uncertainty in international 
politics. It is a result of the fact that, by striving for his own security, one can make 
other parties feel insecure and threatened. Although both the dilemma and the 
ways to overcome it are only briefly delineated in the lecture “The Tragic Element 
in Modern International Conflict” which Butterfield originally delivered at the 
University of Notre Dame, Indiana, and later included in a revised form in History 
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and Human Relations, they are analytically discussed in Christianity, Diplomacy and 
War and International Conflict in the Twentieth Century.  
Christianity, Diplomacy and War 
Christianity, Diplomacy and War (1953) is important for many reasons. To begin 
with, it is Butterfield’s first book explicitly devoted to international affairs and 
probably contains his fullest statement regarding the wisdom of the statesmen of 
the past, and the ways in which it could be utilised in order to address the 
challenges of the present. The book was discussed extensively in the United States, 
and not all comments were positive. As McIntire (2004) mentions, some of the 
views expressed in the book placed Butterfield in the left/liberal part of the 
political spectrum and made him a dissenter during his times. Butterfield’s 
advocacy for a more inclusive international order triggered the reaction of Life 
magazine, which detected in his support for non-ideological diplomacy an element 
of immorality, and questioned whether Soviet Russia could be a part of a new 
international order. However, Butterfield’s views were not dictated by any special 
sympathy for Russia, but rather by an understanding of the requirements of 
international order. The way in which the Cold War was waged, and perhaps its 
very existence, showed that his contemporaries had forgotten the lessons of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and tended to analyse the international 
scene in terms of black and white.  
    Butterfield’s account of the Cold War sees in it the continuation of a disastrous 
period inaugurated by World War I in 1914. Contrary to previous military conflicts, 
World War I was fought as a war to end all wars, and in theory put organised force 
at the service of morality. In practice, however, what it did was to make war the 
master of politics, and deprive diplomacy of its special mission in a world 
populated by righteous nations and their enemies. What Butterfield argues in the 
book is that the Central Powers might be more responsible for the outbreak of 
hostilities in the first place, but the Allies should be blamed for the transformation 
of a military conflict into a war for righteousness, which by its very nature is not 
easily susceptible to diplomatic compromise.   
    What is more, Butterfield’s typology of different forms of state and his 
assessment of the relationship between democracy and violence is not particularly 
favourable to the Allied cause. His argument is that the monarchies of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not especially violent, since their rulers 
were the bearers of a common Christian heritage, and in some cases they even 
belonged to the same family. Democracies, on the other hand, usually need to 
cultivate the fanaticism of the masses in order to support the war effort, and end 
up acting as the prisoners of their own rhetoric. Having aroused the passions of the 
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population and declared war against the wicked, democratic leaders find it 
increasingly difficult to accept a negotiated end to a conflict.   
    This unfortunate side of democratic politics is even more pronounced in new 
democracies, which are always tempted to succumb to nationalism in order to 
provide solution to various social problems. According to Butterfield, 
aggressiveness and activism in foreign policy reach their peak in revolutionary 
states, which behave in a similar way independent of the particular ideology they 
espouse. Even religious revolutionaries tend to disregard the existing rules of the 
diplomatic game and treat other political leaders with extreme suspicion. 
Butterfield contends that a revolution cannot be identified with the atrocities it 
commits in the domestic front or with the problems it creates in international 
relations, and admits that there might be circumstances under which it is 
unavoidable. However, he is very sceptical towards revolutionary states and 
emphasises the dangers that democracies have to take into account when 
designing their policy. 
    For Butterfield, the main problem with World War I is not so much that it took 
place and interrupted a relatively long period of European peace, but that it was 
fought to the bitter end and resulted in the collapse of the European international 
order itself. Britain, by its unwillingness to permit the imperial aggrandisement of 
Germany, triggered a process which ultimately led to the dissolution of its own 
empire. According to Butterfield, the way the war was conducted becomes even 
more inadmissible if we take into account the fact that the belligerents were not 
yet ideological opponents, and they belonged to the same family of nations. Their 
competition for colonies or other advantages should never have taken the 
character of a war of annihilation, which ultimately destroyed international order 
and led to World War II and the Cold War.  
    Drawing on the diplomatic and political traditions of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Butterfield presents a compelling vision of an international 
orde based on the respect for the existence of all participants and the rights of 
small states. According to him, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
war was fought only for limited ends and was the servant of diplomacy. Diplomacy 
had developed its own moral code, which was based on the general pursuance of 
truth and peace. Since lies are sooner or later discovered, diplomats had acquired a 
habit for telling the truth, and they also co-operated harmoniously with their 
colleagues from other countries for the preservation of peace. The very occurrence 
and continuation of a war was a challenge to their professional ethos, since it 
tended to strengthen the position of military men at their own expense. Far from 
interpreting the world in terms of black and white, the diplomats of the past were 
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convinced that they were dealing with rivals, and that the mission of war was to 
decide the possession of certain disputed territories. The limited role assigned to 
war during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries made its appearance less 
likely, since even the gains expected from it were not too big.  
    Butterfield recognises the fact that the experience of the past cannot be 
mechanically applied to the present, and that no historical period can be 
considered to be inherently superior to others. However, he suggests that the 
classical European undrestanding of international order and avoidance of 
ideological diplomacy, can teach the superpowers of his own period a number of 
things. The United States and the Soviet Union should not see each other as 
enemies but rather as rivals, and they should also respect the autonomy of small 
states. The kind of ideological diplomacy employed by both superpowers during 
the Cold War threatened to revive the European Wars of Religion in an age when 
technology had made war far more destructive than it was in the past.  
    As we shall see later, Butterfield’s tendency to search for similarities between 
different historical periods and describe the Cold War as an aberration from certain 
established diplomatic norms of the past, was not without its problems. However, 
he definitely provided a historically grounded form of theory, which aimed to offer 
tangible and practical solutions to current political problems. In order to limit the 
role of war in history, Butterfield suggests, one does not need to engage in abstract 
theorising, but rather to study the most peaceful periods in the history of mankind 
and derive ideals and practical recommendations from there. Of special interest is 
Butterfield’s belief that the problems raised by the existence of a powerful Soviet 
Russia should be dissociated from those related to the spread of egalitarian ideas 
regarding the desirability of a classless society. Although egalitarian ideas can be 
accepted to the extent that they inform Christianity as well, the problems raised 
for Europe by the rise of Russian power are not directly related to the particular 
ideology it espouses. Even if Soviet Russia were a traditional Christian nation, 
Butterfield concludes, Britain could still not easily accept the increase of its 
influence in the world. By arguing that egalitarian ideas are not a product of 
communism but inform Christianity as well, Butterfield provides further grounds 
for not exaggerating the differences between Soviet Russia and the West. 
International Conflict in the Twentieth Century  
The necessity of learning from the past in order to handle the dilemmas of the Cold 
War is also emphasised by Butterfield in International Conflict in the Twentieth 
Century: A Christian View (1960). The aim of a scientific approach in history and 
international politics should be to establish correlations between events in order to 
describe the dangers existing for the international order. Knowledge of the past 
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does not have to do so much with hard information regarding wars and 
revolutions, but it has rather to do with the ways in which scholars and politicians 
absorb and utilise this information in order to confront the challenges of their own 
period. The wisdom to which the study of the past gives birth might survive after 
one has forgotten all the particular information regarding the events of the past. 
To deny that there are certain regularities in history is not tantamount to a defence 
of human freedom, but it rather leads to a distorted understanding of the 
relationship between freedom and necessity. Although the freedom of individual 
and collective actors is bigger than we ordinarily assume, it can only be appreciated 
when the importance of conditioning factors and circumstances is also 
acknowledged. As we have seen, this investigation of the relationship between 
freedom and necessity is one of the main themes of Butterfield’s work as a 
dialectically inspired historian and international theorist.  
    According to Butterfield, the political and diplomatic elites of the twentieth 
century have lost much of their ability to analyse the past in order to guide their 
countries in a turbulent world. Although they process a large amount of 
information, they are unable to grasp the fundamental historical tendencies which 
give a certain degree of predictability to human action. For Butterfield, in falsely 
assuming the uniqueness of historical events, political men forget what social 
scientists, such as sociologists and economists, have to teach. Although social 
scientists do not completely deny human freedom, they search for regularities and 
predictability in their special fields of inquiry. For Butterfield, historical laws do not 
have the meaning of inexorable developments to which one must adapt, but they 
simply point to tendencies and regularities that should be taken into consideration 
by every prudent actor. In passages like this, Butterfield shows how closely related 
history is to sociology and the other social sciences which are not interested in the 
unique but what is general in the unique.   
    For example, as Butterfield goes on to explain,  in order to explain the outbreak 
of World War I, one should start from long-term developments and contextual 
factors, which are related to the political constitution of Germany and the political 
tensions then existing in Europe. On the other hand, however, Butterfield makes 
the point that the war could have been averted, if certain important individuals 
had made different decisions, and if larger groups of people had developed 
different political attitudes. Therefore, for Butterfield, the existence of influential 
processes and tendencies does not mean that human beings do not have choice 
and freedom of action regarding the actual course of historical events.  
    With regard to the Cold War, Butterfield argues that the lessons of the past show 
the necessary relationship between the balance of power and the integrity of small 
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states, and that that exists between domestic and international developments. 
Historically, the balance of power enabled small nations to retain their 
autonomous existence and their independence from big ones, without being 
reduced to the status of satellite states. What is more, for Butterfield, history 
shows that political events taking place within countries can influence the overall 
distribution of power at the level of the international system. This applies 
particularly to the revolutions that largely determined the physiognomy of the 
twentieth century. Probably the most important argument Butterfield puts forward 
is that, unless confined to limited objectives, war generally tends to create greater 
problems than those it solves. Neglecting this general truth made the Allies to 
reduce Germany to military impotence, and in this way to made possible the rise of 
Russia. The military annihilation of Germany did nothing to stop the emergence of 
Soviet Russia as a new threat to the integrity and independence of European states 
after the end of World War II. As we shall see next, this analysis of the post-World 
War II international predicament is fully compatible with Butterfield’s 
conceptualisation of the idea of the balance of power and discussion of how France 
historically replaced Spain as a threat to the autonomy of other European states.  
    It is important to note that Butterfield’s search for connections and similarities 
between historical events does not only enable him to offer an interesting account 
of the problems facing the West during the Cold War, but it also puts him into a 
position to develop certain hypotheses regarding the future. Although he did not 
believe that the end of the Cold War was to take place anytime soon, he clearly 
saw that a victory of the United States was destined to give rise to new dilemmas 
and confrontations. As he notes with remarkable prescience, when a single country 
achieves a position of predominance, it develops a tendency to act without 
thinking of others and it imagines that it is more virtuous that it actually is.  
Because of the combined influence of military might and perceived moral 
superiority, a decisive victory of the U.S. in the Cold War was likely to “throw to the 
top the kind of man who will exploit the opportunity for aggression” (Butterfield, 
1960: 87).This belief that unchecked American power would generate new 
problems shows that the kind of wisdom which Butterfield sought from the study 
of history was not entirely illusory.  
     Butterfield’s analysis of the hot and cold wars of the twentieth century and 
search for alternatives in the European past have triggered various responses. 
McIntire (2004) is critical of Butterfield’s pro-German attitude and later 
accommodating stance towards the Soviet Union. For McIntire, Butterfield’s 
historical observations regarding the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and 
attempt to present the Soviet Union as a potential member of a new inclusive 
international order are politically motivated. His most penetrating criticism is that 
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Butterfield inserts his own personal views into the historical record, and that the 
maxims which he attributes to the eighteenth-century politicians and diplomats 
can nowhere be found in the systematic and complete form in which he presents 
them. Tim Dunne (1998) echoes Wight’s refusal to draw normative conclusions 
from eighteenth-century politics, and argues that the loyalty of political leaders to 
the international system during that period should not be taken for granted. 
According to Dunne, the resort to diplomacy and negotiation is not necessarily an 
indication of the existence of a common identity among the members of a system, 
and the relatively frequent military conflicts make the eighteenth century 
something less than an ideal model for contemporary international relations.  
Without having Butterfield in mind, Otto Pflanze (2004) notes that many 
eighteenth-century philosophers were  critical of the ways in which international 
politics was conducted in their age, since war was considered to be a legitimate 
instrument of policy and it was far from uncommon.The balance of power as the 
operating principle of the international system between 1714 and 1792 did not 
lead to a peaceful world and actually generated many tensions “as rulers 
calculated, ministers plotted, and generals planned” (Pflanze, 2004: 152). Even if 
the system conferred certain advantages to the great powers, these were not 
enough to protect small states, such as Poland.  
    These criticisms do not mean that Butterfield’s belief that one could learn certain 
things from the past was unfounded, but they rather mean that his understanding 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was more ideologically coloured than 
he would like to admit. In any case, as a student of contemporary international 
affairs Butterfield showed how the European past could be used in order to 
criticise and transform the global present. The ideas of non-ideological diplomacy 
and the balance of power that inspire his critique of the Western attitude in 
international affairs may have a conservative dimension, but they acquire a 
completely different meaning within the historical context of the Cold War. It is no 
accident that, as we shall see in Chapter 8, Carr made similar political 
recommendations. Even Wight, despite the fact that he was less inclined than 
Butterfield to idealise the European past, saw that something was fundamentally 
wrong with the development of international politics after World War II, and that 
the ideas of non-ideological diplomacy and the balance of power had not lost their 
value. The osmosis between Wight and Butterfield was further facilitated by their 
common participation in the British Committee.  
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III)   BUTTERFIELD AND THE BRITISH COMMITTEE ON THE 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
Butterfield’s engagement with the British Committee on the Theory of 
International Politics lasted between 1958 and 1968. Along with Wight, they tried 
to create an equivalent to the American Committee on the Theory of International 
Relations which was based in New York and was chaired by Hans Morgenthau and 
Reinhold Niebuhr. As McIntire (2004) notes, the Rockefeller Foundation, which was 
already funding the American Committee, originally contacted Butterfield in 1954 
impressed by the ideas expressed in Christianity, Diplomacy and War. Although 
Butterfield’s views were not identical to those of Niebuhr or Morgenthau, his non-
ideological account of the Cold War and appeal to religion and history found an 
exceptionally warm reception in the United States.   
    After a short visit there in 1956 and a second invitation by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, Butterfield finally decided to become the chairman of the British 
Committee and along with Wight, whom he considered indispensable, to select the 
remaining members. The emphasis on historians and philosophers and the relative 
absence of IR specialists, who, in any case, did not abound at the time, was an 
indication of the kind of approach that Butterfield developed during his time at the 
Committee. Desmond Williams was a Professor of Modern History at University 
College Dublin. Michael Howard was a military historian at London. Donald 
MacKinnon was a philosopher and a theologian, and Geoffrey Hudson was a fellow 
at Oxford. Adam Watson and William Armstrong represented the world of policy 
and were drawn from the British Foreign Office and the Treasury respectively. 
Apart from Wight, who was destined to succeed Butterfield as chair of the 
Committee in 1962, Hedley Bull was the only representative of academic 
International Relations (IR).  
    Despite the careful selection of collaborators, Butterfield’s anti-theoretical 
predisposition made him feel dissatisfied with the Committee only a few years 
after its creation.  According to Michael Bentley (2011), by the spring of 1961, 
Butterfield had already started feeling annoyed by the reluctance of some 
participants to address international dilemmas in strictly historical terms and 
willingness to explore the possibility of a more theoretical approach to them. The 
essays included in Diplomatic Investigations (1966) show what kind of theoretical-
historical approach Butterfield had in mind for the Committee, and illustrate his 
historicist approach to international theory.   
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The Balance of Power 
According to Dunne, Butterfield’s account of the maturation of the theory of the 
balance of power, takes into account the importance of various scientific, 
economic, and political developments. The first have to do with the emergence of 
the Newtonian system of astronomy. The second are related to the notion of the 
balance of trade, and the latter have to do with the inclusion of the theory of 
equipoise in the British constitution. Butterfield does not treat the balance of 
power as an ahistorical principle, but notes that its emergence is inextricably linked 
to a set of developments peculiar to modern Europe. The balance of power is 
treated by Butterfield as an essential aspect of the European states-system; an 
aspect which was wrongly abandoned by idealistic reformers after World War I.  
     For Butterfield (1966a), the principle is both internal and external to the 
European states-system. It is internal in the sense that it regulated the system for a 
large period of its history, and cannot  be properly understood outside the general 
framework of modern European history. However, it is also external to the system, 
in the sense that, even during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was 
never completely realised. The cool calculation of state interests, Butterfield notes, 
had always to overcome religious or other prejudices and the multiple ties that 
existed among European elites and influenced their actions. The historical 
experience that most of all enabled the emergence of the theory of the balance of 
power was the imperialist policy pursued by the French during the reign of Louis 
XIV. Since France replaced Spain as a threat to the independence of Europe, it was 
realised that the aggressive policy pursued by Spain during the previous century 
was not the result of any particular wickedness, but of structural pressures equally 
applicable to Spain in one age and to France in another.  
    In particular, as Butterfield notes, it was the French critic Fenelon who first 
developed what might be called a positive theory of the balance of power. 
According to Fenelon, the benign behaviour of a nation in the past cannot provide 
a guarantee for its actions in the future. Rising to a position of predominance, 
tempts one to embark on a career of conquest and disregard existing moral and 
legal standards. Even if a particular ruler shows moderation, his successor is 
extremely unlikely to miss the opportunity to achieve the aggrandizement of his 
country at the expense of others. 
     During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Butterfield points out, the 
theory of the balance of power transformed the way in which state objectives were 
conceptualised, and led to the development of a relatively benign understanding of 
the national interest. Egotism and ambition were part of international politics 
without, however, being identical with it.  Every enlightened ruler or foreign 
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minister displayed an interest in the overall distribution of power in Europe and 
not only in the position of his nation. The alliances formed against potential 
aggressors made the costs of an imperialist policy higher and its chances of success 
thinner. The notion of the balance of power is for Butterfield indistinguishable 
from the idea of the raison de systeme: it only by covering the international system 
in its entirety that this notion can provide a long-term and reliable solution to 
international problems.  
    According to Butterfield, the eighteenth century witnessed the fullest application 
of the principle of the balance of power, since no country enjoyed an undisputed 
military predominance at the time. What is more, the type of international order 
prevalent in the eighteenth century was ideologically and religiously pluralistic, 
since it was based on the peaceful co-existence of Catholics and Protestants. 
Likewise, monarchies and republics met on equal terms, and did not see any 
reason to transform constitutional differences into an international problem. The 
type of order established in the eighteenth century was especially favourable to 
small states, which were able to retain their political independence and unique 
cultural identity. Under the influence of the theory of the balance of power, 
eighteenth-century statesmen were able to relinquish the older ideal of the Roman 
Empire and to accept the diversity of Europe in both cultural and political terms.  
    Although Butterfield puts forward the argument that the eighteenth century 
treated the balance of power as a highly regarded theory of international relations 
with important practical consequences, he also recognises certain ambiguities and 
difficulties that characterised its workings. First, there was the question of the 
exact relationship between the balance of power as an overarching principle and 
the balance of power as an expression of local dynamics. The existence of many 
local systems of balance of power did not necessarily involve a more general 
European balance, and that became sadly evident in the case of the partition of 
Poland. Secondly, there was the question of who was protecting the balance and 
who not. Although some writers saw in England the guardian of the European 
balance of power, the French expressed a different point of view and accused 
England of paying lip service to the principle of the balance of power in Europe 
while openly violating it in the rest of the world.  Maybe the most important 
reservation that Butterfield expresses with regard to the principle of the balance of 
power has to do with its implicit support for the status quo.  Although in principle 
the balance of power expresses the common interest, in practice it can end up 
reflecting and legitimating the existing distribution of power. The ideological 
function of the principle of the balance of power has to do with the fact that 
statesmen frequently “tend to identify the balance of power with the existing map 
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of European forces, disliking any change that would entail a redistribution of 
current alliance-arrangements”  (Butterfield, 1966a: 146).  
    Butterfield’s reasons for providing a detailed historical account of the emergence 
of the principle of the balance of power and discussing some of the problems 
related to its workings are made evident in the last pages of the essay. The theory 
and practice associated with the idea of the balance of power, he suggests, show 
that twentieth-century thinkers were wrong in assuming that the European past 
was marked by a brute form of anarchy, and was tantamount to a state of nature. 
International order is by no means incompatible with the existence of sovereign 
states that pursue their own interests within established limits. Instead of investing 
their hopes in a radical break with the past and a new beginning in international 
relations, idealistic reformers could have achieved more by trying to improve the 
tradition of the balance of power and adapt it to the requirements of their own 
age.  
    At the same time, within the context of the Cold War, any appeal to the notion 
of the balance of power meant  that force could not be effectively met without 
force, and that small and medium states should examine seriously all the 
diplomatic choices available to them without mechanically aligning themselves 
with this or that superpower. By praising the pluralistic character of the 
eighteenth-century international order based on the balance of power, Butterfield 
renews his call for a non-ideological diplomacy as an alternative to the ideological 
crusades pursued by both superpowers during the Cold War. This emphasis on 
diplomacy means that the kind of alliances required by the balance of power is far 
from self-evident, and they change according to the international situation itself.   
The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy  
Butterfield’s (1966b) choice to discuss diplomacy after examining the notion of the 
balance of power is far from accidental. Although as we saw above he does not 
completely reject the resort to force, diplomacy is the moving force behind the 
balance of power in the way that he describes it. Despite the fact that various 
adjustments of diplomatic practice to new conditions might be both desirable and 
unavoidable, Butterfield emphasises that diplomacy in its traditional non-
ideological form still has a valuable role to play. Like Carr, Butterfield sees Soviet 
Russia as a state in a world of states, and by drawing attention to the historical 
precedent of Napoleon and the Napoleonic Empire he suggests that no 
fundamental change of the way in which diplomacy is conducted is in sight. The 
rise to power of new nations and social classes does not make history irrelevant, 
since they inevitably face dilemmas similar to those of their predecessors.  
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    The most important historical change he mentions—change influencing equally 
diplomacy and the workings of the balance of power—has to do with the 
increasing importance of the moral factor in international relations. The existence 
of several uncommitted nations during the Cold War means that there is an 
ongoing struggle for ideological influence that exceeds everything that has taken 
place in the past.  Nuclear weapons, despite their annihilating potential, make an 
actual military conflict unlikely and encourage one to pay more attention to 
diplomacy and persuasion in international relations. All these factors, Butterfield 
concludes, make necessary a significant change in diplomatic practice without, 
however, rendering the past irrelevant in any conceivable sense. 
     The new diplomacy that Butterfield recommends means adapting traditional 
diplomacy to new realities and not inventing a radically new form of diplomatic 
practice. Although in political terms he wants to increase the effectiveness of 
Western diplomacy, he also warns against treating socialist countries as pariahs 
excluded from the international order. To the extent that diplomacy serves the 
positive goal of peace and is not a simple preparation for war, it must undermine 
and not consolidate the simplistic distinction between civilisation and barbarism in 
international affairs. In both his discussion of the balance of power and the crisis of 
diplomacy Butterfield does not try to artificially resuscitate the past but rather to 
see how past experiences could be utilised in the present. For Butterfield, the aim 
of international theory is not to explain a static world but to promote changes and 
reforms sanctioned by the past. What ultimately separated him from the more 
theoretically inspired members of the Committee—and especially from Bull—was 
the emphasis on the pragmatic character of knowledge. Butterfield’s theoretical 
interventions do not aim so much to explain things, but rather to take advantage of 
the experience of the past in order to change the present. Although indebted to 
the past, his thought is best suited to the present and the needs of his 
contemporaries.  
IV)    MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER  
Butterfield’s interest in change as an essential parameter of the historical process 
is clearly expressed in his Martin Wight Memorial Lecture Raison d’ Etat: The 
Relations between Morality and Government (1975) and the essay “Morality and 
International Order” (1972). The first does not contain any definite conclusions 
regarding the relationship between the form of morality associated with the 
pursuance of the national interest and alternative moral imperatives. What 
Butterfield wants to show is how the idea of the reason of state emerged in the 
first place, and what kind of obstacles and particularistic loyalties it had to 
overcome within particular societies. Although he nowhere glorifies the state or 
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the accumulation of power for its own sake, Butterfield does not consider any 
secular alternatives to nationalism or debate the claims of religious morality. 
Indeed, his suggestion that people do not know how to be sorry enough for 
statesmen who often have to make difficult decisions, seems to involve the 
acceptance of the point of view which is frequently associated with the idea of the 
reason of state without paying enough attention to alternative moral imperatives.  
    On the other hand, the views expressed in “Morality and International Order” 
are interesting for various reasons, and maybe have not received adequate 
attention by Butterfield’s interpreters and biographers. In this essay, Butterfield 
places morality within history and the actual world of international relations, and 
shows how different conceptions of international order and the role of the great 
powers informed the development of the European states-system during its 
tumultuous development. Contrary to his frequent depiction of the balance of 
power as a homogeneous and coherent doctrine, Butterfield shows how the 
relatively egalitarian world of the eighteenth century was replaced in the 
nineteenth century by a hierarchical international order, in which great powers 
enjoyed both special privileges and special responsibilities. According to 
Butterfield, although everybody did not willingly accept the leadership of the great 
powers, their pronounced role in the international system became evident at the 
Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, when they sought solutions to problems such as 
piracy and the African slave trade. Considering the contemporary relevance of 
these problems, he concludes that the West is guided by a relative egalitarian 
understanding of the international order, whereas the East tends to adopt a 
hierarchical conception and deny the autonomy of small states. Butterfield’s 
unflinching support for an inclusive international order does not therefore make 
him to relinquish morality and to negate the possibility of making moral 
distinctions among the participants in this order.   
V) CONCLUSIONS 
Butterfield’s historicist conceptualisation of the phenomenon of international 
change assumes the form of a comparison between the policies adopted by 
European statesmen during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and those 
followed by the superpowers during the Cold War. Behind his critique of 
ideological diplomacy and call for the respect of autonomy of small states lies an 
interest in the future of Western Europe. Although during the 1950s he saw the 
expansion of Soviet influence in the world as the main threat facing Britain and 
other European states, his attitude was by no means uncritical towards the United 
States. Indeed, as we saw, he believed that some kind of American victory in the 
Cold War was likely to create new problems for Europe and the world at large. 
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Butterfield’s ability to predict future developments is closely related to the way in 
which he followed the dictates of what he called a scientific approach to foreign 
affairs. Such an approach would draw its material from history and would argue 
that similar international conditions are likely to produce similar forms of 
behaviour independent of the character of the actors involved. Even in crucial 
moments, such as during World War II, Butterfield refused to limit his attention to 
the present and the handling of current difficulties, but he always looked ahead. 
The belief that neither Germany nor Russia should be permitted to acquire 
excessive strength at the expense of the other stayed with him all his life and at 
times made him a severe critic of British diplomacy. The fact that diplomats were 
not able to follow Butterfield’s long-term vision is not surprising and shows how 
difficult it is for an intellectual to have a direct impact on the policies of his country.  
    Although Butterfield managed to make some useful recommendations regarding 
the international politics of his time, and to show how catastrophes such as World 
War I could probably have been avoided, his conceptualisation of international 
change is not devoid of problems. Butterfield offered a rather idyllic presentation 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and emphasised certain elements, 
while flagrantly ignoring others. For example, presenting the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars of 1792-1815 as a mere parenthesis in an era of non-ideological 
diplomacy is something with which not everybody would agree. What is more, the 
virtues of the balance of power system, which he did not hesitate to recommend 
to his contemporaries, have been endlessly debated for centuries and no 
conclusive answer seems to be possible. Although at certain times it has permitted 
international stability and contributed to the absence of major international 
conflicts, it has also created various local conflicts and been held responsible for 
the outbreak of World War I, which so much troubled Butterfield himself. In brief, 
to the extent that he was trying to respond to the dilemmas of his age, Butterfield 
did so with remarkable success. To the extent, however, that he did not see non-
ideological diplomacy and the balance of power as answers to a particular  
problem but as expressions of a timeless wisdom of statecraft, his historicism was 
not self-critical and deep enough. While not disagreeing with Butterfield’s practical 
recommendations, Wight and Carr adopted a more self-reflective and critical 
attitude when discussing the problem of international change. Their defence of 
European interests in a changing world did not make them see certain periods of 
international history as normal and some others as simple aberrations.  
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Chapter 7 
 Martin Wight on Theory as History  
 
Both supporters and critics of Martin Wight’s approach to International Relations 
(IR) have drawn attention to his supposed preoccupation with historical continuity 
at the expense of historical change. For Hedley Bull (1977; 1978), Wight shares 
with realist writers the pessimism regarding the prospects of creating a more 
harmonious and just international order. As a result of the tendency to interpret 
international politics according to set patterns, Wight is sceptical of the belief that 
some particular social or technological innovation, such as the advent of economic 
globalisation or the spread of nuclear weapons, is going to transform radically the 
character of the international system. From a different point of view, Roy Jones 
(1981) criticises what he sees as the static dimension in Wight’s thinking and the 
virtual substitution of history for meta-history. In the world described by Wight, 
Jones claims, there is a lot of activity but nothing really happens, since 
international actors and institutions remain basically unchanged during the 
centuries. However, as I shall try to show here, this reading of Wight is far from 
neutral.  
    As Wilson (2003) points out, Bull’s interpretation of past thinkers is inextricably 
linked to the conservative presuppositions of his own methodological approach. 
What animates Bull’s study of international affairs is the belief that the 
international system consists of certain fundamental institutions, such as war, 
alliances, and the balance of power, and that the task of the international theorist 
is to capture the essence of these institutions. Even sympathetic readers of Bull’s 
work, such as Andrew Hurrell (2002), do not deny that he is primarily concerned 
with historical continuity, but rather seek to justify his views and general 
pessimism regarding the future prospects of international society. Although Bull 
clearly has the right to his own personal beliefs, some of these beliefs have been 
unfairly projected on Wight, who is an underexplored source for conceptualising 
the phenomenon of change in international relations.  
    Like Butterfield and Carr, Wight develops a historicist approach to the 
phenomenon of international change and emphasises the importance of European 
traditions and interests. As a historian of the British Empire, Wight describes a 
polity in flux and describes both colonialism and decolonisation from a British point 
of view. For Wight (1959), British imperialism triggers a debate between absolute 
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and historically conditioned morality, and his own sympathetic presentation of 
British activities in Africa places him among the supporters of a historically 
determined form of international morality. In Power Politics, Wight uses the 
European diplomatic traditions of the nineteenth century in order to criticise the 
degeneration of key institutions of international society under the influence of the 
Cold War. His understanding of the balance of power is clearly influenced by the 
European legal and moral traditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
and aims to protect the autonomy of European states. The approach adopted in 
Systems of States is less comparative and more evolutionary than it is usually 
assumed to be. As I will argue, Wight’s Westphalian assumptions make him identify 
states-systems with systems composed of independent political entities, and to 
offer a somewhat biased reading of classical Greece. Comparing Wight’s work to 
that of Watson enables one to see how an alternative approach to the same set of 
problems is possible.  
    Finally, in his investigation of Western values in international relations Wight 
adopts a Western point of view when evaluating the problems raised by the 
concepts of international society and international morality. Although this point of 
view is fully compatible with his historicism, it creates methodological and 
substantive problems that will be taken into account in the relevant section. The 
views of Mackinnon are mentioned here because they show that defining Western 
values is not easy. The adoption of a European point of view when assessing 
international change does not mean that Wight was uncritical of certain aspects of 
the European past, or that he believed that its lessons could be directly applied to 
the present. For him, the European experience of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries provides more an intellectual horizon and less a model with easy 
application to the present. Nevertheless, Wight’s tendency to abstract certain 
political institutions from the course of world history in Systems of States, and to 
abstract certain ideas from a complex and rather contradictory tradition in 
“Westerns Values in International Relations”, show that his historicism is self-
reflective but not critical enough.   
I)   WIGHT AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE  
Wight’s engagement with colonial issues lasted between 1941 and 1946 and 
represents the most “technical” or “academic” aspect of his work. Contrary to 
what applies to his critique of Toynbee, where Wight assumes the mantle of the 
Christian intellectual, in his discussion of colonial issues Wight appears as a 
disinterested observer who tries primarily to understand and/or explain and not so 
much to criticize. However, what I would like to show in this section is that Wight’s 
historical work on the British Empire is the best place to start in order to 
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understand his historicist conceptualization of international change. Far from being 
politically disinterested or objective, Wight approaches his subject from a 
particular point of view which is no other than that of the colonial powers, like 
Britain. This is not to say that most of his observations are not historically accurate 
or that he does not help as understand the complex and multi-layered nature of 
the British Empire. On the contrary, by showing the degree of autonomy that some 
of the colonies enjoyed for a period of time, Wight offers grounds for relativizing 
the distinction between independence, hegemony, and empire that has been also 
undermined by later English School thinkers such as Adam Watson (1992/2009; 
2007). 
    Wight’s books The Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945, The Gold 
Coast Legislative Council, and British Colonial Constitutions, aim to analyse the 
colonial experiment in all its diversity and particularity and to offer a dynamic view 
of the British Empire. Despite his rhetorical appeal to a supposed continuity in the 
political development of the colonies, Wight’s meticulous historical investigation 
proves beyond doubt that the degree of self-government enjoyed by the colonies 
was far from given and that it was determined by the interaction of both socio-
political and military factors. The situation in the colonies should be examined in 
conjunction with the wider needs of British foreign policy and a number of political 
developments which influence the world at large.  
    Although my discussion of large-scale political change in the colonies draws 
primarily from Wight’s The Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945, his 
other works on the subject will also be mentioned and the gradual modification of 
his political outlook will be made evident by an analysis of the radical views 
expressed in Attitude to Africa (1951). These views do not signal a departure from 
but rather a modification of his overall historicist outlook on international change 
which emphasises the aspirations of particular political actors. As narrative 
historian, Wight tries primarily to understand what was going on in the colonies 
and which factors actually moulded the relationship between them and the mother 
country. Although Edward Keene (2008) is right in arguing that the kind of 
historical approach adopted by Wight and the other members of the English School 
is primarily narrative and not analytical, it can be argued that Wight shows an 
interest in the causes and the consequences of the historical transformations he 
describes. Despite the fact that his historical narrative is focused on political and 
constitutional developments, what underlies and determines these developments 
is a number of social and cultural realities unique to the African continent. For 
Wight, the tribal allegiances of most Africans combined with the slow progress of 
economic development along Western lines posit severe limits to what can be 
realistically achieved in Africa by either foreign or local political administrators.  
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From the Old to the New Empire  
At the heart of Wight’s (1946a) account of the development of the Legislative 
Council as the key organ of colonial administration lies the transition from the so-
called old representative system to the model of Crown Colony government. The 
old representative system covers the first stages of the development of the British 
Empire and concerns English settlers who carried with them the law of their 
mother country when moving to the colonies. As British subjects, the first 
colonisers could be taxed only with the consensus of their representative 
institutions, and they tried to reproduce in places such as Virginia the English mode 
and mores of government. On the other hand, the system of Crown Colony 
government starts to take shape after the American Revolution and the Anglo-
French war of 1793-1815. According to Wight, this war transformed the Empire 
from one that dominated the Atlantic to one that encircled the Indian Ocean and 
modified its racial composition. The majority of the inhabitants of the British 
Empire ceased to be British subjects, and various other European nationalities, as 
well as vast non-European populations, entered the picture. Some of the new 
populations were not sympathetic towards the British system of government, and 
the promotion of important humanitarian aims, such as the abolition of the slave 
trade, necessitated the concentration of political power in London. Since the old 
representative institutions ceased to be functional, the system of Crown Colony 
government spread across the Empire.  
    The system of Crown Colony government was based on the active role of the 
Governor who, along with certain appointed members and officials, virtually 
controlled both the Legislative and the Executive Councils of a colony. The 
Governor’s decisions were subject only to the authority of the Colonial Office in 
London, but gradually the English Parliament managed to acquire a saying in the 
administration of the colonies. Wight does not openly criticise the abandonment of 
the representative institutions involved in the transition from the Old to the New 
Empire, and his main aim is to illuminate the conditions which made this 
constitutional change necessary. Apart from the fact that his outlook on colonial 
issues is that of the narrative historian and not that of the political theorist, Wight 
is not so much interested in political institutions themselves, but rather in the 
functions they perform within the wider scheme of things. However, it should be 
noted that at times he comes close to presenting the colonial populations as mere 
objects of administration, whose legitimate interests can in principle be protected 
by distant institutions.  
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    Especially with regard to Africa, which is his primary concern, Wight emphasises 
the backwardness of millions of tribesmen, who sometimes fall within the same 
administrative unit while speaking different languages and belonging to different 
cultural groups. Whereas in the white colonies which finally acquired the status of 
Dominions there was a unified political body able to promote its interests and 
defend its autonomy from the colonial centre, in Africa colonial authorities had to 
create an electorate out of many disparate tribes and groups. Wight argues that 
the paternalism of Crown Colony government subverted the ultimate political aim 
of the liberation of the colonised but that no reliable political alternative existed 
under the particular historical circumstances. The political paradox represented by 
the model of Crown Colony government was addressed in the twentieth century 
with the emergence of forms of semi-responsible government in several African 
countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and the Gold Coast. As I will show next, the reason 
why Wight shows understanding for the slow progress of representative 
institutions in Africa is the acknowledgement of the complex problems facing plural 
societies. In these societies, no unified political body exists and it is the state that 
creates the society than vice versa.  
Democracy in Plural Societies 
According to Wight, a plural society comprises two or more cultural entities which 
lead their own distinct lives within the same territorial unit. These different cultural 
elements or social orders cooperate for certain practical purposes, such as the 
defence against external aggression, but also vie for social and political influence. A 
plural society differs from a confederation because the different populations do 
not occupy distinct geographical areas. Although secession is possible from a 
confederation, this is not the case in plural societies where the only alternative to 
peaceful coexistence is civil war. For Wight, the remarkable political progress 
achieved in the Gold Coast is due to the fact that there racial and linguistic 
differences are less prominent than elsewhere in Africa. By relating positive 
political developments to the existence of a common identity, Wight comes close 
to explaining the phenomena he describes and does not rely exclusively upon a 
narrative mode of exposition.   
    It is also interesting to note that in The Gold Coast Legislative Council (1947), 
Wight does not limit himself to the role of constitutional historian but offers 
several interesting sociological insights regarding the antagonism of different 
groups within the Legislative Council. Although the Gold Coast represents a racially 
homogeneous society by African standards, social divisions are by no means 
absent. In particular, Wight analyses the conflict between the traditional African 
chiefs, who command the allegiance of the local population, and a new middle 
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class of lawyers and doctors, who challenge both the colonial authorities and the 
traditional domestic political hierarchies. Although his sympathies lie with the 
chiefs, he makes clear the fact that no social and political stability can be achieved 
in the colonies without the political participation of the educated middle classes. 
Despite that his account of the situation in the Gold Coast is by no means a grim 
one, he puts into question  the “unquestioning and sometimes pathetic optimism 
of the public outlook, the unshaken belief in the old simple creed of progress which 
saturates the press” (Wight, 1947: 174). The indigenous intellectuals, Wight argues, 
harbour the illusion that they can succeed where colonial administrators often fail. 
However, this optimism is not the result of a sober analysis of the situation, but is 
rather the consequence of a serious misunderstanding of the nature of politics, 
which is a new game for the Africans “and neither its complexity nor its Western 
standards are always understood” (Wight, 1947: 178). 
    The problems of plural societies are also examined in British Colonial 
Constitutions 1947 (1952) where Wight notes that the legal distinction among 
colonies, protectorates and trust territories is less important than the actual form 
of government of an area belonging to the British Dependent Empire. The mode of 
government is actually determined by whether a certain society is culturally 
homogenous or not. Wight reiterates the belief that African cultural pluralism is 
incompatible with progress along Western constitutional lines, and that democratic 
institutions require some kind of common identity among the governed. Apart 
from the material scarcity and the negative attitude of the population towards 
taxation and representation, the spread of democracy in Africa is hampered by the 
absence of a unified electorate. Creating such an electorate is necessary in order to 
achieve the control of the executive by the legislature, the control of the legislature 
by the people, and the ultimate independence from imperial authority. All things 
considered, what one should notice is not the failure of the British to transform 
backward countries into democracies within a relatively short historical period, but 
the political changes achieved after centuries of backwardness and isolation. 
Therefore, Wight’s reading of the colonial experiment is a rather positive one to 
the extent that modernisation and Westernisation are considered desirable, and 
the distance between Western promise and Western achievement is attributed to 
the various peculiarities of Africa. 
Attitude to Africa  
The immediate political emancipation of Africa from colonial control is seriously 
considered by Wight only in Attitude to Africa (1951a). Like Carr (1951), he 
presents as inevitable some kind of compromise between the West and African 
nationalism and argues that this compromise should not lead to the increase of 
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Soviet influence in Africa. In particular, Wight distinguishes sharply between Asia, 
where local nationalism associated itself successfully with Communism, and Africa, 
where this can and must be avoided. The main political forces at play in Africa are 
Western “imperialism”, indigenous nationalism, and communism. Wight argues 
that the relationship among these different political forces is particularly complex, 
since the new African leaders are neither Marxists nor communists. The Western-
educated lawyers, doctors and teachers that put into question traditional African 
hierarchies do not hold political views that bring them automatically close to 
Russia. However, they are opportunists in the sense that they are willing to accept 
whatever help they can get for the liberation of their countries. For Wight, Britain 
and the other European powers should reach a compromise with these new social 
and political forces in order to stop them from aligning themselves with 
communism.  
    His attitude towards African nationalism in general is ambivalent. Like every 
other nationalism, African nationalism has both a positive and a negative 
dimension. Its positive role is to cultivate a new feeling of solidarity among the 
Africans, whose traditional tribal allegiances have to some extent been eroded as a 
result of the Western activity in the region. However, African nationalism also 
generates negative feelings towards whites because of the real or imagined wrongs 
committed by them in Africa. Wight’s ultimate acceptance of the historical role of 
African nationalism is dictated by pragmatic considerations and the more general 
belief that no society can be regenerated from outsiders. Africans, like all other 
men, would prefer to govern themselves badly than to be governed by outsiders. 
The modernisation of Africa can be the work neither of tribal networks nor of 
Westerners, but it can be based only on indigenous agents of progress. To the 
extent that the new African leaders do not try to transform their countries into 
totalitarian regimes, their independence, as well as that of their countries, should 
be accepted by Britain and the other European nations.  
    Maybe the most interesting hypothesis put forward by Wight is that every 
appeal to the moral superiority of the Western model of government should be 
complemented by a demonstration of the practical advantages of democracy over 
alternative political regimes. Indeed, taking into consideration the particular 
situation in most African countries, it could be argued that freedom in Africa 
should primarily mean “freedom from poverty and disease, from soil erosion and 
economic underdevelopment” (Wight, 1951a: 36). Any efficient African 
government should not only release the energies of indigenous political forces and 
provide for order, but also create the conditions for a “steadily increasing growth 
of social, economic and political opportunities and rights” (Wight, 1951a: 63). 
Wight does not underestimate the cultural challenges facing the promotion of 
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democracy in Africa, and says that the secret ballot and the power-station 
frequently co-exist with witchcraft and ritual murder. However, what clearly 
distinguishes Attitude to Africa from Wight’s other books on colonial issues is the 
recognition of the fact that no society can be fully regenerated by external forces 
alone and that, under certain  circumstances, even political nationalism has a 
positive historical role to play.  The emphasis on social rights and opportunities also 
creates an interesting difference between Attitude to Africa and Wight’s other 
books on the subject.  
    To conclude, as a student of colonialism Wight describes and assesses the 
imperial project and the process of decolonisation from the point of view of Britain 
and the other European powers. Although he is apparently interested in the 
political and constitutional developments in the colonies, the social and cultural 
insights and considerations that Keene sees as one of the main features of the late-
twentieth-century historiography, are not completely missing from his work. His 
interest in international change leads him to distinguish among three turning 
points in the development of the imperial project.  The transition from the Old 
Empire of the seventeenth century to the New Empire of the nineteenth, after the 
transitional period of the eighteenth century, is accompanied by the abandonment 
of the representative institutions of the colonies, and the empowerment of the 
Governor of a colony who, along with the imperial centre, determined the life of 
the inhabitants. The nineteenth-century model of Crown Colony government was 
put into question after World War I, which triggered a process of democratisation 
based on the assumption that colonial rule is only a temporary measure, and that it 
should be exercised according to the interests of the governed. World War II and 
the beginning of the Cold War cause a large-scale process of political and social 
change which is incompatible with retaining the Empire in its established form, and 
necessitate principled compromise with local political forces.  
    Despite the fact that in his discussion of different historical periods Wight adopts 
a historicist point of view, which is attuned to the self-understanding of British 
foreign policy, he is conscious of the fundamental tension that characterises British 
imperial policy. To the extent that the ideal of self-government shared by both the 
British and the subject populations cannot be altogether abandoned in the name of 
effective government, the Empire represents not only a dynamic but also a 
transient political form which cannot be realistically expected to reproduce itself 
ad infinitum. For Wight, both the Empire and the subsequent historical process of 
decolonisation constitute mixed blessings, whose effectiveness is ultimately 
circumscribed by the kind of social and cultural conditions prevailing in the African 
continent. The combination of material scarcity with exclusive tribal loyalties 
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creates an explosive problem which cannot be easily solved by by either colonial 
administrators or local intellectualsxxxv.  
II) POWER POLITICS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER  
 Power Politics (1978) represents Wight’s most systematic attempt to enumerate 
the basic rules of international politics in a world populated by sovereign states 
recognising no political superior. Despite his acknowledgement of the important 
role of power and force under modern circumstances, Wight manages to show the 
complex nature of political reality, where elements of order and conflict, 
cooperation and competition, always balance and mitigate one another. The very 
phrase “power politics” is used in a complex way to describe two different things. 
On the one hand, the phrase power politics describes the relationship and the 
interactions that take place among the politically autonomous and sovereign units 
we call nations or states. On the other, the term power politics refers to something 
much more problematic: the identification of international politics with force or 
the threat of force without consideration for the dictates of reason and justice 
Wight is primarily concerned with power politics in the first sense, which denotes 
the relationship between independent states, and does not prima facie have any 
particular moral connotations. However, what is important to note is that, for him, 
power politics in the descriptive sense of the term ultimately dissolves into power 
politics in the evaluative and colloquial sense, which constitutes a translation of the 
German word Machtpolitik. Although he does not reject the influence that 
considerations of right and justice might exercise on international relations, it asks 
from the reader to assume that power politics in the academic sense of the term 
are usually approximating to power politics in the colloquial sense and therefore 
must be analysed in this light.  
    Wight’s challenge to realism does not only have to do with the recognition of the 
importance of moral considerations, but is also related to his historicist interest in 
the phenomenon of change and the consistent refusal to de-historicise his subject.  
Power Politics offers conceptual tools and distinctions that are necessary to take 
into account the phenomenon of change in international affairs. In particular, 
Wight provides the seeds of a historicist approach to international change by 
emphasising the differences between medieval and modern politics, and drawing 
attention to the pernicious influence of the Cold War upon key institutions of 
international society. Despite the fact that the modern period in general is 
characterised by neglect for what is morally right and the consequent prioritisation 
of power considerations, the Cold War exacerbates this problem by putting into 
question the fundamental distinction between war and peace and undermining the 
role of diplomacy. Nineteenth-century conceptions of war and diplomacy are used 
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by Wight as a criterion for condemning the excesses of the Cold War. Despite his 
belief that a close cooperation between Western Europe and the United States is 
necessary to counter Soviet influence in world affairs, Wight defends not only the 
traditions of Europe but also the interests of small and medium European states 
through an examination of the notion of the balance of power. This interest in the 
fate of small states brings him close to Butterfield who also had an interest in the 
particular topic, and to a certain extent distances him from Carr, who saw the 
world through the eyes of the great powers.  
Genealogy of Power Politics  
According to Wight (1978), the sovereign and constantly interacting political units 
that comprise the modern states-system are a historical innovation which has 
existed in the modern West from the sixteenth century onwards. The predecessors 
of the modern sovereign states should be sought in the Greek city states of 
classical antiquity and the various kingdoms of the Hellenistic period. However, the 
way that the modern states-system operates varies significantly from the kind of 
political unity established by the Roman Empire after the end of the Hellenistic 
period and the form of religious unity promoted by the Church during the medieval 
period. The advent of the modern sovereign state transformed not only the 
tangible reality of international affairs but also the attitude of men towards 
politics. For Wight, the modern state managed to provide a more limited but at the 
same time a more powerful object of loyalty than medieval Christendom, since 
modern man is more willing to fight for the state than for any social or religious 
cause that transcends its boundaries.  
    The modern period is therefore characterised by a decrease in moral unity and 
the weakening of international society, which ends up meaning nothing more than 
the sum of its parts. Following William Stubbs (1887) view that medieval history is 
the history of rights and wrongs and modern history is the history of forces and 
powers, Wight expresses his severe disappointment with the role and evaluation of 
moral and political theory in modern times. Although for the medieval man the gulf 
between ideals and reality was an indication that something was wrong with 
political reality, for the modern man the distance between ideals and reality shows 
that something is wrong with the ideals that are proved to be inapplicable in the 
real world.  
     It should be noted that Wight’s genealogy of power politics focuses not only on 
the differences between the medieval and the modern periods but also on the 
trauma of World War I. Among else, this war led to the replacement of the older 
and more refined phrase “raison d’état” by the notion of power politics 
understood as the conduct of foreign policy without regard for moral 
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considerations. Therefore, Wight’s genealogy of power politics helps us to think 
critically about two major historical transitions. The first is that from the medieval 
to the modern period. Wight does not offer much detail regarding medieval 
politics, but adopts the self-understanding of the medieval man and assumes that 
during the medieval period international society was stronger than in modern 
times. Although the transition from the medieval to the modern period is 
responsible for the birth of power politics in the academic sense of the term, World 
War I generated the dogma of power politics in the popular sense of the term. 
These conceptual distinctions and clarifications made in the beginning of Power 
Politics make the reader far more critical than he would otherwise be towards the 
rules and institutions that are presented in the next pages of the book.  
Anarchy and War 
For Wight, the behaviour of states in modern times is largely explained by the 
existence of international anarchy understood as the absence of an international 
government. Because of the absence of a global authority no state can know with 
certainty that it is not threatened by other states and must assume the worst 
regarding their intentions. Following conventional realist wisdom, Wight comes 
close to presenting international anarchy as the cause of war arguing that:  
        The fundamental cause of war is not historic rivalries, nor unjust peace settlements,  
         nor nationalist grievances, nor competitions in armaments, nor imperialism, nor  
         poverty, nor  the economic struggle for markets and raw materials, nor the  
         contradictions of capitalism nor the aggressiveness of Fascism or Communism;  
         though some of these may have occasioned  particular wars (Wight, 1978: 101).  
 
Although he does not deny the importance that any of these factors can have in a 
particular historical context, Wight emphasises that all of them operate within the 
wider framework of international anarchy and the resulting Hobbesian fear. For 
Wight, the advent of democracy and socialism did not mitigate the worst 
consequences of international anarchy but arguably made things worse. The 
patriotism of ordinary citizens has its ugly side and the democratisation of politics 
in the twentieth century spread the feeling of national pride among social classes 
that were in the past excluded from international politics.  
    Despite his belief in the general inescapability of war under modern conditions, 
Wight distinguishes between several types of war and claims that one of these 
types has become particularly prominent from the end of the eighteenth century 
onwards. Wars of gain, wars of fear, and wars of doctrine, serve different historical 
functions and characterise different historical periods. The clearest example of a 
war of gain is the European colonial wars which expanded decisively the frontiers 
of international society. Leaving colonial wars aside, the motive of financial gain in 
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international politics is much less important than ordinarily assumed. The most 
important and ancient type of war is wars of fear which usually start from the 
rational realisation of a future threat. To the extent that a power is rapidly losing 
strength comparative to one of its main antagonists, it has valid reasons to fear for 
its future in an anarchic world, and to resort to aggressive action to forestall an 
enemy who is getting stronger as time passes. The diachronic presence of wars of 
fear in the international system is sharply contrasted by Wight with the novelty of 
wars of doctrine. Although wars of fear occur from the time of Thucydides 
onwards, wars of doctrine are a relatively recent development, whose origins 
should be sought in the French Revolution. In wars of doctrine, it is not really a 
nation fighting another nation but a group of people with common loyalties 
fighting another group of people with opposing loyalties. In this case, horizontal 
ideological forces disrupt the vertical structure of international society which, as 
Wight puts it, finds itself in a condition of stasis. Wars of doctrine bring war close 
to revolution and put into question the distinction between war and peace, which 
is one of the preconditions of civilised life. As Wight (1978: 141) argues: 
        Today it requires a mental effort from us to regard as abnormal circumstances in  
        which ships  are sunk and aircraft shot down without warning, peaceable citizens are  
        kidnapped and disappear, traitors flee from one side to the other bringing secrets and   
        receiving moral acclaim, prisoners are tortured into apostasy, and diplomacy is  
        replaced by propaganda.  
 
Despite the fact that he is very anxious regarding the consequences of wars of 
doctrine upon international society, Wight is not willing to identify one particular 
kind of war with war per se and to present the other types of conflict as simple 
aberrations. In his discussion of international revolutions, he argues that the 
history of international society is equally divided between revolutionary and non-
revolutionary periods, and therefore there is no reason to assume that making war 
to promote a doctrine is less normal than waging war for reasons of fear or gain. To 
the extent that every war in Europe since 1792 had a doctrinal dimension, the 
international system cannot be adequately understood in terms of the balance of 
power, and the special weight of a state within international society is frequently 
related to its ideology. Like Butterfield, Wight argues that revolutionary upheavals 
taking place within countries have the tendency to lead to wars of righteousness. 
These wars exceed in ferocity those which are conducted for reasons of state, since 
they have unlimited aims and aspire to transform international society by 
promoting new ideological principles. However, one of the paradoxical 
consequences of ideological wars is to reveal the hidden unity of international 
society, which is no longer constituted by sovereign states but by politicised 
individuals. For Wight (1978: 87):  
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        The unity of international society is thrown into sharpest relief when it is riven by an  
         international civil war. Catholics hate Protestants, ultras hate Jacobins, Communists 
         hate the bourgeoisie, with a fiercer passion than Frenchmen hate Germans or  
         Americans  hate Japanese.  
 
Therefore, irrespective of the fact that international revolutions have their grim 
aspects, they play a significant role in international politics under modern 
circumstances. Although the search for pure economic gain is not as important as it 
once was in the conduct of war, “the motives of fear and doctrinal conviction 
continue to be part of our daily experience” (Wight, 1978: 142-143). Despite the 
fact that Wight’s presentation of international anarchy as the fundamental cause 
of war brings him close to mainstream realist assumptions regarding the nature of 
international politics, his distinction between different types of war enables him to 
paint a more complicated picture than those who assume that war is by definition 
a relationship between states seeking to augment national power. Wars of 
doctrine definitely have an unpleasant dimension and can lead to extreme and 
protracted forms of conflict, but they are not a simple exception or aberration 
from what is supposedly normal in international relations. Like the other 
institutions of international society, war does not have a given essence and can 
perform different functions within the international system.  
International Institutions 
 
The complex nature of political reality is also demonstrated by Wight in his 
discussion of international society and its institutions. Cooperation and conflict are 
both present in international affairs, since the workings of power politics are 
tempered by diplomacy, international law, and international organisations.  The 
cornerstone of international society is international law, which ascribes rights and 
duties to its members. Far from being stable and unchanging, international law 
follows the political and other developments which take place within the wider 
framework of international society. As Wight notes, this is especially true for the 
law of war that has historically undergone various modifications. Until the middle 
of the seventeenth century, the Christian tradition of the Just War provided the 
measure for assessing the legitimacy of particular wars. A war was judged not so 
much according to its conduct but was rather evaluated according to its origins and 
the aims it served. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, war 
was recognised as a legitimate activity within the context of international society, 
and what mattered was not its original cause but its conduct according to certain 
established rules and conventions.  
    In the twentieth century, the League of Nations tried to outlaw aggressive war 
and in a sense revived the Just War tradition of the Christian Middle Ages. Any war 
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or threat of war was transformed from a private to a public issue affecting all 
members of the League, which had the right to intervene in order to protect the 
existing distribution of power. Further significant changes in the law of war were 
brought about by the United Nations (UN) and the Nuremburg Trials. The UN 
Charter limited the right to war only to cases of self-defence, which, however, can 
be interpreted in a number of different ways by the states involved in a particular 
conflict. With regard to the Nuremburg Trials, Wight claims that they provide the 
first case in history where the military and political leaders of a sovereign state 
were condemned for engaging in aggressive war. The decisions made at 
Nuremburg represent not only a sea change in the law of war but also an 
important step of moral and political progress.  
    Apart from international law, institutions of international society such as 
diplomacy and alliances are also changing forms and functions throughout the 
centuries. As far as it concerns diplomacy, Wight is troubled regarding its 
contemporary place in international affairs. He notes that historically there has 
been an increase in the size of diplomatic missions and an extension of the 
diplomatic system from Europe to Asia and the rest of the world. On the other 
hand, the Cold War undermines the distinction between diplomacy and espionage 
and puts strain on those diplomatic standards that were faithfully observed among 
the European powers during the nineteenth century. Despite his recognition of the 
importance of diplomacy in international society, Wight is not particularly sanguine 
regarding its prospects in an ideologically divided world. The kind of revolutionary 
diplomacy carried out by the Soviet Union does not represent a renewal of 
traditional diplomatic customs but a perversion of the basic functions of diplomacy 
expressed in “espionage in place of information, subversion in place of negotiation, 
propaganda in place of communication” (Wight, 1978: 117). The relationship 
between traditional and revolutionary forms of diplomacy is not equal, since the 
new practices marginalise the old ones in the same way that bad money drives out 
of the market the good.  
    Alliances have a dynamic nature which is due to the fact that circumstances in 
international politics constantly change rendering in this way the idea of natural 
friends and enemies illusory. Although the belief in natural alliances based on a 
common culture and the existence of mutual interests is an old one, a natural ally 
can in reality be understood only as “an ally in the nature of a transient balance of 
power” (Wight, 1978: 125). At the same time, Wight argues that under the 
circumstances created by the Cold War alliances must become more creative and 
comprehensive than they were in the past. He looks favourably on a federal liaison 
of the Atlantic world which would promote global cooperation and offer a tangible 
political alternative to the Soviet Union. This support for forms of alliance which 
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surpass traditional intergovernmental cooperation is one more element which 
distinguishes Wight’s approach from conventional realist readings of international 
politics. In his discussion of international law, diplomacy, and alliances, Wight is 
especially critical of the negative influence that the Cold War exercises upon key 
institutions of the international society. However, instead of calling for a simple 
return to the European past, he tries to see how international institutions could be 
reformed in order to meet new challenges. Although his viewpoint is not realist in 
any conventional meaning of the term, it is realistic in the sense that it tries to 
offer tangible solutions to contemporary problems. For Wight, international 
institutions are not to be judged by speculative standards or by the experience of 
previous epochs but should rather be evaluated by the historically determined 
requirements and expectations of the practitioners.  
International Government 
Despite Wight’s early personal support for the League and sympathetic reading of 
its failures in Power Politics, it is important to note that for him international 
organisations in general are phenomena of rather secondary importance in 
international politics. In accordance with the general insights of the English School 
of IR, Wight identifies the primary institutions of international society with 
practices such as alliances and diplomacy and not with formal international 
organisations such as NATO or the EU (Wilson, 2012). It is for this reason that he 
says that the League never controlled the politics of the post-World War I period, 
and that the UN influences the international developments of its own time even 
less. 
     With regard to historical change, Wight draws attention to two turning points in 
the history of the League. The first was its creation in an era when the rational 
reordering of international relations seemed both desirable and possible. The 
second was its unwillingness to impose decisive sanctions against Italy for its 
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-1936. This political mistake corroborated the 
impression that the League could not serve the purpose for which it was founded, 
and ultimately acted as the “generator of a whole series of other failures” (Wight, 
1978: 208). Wight does not argue that the idea of collective security was flawed, 
but points out that under the given historical circumstances the necessary political 
unity among the great powers was absent. In other words, for Wight, the failure to 
implement collective security policies in the interwar period was not an intellectual 
but a moral failure. The League’s inability to promote an enlightened form of self-
interest among the great powers was not the logical consequence of its 
institutional architecture, but it rather was an unfortunate result of the way certain 
political actors chose to frame their interests at the time.  
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    Although the UN is the formal successor of the League, their apparent 
similarities should not hide their fundamental differences. As Wight claims, in 
contradistinction to the League, the UN establishes an authoritarian model of 
international government, which is based upon the prerogatives of the great 
powers participating in the Security Council. Although the League was dependent 
upon the explicit consent and cooperation of its members, the UN has in principle 
the power to override the wishes of individual members and affect their legal 
rights. For Wight, the main problem lies with the powers granted to the Security 
Council, which follows the Hobbesian dictum that whoever has the right to pursue 
a goal has also the right to whatever means he finds necessary for its achievement. 
The Security Council’s mission to protect international peace and security renders 
the signatories of the UN Chapter obliged to provide the appropriate means for 
that purpose, and even to have their air forces instantly available for the 
imposition of military sanctions against recalcitrant states.  
    Wight’s observation that the League signalled some form of return to the Just 
War tradition of the Middle Ages shows that what we consider to be new and 
unprecedented frequently is not, and that history has a cyclical dimension with  
periods of idealism and realism frequently following one another. In the same way 
that the Christian tradition of the Just War was succeeded by the more realistic 
doctrines of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the twentieth century the 
League of Nations was superseded by the UN. His conceptualisation of the League 
as a Lockean institution and the UN as a Hobbesian one proves that institutional 
development is not a simple or linear process. Contrary to Carr, Wight shows 
sympathy for the small states the interests and wishes of which are frequently 
ignored in the name of effective intergovernmental organisation. Ultimately, his 
understanding of what an effective and just international organisation should be 
about is influenced by the historical precedent of the League of Nations.  
The Arms Race, Disarmament and Arms Control 
Wight’s examination of the dynamics of the arms race, disarmament, and arms 
control, displays his understanding of international society as a heterogeneous 
entity, where strong and weak nations pursue different agendas, and where the 
interests of the satisfied powers do not naturally coincide with those of the 
dissatisfied. According to Wight, the influence of technology and scientific progress 
on the conduct of war can be traced back to the nineteenth century, but their 
influence becomes particularly obvious in the twentieth century. As he notes, the 
rapid technological change observed during the twentieth century favours the 
nations which challenge the status quo, whereas reductions in armaments are 
usually sought by states which are content with their situation and have no 
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territorial claims against others. In the twentieth century, the utopian ideal of 
disarmament is replaced by that of arms control, which mainly aims to limit the 
possession of nuclear weapons.  
    Efforts at disarmament and arms control take place in periods of severe military 
conflict, such as the French Napoleonic and Revolutionary Wars of 1792. The 
French Revolution not only led to military confrontation across Europe, but also 
made pacifism for the first time in history the official ideology of a great power. 
Consequently, the struggle of the status quo powers against Napoleonic France 
urged the Concert of Europe to adopt reduction in armaments as one of its main 
political goals, differentiating in this way the international system of the 
nineteenth century from that of the eighteenth. World War I triggered the 
unsuccessful Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations. More 
importantly, in the second half of the twentieth century, the nuclear arms race 
generates discussions for the control of nuclear weapons. Therefore, for Wight 
pacifism is not so much an autonomous ideology but rather a natural reaction to 
political and military developments taking place within international society. In 
both its traditional and its modern forms it is not neutral but it is connected with 
the interests of particular states.  
    Far from being politically neutral, the attempt to limit the possession of nuclear 
weapons to certain nations expresses the interests of the nuclear haves at the 
expense of the have-nots. For Wight, initiatives such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty do not coincide with the general interest but express the 
historical understanding achieved between the superpowers of his time and their 
condominium over international society. Although he recognises that different 
forms of competition in armaments can be observed throughout history, Wight 
makes clear the fact that organised attempts at disarmament can be observed only 
from the nineteenth century onwards. These endeavours express the collective 
interest of certain satisfied great powers at the expense of nations which are not 
satisfied with their position in the world. Wight’s sober analysis of the arms race, 
disarmament, and arms control is fully consistent with his overall conceptualisation 
of international society as a complex and historically conditioned entity, where no 
natural harmony of interests exists and it can only be cultivated by artificial means. 
The call to limit the possession of nuclear weapons is not politically neutral but 
expresses the interests of certain powerful actors within international society. 
Likewise, in his discussion of intervention Wight argues that it is clearly a 
relationship between strong and weak states. Great powers rarely find themselves 
in the position of the victim of a foreign intervention, and, even in that case, the 
“intervention” is not really worthy of the name. However, despite this dependence 
on power, the practice of foreign intervention cannot be altogether repudiated, 
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since supporters of every political ideology admit that under certain historical 
circumstances intervention is unavoidable. Therefore, a great power should be 
judged not by whether or not it is engaging in the practice of intervention, but 
rather by the  way in which it is doing so without being too eager to exercise its 
power abroad.   
The Balance of Power  
Any examination of the balance of power as a distinct idea in Wight’s thought must 
take into account the fact he viewed it as the key organising principle of 
international politics under modern circumstances, and that it therefore provides 
the necessary background for understanding his analysis of a number of more 
particular issues. For example, in order to clarify the nature of the problems facing 
the world during the inter-war period, Wight draws attention to the importance of 
changes in the balance of power taking place at the time and the glaring failure of 
Western statesmen to comprehend these changes and act accordingly. For Wight, 
the hope that war might be abolished was not the expression of a timeless moral 
demand but was rather the ideological manifestation of a particular configuration 
of power, which was favourable to some nations and adverse to others. Kenneth 
Thompson (1980) is right to point out that for Wight the balance of power is the 
most important regularity that can be empirically observed in modern international 
politics. However, as I will demonstrate in this section, Wight is keen to distinguish 
between several different meanings of the concept of the balance of power, and 
ultimately to incorporate it into his historicist account of international change. By 
contrast to Butterfield, who in his discussion of the balance of power tries to show 
how a correct understanding of that notion gradually emerged, Wight is conscious 
of the fact that no simple or universally accepted definition of the concept of the 
balance of power exists. Different understandings of the balance of power express 
the distinct sensibilities of different epochs and the divergent interests of certain 
states or groups of states.  
     In the original edition of Power Politics (1946b), Wight distinguishes between 
two basic meanings of the balance of power: the subjective meaning and the 
objective one. In its subjective sense, the balance of power signifies a policy 
consciously adopted by a particular state to augment its power in the international 
scene. As Wight notes, in most cases the subjective aim of a power is not to create 
a simple equilibrium with other powers, but it rather is to safeguard its superiority 
over them. One the other hand, in its objective sense the balance of power 
expresses a law of international politics. This law is distinguishable from the aims of 
particular states and tends to create equilibrium of power in the international 
149 
 
scene. The subjective and the objective meanings of the balance of power guide 
the actions and thoughts of politicians and historians respectively. 
     Despite the fact that statesmen are primarily interested in the balance of power 
as a subjective policy which promotes the preponderance of their state over 
others, historians analyse it as an objective law which renders states roughly equal 
in power. Wight does not adopt the point of view of the politicians, but he is also 
unwilling to fully side with the historians. His distrust towards the balance of power 
as an objective tendency concerns not only the cases of vassal-states and jackal-
states, which out of fear or greed align themselves to a dominant power, but is also 
related to the more general political requirements of the balance. For Wight, only 
popular states with strong representative institutions can offer an effective 
resistance to hegemony. The fact that weak and corrupt states usually support a 
potential hegemon means that “the law of the Balance of Power is the more true 
of states according to their strength, confidence and internal cohesion” (Wight, 
1946b: 47). His reservations towards the balance of power as an objective 
tendency become even more pronounced in the revised edition of Power Politics 
(1978), where he distinguishes among several different meanings of the concept of 
the balance of power,  and claims  that it is important to take into consideration  
the historical and geographical limits within which it operates.  
    In particular, Wight observes that the conceptualisation of the balance of power 
as an objective reality is mainly a twentieth-century phenomenon, which should be 
contrasted to the earlier legal and moral connotations of the balance. During the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the balance of power was understood more 
as an ideal and less as a reality. In the eighteenth century, it was a legal concept 
which was included in important international treaties, such as that of Utrecht, and 
it generally expressed an aspiration and not a law.  In the nineteenth century, the 
formulation of the principle of the balance of power was influenced by the spread 
of liberal economics and was understood as a moral principle. In the same way that 
individuals should be left to their own devices in the economic market, states 
should be left to their own devices in the international scene in order to promote 
the general interest. Wight’s scepticism towards the balance of power as a law is 
demonstrated by his remark that its meaning is more fully comprehended in 
periods of international crisis and hegemonic struggle. In other words, the balance 
of power is important not so much as a reality but rather as a normative ideal. 
Even if the balance of power corresponds to an objective sociological tendency, 
this tendency is mitigated and circumscribed by its opposite: the principle of the 
concentration of power and the establishment of international hegemony by the 
most powerful actor within a given international system. The historical experiences 
of the ancient Chinese and the Hellenic  systems of states prove exactly how fragile 
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the balance of power is as a political reality and how it is limited by countervailing 
tendencies within the international system.  
    The idea that different definitions of the balance of power are adopted in 
different historical periods inspires Wight’s analysis of this concept in Diplomatic 
Investigations, where he distinguishes among nine distinct formulations of the 
balance of power and prioritises the first definition which has to do with the even 
distribution of power. Among the nine different definitions mentioned by Wight it 
is only the last one which assumes that there is “an inherent tendency of 
international politics to produce an even distribution of power” (Wight, emphasis in 
the original, 1966c: 165). Wight is sceptical towards this hypothesis, and adopts the 
first definition of the balance of power, which places the equal distribution of 
power within certain geographical and historical limits. According to this definition, 
the balance of power is not a timeless political reality but a phenomenon that can 
be observed within particular international systems for certain periods of time. A 
clear example of the balance of power as an equal distribution of power among the 
members of a particular system is provided by the Italian states-system between 
1454 and 1494. The moral connotations of the balance of power are analytically 
explored by Wight in “The Balance of Power and International Order”,  where he 
makes the important observation that “the symbol or metaphor of the balance was 
originally used in civilized discourse to represent, not international order, but 
moral order” (Wight, 1973: 85). For him, the power of the balance of power lies in 
its ability to safeguard international order by combining the interest of individual 
states to their autonomy with the collective interest.  
    To conclude, Wight adopts a largely historicist approach in his analysis of the 
balance of power emphasising the importance of European traditions and showing 
the different nuances and transformations of the concept across time. In both 
Power Politics and the other publications where he discusses this concept he is 
interested in its historical and geographical contours. At the same time, Wight 
exhibits a strong preference for the moral definitions of the balance, which are 
traced back to the origins of the modern European system of states. Twentieth-
century scientific understandings of the balance of power do not necessarily 
represent a progress with regard to its earlier formulations by legal and moral 
theorists. Wight does not exactly call for a revival of the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century conceptualisations of the concept, but he wants to make 
evident its moral connotations and overall relationship with international order 
under modern circumstances. His observations that the idea of the balance of 
power is always rejected by powers aspiring to global hegemony, and that the 
primary meaning of the balance is that of an even distribution of power, show that 
his conceptualisation of the balance of power was certainly critical of the 
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superpowers of his age. In the final analysis, Wight not only appeals to the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European formulations of the balance of 
power, but also supports the autonomy and integrity of European states which, 
having abandoned the quest for hegemony, find themselves in favour of the equal 
distribution of power in the international scene.  
    III)    SYSTEMS OF STATES  
Wight’s historicist conceptualisation of international change becomes particularly 
evident in his examination of different international systems in Systems of States 
(1977), and in his celebration of Western values in international relations. In both 
cases, Wight uses the present in order to evaluate the past, and attributes world 
historical value to the European political experience. The particularity of Wight’s 
vision of the past and the present becomes evident if it is compared with the more 
critical views expressed by Watson and Mackinnon on the same set of problems. It 
is for this reason that in this section I will discuss the views expressed by Watson in 
The Evolution of International Society and in the next section I take into account 
the ideas of Mackinnon.  
    Systems of States consists of a number of papers that Wight wrote for the British 
Committee. Gramsci’s (1971) methodological recommendation that we must be 
cautious when evaluating books that were not published by the author himself, 
means that every attempt to assess the book’s importance should start from the 
admission of the fact that the papers it contains were conceived as part of a larger 
project. Within this project, other Committee members were supposed to play an 
important role, discussing civilisations that do not receive adequate coverage in 
Systems of States. That said, what I would like to argue is that there is a certain 
tension between the ambitious theoretical framework presented in the book’s first 
chapter “De systematibus civitatum” and the limited range of systems and 
historical experiences that are examined in the next chapters. Despite the promises 
given in “De systematibus civitatum” the book as a whole is permeated by 
Westphalian ideological assumptions and is based on a rather sharp distinction 
between states-systems, suzerain state-systems, and empires. By placing the 
European experience at the centre of his analysis, Wight prioritises structure over 
history and assigns universal significance to a contingent political arrangement, 
which was in crisis even when the papers included in the book were originally 
written.  
    For Wight (1977), who traces the idea of a states-system back to Pufendorf, what 
lies at the heart of a states-system is the mutual recognition of sovereignty. This 
recognition is expressed in institutions such as diplomacy, the balance of power, 
and international law. The belief that systems comprised of independent political 
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entities recognising one another’s sovereignty should be distinguished from 
suzerain state-systems, where one state asserts claims to superiority accepted by 
the rest, makes Wight to list only three examples of states-systems:  the ancient 
Greek, the modern European, and the Chinese of the period of the Warring States. 
Among these systems, only the first two are analytically discussed and compared 
with one another. Although, as the papers of the British Committee show, Hudson 
was to write about China and Williams about the Middle Ages, Wight had 
reservations about both cases.  
    As regards China, Wight felt that even during the period of the Warring States 
(771 B.C. -221 A.D.) the hegemonic claims of the Chou dynasty were not entirely 
rejected, and therefore the independence of the members of the system was 
under question. As regards the medieval period, Wight did not believe that 
anything resembling a states-system existed in Europe at the time. As he notes, to 
the extent that we can conceptualise medieval political realities all, we should talk 
about a very complicated double-headed suzerain state-system. However, without 
arguing that medieval society can be conceptualised as a states-system, Wight 
shows the negative and positive aspects of the connection that exists between the 
medieval and the modern Europe. On the negative side, Wight argues that 
secularism and political modernity occurred as the result of the failure of Latin 
Christendom to reform itself and to heal its internal divisions. It was precisely this 
failure that strengthened the secular powers already present in the Council of 
Constance (1494) and enabled them to gain the upper hand in the Westphalian 
settlement. On the positive side, taking into account the danger of projecting 
modern notions into a medieval reality, Wight makes the interesting claim that, to 
the extent that a “state” existed during the Middle Ages, this state was the Church. 
Lastly, the notion of secondary states-systems, whose members are empires or 
suzerain systems, is not analysed in length and the main example provided 
concerns the Armana age.  
    Since focusing one’s critique on what Wight failed to include in his account of 
states-systems could trigger the response that other members of the Committee 
were working on those topics, I would like to analyse Wight’s treatment of non-
European systems, and especially of the Hellenic one, since it is the only that is 
extensively discussed and compared directly to the modern European system. 
Wight’s harsh evaluation of that system illustrates the ways in which his thought 
was heavily influenced—and confined—by the modern European experience. 
Despite the fact that Wight displays an impressive knowledge of ancient Greece, 
his method is not a genuinely comparative one, since he uses the present in order 
to evaluate the past. The Hellenic system is actually defined by lack: by the lack or 
153 
 
at least the limited development of those important institutions that we—
moderns—regard as normal.  
Classical Greece  
For Wight, the ancient Greeks had a very limited comprehension of international 
law. The Greek city-state was not seen by its inhabitants as a polity possessing 
rights and obligations towards polities of the same type, but was understood as a 
natural organism, which exists to guarantee the moral and political development of 
its own citizens. Although in modern Europe the development of the state is 
coterminous with the development of the international system, in Greece the part 
defined as a city state was both chronologically and normatively prior to the whole 
defined as the international system. As a result, whatever customs of war existed 
were not codified and the peaceful settlement of disputes did not conform to set 
rules. As Wight notes, the role of the third party when mediating in a dispute was 
to arrive at a moral and not so much a legal decision, and to settle the problem 
following the dictates of equity rather than law in the strict sense of the term. 
These dictates were encapsulated in the ancient Greek notion of dike.  
    Apart from international law, the diplomatic system was also underdeveloped. 
The modern network of mutually recognised embassies and ambassadors is an 
Italian invention, which was unknown to the Greeks. According to Wight, the list of 
ancient Greek diplomatic agents broadly defined included the herald, the envoy, 
and the proxenos. Heralds carried a particular message from one city state to 
another and were not entitled to negotiate. Envoys had the jurisdiction to 
negotiate about a particular issue, but were not permanent diplomatic 
representatives, because after negotiating they were required to return to their 
city and had no particular links to other cities. On the other hand, proxenoi had 
special and permanent links to others since they were supposed to leave the city in 
which they were born to become citizens of another city. Although some of them 
had considerable influence on commercial matters or even politics, they were not 
entitled to discuss matters of war and peace and could play no meaningful role in 
settling international disputes. Despite the fact that Wight is intrigued by the role 
of proxenoi, he treats this institution as a peculiarity and draws attention not so 
much to what proxenoi were doing but rather to what they were not able to do. In 
general, his examination of forms of diplomatic representation in ancient Greece 
aims to explain why there were no permanent diplomatic representatives in the 
modern sense of the term, and not to explain how an international system could 
work effectively without their aid by making use of different categories of 
diplomatic agents.  
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    One further attribute of the ancient Greek system was the absence of the idea of 
the balance of power and the institution of the great powers. A relatively 
egalitarian conception of international society was accompanied by a hegemonic 
understanding of the international system, where one particular city was naturally 
elevated above the rest. Contrary to the moderns, the ancients felt comfortable 
with the supremacy of a single power, which could in principle express the 
collective interests of the Hellenic world against foreign aggression, and frequently 
tried to institutionalise its hegemony through organisations such as the 
Peloponnesian League. Finally, Wight draws attention to the allegedly limited 
importance of horizontal loyalties and international public opinion within the 
Hellenic states-system. Putting into question Edmund Burke’s assumption that the 
ideological division of Europe after the French Revolution has important similarities 
with the competition between democrats and oligarchs in the Hellenic world, 
Wight claims that the Hellenic factions were not united by a systematic and 
genuinely internationalist political doctrine. Despite the fact that ideological 
sympathies that cut across the frontiers of city-states and made Athens and Sparta 
the champions of discrete political causes, the struggle for power was more 
important than the promotion of a universal political ideal. 
    Public opinion was severely restricted in its ability to influence international 
developments and primarily assumed the form of eunoia towards particular 
persons or cities without taking into consideration the interests of mankind as a 
whole. As Wight goes on to argue, it is only in modern times that public opinion 
ceases to be concerned exclusively with particular objects and acquires the ability 
to judge an action on moral grounds following impersonal rules. For the modern 
man, apartheid is wrong not only because of its consequences upon a certain 
national group but also because it ostensibly violates important norms of human 
dignity. As a result of the failure of the Greeks to conceptualise the interests of 
humanity conceived as a moral whole, Immanuel Kant’s insistence on publicity and 
Woodrow Wilson’s appeal to the opinion of the world “would have puzzled, but in 
different ways, Thucydides and Plato, Isocrates and Demosthenes” (Wight, 1977: 
72).  
    Although Wight is generally justified in claiming that several key ideas and 
institutions of the modern system of states were missing from the ancient Greek 
one, he does not seriously consider the possibility that the moderns have certain 
things to learn from the ancients. In particular, he does not fully realise that an 
institution cannot be identified with the function it performs, since the same 
function can theoretically be performed by a different institution. For example, the 
fact that in ancient Greece there were no diplomats does not mean that there was 
no regular communication among cities, or that developments in one city were not 
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extensively debated and analysed in other cities. Watson, to whom we now turn, 
expands the list of relevant historical examples and also presents a more positive 
reading of the Hellenic system.  
The Evolution of International Society  
The fact that Wight focuses his attention on a rather limited number of cases and 
his evaluation of those cases is not altogether satisfying, can be seen when 
comparing his approach with that that Watson adopts in The Evolution of 
International Society (1992/2009). Watson’s magnum opus is based on some of the 
theoretical insights contained in Systems of States, and especially the first chapter 
“De systematibus civitatum”, but it represents a decisive break with the 
Westphalian assumptions that were broadly accepted by the members of the 
Committee when Wight was writingxxxvi. As Buzan and Little (2009) note, in order to 
accommodate the different forms of international political systems that have 
emerged across time, Watson includes in his account the empires that naturally 
have no place in Wight’s systems of independent states. By arguing that 
international systems operate on a spectrum that extends from empire to the 
existence of completely independent political communities, but are mainly defined 
by hegemony understood as an intermediate position, Watson provides a more 
inclusive theoretical framework than Wight and undermines the anarchy/hierarchy 
distinction that has dominated the discourse of IR in the post-World War II period. 
As Jack Donnelly (2015) has pointed out, this fixation with anarchy is a relatively 
recent disciplinary convention, which has little to do with international reality itself 
and more to do with the role of certain influential texts. Indeed, although Donnelly 
mentions Wight’s original edition of Power Politics as one of the precursors of the 
Waltzian anarchy, Systems of States arguably performs a similar function by 
emphasising the independence of the members of a states-system.  
    Despite the fact that Wight suggests that only independent political communities 
can provide the units necessary for the creation of a states-system, Watson paints 
a more complicated picture, where independent political communities, suzerain 
state-systems, and empires, belong to the same political universe and regulate 
their relationships in similar ways. Watson’s discussion of the ancient systems that 
are virtually ignored by Wight begins in Sumer, where the first written records can 
be found. Contrary to Egypt, Sumer was not an empire but a conglomerate of 
independent political communities, whose sovereignty was limited only by the 
kingship that the ruler of the most prominent city exercised at any given time. 
Although the Great King did not have the right to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of Sumerian cities other than his own, he was entrusted with the mission to 
arbitrate disputes among cities and also to regulate the use of force. Without being 
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an expression of the principle of empire, as ancient Egypt was, or being organised 
around the principle of absolute independence, the Sumerian system was mainly a 
hegemony, where the advantages of relative independence were combined with 
those provided by the existence of a central authority. For Watson, the degree of 
independence that the Sumerian cities enjoyed within the framework provided by 
kingship, brings the Sumerian historical experience close to that of later political 
forms, such as those developed in classical Greece and modern Europe.  
    With respect to the secondary states-systems, which are mentioned but not 
analysed by Wight, Watson provides the example of the relationships between 
Egypt and the Hittites. These relationships concerned issues similar to those facing 
the independent Sumerian cities, and were regulated by frequent diplomatic 
contacts based on the inviolability of heralds. The elaborate conventions and rules 
that influenced the various exchanges among Egypt and the Hittites lead Watson to 
talk about the existence of an international society, which included other 
communities as well. The methods developed in the world of the pre-classical 
empires to regulate the interaction of units different from those existing in classical 
Greece or modern Europe, found their fullest elaboration in the case of the Persian 
Empire. The Persians relied heavily on the use of soft power, and where possible 
they avoided resorting to coercion. The very size of this Empire meant that 
subjugate territories enjoyed considerable political autonomy, and this autonomy 
only increased the more one moved away from the imperial centre. Even when 
empires did not hesitate to resort to coercion to protect their interests, as the 
Assyrians frequently did, Watson notes that there were real benefits to be derived 
from the existence of an imperial authority. These benefits made empires 
particularly attractive to merchants, but they were also realised by wider sections 
of the population.  Apart from Watson’s bold move to include suzerain state-
systems and empires in his account of the evolution of modern international 
society, the differences between him and Wight become particularly evident in 
their contrasting evaluations of classical Greece.  
    Although as we saw Wight compares the international experience of the ancients 
to that of the moderns and finds it wanting in many respects, Watson offers a 
more sympathetic reading of ancient civilisations, and does not exclude the 
possibility that the moderns could benefit from studying the political experience of 
the ancients. Contrary to Wight, Watson tries to show the similarities between the 
international political experience of the ancients and that of the moderns, and to 
indicate ways in which modern international society could benefit from practices 
and institutions developed within the ancient Greek one. For Watson, the cultural 
affinities existing among ancient Greeks had significant political consequences, 
which give us the right to talk about a Hellenic international society and not just a 
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system. For example, the belief that it was improper and in the long term 
counterproductive to destroy the defeated side provides the example of an 
important similarity between the ancient Greek and the modern European 
international practice, and is not irrelevant to the idea of the balance of power. As 
Butterfield showed, no balance of power can be effectively maintained when the 
loser is annihilated.   
    What is more, although Wight admits the existence but tends to minimise the 
importance of horizontal loyalties in ancient Greece, Watson draws attention to 
the importance of social cleavages in the Greek society, and emphasises the ways 
in which these cleavages and divisions were utilised by the great powers of the 
day, Athens and Sparta.  In the same way that the Athenians tended to support the 
establishment of democratic governments across the ancient Greek world, the 
Spartans felt more secure and comfortable with the existence of oligarchic 
regimes. Both Athens and Sparta were willing to intervene in the so-called internal 
affairs of other cities in order to safeguard their own security, and even the 
Persians were frequently called upon by competing political factions within Greece. 
Watson does not deny that Athens and Sparta were primarily motivated by 
security interests, but points out that the same broadly applied during the Cold 
War to the actions of Soviet and American leaders.  
    Perhaps the practice that most fascinates Watson is that of dike. Watson agrees 
with Wight that dike is not an expression of international law in the modern sense 
of the term, but he points out that this has its advantages. Freed from the legalistic 
assumptions of the moderns, the ancients were able to treat a given issue 
according to its own peculiar nature, and combine the requirements of justice with 
those of expediency. As Watson goes on to argue, dike underpinned the 
understanding reached between Athens and Sparta during the period of their joint 
hegemony in Greece, and also the short but interesting period known as the King’s 
Peace. During that period, the major Greek cities along with the Persians and the 
lesser Greek cities became fully conscious of the fact that they belonged to the 
same political universe, and they therefore needed common rules and institutions 
to regulate their relationships. Ironically, it was under Persian guidance that the 
Greek cities saw with clarity their common interests and participated in the 
creation of a functioning international society. Although Wight also recognises the 
importance of the relationships and interactions that took place between Hellas 
and Persia, he abstains from describing Hellas and Persia as members of the same 
states-system. He also provides a somewhat different interpretation of the King’s 
Peace as an achievement of the Persian and Spartan diplomacy, which attributed a 
secondary role to Athens and the other Greek cities.  
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    As regards the post-Westphalian period of international relations that provides 
the basis of Wight’s conceptualisation of a states-system, Watson accepts that the 
Westphalian settlement of 1648 was built upon distinctively anti-hegemonic 
foundations. Especially during the period between the Peace of Westphalia and the 
Utrecht settlement of 1714, European international politics assumed an almost 
anarchic form, and were defined by the strong support for the independence of 
the various states. However, Watson also argues that behind the support for the 
independence of states and the mutual recognition of sovereignty there could be 
observed strong hegemonic tendencies, which were partly successful in the cases 
of Louis XIV and Napoleon. The ultimate defeat of French hegemonic ambitions in 
Europe did not lead to any absolute form of independence, but it rather led to the 
establishment of the collective hegemony embodied in the nineteenth-century 
Concert of Europe. 
     It is also interesting to note that Watson assigns a more important role to the 
Ottomans than Wight. Although their support for a European balance of power 
was not entirely consistent, and in that sense they did not play the role that the 
Persians played in Greece, the Ottomans should be placed within and not outside 
the European international society. Cultural and political differences 
notwithstanding, the Turks contributed to the establishment of the Westphalian 
settlement, and also generally accepted certain important rules in their relations 
with the European powers. Although Wight’s critique of Alexandrowicz (1967) 
tends to differentiate the corpus Christianorum from the rest of the world, Watson 
minimises the importance of cultural differences and provides support for a more 
inclusive and variegated form of international society where common interests 
matter more than the existence of a common identity.  
    All things considered, the juxtaposition of Wight’s Systems of States and 
Watson’s The Evolution of International Society reveals that the title of the first is 
more appropriate to the second and vice versa. As Buzan (2014) points out, despite 
its title, Watson’s book can be best understood as a contribution to a genuinely 
comparative historical project where notions of development or evolution play a 
secondary role. On the other hand, the papers included in Wight’s book are more 
about evolution and development than it is ordinarily assumed, and tend to 
interpret the past through the prism of the present. It is because of that that 
Vigezzi has argued that for Wight the writing of the papers included in Systems of 
States represents a conclusive but also treacherous moment. The reference to the 
most different forms of political community in “De systematibus civitatum” is 
contradicted by the writer’s deeply engrained belief that a true system of states 
can only consist of the sovereign political entities that define European modernity.  
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    Murray Forsyth (1978) was also correct to emphasise the element of progression 
or development that defines Wight’s evaluation of different historical states-
systems and, as I shall argue, this element becomes even more obvious in his 
historicist defence of Western values in international relations. What I am trying to 
do in comparing Wight’s views to those of Watson in this section and to those of 
Mackinnon in the next section, is not so much to show that they were correct and 
Wight was wrong. What I would rather like to point out is that historicism can 
sometimes lead to a selective reading of the past and discourage the search for 
ideological and institutional alternatives to the present. It can also make us forget 
that both the past and present can be the object of the most diverse 
interpretations, and that historical investigations can easily turn into structural 
ones when one ceases to be critical towards one’s own assumptions and beliefs.  
IV) WESTERN VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Wight’s defence of values and institutions which were first realised in modern 
Europe becomes explicit in his discussion of Western values in international 
relations.  These values largely coincide with what in his lectures on international 
theory Wight calls the Rationalist/Grotian tradition and distinguishes it from both 
Realism/Machiavellianism and Revolutionism/Kantianism. However, one important 
difference between the views expressed in “Western Values in International 
Relations” (1966b) and the approach employed in International Theory: The Three 
Traditions (1991) is that in the latter book Wight adopts a contextualist point of 
view. Although there are passages where Wight reveals his personal sympathy for 
Grotianism/Rationalism, he also makes the important observation that the three 
traditions of international theory correspond to different material and political 
elements in international reality itself. Realism expresses the condition of 
international anarchy and the resulting fact that international relations are 
ultimately regulated by war. The practices of diplomacy and commerce provide the 
material bases of Rationalism. Finally, moral and psychological ties that develop 
independent of national frontiers provide the rationale behind Revolutionism.  
    By contrast to the contextually and historically informed approach adopted in 
International Theory, in “Western Values in International Relations” Wight builds 
his argument on certain unit-ideas, which are artificially abstracted and isolated 
from their historical and intellectual contexts. What unites these ideas is the fact 
that they express the middle way between opposed extremes, and they are 
intimately connected to the Western tradition of constitutional government. 
Although Wight in principle dissociates “Western values” from their Cold War 
connotations, he is not entirely consistent. By relating international principles to a 
particular form of government, he does not fully take into account the fact that 
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what primarily mattered during the Cold War was not to strengthen the bonds 
existing within the West, but rather to strengthen the bonds between the West 
and the rest, and especially Soviet Russia. Even today, after the end of the Cold 
War, relating international practices and institutions to a particular form of political 
regime does not seem as a promising strategy.  
    Wight’s belief that the ancients did not have a conception of international 
morality similar to that of the moderns neglects the fact that in ancient Greece 
there did not exist a “state” understood as a separate entity from the “society”. 
International morality in the way that Wight defines it presupposes this 
fundamental –but also morally problematic—distinction between state and 
society. Although there might be some progress in the field of international ethics, 
it is not certain that modern democracy is superior to the ancient one. Finally yet 
importantly, one should keep in mind that, as R. B. J. Walker (1993) has pointed 
out, an appeal to a middle road might end up legitimising the extremes that it 
supposedly avoids. Following the middle road that Wight describes – and maybe 
recommends—might be a wise choice under certain circumstances, but it cannot 
be seen as a recipe of universal political application. From a historicist point of 
view, choosing an extreme position might also be acceptable within a particular 
context. Having raised those concerns, we will now examine how Wight defines 
Western values in the particular fields of international society, the maintenance of 
order, intervention and international morality.  
International Society  
For Wight (1966b), in its Western version the idea of international society 
represents a via media between those who argue that only the state exists and 
those who claim that only humanity with its individual men and women can be a 
valid object of moral and political loyalty. For the supporters of the Western 
conception of international society, such as Suarez, the moral claims of states are 
valid but do not exhaust everything that can be said about international affairs. 
States are not self-contained and must always be treated as the basic parts of a 
wider international whole. Therefore, for its Western proponents, international 
society is neither a fiction nor a mere aspiration but a tangible reality which should 
be examined through historical and sociological lens. 
     Apart from the speculations of intellectuals and statesmen, the existence of 
international society can be proved by these institutional conventions and political 
devices that originally emerged in Western Europe and later engulfed the rest of 
the world. These include among others diplomacy, international law, and the 
balance of power. Wight does not believe that the Western conceptualisation of 
international society is devoid of problems, ambiguities, and imprecisions. 
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However, he sees it as a particularly realistic one in the sense that it corresponds to 
the peculiarities of international experience. As Robert Jackson reminds us, “the 
middle way in international affairs is no high road: it is a meandering track through 
forest and heath where it is easy to lose one’s way, and also one’s grip” (Jackson, 
2008: 359).  
Order and Intervention 
For Wight, the Western view of international order employs certain political 
attributes of constitutionalism to interpret international relations. At the heart of 
the Western understanding of international order can be found the depiction of 
security as a public good, which is beneficial to the majority of the members of 
international society. The limits of international order in practice coincide with the 
interests of the most prominent members of international society,  which are  
generally satisfied with the status quo and see the revisionist states as a threat not 
only to themselves but also to international society more generally. As Wight 
notes, the hypothesis that there can be a delinquent or aggressor state is part and 
parcel of the Western comprehension of international order. The Western 
understanding of international order can therefore be seen as a middle way 
between the view that security is exclusive and there is no international order, and 
a fully inclusive conceptualisation of international order, which would apply equally 
to all members of international society without distinguishing between status quo 
and revisionist states.  
    With regard to intervention, Wight argues that it is a particularly contentious 
practice even from a Western point of view. To the extent that it openly violates 
the equality and independence of all members of international society, it is a 
hostile act. On the other hand, it is so frequent and widespread that one can totally 
reject it only at the cost of losing contact with empirical reality. The argument 
against intervention underlines the rights of states and considers it a violation of 
the natural liberty of nations. On the other side, the most important supporters of 
intervention defend the present or future homogeneity of international society, 
which must either remain in a particular condition, or be radically transformed 
towards a certain direction. For Wight, a sober appreciation of intervention should 
start from the acknowledgement of the moral interdependence of peoples and the 
dual nature of international society, which has states as its immediate members 
but individual men and women as its ultimate members. The recognition of the 
moral interdependence of peoples provides a via media between interventionism 
and non-interventionism, and leaves open the possibility that even great powers 
could be submitted to the kind of moral and political scrutiny usually reserved for 
small nations.  
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International Morality  
Of special interest is Wight’s discussion of international morality and belief that the 
modern West has developed a more positive and nuanced understanding of 
international ethics than classical civilisations. In ancient Greece and Rome, 
political ethics took the form of veto on political action. Certain great military or 
political men refused to sanction decisions which offered short-term military and 
political gains but were fundamentally incompatible with personal honour. For 
example, notes Wight, after the Greek victory against Xerxes, the Athenians did not 
approve of Themistocles’ idea to set ablaze the allied fleet and in this way acquire a 
decisive military advantage over the other Greek city-states. As Wight mentions, 
the importance of moral veto on political action is also echoed in the refusal of the 
Roman general Fabricius to poison the Greek general Pyrrhus, who was one of the 
most important military foes of Rome. In these cases, personal morality is directly 
applied to international politics, but its application has a rather provisional and 
exceptional character which does not fundamentally transform the rules of the 
game.  
     For Wight, the reason why modern history does not provide such clear examples 
of moral opposition to practically beneficial courses of action is that Europe has 
developed a complex form of political morality, which was noticeably absent from 
earlier civilisations. In the modern world, politics and ethics are no longer 
conceptualised as separate realms posing limits to one another, but are 
understood as parts of an integrated whole. Political decisions such as the British 
grant of independence to India cannot be understood from either a moral or a 
practical point of view but show the interdependence of morality and raison d’état 
under modern conditions. Therefore, individual conscience does not frequently 
need to oppose political decisions, because moral factors and considerations 
normally influence the political process.  As with the Western conception of 
international society, Wight does not hide the fact that international morality in its 
modern form has certain unpleasant aspects, and that at its worst can give rise to 
forms of hypocrisy and self-deception, which offer a spurious moral justification to 
every political decision.  
    However, he clearly treats the modern invention of international morality as a 
positive historical phenomenon which transforms individual conscience from a 
constraining to a creative force. Under modern conditions, individual conscience 
needs no longer to unconditionally oppose politics because it can aspire to 
influence its conduct. As with the cases of international society, order, and 
intervention, the Western conception of international morality represents a via 
media between utopianism and Realpolitik. Wight’s discussion of the modern 
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emergence of an advanced moral sensitiveness missing from earlier civilisations 
provides one more indication of his favourable reading of modern international 
history, which is superior to the ancient one in both institutional and moral terms. 
However, although he shows the historical alternatives to Western values in 
international relations in the form of the views propounded by classical 
civilisations, he does not make entirely clear which are the contemporary 
alternatives to Western values and who their supporters are. For example, 
although Soviet communism does not meet the standards of constitutional 
government and individual freedom that Wight identifies with Western values, 
Marx and certain versions of Marxism cannot be easily separated from a tradition 
interested in the self-realisation of the individual and the establishment of more 
harmonious relationships among distinct peoples and societies. Indeed, the 
progressivist and internationalist leanings of many Marxists could bring this 
ideology to the forefront of Western values.  
    The selective way in which Wight constructs Western values can be realised by 
taking into consideration Mackinnon’s paper “Western Values”, which provides the 
background for understanding Wight’s discussion of the same problem. For 
Mackinnon (1960), who wrote and presented his paper in the British Committee 
before Wight, principles of constitutional government certainly account for the 
important differences between the modern West and societies where the only 
alternative to arbitrary authority is violent revolt. However, the benign liberalism 
with which Wight identifies Western values is only part of the picture, and ignores 
the importance of the political conservatism usually associated with Catholic 
religious beliefs. What is more, for Mackinnon, the kind of formalism inherent in 
the idea of the rule of law does not always answer the concerns of people anxious 
for the satisfaction of their most basic material needs. The material base of the 
appeal of communism was a problem that interested Mackinnon, Butterfield, and 
maybe other members of the Committee as well.  Mackinnon does not side with 
those who argue that economic considerations necessarily override political ones, 
but notes that prioritising political considerations is not always acceptable. Wight’s 
depiction of Western values in international relations is therefore a highly selective 
one, and does not exhaust a very difficult problem. More importantly, even if one 
accepts Wight’s views and rejects the problems raised by Mackinnon regarding the 
formalism and potential conservatism of Western values, the problem remaining 
has to do with finding ways to regulate the relationships between the West and the 
rest.   
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V)    CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have emphasised the historicist element in Wight’s approach to 
international change. As a student of colonialism, Wight adopts a historically 
conditioned form of international morality, and evaluates the expansion of Britain 
not according to timeless moral criteria but according to the degree to which it 
delivered on its promises. Paradoxically, at times, Wight comes close to accusing 
the Africans for the various British failures in Africa by drawing attention to the 
social backwardness and the cultural disunity of the continent. The main problem 
is not that Wight does not judge imperialism from the outside according to the 
dictates of an absolute international morality, but that he has relative low 
expectations regarding what the British could have achieved in Africa. Although he 
might be right in his conclusion that the British are not directly responsible for the 
poverty in Africa, and that modernisation is a slow and difficult process, he 
certainly could have focused more on the rationale of the British presence in the 
continent, and this would have also enabled him to provide a more convincing 
balance sheet of the British achievements and failures. What is more, Wight’s 
exclusive preoccupation with the problems of British Africa deprives him of the 
opportunity to consider the implications of what Duncan Bell (2007) has described 
as the idea of Greater Britain. Taking into account the relationship between the 
United Kingdom and the settler colonies of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
would certainly have enabled Wight to be more critical of the transition from the 
Old to the New Empire. The historical possibility of creating some form of federal 
union between Britain and the so-called settler colonies proves that the 
relationship between colonies and the imperial centre could have been more 
reciprocal than Wight imagined.  
    The historical changes identified by Wight in Power Politics show that even under 
modern conditions the rules and the character of international relations are not 
given. In particular, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed major 
departures in the function of institutions such as war, diplomacy and international 
law. Wight’s depiction of the dangerous consequences of wars of doctrine, and the 
more general negative influence of the Cold War upon the classical European 
diplomatic tradition, certainly helps one understand what was going on at the time, 
and accords with Butterfield’s presentation of the same problems. What is less 
clear is what exactly Wight proposed as an alternative to the Cold War and modern 
power politics in general. As we saw, he was generally critical of the modern idea 
of the autonomy of politics, and believed that in medieval Europe notions of 
practical expediency were more closely linked to moral and religious ideals. 
Despite this positive depiction of the medieval period, nothing in Wight’s work 
suggests that he was an enemy of political modernity or that he wanted to see 
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religious institutions acquiring political power. A similar problem applies to his 
critique of the Cold War. Although Wight was certainly justified in his defence of 
the political autonomy and cultural traditions of Europeans states, it is unlikely that 
he preached a direct return to the European past, as Butterfield did.  
    Despite the fact that his general understanding of international institutions was 
influenced by the European traditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
Wight realised that no institution can remain static because of the various changes 
taking place in its environment. Even in Systems of States, where he adopts a 
largely Westphalian point of view when defining and evaluating states-systems, 
Wight displays sensitivity towards the historical contours of the balance of power 
and the possibility of a world state. The belief that both international institutions 
and their functions are historically contingent creations stops Wight from offering a 
simplistic answer to the dilemmas of the Cold War. Indeed, his call for a closer 
cooperation between Europe and America proves that what primarily interested 
him was the reform of international institutions according to contemporary needs 
and circumstances. Adopting the opposite strategy would have left Wight 
vulnerable to the charge of essentialism, which Wight himself levelled against Bull 
and his static understanding of international institutions.  
    Wight’s sympathetic presentation of Western values and institutions in “Western 
Values in International Relations” provides a point of departure for thinking about 
the particular problem but it should not lead to the simplistic assumption that 
finding oneself in the middle between opposed extremes is always a valid choice. 
More importantly, it should not lead us to believe that the tragic dilemmas and 
choices that characterise international politics can somehow be avoided by 
following a comfortable middle way. This way can be the best or the worst of all 
possible worlds depending on the circumstances. Indeed, a more comprehensive 
and critical presentation of Western values would have enabled Wight to see that 
some of the most reproachable practices and assumptions associated with the 
superpowers of his time originated in Europe. Mackinnon’s views might be 
relevant in this context. Relating international principles to domestic political 
arrangements was a problem in Wight’s time, and maybe it remains a problem 
today. Thinking about theory as history should not make one lose sight of the more 
general requirements of international order expressed in ideas and institutions 
that could command the acceptance of both Western and non-Western states. 
Otherwise, historicism lapses into relativism and/or power politics.  
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 Chapter 8 
 E. H. Carr on Theory as History   
 
Like Butterfield and Wight, Carr offers a distinctively historicist conceptualisation of 
international change which aims to safeguard British and Western European 
interests in a changing world. As I will show in this chapter, his proposals for 
international reform are very well-attuned to the interests of the great powers of 
his day: Britain, America, and the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that he did not in 
principle reject the ideas of non-ideological diplomacy and the balance of power, 
Carr believed that these ideas should regulate the relationships of units different 
from the nation state in its traditional form. In the fourth age of nationalism whose 
arrival is announced in Nationalism and After (1945) the main protagonists of 
international politics cease to be traditional nation states. Britain, America and the 
Soviet Union are presented as great multinational units whose relationships in the 
post-World War II period should ideally the assume the form of a collective 
hegemony. Although Butterfield and Wight put their defence of British and 
Western European interests within a pluralistic political framework that was 
sensitive to the interests and small and big states alike, Carr’s views bring him close 
to a number of ideas and ideological assumptions that were later systematically 
explored by Adam Watson (1992/2009; 2007).  
    In particular, what I would like to argue is that the way in which Carr relates his 
support for British interests to the ideals of international order, justice, and the 
combination of nationalism with internationalism, creates a very important 
similarity between him and his nineteenth-century liberal predecessors. Although 
as Michael Cox (2010) has pointed out the crisis of liberalism provides the 
background against which Carr’s social and international ideas can be understood, 
his response to that crisis was a dialectical one. Despite the fact that Carr broadly 
accepted the liberal internationalist goals of encouraging progress, protecting 
order and promoting justice in international relations, he did not believe that these 
goals could be served by laissez-faire and the doctrine of the natural harmony of 
interestsxxxvii. Following the development of liberalism in general, Carr decided to 
abandon the natural harmony of interests for the artificial identification of 
interestsxxxviii. In the case of Carr’s (1939/2001) examination of peaceful change, 
this identification is carried out in a rather ad hoc way through sacrifices that the 
strong make in favour of the weak.  The model here is the concessions that 
nineteenth-century capitalists made to the workers without the intervention of the 
state, and the absence of any constitutional framework means that peaceful 
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change is substructural rather than superstructural (Wilson, 1996). The wider 
institutional framework that he considered necessary for the synthesis of 
nationalism and internationalism is considered in the second section of this 
chapter. This section shows how Carr managed to dissociate nationalism from its 
nineteenth-century connotations and to defend a distinctively political form of 
nationalism, which encourages us to re-examine this concept. Finally, Carr’s 
proposals for domestic social reform are examined in the third section, which 
argues that his social concerns are linked with his international ones. The question 
whether Carr’s proposals for international change make him a liberal, a socialist, or 
something different, will be answered in the Conclusions, and is closely related to 
how one understands the relationship between liberalism and socialismxxxix.  
I) PEACEFUL CHANGE 
Carr’s advocacy for peaceful change in The Twenty Years’ Crisis is one of the most 
frequently criticised aspects of his work. According to Wilson (2000), one of the 
main fears expressed by early critics was that the book, which was published just 
before the outbreak of World War II, exercised a negative influence on Britain’s 
ability to wage the war against Nazi Germany. However, despite appearances, 
Carr’s understanding of peaceful change is far from unpatriotic and it fits very well 
within his overall historicist outlook on international change. The fact that he 
believed that some kind of compromise could be reached between Britain and 
Germany for the avoidance of a new world conflict does not mean that he did not 
take seriously British interests. Indeed, as I shall try to show here, the type of 
change he had in mind was advantageous primarily to Britain and the other status 
quo powers of the interwar period. For Carr, status quo powers such as Britain and 
France could retain their privileged position in the international system by making 
certain limited concessions to revisionist states such as Germany. In other words, 
the kind of change Carr advocated had a strong conservative element and offered 
the only way to protect the broad outlines of the interwar balance of power short 
of war.  
        In both his domestic and his international examples of successful peaceful 
change Carr displays a historicist preference for the interests of particular historical 
actors, and also tries to see how these interests can be reconciled with the the 
prevalent expressions of international morality, such as the principle of national 
self-determination. Although morality does concern him, it does not concern him 
in the form of the abstract and universal moral command but rather in the form of 
broadly accepted principles which influence the practical conduct and expectations 
of states. In the original 1939 edition of The Twenty Years’ Crisis Carr presents the 
Munich Agreement as the expression of  both  power and morality, and offers his 
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support to the policy of appeasement followed by the British Prime Minister 
Chamberlain towards Hitler in the 1930s. In the second and later editions of the 
book he distinguishes between more or less successful cases of peaceful change, 
while clinging to the central idea that peaceful change should satisfy the 
requirements of both justice and practical expediency.  
    Among contemporary thinkers, Carr’s conceptualisation of peaceful change puts 
him in the middle between, on the one hand, Manning’s (1937) belief that peaceful 
change is not necessarily change for the better or change in the interests of justice, 
and, on the other hand, Toynbee’s (1937) idealistic search for a form of 
international change that would be peaceful in the deep sense of the term and 
lead to a harmonious world. By avoiding the pitfalls of both pure realism and pure 
idealism Carr shows how necessary it is to establish a working relationship 
between power and morality in order to solve a particular problem. The domestic 
and international examples he employs are important as expressions of this 
abiding belief in the importance of bringing together power and morality, and they 
also reflect the hope that justice can be realised without undermining the 
foundations of the existing social and international order. To the extent that his 
interest in morality concerns primarily practical morality, it is compatible with his 
historicist outlook. The main problem facing Carr’s account of peaceful change is 
not its supposedly unpatriotic character, or its neglect for justice, but the analogies 
that he tries to establish between the domestic and the international realms. 
Although the Western proletariat accepted the material and other benefits 
bestowed upon it by the democratic welfare state and abandoned social 
revolution, it is doubtful whether the revisionist states of the interwar period could 
relinquish war in the name of the limited sacrifices that Carr advocated and the 
British policymakers implemented. Although his proposals for peaceful change 
make sense if an international society exists, they do not make sense if such a 
society is an illusion and only competing national units actually exist. Paradoxically, 
Carr’s proposals for peaceful change are based on what he is seen to undermine, 
i.e. international society.  
Capital and Labour  
In the investigation of the phenomenon of peaceful change Carr follows his general 
strategy of establishing analogies between the domestic and the international 
realms, and as Michael Joseph Smith (1986) notes, he chooses to present labour-
capital relations in nineteenth-century industrializing states as a model for 
twentieth-century international politics. For Carr, no political order, domestic or 
international, can survive without accommodating change. Peaceful change in the 
domestic realm is defined by the absence of revolution, and peaceful change in the 
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international realm is defined by the absence of war. In both the domestic and the 
international spheres power and morality have their special role to play in the 
process of peaceful change but before arriving at a synthesis between them one 
should distinguish between the one element and the other.  
    According to Carr (1939/2001), the growth of social legislation reflects the just 
grievances of the working class, but it would not have been achieved without 
recourse to strikes and threats of social revolution. Even the campaign against the 
condemnation of Dreyfus in France would not have been successful without the 
support of massive political organisations and social movements. Despite the 
important differences that exist between strikes, revolutions, and peaceful political 
mobilisation, it is clear that the kind of political change that Carr has in mind can 
never be entirely peaceful since the threat of force always lurks in the background. 
The participants in a process of peaceful change do not abandon their right to 
resort to force but they only choose to suspend it temporarily. Although 
governments try to appear decisive and frequently declare that they will not yield 
to threats of force, it is utopian to believe that extensive domestic and 
international reforms can be enacted without some form of power backing them.  
    In the same way that no dominant class abandons voluntarily its social privileges, 
no state makes important sacrifices to another in order to satisfy international 
public opinion or to comply with the advice of independent experts. According to 
Carr, the relevance of nineteenth-century social relations for twentieth-century 
international relations has primarily to do with the fact that workers and capitalists 
managed to reach a historical compromise without the direct intervention of the 
state. As a result of this compromise, the working classes ameliorated their 
material condition and a social revolution was avoided. Therefore, for Carr, what 
really hinders international change from following the successful route of social 
change is not the absence of effective international institutions but rather the 
limited development of that spirit of compromise which enabled the members of 
the national community to reach a mutually beneficial understanding.  
    Although he recognises that both capitalists and workers must show goodwill in 
order to achieve an understanding, and in a similar way both satisfied and 
dissatisfied nations have their particular responsibilities, the main emphasis of the 
analysis of peaceful change in the domestic realm is on the responsibilities of the 
strong towards the weak. It is also interesting to note that Carr tends to downplay 
the importance of the state and of the political process in general and to present 
the historical compromise between capitalists and workers as a more or less 
private matter. This explains his international view that satisfied and dissatisfied 
nations can reach a compromise in the absence not only of a world state but also 
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of any institutionalised process of peaceful change. Instead of calling for the 
establishment of an institutional process of peaceful change and then for the 
resolution of particular problems, Carr calls for the ad hoc resolution of the 
pressing problems of his time which could hopefully lead to the institutionalisation 
of peaceful change in the distant future. Although Carr was not necessarily wrong 
in believing that peaceful change could take place in the absence of a world state, 
the limited sacrifices he proposed were unlikely to satisfy Nazi Germany and 
Mussolini’s Italy. Maybe the attitude of the nineteenth-century proletarians he has 
in mind was dictated by more than simply material considerations, and it was their 
sense of belonging to a given community that was decisively absent from the 
minds of the leaders of revisionist states like Germany and Italy.  
International Examples  
According to Carr, in the same way that during the nineteenth century the 
capitalists managed to retain their dominant position in the social order by making 
certain concessions to the workers, the privileged powers of the interwar period 
could retain their position in the international system by making certain limited 
concessions to Germany. The main difference between Carr’s domestic and 
international examples of successful peaceful change is that in the domestic 
context the concessions that the capitalists made to the workers were to their own 
material detriment. On the other hand, the sacrifices that Carr wanted Britain to 
make in order to satisfy Germany were not territorially detrimental to Britain but 
to certain small nations, like Czechoslovakia. In accordance with his historicist 
approach to international change in general, in his discussion of international 
peaceful change Carr prioritises the interests of certain nations and virtually 
ignores the interests of others. Peaceful change for Carr is change conducive to the 
interests of established great powers, like Britain, and marginalised great powers, 
like Germany.  
    The proletarian nations that he had in mind and whose aspirations in the world 
scene he supported were not the militarily weak ones, such as Manchuria and 
Abyssinia, but rather dethroned great powers, like Germany, and dissatisfied 
medium powers, like Italy. As Michael Cox (2001) reminds us, Carr viewed the 
position of Germany as a have-not state as fundamentally problematic and 
inevitably subject to change. To the extent that some kind of change was 
inevitable, “it was better that this occurred through negotiation around an agreed 
agenda rather than by any other means” (Cox, 2001: lxxiv). The fact that Carr was 
ready to recognise the advantages of adjusting to changing power relations 
independent of moral considerations does not mean that he was not interested in 
the moral dimension of peaceful change. The Munich Agreement was from his 
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point of view praiseworthy not only because of its recognition of the principle of 
national self-determination but also because it compensated Germany for its harsh 
treatment by the Allies after World War I. The Munich Agreement figures 
prominently in the first edition of The Twenty Years’ Crisis and is portrayed in two 
distinct ways as either a function of power or as a function of both power and 
morality. From the point of view of power, Carr claimed that: 
     If the power relations of Europe in 1938 made it inevitable that Czecho-Slovakia should  
     lose part of its territory and eventually her independence, it was preferable (quite apart  
     from any question of justice or injustice) that this should come about as the result of  
     discussions round a table in Munich than as the result either of a war between the      
     Great Powers or of a local war  between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia (Smith, 1986:  
     83). 
      
More importantly, from the standpoint of both power and morality, Carr depicted 
the Munich settlement as a paradigmatic case of peaceful change claiming that: 
    The negotiations which led up to the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, were  
    the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major international issue by  
    a procedure of peaceful change. The element of power was present. The element of    
    morality was also present   in the form of the common recognition by the Powers, who    
    effectively decided the issue, of a  criterion applicable to the dispute: the principle of  
    self-determination. The injustice of the incorporation in Czecho-Slovakia of three-and- 
    a- quarter million protesting Germans had been attacked in the past by many British      
critics including the Labour Party and Mr. Lloyd George.  Nor had the promises made by M.  
Benes at the Peace Conference regarding their treatment been fully carried out. The 
change in itself was one which corresponded both to a change in the European equilibrium 
of forces and to accepted canons of international morality (Smith, 1986: 84).  
 
In the second and the later editions of The Twenty Years’ Crisis the Munich 
Agreement loses its moral dimension as the supposed expression of the principle 
of national self-determination and is portrayed  as a result of yielding to threats of 
force. However, this does not automatically make it illegitimate, since for Carr 
violence among nations has necessarily a more pronounced role than violence 
within nations. Despite the attempt to establish analogies between successful 
social and international change, he warns the reader that “the parallel should not 
be pressed too far” (Carr, 1939/2001: 196). This is due to not only to existence of 
international anarchy and the absence of a world state, but is also related to the 
different moral attitudes that inevitably influence the employment of social and 
international force. 
    Although at least in democratic countries all social classes prefer to find non-
violent ways to solve their differences, this does not apply to the international 
sphere where the role of morality is more circumscribed and the role of violence is 
more significant. The peculiarities of the international realm make Carr to argue 
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that even as a simple way of avoiding violence peaceful change has its merits. 
These merits can be clearly observed in cases such as that of nineteenth-century 
Bulgaria, where the avoidance of war among the great powers was more important 
than the protection of the territorial integrity of the country itself.  As Carr argues 
in his second example of successful international peaceful change: 
     If the relations of power between the leading European countries in 1877 made it  
    inevitable that Bulgaria should be deprived of much of the territory allocated to her by  
    the Treaty of San  Stefano, then it was preferable that this result should be brought    
    about by discussions round a table in Berlin rather than by a war between Great Britain   
    and Austria-Hungary on the one side and Russia on the other (Carr, 1939/2001: 199).  
 
Therefore, although in the second and later editions of The Twenty Years’ Crisis 
Carr stopped portraying the Munich Agreement as the expression of a coincidence 
between power and morality, he continued to argue that peaceful change at the 
expense of a small European state is preferable to a war among the great powers. 
He also continued to emphasise that ideally peaceful change should meet the 
requirements of both power and morality. As he argues with regard to the Anglo-
Irish Agreement of 1921:  
The settlement could not have been reached, and above all could not have been lasting, 
solely on a basis of power. The Anglo-Irish Treaty was a flagrant case of ‘yielding to  
 threats of force’:  it was concluded with the authors of a successful rebellion. But it had           
its necessary moral  foundation in the acceptance of a common standard of what was just 
and reasonable in mutual relations between the two countries, and in the readiness of 
both (and particularly of the stronger) to make sacrifices in the interest of conciliation; and 
this made a striking success of an agreement about which the gloomiest prognostications 
were current at the time of its conclusion (Carr, 1939/2001: 200-1). 
 
Although admissible as a means of avoiding war, peaceful change should be based 
on a combination between power and morality. The one example of unsuccessful 
peaceful change mentioned by Carr, of a peaceful change that never took place, is 
Germany’s failure to revise the Versailles Treaty during the interwar period. As a 
result of its lack of adequate political and military power, Germany failed to revise 
even those sections of the treaty which were widely recognised as unjust in both 
Britain and Germany. His distinction between an ideal case of peaceful change 
provided by the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, a successful 
but not ideal form of peaceful change, and an unsuccessful peaceful change that 
fails to materialise because of the absence of power, indicates a strong normative 
preference for combining power with morality. In cases where this is not possible, 
following the dictates of the calculus of power even independent of moral 
considerations might still be necessary. Combining power and morality, or even 
relying on power alone, is preferable to having a just cause without the effective 
means to promote it in the domestic or the international scene.  
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    To conclude, in this section I have endeavoured to show that Carr’s 
conceptualisation of peaceful change is far from unpatriotic, and is fully compatible 
with his historicist outlook which emphasises the interests and aspirations of 
particular historical actors. Carr’s proposals for change have a strong conservative 
element in the sense that they aim to preserve an international order organised 
around the interests of satisfied powers like Britain and France. In the same way 
that the capitalists managed to retain their privileged position in society by making 
certain limited concessions to the workers, status quo powers are called to show 
goodwill and understanding towards the revisionist powers in order to avoid a new 
world conflict.  
    The main problem with Carr’s approach to peaceful change is not that it fails to  
take into account British interests, or that it is uninterested in morality defined in 
historical terms, but rather that it presupposes the existence of an international 
society whose existence Carr himself doubted. Perhaps Butterfield – and especially 
Wight—might be better guides here.  Admitting that the strong have certain 
responsibilities towards the weak is only the first step towards delineating those 
responsibilities. It also does not fully answer the question why the socially or 
internationally weak should accept the limited sacrifices offered by the strong and 
repudiate revolution or war. Indeed, Germany – which was the main beneficiary of 
Carr’s proposals for peaceful change—proved to be unwilling to reconcile itself 
with an ameliorated position within the existing international system, and tried to 
create a new European order which would accommodate its own hegemonic 
ambitions. Ultimately, Carr’s proposals failed not because they were not realistic 
but because they were too realistic: prioritising short-term advantage and trying to 
promote piecemeal international reforms apparently was not good enough for the 
have-nots of Carr’s time. The question of whether his post-World War II proposals 
for international change fared any better is going to concern us next in the 
investigation of his historically informed account of nationalism.  
II)  NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM 
In the same way that Carr’s theory of peaceful change is organised around and 
expresses the interests of the strong actors in the international system at the 
expense of the weak, his evaluation of nationalism is far from homogeneous. The 
political form of nationalism that Carr advocated has both theoretical and practical 
value. Its theoretical value lies in challenging the bond between the nation and the 
state that even contemporary students of the phenomenon of nationalism seem to 
accept. Its practical value lies in promoting the interests of the multicultural states 
that provide the focus of his historicist conceptualisation of international change. 
The conclusion of his analysis is that some kind of synthesis between nationalism 
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and internationalism is still possible, but that it requires a new (political) form of 
nationalism and a new (social) form of internationalism.   
Historicising Nationalism 
Before going on to examine his distinctively political version of nationalism, it 
would be interesting to see how Carr managed to effectively historicise this 
phenomenon and to deny that it has any given essence or character. 
Contemporary students of nationalism such as Ernest Gellner (1992) have 
justifiably praised Carr for showing sensitivity to particular historical situations and 
contexts and relating nationalism to wider social developments and forces. Carr’s 
distinction among four different periods of nationalism in Nationalism and After 
(1945) is based on the assumption that the character of nations and the forms of 
their interaction are subject to change. This change does not originate at the level 
of the international system but has very much to do with developments taking 
place within the units. Moreover, what Carr is really discussing in his examination 
of four different periods of nationalism are not just political units but rather the 
complex entities that Cox (1986) describes as state/society complexes. Different 
periods of nationalism correspond to different ways of organising social and 
economic life. These ways have important consequences for nationalism itself. The 
fact that ultimately priority is attributed to politics over economics does not stop 
Carr from depicting nationalism in all its historical complexity and multiformity.  
    The generally positive presentation of the first two periods of nationalism is 
somewhat unexpected coming from someone interested in the empowerment of 
the people. Carr (1945) argues that the beginnings of nationalism coincide with the 
advent of modernity and should be placed in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Before being terminated by the French Revolution, this first period of 
nationalism was closely related to internationalism because of the the generally 
cordial relationships between kings and princes who understood their citizens and 
countries as “subjects” and “possessions” respectively. During this period, 
international law was not an impersonal set of rules but rather a number of 
treaties made between particular sovereigns. The educated classes of the major 
European countries were also in regular contact with one another using French as 
their main medium of communication. Although not entirely absent, wars were 
relatively limited. Finally, mercantilist policies did not see the economy as 
something separate from the state but rather as something that should be 
regulated and controlled according to the interests of the state.  
   The second period of nationalism succeeded the Napoleonic wars and managed 
to offer a particularly worthwhile synthesis of nationalism and internationalism. 
Nations, which were no longer exclusively represented by their leaders, coexisted 
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harmoniously with one another and the development and freedom of each was 
seen as a precondition for the development and freedom of all. Carr draws 
particular attention to the fact that behind the facade of laissez-faire and the 
supposedly impersonal rules regulating economic life political power was present. 
British imperial power, and especially the City of London, managed to regulate the 
world economy while leaving intact the illusory belief in the existence of an 
international economic mechanism which was separate from states. Although this 
second period of nationalism, which was interrupted by World War I, has been 
seen as the most complete expression of the idea of a world economy, Carr talks 
about a pseudo-international economic order based on British supremacy. The gist 
of his argument is that the distance between economic ideology and economic 
reality had during the nineteenth century a beneficial influence upon international 
relations. Nations, which were now primarily represented by their middle classes, 
were considered to have the same interests, and military conflicts largely faded 
into the background. 
    The marriage of nationalism and internationalism that characterises the first two 
periods of nationalism was interrupted by the outbreak of World War I, which led 
to the third period of nationalism. During this period, the character of nations 
changed once more and the lower classes acquired new social and political rights. 
In a way similar to the first period, economic policies served particular national 
goals and this time aimed to serve the material welfare of all the members of the 
nation. Despite the apparent similarities between the first and third periods of 
nationalism, Carr rejects the term “neo-mercantilism” since it would imply a return 
to the past and not the advent of something new.  During the period of socialised 
nations socialism itself ceased to be international since “the mass of workers knew 
instinctively on which side their bread was buttered” (Carr, 1945: 20). Even the 
appearance of a single world economy was replaced by a number of national 
economies, which were obviously competing with one another. The dissociation of 
nationalism from internationalism led to two world wars which were fought in 
ways unimaginable in the past. During World War II, any distinction between 
combatants and civilians disappeared entirely.  
     Although Carr did not want to prejudge future developments, he saw that some 
kind of combination of nationalism with internationalism was needed in the post-
World War II historical context which coincides with the fourth period of 
nationalism. This combination could not be found so long as the cultural nation 
continued to coincide with the political state. Although in Nationalism and After 
Carr comes close to describing the new political units he had in mind as 
“civilisations” – and also includes China in his analysis—he was primarily interested 
in the future of Britain, America, and the Soviet Union. As the main actors in the 
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post-World War II international scene, these multicultural states proved that the 
association of the “nation” with the “state”, which Gellner (1983) sees as the 
essence of nationalism, was no longer viable. However, what I would like to argue, 
focusing mainly on Conditions of Peace (1942), is that Carr’s careful distinction 
between nationality, national self-determination and political nationalism enabled 
him to free nationalism from its nineteenth-century connotations, and to argue in 
favour of a multipolar world organised around the collective hegemony of Western 
Europe, Russia and America. The steps for the creation of such a world are 
analytically examined in Conditions of Peace which, at least in policy terms, is Carr’s 
most accomplished work.  
Nationality, National Self-Determination and Political Nationalism 
According to Carr (1942), the principle of nationality establishes a link between the 
nation as a cultural unit and the state as a political unit and makes the first the 
measure of second. The ideological assumption that nations ought to form states 
and states ought to provide political expression to nations was born with the 
French Revolution, and was fully compatible with the political realities of the age. 
However, during the twentieth century, it was realised that the application of the 
principle of nationality outside of its original Western European framework is not 
easy, since not all people sharing the same language want to be members of the 
same state. For Carr, the principle of nationality is valid only in a particular 
geographical context and within a particular historical framework and does not 
provide an answer to the problems of the twentieth century.  
    Despite his critique of the principle of nationality, Carr is positive towards self-
determination, which is an idea inseparable from democracy and the liberal view 
that government requires the consent of the governed. As he notes, determining 
the contours of the political unit is equally important with deciding its 
constitutional form, and ignoring the principle of self-determination is not a viable 
option under modern political circumstances. However, political practice in Eastern 
Europe during the first half of the twentieth century proved that the exercise of the 
principle of national self-determination does not necessarily lead to the espousal of 
the principle of nationality. Far from equating the principle of self-determination 
with the principle of nationality, Carr wants mainly to show the distance between 
the two principles and to prove that they are logically and historically separable. 
The fact that defining the cultural nation is not always easy, and that even clearly 
defined nations do not in all cases want to form a state, undermines the argument 
that the claims of self-determination coincide with those of nationality.  
    Having shown that the principle of nationality is the expression of particular 
historical experiences and that it cannot be easily applied outside of its original 
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Western European framework, Carr proceeds to question the principle of national 
self-determination itself. Although important, national self-determination cannot 
be treated as an ideological mantra, since it is limited by the rights of existing 
states. Even when a cultural nation speaks with one voice and requires political 
independence, this does not mean that a multinational political unit such as Great 
Britain or the Soviet Union is obliged to comply. As Carr notes, the right of 
Welshmen or the inhabitants of Uzbekistan to determine the contours of the 
political unit to which they belong is conditioned and outweighed by the right of 
Great Britain or the Soviet Union to retain their territorial integrity.  
    Therefore, after employing the idea of national self-determination in order to 
undermine the principle of nationality, Carr goes on to argue that even self-
determination possesses a relative and not an absolute value. His view that there is 
no absolute right to self-determination in the same way that an individual cannot 
do whatever he likes within the framework of a democratic state is plausible, but is 
based upon the conscious prioritisation of the claims of political nationalism. The 
carriers of this political nationalism are the great multinational units of his time: 
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. As was the case with his 
investigation of the principle of peaceful change, his evaluation of the principles of 
nationality and national self-determination is ultimately based on the conscious 
prioritisation of the interests of certain powerful states. In the same way that 
successful peaceful change should ideally be based on a combination of power and 
morality, the rights of states encapsulated in the notion of political nationalism are 
founded upon both practical and moral considerations.  
The Military and Economic Limitations of the Nation State 
Carr’s support for the large multinational units of his time was dictated by both 
moral and geopolitical considerations. For him, the answer to the question what 
constitutes a viable political unit able to retain its independence and protect the 
interests of its citizens is a historically contingent one and cannot be identical for 
all ages. The general historical tendency that can be observed when moving from 
the ancient Greek city state to the European nation state of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and then to the multicultural units of the post-World War II 
period, is that, as time passes, the size of the effective political unit increases, and 
the requirements of security and welfare become more difficult to meet.  
    This historically observed increase in the size of political units means that the 
principles of nationality and national self-determination belong mainly to the past 
and not to the present or the future. The principle of nationality is clearly outdated 
and self-determination remains relevant only in some contexts and for some 
purposes. Before delineating his vision of the future and Britain’s prominent role 
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within an integrated Western Europe within which the principles of nationality and 
self-determination are radically transformed, Carr tries to show the bankruptcy of 
the small and medium nation state in Europe and beyond.  
    From the standpoint of political and military power, World War I proved that, 
contrary to what was happening during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
small states are no longer able to maintain their neutrality in times of conflict 
among the great powers. To the extent that they are virtually drawn into military 
conflicts independent of their will, the best choice of small and medium powers is 
to align themselves permanently with a great power. The kind of cooperation that 
modern warfare demands cannot be developed at short notice, and presupposes 
the establishment of permanent military bonds among states. Systems of collective 
security theoretically provide an answer to the problems of small states, but they 
are not practicable. Therefore, forging permanent military and political links 
between states is a win-win policy favourable to the interests of big and small 
states alike.  
    Although Carr’s arguments regarding the military limitations of small states in an 
age of global conflicts have their merits, his second assumption that they are 
morally deficient because they cannot provide for the material wellbeing of their 
citizens is stated but not proven in any convincing way. At least in Conditions of 
Peace, Carr takes for granted rather than explains the fact that small states cannot 
provide for the material prosperity of their citizens. What he is actually doing is 
developing an argument against the negative political consequences of economic 
nationalism, which is assumed to be incompatible with peace, and to threaten the 
future of civilisation. Even if one recognises the political dangers inherent in the 
return to mercantilist policies, it could be argued that at least during Carr’s time 
small and medium European states were not irrelevant in economic terms and 
were still able to contribute to the prosperity of their citizens.  
    Probably Carr’s most convincing moral argument against ordinary nationalism 
has to do with the belief that retaining the independence of the small and medium 
nation state in Europe is not conducive to international peace. From his point of 
view, dividing the industrially developed world into British, Soviet and American 
spheres of influence was necessary for the avoidance of a new world conflict. In 
particular, the reconstruction of the war-torn Western European nations under 
British leadership could thwart the division of the globe into two mutually exclusive 
political and ideological camps. Although Britain and the Western Europe at large 
ultimately decided not to play an autonomous role in the post-World War II 
balance of power, Carr’s foreign policy proposals provide the most concrete vision 
of an independent European role in world affairs and represent a creative synthesis 
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between nationalism and internationalism. During the historical period which was 
just emerging when Carr was writing on nationalism, large multicultural states, 
such as Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, would attempt to 
combine nationalism with internationalism by promoting historically novel 
approaches to regional integration. These approaches would extend the traditional 
responsibilities of great powers for the promotion of international peace and 
security to the social domain, and would potentially render them the guarantors of 
the welfare of ethnically diverse populations.  
    By arguing that internationalism should have a social dimension Carr showed 
that no return to the past was possible. The fourth age of nationalism is identified 
with state/society complexes different from those existing in previous periods, and 
is very closely related to developments taking place within the units themselves. It 
is those developments that he analysed in The New Society (1951) which we will 
discuss in the next section. The question of whether historical developments in 
Europe during the post-World War II period justified Carr’s belief that the type of 
nationalism described by Gellner (1983) belongs to the past cannot be easily 
answered. For a time at least, European states retained their sovereignty within a 
framework of interdependence, which is, however, subject to change towards a 
supranational direction. Although writers such as Mark Corner (2014) seem eager 
to celebrate the sui generis nature of the EU as a combination of 
intergovernmental and supranational elements, one cannot help but notice that 
there are pressures towards a more rigid direction that limits drastically the 
autonomy of most of the participants in the European project. In any case, the kind 
of collective hegemony envisaged by Carr in Conditions of Peace is internally 
coherent and is fully compatible with his historicist conceptualisation of 
international change. It also shows that the fourth and later periods of nationalism 
cannot be identical with what preceded them and one cannot effectively theorise 
nationalism in the abstract.  Moreover, even if achieved, the synthesis between 
nationalism and internationalism is always under threat and must be able to adapt 
to new historical situations.  
III)   FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW SOCIETY  
So far I have argued that the kind of international changes that Carr advocated 
were well attuned to the needs of the satisfied powers of the interwar period and 
the main international actors of the post-World War II period. Of course, his 
proposals did not simply reflect the existing distribution of power in the 
international scene and had a strong normative element. The sacrifices that Carr 
demanded from Britain and France were not self-evident, and his advocacy for the 
creation of a politically independent Western Europe led by Britain had to 
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surmount a number of important practical and ideological obstacles. Although his 
recommendations for a form of peaceful change that would hopefully turn 
Germany from a dissatisfied power to a satisfied one were published too late, and 
his support for an autonomous Europe could be considered to be premature given 
the differences between Britain and the emerging superpowers, the ideas 
expressed in The New Society (1951) certainly express the spirit of the age. 
Although The New Society might not be the classic that The Twenty Years’ Crisis 
undoubtedly is, it certainly helps one to understand Carr’s historicist approach to 
international change. As in the books discussed so far, Carr is primarily concerned 
with the future of Britain and Western Europe in a changing world. The social 
reforms recommended by Carr clearly serve British interests and aspirations in the 
world and prove the links that exist between domestic and international politics. 
The way in which he brings together the supposedly separate fields of social and 
international relations is one of the reasons why he cannot be seen as a 
conventional realist in spite of his frank recognition of the importance of power in 
politics.  
    The complex relationship that exists between the social and the international 
component of Carr’s overall theory of change has concerned Charles Jones (1998) 
who makes the valid point that Carr believed in the value of certain social reforms 
independent of their contribution to British national strength and prestige in the 
world. Although it is true that Carr’s approach to issues pertaining to democracy 
and the pursuance of social justice was not instrumental, the key to understanding 
his thinking lies in recognising that the great historical trends which he described 
were not either domestic or international but they were both domestic and 
international at the same time. In other words, Carr’s main argument is that the 
same great historical transformations which necessitated changes in British foreign 
policy and Britain’s relationship with Europe also dictated major departures in 
social policy. Domestic and international relations are not conceptualised as 
independent realms, but they are examined as different aspects of the same 
political reality and as relatively autonomous fields where, however, the same 
great historical forces exercise their determining influence. For the Carr of The New 
Society and the domestic sections of Conditions of Peace, great powers do not exist 
independent of the social policies they pursue, but they rather owe their existence 
to successful domestic policies, and this was especially true with regard to Britain 
and Western Europe which were emerging from a disastrous war.  
    The roots of the new domestic and international society discussed by Carr should 
be sought in three influential revolutions: the French Revolution, the American 
Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution. In particular, the old society that found 
itself under attack in Britain and the other Western European countries after the 
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war was that of individualist democracy and laissez-faire economic organisation. 
The international dimension of this old society was the subjugation of the peoples 
of Asia and Africa to Europe and the negation of their political and social 
independence. To the extent that the transition from competition to planned 
economy and from colonialism to independence was inevitable, Carr argued that 
adapting to those changes was the only way for Britain to retain a leading position 
in the world. Clinging to the past had nothing to offer to Britain or the other 
Western European countries and would only make them seem out of place in the 
post-World War II world. Although Carr’s sober investigation of the transition from 
competition to planned economy indicates the willing acceptance of the social 
tendencies he describes, his examination of the relationship between Britain and 
the former colonial world mainly expresses the need to make virtue out of 
necessity and to benefit from changes that occur virtually independent of one’s 
political will.  
From Competition to Planned Economy  
In accordance with his more general understanding of historical change, Carr 
presents the replacement of unrestricted competition by economic planning as the 
result of various social pressures and not as the consequence of the 
implementation of any clearly defined economic programme. Although this 
transition from competition to planned economy was especially evident in post-
war Britain, its roots could be traced back in processes and debates which were 
largely coterminous with the Industrial Revolution. According to Carr, already in 
the 1840’s there existed in Britain a factory legislation aiming at the protection of 
the most vulnerable part of the workforce: women and children. This legislation 
was gradually extended to include everyone else as well, and echoed Robert 
Owen’s warnings against the unregulated expansion of industrial organisation. As 
Carr notes, the victories of Owen and other humanitarian reformers of the 
nineteenth century were so impressive that already in the 1880’s the night-
watchman state of classical political economy had been rendered obsolete by 
social and political developments in England and elsewhere.  
    In the twentieth century, the establishment of forms of planned economy which 
were more comprehensive than the welfare state was the result of pressures 
exercised not only by the workers but by the capitalists as well. The small 
businesses of the nineteenth century were replaced by large trusts, which 
managed to either limit or eliminate real economic competition in their fields. 
Within the framework of this transition from the liberal economy of the nineteenth 
century to the planned economy of the twentieth century,  “the individual business 
man has been ousted by the company, the company by the cartel and the trust, 
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the trust by the super-trust” (Carr, 1951: 25). In this account of the decline of free 
competition Carr emphasises the importance of factors endogenous to the system. 
Although the establishment of the welfare state is presented as the result of social 
and political pressures exercised by the workers and various humanitarian 
reformers, economic planning has primarily to do with the self-defeating character 
of capitalism itself. After having managed to reduce competition through economic 
means, the few capitalists left standing were not eager to trust their fate to chance 
and risk extinction as the consequence of economic crises which in the course of 
the twentieth century were becoming more and more severe.  
    Especially after the Great Depression of the 1930s, Carr notes, capitalists and 
workers found themselves united in the belief that the economy cannot be left to 
operate according to its own logic, and the state ought to protect the interests of 
the national economy in its entirety. For Carr, the essence of economic planning is 
that no sector of the economy is left to operate alone, and all sectors are 
coordinated by the state in order to augment the interests of the society as a 
whole. Although economic planning in the sense described by Carr should not be 
confused with the nationalisation of industry, since both private and public 
companies can be the objects of planning, at least in The New Society he displays a 
clear preference for extending the direct control of the state over key sectors of 
the national economy. Planning in the sense of directing the economy according to 
the interests of society as a whole, and also the nationalisation of major industries, 
take precedence over enabling workers to control the process of production, or   
granting material benefits to them.  With regard to the control of production by 
the workers, Carr claims that it offers limited practical results since the democratic 
principle cannot be easily applied to the industrial sphere. Providing material 
incentives is also inadequate, because the welfare state has made workers less 
amenable to material coercion by offering a certain sense of economic security to 
them.  
    It is at this point that Carr introduces the hypothesis that the nationalisation of 
the economy will hopefully create a new feeling of social obligation to the workers. 
Nationalisation expresses “the conception of industrial democracy on the national 
plane rather than on that of the particular factory or industry” (Carr, 1951:55). 
Contrary to the private enterprises, which make only an economic appeal to the 
worker, nationalised industries will help him realise that the national economy is a 
single whole, and that his own efforts in the sphere of production contribute to 
national prosperity and wellbeing.  Although the emphasis on nationalising as 
many industries as possible makes Carr’s appeal to planning also an appeal to 
socialism, the kind of socialism he advocates is not so much an ideological choice 
but rather a matter of national survival since, as he puts it, “we have to advance 
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towards socialism…or perish” (Carr, 1951: 55). Irrespective of the tension that 
exists  between the rather moderate understanding of economic planning 
expressed in the domestic sections of Conditions of Peace and the more radical 
ideas expressed in The New Society, the fact remains that Carr saw his  preferred 
social policy as necessary to British national strength and prosperity.  
    Although it could be claimed that he simply chose to formulate his social ideals in 
the language of national interest, the issue goes deeper than the choice of the 
most adequate rhetorical means. Carr was genuinely convinced that Britain and the 
other Western European countries had to adapt themselves to a new social 
environment and that some form of socialism was necessary to their socio-
economic development. In a country such as Great Britain, the resistance to the 
adoption of nationally beneficial social policies was the result of the detrimental 
influence exercised by vested interests, but also, and perhaps more importantly, of 
the widespread tendency to look towards the past and to search there for 
solutions to contemporary problems. If Britain and the other European nations 
wanted to continue playing a remarkable role in the twentieth century, what was 
needed was not a return to the past but the exploration of new forms of social 
organisation. In the same way that a British-led Western Europe could theoretically 
balance America and the Soviet Union in military and political terms, it could also 
develop a form of social organisation lying between the extremes of unadulterated 
capitalism and state socialism. Paradoxically, those aspects of Carr’s thinking which 
effectively express the spirit of the age in which he was writing, are also those 
which seem rather distant today. 
From Colonialism to Independence  
For Carr, the same misguided antithesis to the adoption of policies consonant with 
the requirements of the new society in its international dimension could be 
observed in the relations between the West and the former colonial world. 
Contrary to what happens in What is History?, where the emancipation of Asia and 
Africa is invested with world historical significance and presented in terms of the 
expansion of reason, in The New Society Carr adopts a historicist point of view and 
tries to see how Britain and the other European countries could benefit from the 
developments in the former colonial world. Because of its past involvement in Asia 
and Africa Britain is portrayed as better suited than the United States to 
understand what is going on there, and to avoid the equally unacceptable 
extremes of interventionism or indifference towards the fate of its former colonial 
subjects. In particular, Carr makes a cogent argument in favour of a policy which 
would be non-interventionist in political terms but which, at the same time, would 
actively promote the industrialisation of backward countries. Before seeing how he 
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believed Britain could help the former colonies, it is important to take into account 
his largely economic interpretation of both the nineteenth-century Western 
imperialist expansion and the twentieth-century decolonisation movement.  
    With regard to Western imperialism, Carr adopts Lenin’s and J. A. Hobson’s 
economic point of view and emphasises that their economic interpretation of 
imperialism has been adopted by the leaders of Asia and Africa. As far as it 
concerns the twentieth-century decolonisation movement, he makes the 
important point that its essence lies in the rejection of the form of the 
international division of labour established during the early stages of the Industrial 
Revolution. Contrary to what was happening in the nineteenth century, in the 
twentieth century Asia and Africa are no longer willing to import industrial 
products from the West and in exchange to provide food and raw materials.  
Although Lenin was primarily interested to show how imperialism leads to conflict 
between the imperialist countries and the colonial world, and between the 
imperialist countries themselves, for Carr the economic dimension of imperialism 
and decolonisation means that a modus vivendi can be reached between the West 
and the former colonial world. The economic rather than political aspirations of the 
decolonisation movement mean that by showing goodwill and promoting 
industrialisation Western leaders can bridge the gap between themselves and the 
nations of Asia and Africa.  
     The decision of Asian and African leaders to promote the industrialisation of 
their countries is not something which threatens Western interests, but an aspect 
of the enlargement of the circle of industrial nations. What African and Asian 
nations are doing during the twentieth century, has already been done by 
countries like Germany in the nineteenth century. It is in this context that Carr 
observes that during the last quarter of the nineteenth century  the industrial 
monopoly of Great Britain was put into question by Germany and the United 
States, and that by 1900 Japan and Russia were also trying to find a place among 
the industrial nations of the world. By placing the industrialisation of Asia and 
Africa in a wider historical perspective, Carr leads the reader to the conclusion that 
it is the logical outcome of the Industrial Revolution, which promotes the 
homogenisation of the world along industrial lines. What is wrong and artificial is 
not the choice of African and Asian leaders to industrialise their countries, but the 
Western assumption that industrialisation can be limited to particular countries at 
the expense of others. The analogies that he tries to establish between the 
industrialisation of Germany and America in the nineteenth century and the 
industrialisation of Asia and Africa in the twentieth century are not faulty in logical 
terms, but they neglect the fact that similar actions can produce very different 
results in different historical contexts. Even if the nineteenth-century international 
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division of labour was problematic in economic and political terms, it is not certain 
that all nations can develop along similar industrial lines irrespective of their size, 
culture, religion and so on.   
    In any event, after conceptualising both imperialism and decolonisation in 
economic terms, Carr goes on to argue that in order to prevent the formation of an 
anti-Western alliance among the former European colonies, Britain and the other 
European nations should not only respect the decision of their former subjects to 
follow the industrial path, but also actively assist them. The practical support that 
he recommends is not limited to the allocation of capital but also includes technical 
help and advice. By investing their capital and offering technical support, Britain 
and the other Western European countries can cultivate the friendship of their 
former subjects, and stop the increase of Soviet influence in Asia and Africa. 
Contrary to what happens in Conditions of Peace, in The New Society Carr shows no 
signs of supporting an independent European role in the world, since America and 
Europe are portrayed as pursuing similar goals with alternative means. Their 
common political interest lies in stopping Russia from increasing its global 
influence by exploiting politically an essentially economic revolution. Because of 
their diplomatic experience and understanding of local conditions, Britain and the 
other European powers could help America develop a policy thwarting and not 
facilitating the spread of Soviet influence by alienating potential allies in Asia and 
Africa. Although Carr continues to adopt a historicist point of view which assigns 
priority to European and British interests, these interests are not placed within the 
framework of a politically independent Western Europe but rather within the 
context of a Euro-Atlantic political partnership which reflects and does not 
challenge the realities of the Cold War. As is also the case with many of the 
examples of successful peaceful change mentioned in the first section of this 
chapter, in his investigation of decolonisation and the colonial revolution he leads 
us to the conclusion that making virtue out of necessity is one of the best ways to 
come to terms with a rapidly changing world.  
IV) CONCLUSIONS        
The aim of this chapter was to draw attention to Carr’s historicist conceptualisation 
of international change and to explore his debt to his nineteenth-century liberal 
predecessors. Like Butterfield and Wight, Carr discussed and analysed 
contemporary political developments from a particular point of view, which was no 
other than that of Britain and the Western Europe at large. Like Butterfield and 
Wight, he managed to combine his historicism with an interest in the requirements 
of international order. Although Butterfield’s and Wight’s support for the interests 
of small states made them espouse an associational form of balancing where no 
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state or group of states dominate the international system, Carr’s interest in the 
fate of the world at large made him support a collective hegemony exercised by 
Britain, Russia and Americaxl. This hegemony could be conducive to the interests of 
small states, since Carr was particularly interested in the social content of 
internationalism, and was reluctant to support coercion and the undisguised 
military domination of small states by the big ones.  
   The answer to the question of whether Carr’s international thought is closer to 
liberalism or to socialism depends on what precisely one means by those terms. 
Certainly, Carr was not a supporter of laissez-faire and the doctrine of the natural 
harmony of interests. However, by the time his major works were published most 
liberals had also ceased to support the political recipes of their nineteenth-century 
predecessors. In particular, the League of Nations, which is treated rather harshly 
by Carr, was a step in the establishment of international government and not an 
expression of laissez-faire principles. If nations naturally had the same interests 
and those interests naturally coincided with each another, it would be difficult to 
discern the rationale behind the creation of such an organisation. Characterising 
Carr’s international thought as socialist would have to overcome a number of 
important problems. First, as we saw in Chapter 5, Carr did not believe in the 
Marxist and Leninist goals of the abolition of the state and of the distinct social 
classes that provide the states’ reason of existence. This scepticism towards 
traditional Marxist goals also applies to the idea of international relations 
understood as relations among more or less independent units. States and 
international relations were an integral part of Carr’s vision of the world.  
    Secondly, when discussing internationalism, Carr does not show any special 
interest in organisations such as the First, and especially the Second International 
of socialist parties, which, according to Perry Anderson (2002), provided the most 
interesting example of a form of internationalism that does not logically 
presuppose nationalism. Carr’s “internationalism” is a derivative of “nationalism” 
since it is based upon it and does not provide a completely different way of viewing 
the world. It should also be mentioned that Carr employs the term 
“internationalism” as a positive concept. This is compatible with its mainstream 
usage and misses the point that a certain form of nationalism might be preferable 
to a certain form of internationalism. Carr’s critique of the notion of international 
society as an ideological device used by the strong to protect their own interests 
shows precisely that internationalism should also be the object of critical 
investigation and not be uncritically accepted under any historical circumstances. 
Finally, to the extent that the idea of equality lies at the heart of both Marxist and 
non-Marxist versions of socialism, Carr’s international thought cannot be seen as 
an expression of socialism because of the privileged role he attributed to great 
187 
 
powers like Britain, America and the Soviet Union. For these reasons, I conclude 
that Carr’s international vision of establishing order and promoting justice within a 
world populated by autonomous or semi-autonomous states creates certain family 
resemblances between himself and the liberal reformers he so much liked to 
criticize. His response to the crisis of liberalism was a dialectical one.  
    Carr’s work on nationalism brings him at the forefront of the particular field and 
sets rather exacting standards for later scholars. His depreciation of nationalism in 
its traditional form of identifying the cultural nation with the political state brings 
him close to Hobsbawm (1992) who, even after the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, continued to insist that identifying the nation with the state offers 
no solution to the problems of small nations under contemporary circumstances. 
For Hobsbawm, even religious fundamentalism offers a more coherent and 
plausible social programme than nationalism. The interest that Eastern European 
countries showed in joining the EU after the dissolution of the Soviet Union to 
some extent confirms Carr’s and Hobsbawm’s view that the nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century nationalism is a spent force. With regard to internationalism, 
Carr correctly insisted that it should have a social character and not be confined to 
the political sphere. His emphasis on securing social rights within a unified Western 
Europe puts into question the link that scholars such as David Miller (1995) have 
tried to establish between the idea of nationality and the pursuance of social 
justice. To the extent that Carr’s account of nationalism suffers from something, 
this has to do with taking the state and the world of states as given, and in treating 
internationalism as an extension of nationalism. In the same way that Deutscher 
(1955) criticised Carr for writing the history of a state in his History of Soviet Russia, 
Gellner (1992) criticised him for trying to see how nationalism influences a system 
of pre-existing polities instead of asking questions about nationalism itself. The 
emotional appeal of nationalism, and the tendency of the modern man to prioritise 
the claims of the state over those of other subnational or supranational entities, 
was more seriously considered by Wight.  
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                                          CHAPTER 9 
Conclusion: Resonances of the History/Theory 
Dialectic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
This conclusion needs to carry out two tasks. First, it needs to arrive at a positive 
understanding of the dialectical method in general and the history/theory dialectic 
in particular. It will do that by supplementing Badiou’s dialectic of scission by 
certain insights derived from the work of Slavoj Zizek, and by applying those 
insights to Butterfield, Wight and Carr. Zizek’s reluctance to offer a straightforward 
definition of the dialectical method and scattered remarks on the subject mean 
that he cannot be plausibly used as a point of departure for understanding 
dialectics; he can, however, add certain nuances to Badiou’s interesting but 
ultimately unsatisfying dialectic of scission. Secondly, this conclusion needs to 
show how Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s history/theory dialectic can fertilise the 
study of International Relations from an English School perspective. It will meet 
this expectation by presenting Buzan’s non-teleological dialectic of societal forms 
and Wilson’s grounded theory of international institutions as the two most 
promising ways of instrumentalising the history/theory dialectic. Despite their 
importance, the proposals of Buzan and Wilson do not exhaust the potential of the 
history/theory dialectic as a basis for reconceptualising the English School.  
Butterfield, Wight and Carr on History as Theory and Theory as History   
As we saw in the course of the thesis, what distinguishes Butterfield, Wight and 
Carr from other thinkers of their generation and justifies their portrayal as the 
founding members of the English School of International Relations is their 
understanding of history as theory and theory as history. This understanding 
differentiates them from a number of participants in the British Committee on the 
Theory of International Politics and also from ecumenically minded historians such 
as Toynbee. In their work, the relationship between history and theory is not 
simply challenged but it is actually reversed. Contrary to what the proponents of 
the classical approach take for granted, in the thought of Butterfield, Wight and 
Carr it is history which stands for the universal and theory which stands for the 
particular. Although Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s attachment to European 
traditions and values examined in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, provides a key to 
understanding their international thinking and explains their choice to treat 
international theory as history, their contribution to history examined in Chapters 
3, 4, and 5, is much more diverse and difficult to evaluate.  What I particularly tried 
to emphasise in the relevant chapters was to show how, when writing as 
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historians, Butterfield, Wight and Carr struggled with problems that are frequently 
associated with theoretical work in IR and elsewhere.  
    The recognition of the tension between agency and structure, necessity and 
freedom, optimism and pessimism, as well as the search for patterns or even 
meaning in the apparently unrelated events of the past, make their historical work 
hardly distinguishable from theory. Although they could be criticised for not finding 
a proper balance between personal and impersonal accounts of history and for 
combining them in a rather ad hoc way, what matters is that they admitted the 
existence of dilemmas which theorists also face when called to analyse the present 
or predict the future. For Butterfield, Wight and Carr, a historical narrative offers 
only a contingent perspective to the past, and the process of its creation does not 
differ essentially from theory building. Certainly, it cannot be arbitrary and it must 
be based on a painstaking investigation of the facts. However, it is also 
indistinguishable from the particular point of view of the historian who carries with 
him all his education, culture, and social and political background. In the end, 
works of history are no more or less objective than works of theory are.  
    Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s historicist conceptualisation of international 
change can tell us a lot regarding how they viewed the role of theorist in a 
changing world. To the extent that their world is no longer ours and the Cold War 
belongs to the past, we are not obliged to accept their proposals for non-
ideological diplomacy and a balance of power favourable to European interests and 
aspirations. Although the realisation of their ideals could have probably averted 
the Cold War, they were conscious of analysing a particular historical situation in a 
particular way, and they did not commit the mistake of treating the problems of 
their age as eternal ones. Indeed, de-contextualising the policy proposals of the 
writers discussed in the thesis, as some contemporary pluralists and realists do, 
would be tantamount to remaining faithful to the letter of the history/theory 
dialectic while departing from its spirit. Having said that, it is my view that 
Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s choice to identify themselves with particular 
historical actors and thus to present theory as history is not totally unfounded and 
does not deprive their international thinking of theoretical relevance. The reason 
why I chose to emphasise particularity when discussing their contribution to IR is 
not only that this particularity accounts for their understanding of theory as history 
but also that, as mentioned earlier, this dimension of their thought has been 
neglected by English School scholars.  
     Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s understanding of history as theory and theory 
as history made me use Badiou’s dialectic of scission as a suitable point of 
departure for grasping the workings of the history/theory dialectic. Understanding 
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history and theory as bifurcated entities is the first step in rejecting Bull’s formal 
logic, which also leads to a number of other problematic distinctions, such as that 
between order and justice. However, challenging the relationship between history 
and theory as conventionally understood is not exactly the same with describing it 
in genuinely dialectical terms. Recognising that history includes theory and theory 
includes history does not in and by itself show what is the end result of the 
history/theory dialectic in the form developed by Butterfield, Wight and Carr.  
What I would like to do is to arrive at a relatively positive understanding of the 
history/theory dialectic and to explore its potential consequences for the study of 
IR.  
Badiou’s Negative Dialectics     
Badiou’s evolving relationship to dialectics is one of the main issues that concern 
interpreters of his work. As Bruno Bosteels (2005) notes, the conventional wisdom 
on the subject is that the dialectician of Theory of the Subject had by the late 
eighties been replaced by a thinker drawing inspiration from different sources, 
such as mathematics and philosophy defined not only independent of but actually 
in opposition to dialectics. What I would like to underline is that both the 
dialectical and the anti-dialectical tendencies of Badiou’s thought are the result of 
a negative understanding of the dialectical method which has not considerably 
changed from Theory of the Subject onwards. This unwillingness to assign any 
positive function to dialectics explains why Badiou’s dialectic of scission should be 
complemented by a number of ideas derived from Zizek’s work. Contrary to 
Badiou, Zizek does not say one big thing regarding the dialectical method, but he 
rather makes a number of observations which taken together enable us to arrive at 
a positive understanding of Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s intellectual oeuvre.  
    Although, as Mads Karlsen (2014) mentions, the dialectical pedigree of the 
approach adopted by Badiou in Being and Event is heavily debated among the 
interpreters of his thought, books such as Metapolitics and Saint Paul are clearly 
anti-dialectical. In the first book, Badiou accepts the designation of the dialectic as 
an outdated form of thinking which, like positivism and historicism, belongs to the 
nineteenth century. In Saint Paul Badiou adopts an explicitly anti-dialectical 
position by separating the death from the Resurrection of Christ, and failing to 
acknowledge how the Christ-event provides an interesting example of the Hegelian 
idea of the negation of the negation. Badiou’s attitude towards the dialectic is 
somewhat more positive in Logics of Worlds where, however, he insists that, if it 
involves a third term, this term does nothing more than emphasising the gap that 
separates the other two. Badiou’s indifference towards the third dialectical 
moment which is usually associated with Hegel’s “negation of negation” means 
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that ultimately he does not escape from the dichotomous categories and 
distinctions that define formal logic.  
    Despite his continuing engagement with Hegel, Badiou continues to understand 
dialectics in terms of the Maoist formula “one divides into two, two does not 
merge into one”. This formula is presented in Theory of the Subject as a prime 
example of dialectical thinking, indeed, as the only law of dialectics, and is also 
defended in Badiou’s discussion of the Cultural Revolution in The Century (2005). 
Badiou’s acceptance of a dialectical schema from which any hope of reconciliation 
is missing is fully in accordance with Maoist and Stalinist orthodoxy, and provides a 
cogent example of what Bosteels (2005) has described as Badiou’s lingering debt to 
Maoism understood not only in political but also in philosophical terms. Badiou’s 
systematic engagement with Platonic thought in Plato’s Republic (2012b) is hardly 
surprising given the frequently negative use of dialectics in Platonic dialogues. 
Equally understandable is his neglect of the thought of Heraclitus whose use of 
dialectics is not positive in the sense of leading to an end of history or to an 
unproblematic combination of opposites, but is not negative either in the sense of 
making division an end in itself.  
    What Badiou does not realise by insisting on a negative definition of dialectics is 
that his philosophical and political intransigence does nothing more than to 
reinforce established conceptual and social oppositions without offering a new 
perspective from which such oppositions can be critically reassessed and ultimately 
relativized.  As Zizek (2008) has pointed out, when dialectical thinking is reduced to 
the simple opposition of two terms, the only kind of “synthesis” available is the 
subjugation of the one term to the other. Paradoxically enough, this is exactly what 
happened in the real world after the dissolution of socialism and the apparent 
triumph of liberal democracy on a global scale. Zizek’s insistence that the negation 
of the negation should be understood as the only true negation has precisely to do 
with the search for a new dialectical context within which the oppositions taken for 
granted by mainstream thought can be debated and undermined. From a Zizekian 
point of view, the interpenetration of history and theory does not have to do only 
with the recognition of their contradictory nature but also with the need to 
challenge the conceptual framework within which they appear as opposites in the 
first place. What Zizek proposes as an alternative to Badiou’s negative dialectics is 
not the utopian belief that we can escape the parameters of formal logic while 
continuing to move within those parameters, but rather the recognition of the fact 
that dialectical logic represents an autonomous way of viewing the word.  
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Zizek’s Critique of Badiou    
As Geoff Pfeifer (2015) notes, Zizek’s critique of Badiou takes place against the 
background of a materialist reading of Hegel. Far from being an idealist who 
assumes that there can be a way out of history and the complications of the 
dialectic, Zizek’s Hegel is the most important philosophical representative of a non-
reductionist form of materialism which attributes to immaterial phenomena a 
certain autonomous and positive dimension. Like Kant and other conventional 
representatives of German idealism, Hegel assumes that it is the knowing subject 
that gives shape to the external world by organising information and ascribing 
meaning to it. However, pace Kant, Hegel’s subject is not an isolated actor but on 
the contrary he is organically rooted in particular communities and cultures. As 
those communities and cultures develop and change, so does individual 
consciousness which ultimately expresses nothing more than a given moment in 
the development of humanity. Therefore, for Zizek, Hegel does not need to be 
salvaged from idealism precisely because he is not an idealist in the sense of 
placing ideational and material phenomena outside the workings of history and the 
dialectic.  
    Of particular interest for my purposes is Zizek’s belief that what appears to be 
negative in politics and dialectics can also be seen as positive. Zizek’s examples of 
transformative political action are often drawn from the world of literature and are 
employed in the same way that other philosophers employ thought experiments in 
order to provide support for their ideas. In Zizek’s (2004) thoughtful analysis of 
how the transition is made from the politics of resistance to the expression of a 
new position, Herman Melville’s Bartleby uses the words “I would prefer not to” 
when asked to carry out certain tasks. Although these words could be seen as a 
mere refusal to execute the orders of his Master, Zizek argues that the fictional 
hero under discussion actually does more than that. By saying not simply that he 
does not want to do something, but rather that he prefers not to do it, Bartleby 
opens a third way between the existing social order and its sterile rejection, and 
ultimately creates a new ideological space. As Zizek concludes, the kind of negation 
encapsulated in Bartleby’s words does not need to await a new political order to 
arrive since it already represents such an order, at least in an embryonic form.   
    Zizek’s choice to recognise in negativity a positive dimension also informs his 
examination of the third dialectical moment of the negation of the negation in 
Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism (2014). By 
relating the negation of the negation to the Lacanian Real, Zizek wants to prove 
that certain values or ideals can be influential, while, at the same time, being also 
unrealisable. From a Marxist point of view, for example, we have first to reject the 
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idea of a genuine universality which is supposedly uncontaminated from any 
particular interest or tradition. However, at the same time, we must also reconcile 
ourselves with the fact that the search for universality is unavoidable.  Although 
the particular social or cultural ideas that assume the mantle of universality are 
justifiably subject to scrutiny, universality as an empty form retains its value. This 
becomes particularly evident in the contemporary case of human rights which, 
while undoubtedly expressing particular concerns and interests, also enable 
different groups to make their voice heard. By first rejecting the idea of a pure 
universality or a neutral account of human rights, and then rejecting this rejection 
by recognising that as forms universality and human rights are important, we see 
how the negation of the negation works in practice. 
    As Mads Karlsen (2014) points out, what defines Zizek’s engagement with the 
negation of the negation is the recognition of the fact that, although unity is 
unattainable, the proper aim of a dialectical approach is to problematise and 
undermine the context within which supposed opposites appear as natural and 
necessary. The negation of the negation is the only true negation in the sense that 
it is the only negation which generates a new perspective from which former 
opposites cease to be understood as such. When we face the tension between two 
supposedly contradictory terms, such as history and theory, we must not simply try 
to find a balance between them, but we should rather try to challenge the very 
definitions and assumptions that make their separation seem natural and 
unavoidable. For Zizek, the alternative to Badiou’s negative dialectics is not 
something which formal logic would describe as positive, but rather something 
which, while appears as negative, is in reality positive. What actually brings closer 
the creation of a new approach is acts of negation that may go unnoticed by the 
purveyors of the existing intellectual order but frequently include something 
positive in their negativity. Indeed, to oppose negative dialectics to idealism, or 
destruction to the false hope of achieving a higher synthesis of opposites, as 
Badiou does, is to move within the confines of the existing intellectual paradigm. 
Moving outside those confines would involve seeing something positive in what 
this paradigm would classify as simply negative.   
Applying Zizek to Butterfield, Wight and Carr  
The positive dimension that Zizek recognises to dialectics has far-reaching 
consequences for appreciating the meaning and the theoretical consequences of 
the history/theory dialectic as developed by Butterfield, Wight and Carr. Their 
rejection of the prevalent understandings of history and international theory is not 
just a preparatory move which requires a final synthesis between history and 
theory in order to be complete. Their active negation of the widespread 
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assumption that history has to do with the particular whereas theory has to do 
with the universal, gives body to a new intellectual paradigm which has important 
implications for IR, historiography, and potentially other disciplines as well.  
Butterfield, Wight and Carr do not simply challenge the conventional definitions of 
“history” and “theory” understood in separation from one another, but they also 
undermine the very framework within which the distinction between them makes 
sense. In their intellectual oeuvre examined in the previous chapters, history 
ceases to be theory’s other since historians and international theorists struggle 
with the same problems of generalisation and attention to context. These 
problems exist independent of whether one is addressing the past, as historians 
do, or the present and the future, as theorists do. What Butterfield, Wight and Carr 
ultimately help us realise is that history and theory can be seen as opposites only 
from the point of view of what Hegel (1977: 122) describes as contentless thought. 
In other words, history and theory can be seen as opposites only when treated as 
mere forms which do not belong to any particular context and are referring only to 
themselves. Once they cease to be treated only as notions, and are seen as actual 
intellectual practices of individuals belonging to particular scientific communities, 
then the one inevitably infiltrates the other. Their interpenetration is not so much 
advocated or recommended but is rather being recognised and acknowledged.   
    It should also be mentioned that Zizek’s acknowledgment of the necessary link 
that exists between particularity and universality in the case of human rights 
enables one to see that Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s support for the European 
values of the balance of power and non-ideological diplomacy is not necessarily 
parochial and imperialistic. Despite being genuinely interested in the future of 
Europe, the writers examined in this thesis also provide the foundations of an 
inclusive form of international order which can be hospitable to different traditions 
and civilisations. In their thought, raison de systeme is mediated by particularistic 
commitments and assumptions but is by no means reduced to such commitments 
and assumptions. The only criticism that can be made is that by advocating a global 
balance of power favourable to Europe and the two superpowers of their age, they 
do not pay much attention to the future role of powers and continents that do not 
constitute even distant offshoots of the European civilisation, most notably China.  
As Quentin Skinner (2002) has observed, studying intellectual history does not 
absolve us of the responsibility to do our thinking ourselves in order to address 
issues that have acquired a special relevance in our own age.  
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Towards a Dialectic of Societal Forms and a Grounded Theory of International 
Institutions 
Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s acknowledgement of the co-constitution of history 
and theory has far-reaching consequences for the English School as a research 
programme and for the elucidation of the relationship between societal forms that 
include but are not restricted to the Westphalian society of states.  Although for 
much of its life the English School associated itself and was also associated by 
others with the analysis of one particular element in international relations, that of 
international society, from the end of the Cold War onwards there has been a 
systematic attempt to widen the scope of English School investigations in order to 
analyse the relationship between the international system, international society, 
and world society. Although the notion of international system is examined by 
other theoretical approaches, the clarification of the relationship between 
international society and world society has acquired special theoretical and 
practical relevance as a result of the complex processes usually described as 
“globalisation”. From Bull’s non-dialectical point of view, the relationship between 
international society and world society is a mainly negative one; the whole point of 
his separation of order from justice is to draw a dividing line between, on the one 
hand, the interstate domain, and, on the other hand, the interhuman domain. 
Despite the abstract moral priority assigned to the rights of individual men and 
women, Bull views any systematic attempt to implement those rights as a direct 
threat to the society of states. This applies both to his magnum opus which was 
critically discussed and evaluated in the first chapter, and to Bull’s (1984) later, 
supposedly more solidarist work. Despite the title of his 1983-84 lectures and the 
apparent attempt to offer a companion to his previous study of order, it is very 
doubtful whether Bull ever managed to escape the narrow confines of the 
Westphalian order, and to offer a practical outlet to his moral cosmopolitanism.  
    Although like every important thinker Bull was a product of his age and his 
prioritisation of order was understandable in a world where very different notions 
of justice were competing for supremacy, contemporary English School pluralists, 
such as Robert Jackson (2000), have decontextualized his views, and portrayed 
every effort to move beyond the confines of the Westphalian order as 
fundamentally flawed. Jackson’s negative evaluation of any attempt to recognise 
the homogenising potential of ideas and practices we normally associate with the 
West, and to promote human rights, is echoed by James Mayall (2000) who 
discusses the dystopia of a homogenised MacWorld, and puts into question the 
power of democracy to play a positive role in international affairs. Despite that 
Jackson and Mayall make a number of valid points in the course of their critique of 
the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, they adopt an unsatisfying philosophy 
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of history which sees change as a (misguided) ideal instead of seeing it as a fact 
which can potentially give rise to new values in domestic and international affairs. 
The tendency of the liberal wing of the English School to portray human rights as 
an unhistorical alternative to the society of states has further complicated the issue 
and unnecessarily politicised the attempt to think about the relationship between 
international society and other societal forms.  
    Without being a solidarist in the sense of adopting an explicitly normative 
agenda, Buzan (2004; 2005b; 2014) has tried to develop a non-teleological dialectic 
of societal forms that puts the traditional opposition between international society 
and world society within a new conceptual framework which, if accepted, could 
revolutionise the study of international relations from an English School 
perspective. Buzan builds consciously upon a number of Wightian insights in order 
to show that the analytically distinct domains which he describes as interstate 
societies, interhuman societies, and transnational societies, depend closely on one 
another.  Following the main assumptions of the history/theory dialectic as 
developed by Butterfield, Wight and Carr, Buzan emphasises that the exact 
relationship between interstate societies, interhuman societies, and transnational 
societies, cannot be determined in the abstract but only under particular historical 
circumstances and conditions. This is undoubtedly in accordance with Wilson’s 
(2012; 2016) historically sensitive understanding of international institutions. 
Although primarily interested in English School theory as a set of ideas that can be 
found in the minds of statesmen and other actors in the international scene, 
Wilson’s grounded theory of international institutions also possesses a strong 
sociological and historical dimension. His rejection of what he defines as stipulative 
or purely theoretical definitions of international institutions poses the issue of the 
historical context in a particularly acute form. For both Buzan and Wilson, the main 
challenge facing English School theory today is to find ways to combine the 
attention to context typical of historians with the conceptual rigour and 
clarification that is associated with the work of theorists. The fact that their 
proposals can give rise to either theoretically informed forms of historiography or 
historically informed forms of theory shows how inadequate is the distinction 
between history and theory in the form accepted by Bull and others. Keene’s 
(2009; 2014) favourable presentation of Wightian historicism, and support for a 
neo-Weberian framework which includes a strong element of historical 
interpretation, also move towards the same direction.   
     Although Buzan makes particularly clear the fact that, within the framework of a 
liberal international order, interstate societies, interhuman societies, and 
transnational societies, can develop in harmony with one another, this is by no 
means true independent of historical context and circumstances. Totalitarian and 
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fundamentalist ideologies depict the relationship between states, individuals, and 
collective transnational actors in a very different way from historical liberalism 
which portrays solidarism as “a close nexus among the three domains” (Buzan, 
2005b: 128).  Despite his attempt to accommodate positivism within a 
methodologically pluralist framework, Buzan, like the founding English School 
thinkers examined in the thesis, ends up appealing to particular cultural and 
political traditions. His analytical structural approach is by no means devoid of 
normative implications, and ends up offering support for a historically contingent 
combination of order and justice realised within the confines of the contemporary 
liberal international order. Like David Armstrong (1993), Buzan argues that 
interstate society is not going to disappear any time soon but the basis of 
association among states may broaden and acquire new characteristics. His 
argument has some similarities with Halliday’s (1994) understanding of 
international society as homogeneity but it leaves more space to non-liberal forms 
of international order which, after all, are far from unimaginable. The main 
objection that could be raised to Buzan’s non-teleological dialectic of societal 
forms is that he portrays Western values in international relations as more 
homogeneous than they are or can be as a result of the aspiration to promote both 
toleration and a particular vision of civilisation within the confines of the same 
international order (Keene, 2002; 2009). His assumption that there is a historical 
tendency towards solidarism arguably bears the mark of positivism since it tends to 
disregard the importance of understandings tied to the experience of particular 
historical actors (Wilson, 2012; 2016). Although certain practices and institutions 
can be seen as the harbingers of solidarism from the point of view of the advanced 
Western democracies, they can also be seen as a revival of the worst aspects of the 
European past by others.  
    Buzan’s dialectical triad of interstate societies, interhuman societies, and 
transnational societies, has far-reaching consequences for reimagining and 
reconfiguring the debate between pluralists and solidarists within the English 
School. This debate has been problematized by scholars such as John Williams 
(2005) and Matthew Weinert (2011) and it provides a poor framework for 
classifying Butterfield’s, Wight’s and Carr’s international thought. For Buzan, 
pluralism and solidarism should not be seen as synonyms for conservatism and 
cosmopolitanism respectively, since they are both redefined as centrist positions 
within a spectrum ranging from asocial anarchy to complete political unification. 
Despite the choice to place special emphasis on coexistence and cooperation 
respectively, pluralists and solidarists cannot altogether deny the value of what the 
other camp proposes since, under modern historical circumstances, even 
existential threats cannot be effectively handled by a nation acting alone. In the 
same way that pluralists are obliged to recognise the value of cooperation in areas 
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such as arms control and the environment, solidarists cannot ignore the obvious 
fact that convergence cannot occur without extensive prior interaction based on 
coexistence. By removing cosmopolitanism from the picture, Buzan helps us 
understand that the debate between pluralists and solidarists has more to do with 
answering the questions what type of interstate society we want and how this 
society should be related to other societal forms and less to do with the possibility 
of transcending the states-system. Such a possibility does not really concern the 
majority of English School solidarists, and is also alien to Buzan’s conceptualisation 
of world society as a field populated exclusively by non-state actors.  
    The way in which Buzan limits world society to the non-political sphere is not 
above criticism, but it certainly helps to corroborate his more general argument 
regarding the non-antagonistic and essentially symbiotic relationship between 
international and world society under contemporary historical circumstances. 
Although by placing emphasis on the value of co-operation Buzan does not 
mechanically adopt the policy proposals of the writers examined in this thesis, his 
attention to historical context brings him very close to the spirit of the 
history/theory dialectic. Despite his claim that the very category of world society 
should be ultimately discarded in favour of recognising the distinct ontological 
foundations of the interhuman and transational domains, my view is that it could 
actually be retained as a composite concept aimed at throwing light on the way in 
which contemporary interstate society is influenced by developments and actions 
taking place outside of its confines.  Indeed, admitting the heterogeneity that 
characterises world society has the advantage of depicting it as a concept not 
dissimilar to international society which is also heterogeneous in the sense of 
accommodating different cultures and belief systems.  
     In any case, to the extent that interstate society ceases to be seen as an 
intermediate level of analysis, which finds itself under pressure from a 
mechanically conceived international system and a cosmopolitan world society, the 
engagement with societal forms other than the Westphalian society of states 
becomes easier. By moving the societal approach beyond the rather narrow 
confines of the Westphalian order, Buzan makes one of the most important 
attempts so far to explore the anthropological, cultural, economic and other 
dimensions of interstate society, and to separate English School thinking from 
those braches of realism with which it is mistakenly associated (Armstrong, 1993; 
Wilson, 2016). By thinking about history and theory, order and justice, 
international society and world society, pluralism and solidarism, as concepts that 
include their dialectical other within themselves, we come closer to understanding 
the nature of the dilemmas facing us and to escaping the tragic moral universe of 
realists and others. Although it can be seen as an exercise in conceptual 
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clarification, the kind of dialectical thinking adumbrated in the thesis arguably does 
more than that. Despite that Buzan’s non-teleological dialectic of societal forms 
and Wilson’s grounded theory of international institutions provide the two most 
promising ways of operationalising the history/theory dialectic they do not exhaust 
its meaning and theoretical consequences. The main advantage of 
reconceptualising the English School along methodological lines is remaining open 
to new theoretical possibilities which, in the final analysis, cannot be understood 
independent of the course of history itself.   
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Notes
                                                          
i Bull’s anti-historicist prejudices become even more evident in his British Committee paper 
discussing the so-called scientific American contributions to international theory. According to Bull, 
international theory assumes the form of a body of general propositions which should be 
distinguished from both the study of history and that of contemporary international affairs. 
Although historians and those following contemporary international affairs are interested in theory 
only to the extent that it throws light on particular events, theorists try to arrive at conclusions 
which are true independent of time and space. It is precisely because of this fundamentally 
ahistorical understanding of international theory that Bull views with understanding Morton 
Kaplan’s harsh criticism of the historians and their supposed failure to be explicit regarding the 
theoretical categories they use. See Hedley Bull, “Recent American Contributions to the Theory of 
International Politics”, Papers of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 1965: 1-10.  
ii Although, as philosophers such as Theodor Adorno have pointed out, no straightforward definition 
of dialectics is possible or even desirable, the belief in the unity of apparent opposites, along with 
the doctrine of movement or flux, constitute from Heraclitus onwards the two main pillars of 
dialectics. For an excellent discussion of the role that dialectic performs in the different 
philosophical systems of Heraclitus, Hegel and Marx see Howard Williams, Hegel, Heraclitus and 
Marx’s Dialectic, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989.  Despite his otherwise very illuminating 
investigation of dialectic, Williams is wrong in advocating a purely methodological understanding of 
it and in attributing this understanding to Marx. Ontological assumptions regarding the 
contradictory nature of reality cannot be easily separated from methodological ones regarding the 
unity of opposites. This is so because the dialectical ontological belief in a natural and social world 
which are necesarrily subject to change is the by- product of the Hegelian methodological insight 
that “the truth only is as the unity of distinct opposites” (Hegel, 1892: 282). In other words, the 
ontological belief in movement and change cannot be separated from the methodological 
assumption that every concrete thing should be understood as a unity of differences, because it is 
the contradictory nature of things which accounts for the phenomena of movement and change. 
This is particularly the case for Marx who saw social evolution as arising from the opposition of 
distinct and irreconcilable social forces. A homogeneous social reality would also be a static one, 
and this helps one to understand how Marx related communism to the end of history. Probably the 
problems with Williams’ reading of Marx arise from his almost exclusive preoccupation with Capital 
at the expense of works such as The Poverty of Philosophy or even Theses on Feuerbach. See 
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, London: Routledge, 1973; Kahn, C.  H., The Art and 
Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume One, London: Kegan Paul, 1892; Karl Marx, The 
Poverty of Philosophy, Clerkenwell Green: The Twentieth Century Press, 1900 ; and Karl Marx, The 
German Ideology including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political 
Economy, New York: Prometheus Books, 1998. For a conceptualisation of dialectics as not simply 
applicable to natural and social reality but as derived directly from Nature, see Frederick Engels, 
Dialectics of Nature, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954: 83-84. Jean-Paul Sartre 
later defended the ontological status of dialectic when applied to the social world but pointed out 
that Engel’s assumption that Nature is dialectical cannot actually be verified. When applied to the 
social world, however, dialectic properly conceived concerns both the process of knowledge and 
the structure of the real. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume One, London: 
Verso, 1976. For a rather ambitious attempt to present dialectic as the solution to all the problems 
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facing IR scholarship and a critique of it, see Christian Heine and Benno Teschke, “Sleeping Beauty 
and the Dialectical Awakening: On the Potential of Dialectic for International Relations”, 
Millennium, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1996: 399-423; and Mathias Albert and Yosef Lapid, “On Dialectic and IR 
Theory: Hazards of a Proposed Marriage”, Millennium, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1997: 403-415. Despite their 
differences, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek are certainly among the most important contemporary 
dialecticians, and this is the reason why they have been included in the thesis. The natural place to 
start in order to apprehend Badiou’s identification of dialectical logic with a logic of scission is 
Theory of the Subject, London: Bloombury, 1982/2009. Zizek is a more complex case, since he 
consciously abstains from offering any straightforward definition of the dialectical method. It is 
because of that that I use Badiou as a point of departure for understanding dialectics and come to 
Zizek later in the thesis.  Zizek does not so much deny the importance of the logic of scission 
developed by Badiou, but he rather places it within a wider dialectical context from which the 
Hegelian “negation of negation” is not completely absent. In The New Materialism: Althusser, 
Badiou, and Zizek, London: Routledge, 2015, Geoff Pfeifer provides a useful presentation of Zizek’s 
ideas, while choosing to place him within an Althusserian framework that is more relevant to 
Badiou. 
iii Of course, both theory and history are essentially contested terms. With regard to the first term, 
Raymond Aron distinguishes among five different senses of it. To begin with, theory can assume the 
form of contemplative knowledge, i.e., philosophy. The second sense of the term “theory” refers to 
the natural sciences and their effort to establish a deductive system of empirically verifiable 
hypotheses. The third sense of theory is connected to the social sciences which, while imitating the 
natural ones in many respects, want to know primarily in order to be able to predict and in this way 
influence the course of events. The fourth and fifth meanings of the term “theory” are more 
relevant to the way that my chosen writers approached the problem of international change. The 
fourth meaning of theory is related to doctrine, or what Aron calls praxeology, a compound word 
consisted of the words “praxis” and “logos”. Finally, the fifth meaning of the term “theory” is 
related to what it could be described as a conceptualisation; in the sense used in my thesis 
conceptualisation refers to an analysis of events which predisposes one to think in certain ways 
about them. Conceptualisation, as Aron mentions, could be seen either as an outline of a theory, or 
an admission that a general theory of the phenomenon under discussion is impossible. See 
Raymond Aron, “What is a Theory of International Relations?”, in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith 
(eds), Theory and Reality in International Relations, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967: 1-
22.  
iv The aloofness and distance of the founding figures of the English School from contemporary 
international affairs has been accepted as a fact by all those writing about the subject. Tim Dunne 
understands this supposed distance as one of the reasons behind the School’s resilience as a 
research programme, and Buzan mentions that the School never showed any particular interest in 
British foreign policy. See Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English 
School, London: Macmillan, 1998: 184; and Barry Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of 
International Relations, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014: 5. However, what I intend to show in my 
discussion of the way that Butterfield, Wight and  Carr conceptualised international change, is that 
the founders of the School assessed and analysed international politics from a particular point of 
view, and that the policy implications of their analysis are relatively easy to see. That said, the way 
in which they equated British interests with Western European ones enables their political 
perspective to escape any nationalistic connotations. Their historicism is not tied to the nation 
state.  
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v Since Roy Jones’ impressionistic critique of the English School, the preoccupation of its members 
with continuity at the expense of change has been seen as more or less self- evident.  Jones’ 
reference to Wight’s meta-history, a history where there is a lot of activity but nothing really 
changes, is echoed in Iver Neumann’s assumption that Butterfield and Wight insisted on the notions 
of recurrence and repetition occuring in the international field as the consequence of the function 
of ahistorical laws. Even Vigezzi –despite his acknowledgement of the changes involved in the 
transition from a European to a global international society studied in Hedley Bull’s and Adam 
Watson’s The Expansion of International Society—argues that the members of the British 
Committee not only were interested more in continuity than they were interested in change, but 
also that they were better equipped to study continuity than to study change. See Roy E. Jones, 
“The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure”, Review of International Studies, 
1981: 1-13; Iver B. Neumann, “The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promises Unfulfilled”, 
International Relations, 17:3, 2003: 341-369; Brunello Vigezzi, The British Committee on the Theory 
of International Politics : The Rediscovery of History, Milano: Edizioni Unicopli, 2005; and Hedley Bull 
and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.   
vi The biographical contextualisation of ideas has also been recommended by Antonio Gramsci in his 
discussion of questions of method in the Prison Notebooks. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from 
the Prison Notebooks, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971: 382-386.  
vii See Marci Shore, “Can we see Ideas?: On Evocation, Experience, and Empathy”, in Darrin M. 
McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014: 198.  
viii For Butterfield, the natural place to start is C. T. McIntire’s Herbert Butterfield: Historian as 
Dissenter. Ian Hall’s The International Thought of Martin Wight is not a biography, but it is a book 
rich in biographical detail and allusion. Jonathan Haslam’s The Vices of Integrity has been rightly 
praised for challenging the boundaries between intellectual and non-intellectual biography. See C. 
T. McIntire, Herbert Butterfield: Historian as Dissenter, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004; Ian 
Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006; and Jonathan 
Haslam, The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892-1982, London: Verso, 1999.  
ix The notion of trajectory has been introduced by Pierre Bourdieu in his critical examination of the 
biographical illusion that human life can be narrated as a coherent story having a beginning, middle 
and an end. By using the notion of trajectory, Bourdieu aims to retain the notion of the “subject” 
without buying into the modernist fallacy that its constancy and essence are never put into 
question. See Pierre Bourdieu, “The Biographical Illusion”, in Paul du Gay, Jessica Evans and Peter 
Redman (eds), Identity: A Reader, London: Sage, 2000: 297-303.  
x From an English School perspective, the method of the biographical contextualisation of ideas has 
been recently used by Barry Buzan and Richard Little in their examination of Adam Watson’s 
concept of hegemony. Buzan and Little argue that their subject’s approach to international theory 
was heavily influenced by the professional and political experiences he had as a diplomat in America 
and elsewhere. Although this approach to the biographical contextualisation of ideas comes very 
close to establishing the type of causal connections that I generally see as tenuous, it seems to be 
confirmed by the writings of Watson himself. See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Introduction to 
the 2009 Reissue”, in Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis, London: Routledge, 2009: xi-xxi; and Adam Watson, Hegemony and History, London: 
Routledge, 2007: 107.  
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xi For Marx, dialectical movement does not consist in choosing among—or combining—existing 
categories of thought and being, but in seeing “the yes becoming no, the no becoming yes, the yes 
becoming at once yes and no, the no becoming at once no and yes...”. See Karl Marx, The Poverty of 
Philosophy, 86. In the case of Butterfield, Wight and Carr dialectical movement means that they are 
not simply historians at one moment, and theorists at another moment, but that they rather try to 
reinvent both history and theory.  
xii For both Jones and Suganami, the natural home of the English School is no other than the LSE 
Department of International Relations. All the academics mentioned by the writers of the 1980s had 
some relationship with this particular department. The identification of a school of thought with an 
academic department is of course highly problematic and, even if it were true, it would still belittle 
the importance and arguably reduce the appeal of the English School.  
xiii The overall agreement between Jones and Suganami regarding the School’s main characteristics 
can be realised by taking into consideration Suganami’s conclusion that British “institutionalism” 
found its paradigmatic expression in the writings of the authors under discussion, and it therefore 
belongs to the past. Jones’ criticisms regarding the supposed indifference of English School authors 
towards the socio-economic dimension, and the dangers of separating international society from 
domestic political phenomena, are also echoed in Suganami’s thought.   
xiv Although Suganami’s exclusion of Butterfield and Carr is understandable given his point of view, 
his failure to include Wight is puzzling. Bull was certainly justified to criticise this omission. See 
Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A 
Contemporary Reassessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006: 23.  In fact, there is a 
certain tension between the way that Suganami defined the members of the English School and his 
proposals for further research. The historically informed investigation of international phenomena, 
which he recommends, cannot be effectively promoted by a list of authors whose interest in history 
is very limited. More generally, Suganami commits the mistake of first identifying the English School 
with something limited—or even parochial—and then calling for its renewal with the use of 
intellectual sources that are somehow alien to it.  
xv For the problems that historians of ideas face when they approach their subjects with 
preconceived paradigms, and the consequent temptation to use of anachronistic concepts, see 
Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume 1: Regarding Method, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002: 57-89.  
xvi As William Olson and Nicholas Onuf note in their thoughtful examination of the development of 
IR, the discipline in the form that we know it today was born after World War I in order to 
contribute to the promotion of peace and the study of international organisation. Its five major 
historical phases of development are all related to external events.  The first phase had to do with 
the study of international law and international history and refers to something very different from 
what we would describe today as IR. During the second phase, what mattered was the study of the 
international institutions created by the victors of World War I and the promotion of international 
peace. The third phase of the discipline of IR emerged as a result of the kind of power politics 
pursued by Italy and Germany in the aftermath of World War I. The fourth major phase of the 
discipline was the result of the Cold War, which led to the reaffirmation of the concepts of power 
and interest temporarily eclipsed by the creation of the United Nations (UN). Finally, the fifth phase 
that Olson and Onuf describe is directly related to the Vietnam war and the search for peace and 
world order as an alternative to aggressive foreign policies. During this phase, Marxism, social 
204 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
psychology, and ideas about interdependence and the importance of non-state actors were widely 
employed in order to challenge the primacy of realism. Buzan and Little have also recognised the 
importance that policy issues had for the birth and direction of IR, but they make the point that the 
justified preoccupation with the present and near future should not lead one to ignore the past. See 
William Olson and Nicholas Onuf, “The Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed”, in Steve Smith (ed.), 
International Relations: British and American Perspectives, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985: 1-28; and 
Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Why International Relations has failed as an Intellectual Project and 
What to do about It”, Millennium, 30 (1), 2001: 24.  
xvii Although Shaw’s arguments put into question the kind of international society frequently 
associated with Manning and Bull, it is not certain that they do justice to the complexity that 
characterises the thought of the first and to the different layers that can be found in the thought of 
the second. With regard to Manning, Wilson has persuasively argued that he is less state-centric 
than often assumed; his understanding of international society as a notional entity consisted of 
other notional (state) entities has far-reaching implications for the study of international relations. 
For Manning, the personification of the state is unavoidable and it is no different from the 
personification of other social entities, such as social classes, churches, and trade unions. 
Misinterpreting a methodological position as an ontological one can have serious implications for 
appropriating Manning’s thought. After all, Manning’s aspiration to a “social cosmology” distances 
him very much from any attempt to separate and abstract international affairs from the wider 
social cosmos to which they organically belong. Although less consistent than Manning on this 
point, Bull explicitly recognises that world order is prior to international order  because the ultimate 
members of any type of collective entity are individual human beings. Despite the fact that both 
Manning and Bull have certain responsibilities for the way in which their thought has been 
(mis)interpreted, it is interesting to see how every age tends to find in a given set of authors what it 
is looking for. The historical context of the Cold War maybe explains more adequately than the 
ideas themselves how Bull and Manning have been interpreted.  See Peter Wilson, “Manning’s 
Quasi-Masterpiece: The Nature of International Society Revisited”, The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 93:377, 2004: 755-769; and Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1977/2002.  
xviii Although plausible as an interpretation of the end of the Cold War, Halliday’s model of 
international society as homogeneity corresponds to a rather particular historical experience. In the 
course of human history, there are many examples where international competition did not lead to 
the adoption of the same societal model. Athens and Sparta in ancient Greece provide such an 
example where the military and political competition among different political units did not 
produce a convergence of social, ideological and political systems. Even today, North and South 
Korea retain their ideological and political differences despite being engaged in competition with 
one another.  
xix Leaving aside the contested nature of  the term “philosophy of history”, even historiography is  
defined in different ways by different houses of history. For a discussion of the main 
historiographical approaches today, see Anna Green and Kathleen Troup (eds), The Houses of 
History: A Critical Reader in Twentieth-Century History and Theory, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999. For a critique of the tendency of international theorists to conveniently 
forget the contestability of the concept of history in order to use it for their own theoretical 
designs, see Nick Vaughan-Williams, “International Relations and the ‘Problem of History’”, 
Millennium, 34:1, 2005: 115-136. 
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xx In the Preface to the Second Edition of What is History? Carr explicitly related his belief in 
progress to the fact that he grew up in the afterglow of the Victorian age mentioning that the 
experiences of his youth prevented him from even thinking about the world as being in a state of 
permanent decay. In his Autobiography, he notes how as a boy he felt a sense of material and 
physical security in a world that was good and was only getting better. Haslam mentions Carr’s early 
support for the Liberal Party and draws attention to his abiding appreciation of Lloyd George. Even 
during his time at the Foreign Office, Carr described himself as an “English liberal” and felt annoyed 
by what he perceived as the failure of the victors in World War I to implement with consistency 
liberal principles, such as that of national self-determination. Although his attachment to 
nineteenth-century liberal ideas did not withstand the shock of the Russian Revolution, his 
commitment to Marxism was more half-hearted than it is often assumed, and was severely 
complicated by the fact that he did not believe in Marxism as a positive program of social change 
actively promoted by the Western proletariat. His anti-imperialism is evident in both What is 
History? and in other public utterances and interventions, but it  is doubtful whether it qualifies him 
as a Marxist. As Wilson has pointed out, Carr accepted Marxism as a form of historical analysis but 
not as teleology. Carr’s dissatisfaction with the kind of academic Marxism promoted by the New 
Left Review under the guidance of Perry Anderson might also be relevant in this context. See E. H. 
Carr, “Preface to the Second Edition”, in E. H. Carr, What is History?, London: Penguin Books, 
1961/1987; E. H. Carr, “An Autobiography”, in Michael Cox (ed.), E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan 1980/2000: xiii-xxii;  Peter Wilson “Power, Morality, and the Remaking of 
International Order: E. H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis”, in Peter Wilson, Casper Sylvest, and 
Henrik Bliddal (eds), Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation, London 
Routledge, 2013: 52;  and Jonathan Haslam, The Vices of Integrity.   
xxi For a discussion of Mackinnon’s methodological and philosophical views, see Stewart Sutherland, 
“Donald Mackenzie Mackinnon 1913-1994”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 97, 1998: 381-389; 
and Molly Cochran, “The Ethics of the English School”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008: 286-
297. To the extent that Wight’s historicism was less absolute than that of Butterfield and Carr, and 
residues of the natural law tradition can still be found in his thought, he is closer to Mackinnon than 
either Butterfield or Carr were.  
xxii For an evaluation of the prospects of avoiding the Cold War through the creation of a global 
balance of power organised around the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France, see 
Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold 
War, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.  
xxiii See Isaiah Berlin, The Power of Ideas, London: Chatto and Windus, 2000: 207. Berlin also offers a 
fascinating discussion of the kind of historicism inspiring Friedrich Meinecke, who tried to see how 
the claims of the nation could be reconciled with more general human values and aspirations. In 
common with the writers examined in this thesis, Meinecke was fully conscious of the existence of 
two different levels of interpretation of historical events: one level focused on human beings 
enjoying freedom of action, and another level related to the operation of the impersonal forces that 
influence the direction of a society and the development of its members. Meinecke’s  inquiry into 
the origins of historicism has been translated in English as Historism: The Rise of a New Historical 
Outlook, translated by J. E. Anderson, London: Routledge, 1972.  
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xxiv For the identification of the philosophy of history with the attempt to interpret the whole of 
human history through the prism of a single concept, see Benedetto Croce, Historical Materialism 
and the Economics of Karl Marx, London: Frank Cass, 1966.  
xxv This tendency is common to both the neorealist and neoliberal incarnations of structuralism in 
contemporary international theory. For a critique of Kenneth Waltz’s strategy first to separate the 
international political system from the multi-sectored international system to which it belongs, and 
then to privilege it over the other sectors, see Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Waltz and World 
History: The Paradox of Parsimony”, International Relations, 23:3, 2009: 446-463.  
xxvi The way in which the writers examined in this thesis encourage us to think about history as 
theory and theory as history bears considerable resemblances to R. B. J. Walker’s attempt to 
destabilise a number of apparently opposed categories by showing how they presuppose one 
another, and they also tend to dissolve into each other. See R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: 
International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.  
xxvii The pre-classical Empires discussed by Butterfield in the Origins of History play also an important 
role in Watson’s The Evolution of International Society. Buzan’s and Little’s International Systems in 
World History is a slightly different case because their narrative starts from hunter-gatherer bands 
which play no part in Butterfield’s book. See Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A 
Comparative Historical Analysis, London: Routledge, 1992; and Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 
International Systems in World History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
xxviii The seeds of such a positive understanding of the role of the Christian political leader can be 
found in Donald Mackinnon’s British Committee paper “Some Notes on the Notion of a Christian 
Statesman”. Mackinnon starts from the recognition of the fact that there is indeed uncertainty in 
the various Christian assessments of the significance of political action. However, to the extent that 
Christians cannot withdraw entirely from the political sphere, they must recognise that being a 
statesman means something different from being a politician. The difference between the two lies 
primarily in the desire to promote the common good. It is also worth emphasising that whereas 
Wight sees the separation of Church and state as a problem, Mackinnon is much more open to the 
possibilities that the post-Constantinian age creates. These opportunities concern Christian 
churches in general and Anglicanism in particular. See Donald Mackinnon, “Some Notes on the 
Notion of a Christian Statesman”, Papers of the British Committee on the Theory of International 
Politics, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1962: 1-9; and Donald Mackinnon, The 
Stripping of the Altars, Suffolk: The Chaucer Press, 1969.  
xxix Although not explicitly addressing the problem of totalitarianism, Tariq Ali’s The Clash of 
Fundamentalisms, provides a good starting point for thinking about totalitarianism under 
contemporary circumstances. It also functions as a corrective to Wight and Toynbee’s tendency to 
portray religion as a by definition benevolent force. Despite the fact that both economic and 
political power can be abused, religious power is not exception to this. See Tariq Ali, The Clash of 
Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, London: Verso, 2003.  
xxx Defining the relationship between Christianity – that inspires Butterfield and Wight—and  
Marxism – that animates Carr’s approach to historiography—is not easy, since both Marxism and 
Christianity can assume different forms. However, any exploration of their points of contact should 
start from the recognition of the fact that both systems of thought and action presuppose the 
rejection of the cyclical theory of history, which was commonly accepted in the Greco-Roman 
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world. Christians, such as St. Augustine, repudiated this conception of history much earlier than 
Marxists, and provided the foundations of the modern idea of progress. The belief in the 
directionality of history creates a very important link between Christianity and modern political 
ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism. Especially with regard to Marxism, there is a common 
interest in seeing human history as something more complex than the result of the actions of 
identifiable individuals. See Frank E. Manuel, Shapes of Philosophical History, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1965. In Christian Faith and Communist Faith, Mackinnon claims that Christianity 
and Marxism are comparable in the sense that they both constitute an expression of faith. For 
Mackinnon, the Marxist expresses a faith no less than the Christian does, since he uses one 
particular political ideal, that of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as an absolute standard in order 
to evaluate all particular social struggles. By defining as good what brings closer the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, and as bad what limits the prospects of such a social transformation, the Marxist 
expresses a metaphysics: a body of doctrine for which he claims absolute validity. The relationship 
between Marxism and Christianity has also been explored by Alasdair MacIntyre who presents 
them as different answers to the same set of questions. See D .M. Mackinnon (ed.), Christian Faith 
and Communist Faith: A Series of Studies by Members of the Anglican Communion, London: 
Macmillan, 1953; and Alasdair MacIntyre, Marxism and Christianity, London: Gerald Duckworth, 
1969. For a discussion of Marxism as an extremely variegated tradition of thought which, under 
certain circumstances, can meet with Christianity, see Nicholas Rengger, “The Ethics of Marxism”, in 
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008: 188-200.  Rengger mentions the articulation of Marxism with 
Christianity in the case of the Latin American liberation theology, but also draws attention to more 
general problem of the often-neglected moral dimension of Marxism.  
xxxi Carr was especially critical of his biography of Marx, and according to his own recollections, he 
developed a genuine interest in Marx and Marxism only after completing this biography. See, 
Jonathan Haslam, The Vices of Integrity.  
xxxii For Hobsbawm, the relationship between history and the future has primarily to do with the fact 
that every prediction is necessarily based on inferences derived from the study of the past; 
therefore, the historian should be able to say something meaningful about the future. The other 
point that Hobsbawm makes, following Carr,  is that past, present, and future constitute a 
continuum with the present to retain only a notional existence between the past and the future. 
See E. J. Hobsbawm, “Looking Forward: History and the Future”, New Left Review, I/125, 
January/February 1981: 1-18.  
xxxiii See E. J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour, London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1968: 272-315. Apart from relating directly political views to material factors, Hobsbawm 
defines the labour aristocracy in nineteenth-century Britain according to the restrictive criterion of 
the level and regularity of a worker’s earnings. Even other broadly defined material factors, such as 
the worker’s conditions of living and his prospects of joining the upper social strata, are virtually 
neglected. The only political factor that enters Hobsbawm’s analysis is British imperialism, which, 
however, is also analysed through the prism of the material benefits conferred to the workers.  
xxxiv Butterfield’s belief that he was living in an age of revolution is expressed with exceptional clarity 
in the first paper he wrote for the British Committee. In this paper, he draws particular attention to 
the revolt against the West, and asks from his audience to consider how they would approach 
international problems if they were Indians or Arabs. See Herbert Butterfield, “Misgivings about the 
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Western Attitude to World Affairs”, Papers of the British Committee on the Theory of International 
Politics, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1959: 1-29.  
xxxv Indeed, Wight’s views are not very far from those that Watson expressed in Emergent Africa, a 
book he published in 1965 under the pseudonym Scipio. Watson was far from uncritical towards 
local political elites, and argued that the Africans were not able to solve their economic and 
technical problems without external help. However, he also noted that there were grounds for 
optimism, since the withdrawal of the colonial powers had not led to armed aggression and 
extensive conflicts among African states. The West had a difficult role to play since it would have to 
combine sympathy with detachment in its attitude towards Africa. See Scipio (Adam Watson), 
Emergent Africa, London: Chatto and Windus, 1965.  
xxxvi Watson has acknowledged his debt to Wight, but also put under scrutiny the Westphalian 
principles that were broadly accepted by the members of the British Committee during the 1960s. 
See Adam Watson, Hegemony and History, 18-19.  
xxxvii For a discussion of the role that these ideas played in nineteenth-century British liberal 
internationalist thought, see Casper Sylvest, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making 
Progress?, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009, especially Introduction and Chapter 2.  
xxxviii As Norman Angell pointed out, the belief that laissez-faire was no longer enough in 
international affairs provided the very rationale for the creation of the League of Nations. Contrary 
to what Carr was suggesting, the League was not an expression of the doctrine of the natural 
harmony of interests, but it rather represented a move towards collectivism and the establishment 
of international rules and government. Twentieth-century liberals were no longer content to rely on 
the doctrine of the natural harmony of interests espoused by their predecessors. See Peter Wilson, 
“Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to The Twenty Years’ Crisis,” in Michael Cox (ed.), E. H. Carr: A 
Critical Appraisal, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000: 174-175.  
xxxix In his discussion of liberalism as the dominant ideology, Michael Freeden notes that the 
complexity that characterises its study has to do with the fact that liberal themes and ideas are not 
confined to liberalism but permeate rival ideologies, such as socialism and conservatism. Especially 
with regard to socialism, Freeden makes the point that in its non-Marxist version is virtually 
indistinguishable from liberalism, since it consists in the pursuit of liberalism with alternative 
means. This is particularly the case in Britain, where the appeal of the value of liberty cuts across 
traditional ideological frontiers. See Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual 
Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. In my exploration of Carr’s debt to his liberal 
predecessors, I am interested in the international goals that inspired him and not so much in the 
means employed for their achievement. In the same way that illiberal political causes can be 
promoted by liberal means, such as elections or the use of the freedom of the press, liberal goals 
can be advanced by illiberal means, such as the intervention of the state in the economy or the 
promotion of international government. Identifying liberalism with laissez-faire would be to reduce 
it to libertarianism. For a critical examination of the ambiguities of international liberalism, see 
Eivind Hovden and Edward Keene (eds), The Globalization of Liberalism, New York: Palgrave, 2002.  
xl The differences between the notion of the balance of power and that of collective hegemony are 
not as great as one could assume, since, as Watson points out, the latter concept contains within 
itself an element of balance. The major powers that exercise a joint hegemony must also check and 
balance one another to retain certain equilibrium in the system. Perhaps Little’s notion of an 
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associational balance of power provides a link between crude understandings of the notion of the 
balance of power – which were by no means espoused by Butterfield and Wight—and the 
interesting concept of collective hegemony. See Adam Watson, Hegemony and History, 106-107; 
and Richard Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.  
210 
 
 
                                                     Bibliography 
   
Abramsky, C. 1974, “Tribute to E. H. Carr”, in C. Abramsky (ed.), Essays in Honour of 
E. H. Carr, London: Macmillan, pp. vii-viii.  
Adler, E. 2005, “Barry Buzan’s Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct the English 
School: ‘Not All the Way Down’”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 
34, No.1, pp. 171-182. 
Adorno, T. W. 1973, Negative Dialectics, London: Routledge.  
Albert, M. and Lapid, Y.  1997, “On Dialectic and IR Theory: Hazards of a Proposed 
Marriage”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 403-415.  
Alexandrowicz, C. H. 1967, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in 
the East Indies: 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Ali, T. 2003, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, 
London: Verso, 2003.  
Almeida de, J. M. 2003, “Challenging Realism by Returning to History: The British 
Committee’s Contribution to IR 40 Years On”, International Relations, Vol. 17, No. 
3, pp. 273-302.  
Althusser, L. 1965/1990, For Marx, London: Verso.   
Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. 1970, Reading Capital, London: NLB.  
Anderson, B. 1983, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread 
of Nationalism, London: Verso.  
Anderson, P. 2002, “Internationalism: A Breviary”, New Left Review, Vol. 14, pp. 5-
25.  
Armstrong, D. 1977, Revolutionary Diplomacy: The United Front Doctrine and 
Chinese Foreign Policy, Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Armstrong, D. 1993, Revolution and World Order, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
211 
 
Aron, R. 1967, “What is a Theory of International Relations?”, in John C. Farrell and 
Asa P. Smith (eds), Theory and Reality in International Relations, New York: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 1-22.  
Ayson, R. 2012, Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Badiou, A. 1967/2012, “The (Re)commencement of Dialectical Materialism”, in 
Alain Badiou, The Adventure of French Philosophy, London: Verso, 2012, pp. 133-
170.  
Badiou, A. 1982/2009, Theory of the Subject, London: Bloomsbury.  
Badiou, A. 2003, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.  
Badiou, A. 2005, The Century, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Badiou, A. 2006, Being and Event, London: Continuum.  
Badiou, A. 2009, Logics of Worlds, London: Continuum.  
Badiou, A. 2012a, Metapolitics, London: Verso.  
Badiou, A. 2012b, Plato’s Republic: A Dialogue in 16 Chapters, New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
Bell, D. 2007, The Idea of Greater Britain, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Bell, D. 2001, “International Relations: The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?”, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 115-126.  
Bellamy, A. J. (ed.) 2005, International Society and Its Critics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Bendix, R. 1984, Force, Fate, and Freedom: On Historical Sociology, Berkeley: 
University of California Press.  
Bentham, J. 1789/1970, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
University of London: The Athlone Press.  
Bentley, M. 2005, Modernizing England’s Past: English Historiography in the Age of 
Modernism, 1870-1970, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Bentley, M. 2011, The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield: History, Science and 
God, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
212 
 
Berki, R. N. 1981, On Political Realism, London: J. M. Dent & Sons.  
Berlin, I. 1951, Review of E. H. Carr, Studies in Revolution, International Affairs, Vol. 
27, No. 4, pp. 470-471.  
Berlin, I. 1954, Historical Inevitability: Auguste Comte Memorial Lecture No. 1, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Berlin, I. 2000, The Power of Ideas, London: Chatto and Windus.  
Berridge, G. 1980, “The Political Theory and Institutional History of States-
Systems”, British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 82-92.  
Bhaskar, R. 1978, A Realist Theory of Science, Hassocks: Harvester Press.  
Bieler, A. and Morton, A. D. 2001, “The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in 
International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective”, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 5-35.  
Booth, K. 1991, “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 527-545.  
Booth, K. and Wheeler, N. J. (2008), The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and 
Trust in World Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Bosteels, B. 2004, “On the Subject of the Dialectic”, in Peter Hallward (ed.), Think 
Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, London: Continuum, pp. 150-
164.  
Bosteels, B. 2005, “Post-Maoism: Badiou and Politics”, Positions, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 
575-634.  
Bosteels, B. 2009, “Translator’s Introduction”, in Alain Badiou, Theory of the 
Subject 1982/2009, pp. vii-xxxvii.  
Bourdieu, P. 2000, “The Biographical Illusion”, in Paul du Gay, Jessica Evans, and 
Peter Redman (eds), Identity: A Reader, London: Sage, pp. 297-303.  
Braudel, F. 1980, On History, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
Brown, C. 2002, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory 
Today, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Brown, C. and Ainley, K. 2005, Understanding International Relations, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
213 
 
Bull, H. 1965, “Recent American Contributions to the Theory of International 
Politics”, Papers of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, pp. 1-10.  
Bull, H. 1966, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach”, World 
Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 361-377. 
Bull, H. 1969, “The Twenty Years’ Crisis Thirty Years On”, International Journal, Vol. 
24, no. 4, pp. 625-638.  
Bull, H. 1972a, “The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969”, in Brian Porter 
(ed.), The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 30-55.  
Bull, H. 1972b, “International Relations as an Academic Pursuit”, Australian 
Outlook, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 251-265.  
Bull, H. 1976, “Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations: The Second 
Martin Wight Memorial Lecture”, British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, pp. 101-116.  
Bull, H. 1977, “Introduction: Martin Wight and the Study of International 
Relations”, in Martin Wight, Systems of States, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 
pp. 1-20.  
Bull, H. 1977/ 2002, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Bull, H. and Holbraad, C. 1978, “Introduction”, in Martin Wight, Power Politics, 
Leicester: Leicester University Press, pp. 9-22.  
Bull, H. 1984, Justice in International Relations: 1983-84 Hagey Lectures, Waterloo: 
University of Waterloo.  
Bull, H. and Watson, A. (eds) 1984, The Expansion of International Society, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
Butterfield, H. 1924/2011, The Historical Novel: An Essay, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Butterfield, H. 1929, The Peace Tactics of Napoleon 1806-1808, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Butterfield, H.  1931/1965, The Whig Interpretation of History, New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company. 
214 
 
Butterfield, H. 1939: Napoleon, London: Duckworth.  
Butterfield, H. 1940/1962, The Statecraft of Machiavelli, London: Collier-MacMillan 
Ltd. 
Butterfield, H. 1944, The Englishman and His History, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Butterfield, H. 1949a, George III, Lord North, and the People, 1779-80, London: G. 
Bell and Sons Ltd.  
Butterfield, H. 1949b, The Origins of Modern Science, London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd.  
Butterfield, H. 1949c, Christianity and History, London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd.  
Butterfield, H. 1951a, History and Human Relations, London: Collins.  
Butterfield, H. 1951b, “The Scientific versus the Moralistic Approach in 
International Affairs”, International Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 411-422.  
Butterfield, H. 1952/1979, “God in History”, in C. T. McIntire (ed.), Herbert 
Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1979, pp. 3-16.  
Butterfield, H. 1953, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, London: The Epworth Press.  
Butterfield, H. 1955, Man on His Past: The Study of the History of Historical 
Scholarship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Butterfield, H. 1957, George III and the Historians, London: Collins.  
Butterfield, H.  1959, “Misgivings about the Western Attitude to World Affairs”, 
Papers of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, pp. 1-29.  
Butterfield, H. 1960, International Conflict in the Twentieth Century: A Christian 
View, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.  
Butterfield, H. 1965/2007, “Sir Edward Grey in July 1914”, in Karl W. Schweizer and 
Paul Sharp (eds), The International Thought of Herbert Butterfield, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 82-111.  
Butterfield, H. 1966a, “The Balance of Power”, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin 
Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International 
Politics, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, pp. 132-148. 
215 
 
Butterfield, H. 1966b, “The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy”, in Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory 
of International Politics, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, pp. 181-192.  
Butterfield, H. 1972, “Morality and International Order”, in Brian Porter (ed.), The 
Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Butterfield, H. 1975, Raison d’ Etat: The Relations between Morality and 
Government, Brighton: University of Sussex.            
Butterfield, H. 1981, The Origins of History, Edited with an Introduction by Adam 
Watson, London: Eyre Methuen.  
Buzan, B. and Jones, R. J. B. (eds) 1981, Change and the Study of International 
Relations: The Evaded Dimension, London: Frances Pinter.  
Buzan, B. et al. 1990, The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-
Cold War Era, London: Pinter.  
Buzan, B. 1993, “From International System to International Society: Structural 
Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School”, International Organization, 
Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 327-352.  
Buzan, B., Jones, C. and Little, R. 1993, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to 
Structural Realism, New York: Columbia University Press.  
Buzan, B. and Little, R. 2000, International Systems in World History: Remaking the 
Study of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Buzan, B. 2001, “The English School: an Underexploited Resource in IR”, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 471-488.  
Buzan, B. and Little, R. 2001, “Why International Relations has failed as an 
Intellectual Project and what to do about It”, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 19-39.  
Buzan, B. 2004, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the 
Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Buzan, B. 2005a, “Not Hanging Separately: Responses to Dunne and Adler”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 183-194.  
216 
 
Buzan, B. 2005b, “International Political Economy and Globalization”, in Alex J. 
Bellamy (ed.), International Society and its Critics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 115-133.  
Buzan, B. 2006, “Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions of International 
Society”, in Richard Little and John Williams (eds), The Anarchical Society in a 
Globalized World, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 75-96.  
Buzan, B. and Little, R. 2009a, “Introduction to the 2009 Reissue”, in Adam Watson, 
The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis, London: 
Routledge, 1992/2009, pp. ix-xxxv.  
Buzan, B. and Little, R. 2009b, “Waltz and World History: The Paradox of 
Parsimony”, International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 446-463.  
Buzan, B. and Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds) 2009, International Society and the Middle 
East: English School Theory at the Regional Level, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Buzan, B. and Mathias, A. 2010, “Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to 
International Relations Theory”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 
16, No. 3, pp. 315-337.  
Buzan, B. 2014, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Buzan, B. 2016, “Taking the English School Forward”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 
51, No. 1, pp. 127-136. 
Carr, E. H. 1931, Dostoevsky: A New Biography, London: George Allen & Unwin.  
Carr, E. H. 1933, The Romantic Exiles: A Nineteenth-Century Portrait Gallery, 
London: Penguin Books.  
Carr, E. H. 1934, Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism, London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.   
Carr, E. H. 1937/1975, Michael Bakunin, New York:  Octagon Books. 
Carr, E. H. 1939/2001, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the 
Study of International Relations, Reissued with a New Introduction and additional 
material by Michael Cox, London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1942, Conditions of Peace, London: Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1945, Nationalism and After, London: Macmillan.  
217 
 
Carr, E. H. 1947, International Relations between the Two World Wars 1919-1939, 
London: Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1950a, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Volume One, London: 
Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1950b, Studies in Revolution, London: Macmillan.   
Carr, E. H. 1951, The New Society, London: Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1952, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Volume Two, London: 
Macmillan. 
Carr, E. H. 1953, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Volume Three, London: 
Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1954, The Interregnum 1923-1924, London: Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1958, Socialism in One Country 1924-1926, Volume One, London: 
Macmillan. 
Carr, E. H. 1959, Socialism in One Country 1924-1926, Volume Two, London: 
Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1961/1987, What is History?, London: Penguin Books.  
Carr, E. H. 1964a, Socialism in One Country 1924-1926, Volume Three, Part I, 
London: Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1964b, Socialism in One Country 1924-1926, Volume Three, Part II, 
London: Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1968, “A Historical Turning Point: Marx, Lenin, Stalin”, in Richard Pipes 
(ed.), Revolutionary Russia, Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press, pp. 282-
300.  
Carr, E. H. and Davies, R. W. 1969a, Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929, 
Volume One, Part I, London: Macmillan. 
Carr, E. H. and Davies, R. W. 1969b, Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929, 
Volume One, Part II, London: Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1969c, The October Revolution: Before and After, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf.  
Carr, E. H. 1971, Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929, Volume Two, 
London: Macmillan.  
218 
 
Carr, E. H. 1976a, Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929, Volume Three, 
Part I, London: Macmillan. 
Carr, E. H. 1976b, Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929, Volume Three, 
Part II, London: Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1978, Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929, Volume Three, Part 
III, London: Macmillan. 
Carr, E. H. 1979, The Russian Revolution from Lenin to Stalin 1917-1929, London: 
Macmillan.  
Carr, E. H. 1980, From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays, London: Macmillan.  
Clark, I. 2005, Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Clark, I. 2007, International Legitimacy and World Society, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Cleveland, H. van B. 1966, The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals, New York: 
McGraw-Hill.  
Cochran, M. 2008, “The Ethics of the English School”, in Christian Reus-Smit and 
Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 286-297.  
Cochran, M. 2009, “Charting the Ethics of the English School: what ‘Good’ is there 
in a Middle-Ground Ethics?”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, pp. 203-225.  
Coll, A. R. 1985: The Wisdom of Statecraft: Sir Herbert Butterfield and the 
Philosophy of International Politics, Durham: Duke University Press.  
Collingwood, R. G. 1946/1993, The Idea of History, Revised Edition with Lectures 
1926-1928, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Corner, M. 2014, The European Union: An Introduction, London: I. B. Tauris.  
Cox, M. 2001, “From the First to the Second Editions of The Twenty Years’ Crisis: A 
Case of Self-censorship?”, in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations, London: Palgrave Macmillan,  
pp. lxxii-lxxxii.  
Cox, M. 2010, “E. H. Carr and the Crisis of Twentieth-Century Liberalism: 
Reflections and Lessons”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 38, No. 
3, pp. 1-11.  
219 
 
Cox, R. W. 1986, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory”, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 204-254.   
Cox, R. W. 1987, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making 
of History, New York: Columbia University Press.  
Cox, R. W. 1993, “Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe”, 
in Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 259-289.  
Cox, R. W. with Sinclair, T. J. 1996, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Cox, R. W. 2008, “The Point is not just to explain the World but to change It”, in 
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 84-93. 
Cox, W. S. and Nossal, K. R. 2009, “The ‘Crimson World’: The Anglo Core, the Post-
Imperial Non-Core, and the Hegemony of American IR”, in Arlene B. Tickner and 
Ole Waever (eds), International Relations Scholarship around the World, London: 
Routledge, pp. 287-307.  
Croce, B. 1941, History as the Story of Liberty, London: George Allen and Unwin.  
Croce, B. 1966, Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx, London: 
Frank Cass.  
Cutler, A. C. 1991, “The ‘Grotian Tradition’ in International Relations”, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 17, pp. 41-65.  
Dark, K. R. 1998, The Waves of Time: Long-Term Change and International 
Relations, London: Pinter.  
Deighton, A. 1990, The Impossible Peace: Britain, The Division of Germany, and the 
Origins of the Cold War, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
DePorte, A. W.1986, Europe between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance, New 
Haven: Yale University Press.  
Deutscher, I. 1955, Heretics and Renegades, London: Hamish Hamilton.  
Diez, T. and Whitman, R. 2002, “Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the 
English School-Scenarios for an Encounter”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 43-67.  
220 
 
Donnelly, J. 2015, “The Discourse of Anarchy in IR”, International Theory, Vol. 7, 
No. 3, pp. 393-425.  
Dunne, T. 1998, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Dunne, T. 1999, “A British School of International Relations”, in Jack Hayward, 
Brian Barry, and Archie Brown (eds), The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth 
Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 395-424.  
Dunne, T. 2000, “All Along the Watchtower: A Reply to the Critics of Inventing 
International Society”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 227-238.  
Dunne, T. 2005, “System, State and Society: How does it All Hang Together?”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 157-170. 
Dunne, T. 2008, “The English School”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 267-285.  
Elton, G. R. 1967, The Practice of History, Sydney: Sydney University Press.  
Engels, F. 1954, Dialectics of Nature, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.  
Epp, R. 1998, “The English School on the Frontiers of International Society: A 
Hermeneutic Recollection”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, pp. 47-63.  
Evans, R. J. 1997, In Defence of History, London: Granta Books.  
Evans, T. and Wilson, P. 1992, “Regime Theory and the English School of 
International Relations: A Comparison”, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, pp. 329-351.  
Fain, H. 1970, Between Philosophy and History: The Resurrection of Speculative 
Philosophy of History within the Analytic Tradition, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press.  
Fawn, R. and Larkins, J. 1996, “International Society after the Cold War: Theoretical 
Interpretations and Practical Implications”, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds), 
International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, London: 
Macmillan, pp. 1-24.  
Finnemore, M. 2001, “Exporting the English School?”, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 509-513.  
221 
 
Forsyth, M. 1978, “The Classical Theory of International Relations”, Political 
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 411-416.  
Fox, W. T. R. 1985, “E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision”, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 11, No.1, pp. 1-16.  
Freeden, M. 1996, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
Fukuyama, F. 1992, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press.  
Gadamer, H. G. 1976, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, New Haven: 
Yale University Press.  
Gaddis, J. L. 1993, “The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future”, in Geir 
Lundestad and Odd Arne Westad (eds), Beyond the Cold War: New Dimensions in 
International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7-22.  
Gaddis, J. L. 1997, “History, Theory, and Common Ground”, International Security, 
Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 75-85.  
Gellner, E. 1983, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell.  
Gellner, E. 1992, “Nationalism Reconsidered and E. H. Carr”, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 285-293.  
Gemerchak, C. M. 2003, The Sunday of the Negative: Reading Bataille Reading 
Hegel, Albany: State University of New York Press.  
Geyl, P. 1956a, “Toynbee’s System of Civilisations”, in M. F. Ashley Montagu (ed.), 
Toynbee and History, Boston [Mass.]: Porter Sargent Publisher, pp. 39-72. 
Geyl, P. 1956b, “Toynbee as a Prophet”, in M. F. Ashley Montagu (ed.), Toynbee 
and History, Boston [Mass.]: Porter Sargent Publisher, pp. 360-377.  
Geyl, P. 1963, Encounters in History, London: Collins.  
Giddens, A. 1979, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and 
Contradiction in Social Analysis, London: Macmillan.  
Gill, S. 1985, “From Atlanticism to Trilateralism: the Case of the Trilateral 
Commission”, in Steve Smith (ed.), International Relations: British and American 
Perspectives, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 185-212.  
Gill, S. 1990, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
222 
 
Gill, S. (ed.) 1993, Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gilpin, R. 1981, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Gluck, M. 1985, Georg Lukacs and his Generation, 1900-1918, Cambridge [Mass.]: 
Harvard University Press.  
Gong, G. W. 1984, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
Gooch, G. P. 1913, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, London: 
Longmans, Green.  
Grader, S. 1988, “The English School of International Relations: Evidence and 
Evaluation”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 29-44.  
Gramsci, A. 1971, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, London: Lawrence and 
Wishart.  
Green, A. and Troup, K. (eds) 1999, The Houses of History, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press.  
Griffiths, M. 1999, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, London: Routledge.  
Hall, I. 2006, The International Thought of Martin Wight, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Hall, I. 2008, Review of Brunello Vigezzi, The British Committee on the Theory of 
International Politics: The Rediscovery of History, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 36, pp. 368-370.  
Hall, I.  2009, “The Realist as Moralist: Sir Lewis Namier’s International Thought”, in 
Ian Hall and Lisa Hill (eds), British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 227-246. 
Hall, I. 2014, “Martin Wight, Western Values, and the Whig Tradition of 
International Thought”, The International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 961-
981.  
Halliday, F. 1994, Rethinking International Relations, London: Macmillan.  
Halliday, F. 2000, “Reason and Romance: The Place of Revolution in the Works of E. 
H. Carr”, in Michael Cox (ed.), E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 258-279.  
223 
 
Halperin, S. W. 1961, Some 20th-Century Historians: Essays on Eminent Europeans, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
Harris, I. 1993, “Order and Justice in The Anarchical Society”, International Affairs, 
Vol. 69, No. 4, pp. 725-741.  
Hart, H. L. A. 1961/1994, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Haslam, J. 1999, The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892-1982, London: Verso.  
Hegel, G. W. F.  1892, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume One, London: 
Routledge.  
Hegel, G. W. F. 1899/ 1956, The Philosophy of History, New York: Dover 
Publications.  
Hegel, G. W. F. 1929, Science of Logic, London: George Allen and Unwin.  
Hegel, G. W. F. 1977, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Hegel, G. W. F. 1991, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Heine, C. and Teschke, B. 1996, “Sleeping Beauty and the Dialectical Awakening: 
On the Potential of Dialectic for International Relations”, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 399-423.  
Hill, C. 1985, “History and International Relations”, in Steve Smith (ed.), 
International Relations: British and American Perspectives, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
pp. 126-145.  
Himmelfarb, G. 1987, The New History and the Old, Cambridge [Mass.]: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.  
Hobsbawm, E. J. 1968, Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour, London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.  
Hobsbawm, E. J. 1981, “Looking Forward: History and the Future”, New Left Review 
I/125, January/February, pp. 1-18.  
Hobsbawm, E. J. 1992, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality, Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hobsbawm, E. J. 1998, On History, London: Abacus.  
Hobson, J. M. 2012, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western 
International Theory, 1760-2010, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
224 
 
Hoffmann, S. 1977, “An American Social Science: International Relations”, 
Daedalus, Vol. 106, No. 3, pp. 41-60.  
Hollis, M. and Smith, S. 1990, Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Holsti, K. J. 1998, “The Problem of Change in International Relations Theory”, 
Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working 
Paper No. 26, pp. 1-21.  
Holsti, K. J. 2004, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International 
Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Horkheimer, M. 1972, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, New York: The Seabury 
Press.  
Howard, M. 1991, The Lessons of History, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Hudson, G. F. 1966, The Hard and Bitter Peace: World Politics since 1945, London: 
Pall Mall Press.  
Huntington, S. P. 1997, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 
London: Simon & Schuster.  
Hurrell, A. 2001, “Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy firmly within the 
English School”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 489-494.  
Hurrell, A. 2002, “The Anarchical Society 25 Years On”, in Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. vii-xxiii.  
Iggers, G. G. 1997, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific 
Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge, Hanover: Wesleyan University Press.  
Jackson, R. 1996, “Is there a Classical International Theory?”, in Steve Smith, Ken 
Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 203-218.  
Jackson, R. 2000, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Jackson, R. 2008, “From Colonialism to Theology: Encounters with Martin Wight’s 
International Thought”, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 351-364. 
James, A. 1982, “Michael Nicholson on Martin Wight: A Mind Passing in the Night”, 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 8, pp. 117-123.  
225 
 
Jenkins, K. 1995, On “What is History?”:From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White, 
London: Routledge.  
Johnson, P. 2013, Collingwood’s The Idea of History, London: Bloomsbury.  
Johnston, W. 1967, “E. H. Carr’s Theory of International Relations: A Critique”, The 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 861-884.  
Jones, C. 1998, E. H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Jones, R. E. 1981, “The English School of International Relations: A Case for 
Closure”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 7, pp. 1-13.  
Kahn, C. H. 1979, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Kaplan, M. A. 1961, “Problems of Theory Building and Theory Confirmation in 
International Politics”, in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds), The International 
System: Theoretical Essays, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, pp. 6-24.  
Kaplan, M. A. 1966, “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs Science in 
International Relations”, World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp.  1-20.  
Karlsen, M. P. 2014, “Materialism, Dialectics, and Theology in Alain Badiou”, Critical 
Research on Religion, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 38-54.  
Kaye, H. J. 1984, The British Marxist Historians, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Kedourie, E. 1979, “Religion and Politics: Arnold Toynbee and Martin Wight”, 
British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 5, pp. 6-14.  
Keene, E. 2002, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in 
World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Keene, E. and Hovden, E. 2002, The Globalization of Liberalism, New York: Palgrave 
in Association with Millennium Journal of International Studies.  
Keene, E. 2005, International Political Thought: A Historical Introduction, 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Keene, E. 2007, “A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy: 
British Treaty-Making against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century”, 
International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 311-339.  
226 
 
Keene, E. 2008, “The English School and British Historians”, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 381-393.  
Keene, E. 2009, “International Society as an Ideal Type”, in Cornelia Navari (ed.), 
Theorising International Society: English School Methods, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 104-124.  
Keene, E. 2012, “The Treaty-Making Revolution of the Nineteenth Century”, The 
International History Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 475-500.  
Keene, E. 2013a, “International Hierarchy and the Origins of the Modern Practice 
of Intervention”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 39, No. 5, pp. 1077-1090.  
Keene, E. 2013b, “Social Status, Social Closure and the Idea of Europe as a 
‘Normative Power’”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 
939-956.  
Keene, E. 2014, “The Standard of ‘Civilisation’, the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-
century International Social Space”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 651-673.  
Kenealy, D. and Kostagiannis, K. 2013, “Realist Visions of European Union: E. H. 
Carr and Integration”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 
pp. 221-246.  
Keohane, R. O. 1988, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 379-396.  
Keohane, R. O. 1992, Review of Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three 
Traditions, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 4, pp. 1112-1113.  
Knudsen, T. B. 2000, “Theory of Society or Society of Theorists? With Tim Dunne in 
the English School”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 193-203.  
Kohn, H. 1956, “Faith and Vision of a Universal World”, in M. F. Ashley Montagu 
(ed.), Toynbee and History, Boston [Mass.]: Porter Sargent Publisher, pp. 351-359. 
Kojeve, A. 1969, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Kratochwil, F. 2006, “History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the ‘Second’ Great 
Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory”, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 5-29.  
227 
 
Kumar, K. 2011, “Philosophy of History at the End of the Cold War”, in Aviezer 
Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 550-560.  
Kupchan, C. A. 1998, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, 
and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity”, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 
40-79.  
Kurki, M. and Wight C. 2007, “International Relations and Social Science”, in 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, 
and Steve Smith (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13-33.  
Laski, H. J. 1925, Grammar of Politics, London: George Allen & Unwin.  
Laski, H. J. 1930, Liberty in the Modern State, London: George Allen & Unwin.   
Lauterpacht, H. 1937, “The Legal Aspect”, in C. A. W. Manning (ed.), Peaceful 
Change: An International Problem, London: Macmillan, pp. 135-165.  
Lawson, G. 2010, “The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations”, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 203-226.  
Lefort, C. 1986, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, 
Totalitarianism, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Lenin, V. I. 1902/1963, What is to be done?, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Lenin, V. I. 1917/1933, State and Revolution, London: Martin Lawrence.   
Linklater, A. 1990, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International 
Relations, London: Macmillan.  
Linklater, A. 1997, “The Transformation of Political Community: E. H. Carr, Critical 
Theory and International Relations”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, pp. 
321-338.  
 Linklater, A. 1999, The Transformation of Political Community towards “A 
Cosmopolitan System of General Political Security”, YCISS Occasional Paper Number 
55.  
Linklater, A. and Suganami, H. 2006, The English School of International Relations: A 
Contemporary Reassessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Linklater, A. 2007, Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and 
Humanity, London: Routledge.  
228 
 
Little, R. 1991, “International Relations and the Methodological Turn”, Political 
Studies, Vol. 39, pp. 463-478.  
Little, R. 1995, “Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological 
and Theoretical Reassessment”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, 
No. 1, pp. 9-34.  
Little, R. 2007, The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths 
and Models, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Little, R. 2009, “History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism in the English 
School”, in Cornelia Navari (ed.), Theorising International Society: English School 
Methods, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 78-103.  
Lloyd, C. 1986, Explanation in Social History, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
Lloyd, C. 1993, The Structures of History, Oxford: Blackwell.  
Lloyd, C. 1996, “For Realism and against the Inadequacies of Common Sense: A 
Response to Arthur Marwick”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 
191-207.  
Long, D. and Wilson, P. (eds) 1995, Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War 
Idealism Reassessed, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
MacIntyre, A. 1969, Marxism and Christianity, London: Gerald Duckworth.  
Mackinnon, D. M. (ed.) 1953, Christian Faith and Communist Faith: A Series of 
Studies by Members of the Anglican Communion, London: Macmillan.  
Mackinnon, D. M. 1959a, “ ‘Philosophy of History’ and the Problems of 
International Relationships”, Papers of the British Committee on the Theory of 
International Politics, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 
London, pp. 1-13.  
Mackinnon, D. M. 1959b “What is the Real Persona of the Community and What is 
the Minimum Required to Maintain It?”, Papers of the British Committee on the 
Theory of International Politics, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham 
House, London, pp. 1-11. 
Mackinnon, D. M. 1960a, “Free-Will and Determinism in Relation to International 
Theory”, Papers of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, pp. 1-20.  
229 
 
Mackinnon, D. M. 1960b, “Western Values”, Papers of the British Committee on 
the Theory of International Politics, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Chatham House, London, pp. 1-10.  
Mackinnon, D. M. 1962, “Some Notes on the Notion of a Christian Statesman”, 
Papers of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, pp. 1-9.  
Mackinnon, D.M. 1966, “Natural Law”, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, 
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, pp. 74-88.  
Mackinnon, D. M. 1969, The Stripping of the Altars, Suffolk: The Chaucer Press.  
Mackinnon, D. M. 1974, The Problem of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Macpherson, C. B. 1962, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to 
Locke, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Makinda, S. M. 2000, “International Society and Eclecticism in International 
Relations Theory”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 205-216. 
Mannheim, K. 1936, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of 
Knowledge, New York: A Harvest Book.  
Mannheim, K. 1952, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul.  
Mannheim, K. 1953, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul.  
Manning, C. A. W. 1937, “Some Suggested Conclusions”, in C. A. W. Manning (ed.), 
Peaceful Change: An International Problem, London: Macmillan, pp. 169-190.  
Manning, C. A. W. 1975, The Nature of International Society, New York: John Wiley 
& Sons.  
Mansfield, H. C., Jr. 1962, “Sir Lewis Namier Considered”, Journal of British Studies, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 28-55.  
Manuel, F. E. 1965, Shapes of Philosophical History, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.  
Mayall, J. 2000, Progress and its Limits, Cambridge: Polity.  
230 
 
Marx, K. 1900, The Poverty of Philosophy, London: The Twentieth Century Press.  
Marx, K. 1998, The German Ideology including Theses on Feuerbach and 
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, New York: Prometheus Books.  
Mayall, J. 2000, World Politics: Progress and Its Limits, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Mayall, J. 2009, “The Limits of Progress: Normative Reasoning in the English 
School”, in Cornelia Navari (ed.), Theorising International Society: English School 
Methods, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 209-226.  
 
McIntire, C. T. 1977, “Introduction: The Renewal of Christian Views of History in an 
Age of Catastrophe”, in C. T. McIntire (ed.), God, History, and Historians: An 
Anthology of Modern Christian Views of History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 3-26.  
McIntire, C.T. 1979, “Introduction: Herbert Butterfield on Christianity and History”, 
in C. T. McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. xi-liv.  
McIntire, C. T. 2004, Herbert Butterfield: Historian as Dissenter, New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  
McNeill, W. H. 1989, Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
McNeill, W. H. 1995, “The Changing Shape of World History”, History and Theory, 
Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 8-26.  
Mehta, V. 1961, Fly and the Fly-Bottle: Encounters with British Intellectuals, 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.  
Miller, D. 1995, On Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Miller, J. D. B. 1990, “The Third World”, in J. D. B. Miller and R. J. Vincent (eds), 
Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 65-94.  
Mirsky, D. S. 1931, “Preface”, in E. H. Carr, Dostoevsky: A New Biography, London: 
George Allen & Unwin.  
Morgenthau, H. 1948, “The Political Science of E. H. Carr”, World Politics, Vol. 1, 
No. 1, pp. 127-134.  
Morgenthau, H. J. 1956, “Toynbee and the Historical Imagination”, in M. F. Ashley 
Montagu (ed.), Toynbee and History, Boston [Mass.]: Porter Sargent Publisher, pp. 
191-199.  
231 
 
Morgenthau, H. J. 1967a, Review of Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 3, pp. 461-463. 
Morgenthau, H. J. 1967b, “Common Sense and Theories of International 
Relations”, in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith (eds), Theory and Reality in 
International Relations, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 23-30.  
Morrison, S. 1962, I Renounce War: The Story of the Peace Pledge Union, London: 
Sheppard Press.  
Namier, L. B. 1929, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, London: 
Macmillan.  
Namier, L. B. 1930/1961, England in the Age of the American Revolution, London: 
Macmillan.  
Navari, C. 1989, “The Great Illusion Revisited: The International Theory of Norman 
Angell”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 341-358. 
Navari, C. 1991, The Condition of States: A Study in International Political Theory, 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press.  
Navari, C. 1996, “English Machiavellism”, in Cornelia Navari (ed.), British Politics 
and the Spirit of the Age, Keele: Keele University Press, pp. 107-137. 
Navari, C. 2009a, “Introduction: Methods and Methodology in the English School”, 
in Cornelia Navari (ed.), Theorising International Society: English School Methods, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-20. 
Navari, C. 2009b, “What the Classical English School was trying to explain and why 
its Members were not interested in Causal Explanation”, in Cornelia Navari (ed.), 
Theorising International Society: English School Methods, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 39-57.  
 
Navari, C. and Green, D. (eds) 2014, Guide to the English School in International 
Studies, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.  
 
Neumann, I. B. 2003, “The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promises 
Unfulfilled”, International Relations, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 341-369.  
 
Nicholson, M. 1981, “The Enigma of Martin Wight”, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 7, pp. 15-22.  
Nicholson, M. 1982, “Martin Wight: Enigma or Error?”, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 8, pp. 125-128.  
232 
 
Northedge, F. S. 1973, “Order and Change in International Society”, in Alan James 
(ed.), The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C. A. W. Manning, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-23. 
Northedge, F. S. 1976, The International Political System, London: Faber & Faber.  
Novick, P. 1988, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American 
Historical Profession”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Olson, W. C. 1972, “The Growth of a Discipline”, in Brian Porter (ed.), The 
Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 3-29.  
Olson, W. and Onuf, N. 1985, “The Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed”, in Steve 
Smith (ed.), International Relations: British and American Perspectives, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, pp. 1-28.  
Pfeifer, G. 2015, The New Materialism: Althusser, Badiou, and Zizek, London: 
Routledge.  
Pflanze, O. 2004, “Realism and Idealism in Historical Perspective: Otto von 
Bismarck”, in Cathal J. Nolan (ed.), Ethics and Statecraft: The Moral Dimension of 
International Affairs, London: Praeger, pp. 149-164. 
Piper, O. 1936, “Christian Politics”, Theology, Vol. XXXII, No. 189, pp. 134-141.  
Pocock, J. G. A. 2009, Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Polanyi, M. 1940, The Contempt of Freedom: The Russian Experiment and After, 
London: Watts & Co.  
Popper, K. 1957, The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge.  
Porter, B. 2007, “The International Political Thought of Martin Wight”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 783-790.  
Quirk, J. 2008, “Historical Methods”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 518-536.  
Rabb, T. K. and Rotberg, R. I. (eds) 1982, The New History, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press.  
Rae, G. 2011, Realizing Freedom: Hegel, Sartre, and the Alienation of Human Being, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
233 
 
Rengger, N. 2008, “The Ethics of Marxism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan 
Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 188-200.  
Reus-Smit, C. 2009, “Constructivism and the English School”, in Cornelia Navari 
(ed.), Theorising International Society: English School Methods, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 58-77. 
Richards, R. J. 2004, “Did Friedrich Schelling kill Auguste Bohmer and does It 
matter? The Necessity of Biography in the History of Philosophy”, in Lloyd E. 
Ambrosius (ed.), Writing Biography: Historians and their Craft, Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, pp. 133-153.  
Richardson, J. L. 1990, “The Academic Study of International Relations”, in J. D. B. 
Miller and R. J. Vincent (eds), Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International 
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 140-185. 
Riemer, A. K. and Stivachtis, Y. A. (eds)  2002, Understanding EU’s Mediterranean 
Enlargement, Frankfurt: Peter Lang,   
Roberson, B. A. (ed.) 1998, International Society and the Development of 
International Relations Theory, London: Pinter.  
Roberts, A. 1991 “Foreword”, in Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three 
Traditions, Leicester: Leicester University Press, pp. xxiv-xxvii. 
Roberts, D. D. 2006, The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth-Century Europe: 
Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics, London: Routledge.  
Rosenau, J. N. 1990, Turbulence in World Politics, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press.  
Sartre, J. P. 1976, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume One: Theory of Practical 
Ensembles, London: Verso.  
Sartre, J. P. 1991, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume Two (Unfinished): The 
Intelligibility of History, London: Verso.  
Savigear, P. 1978, “International Relations and Philosophy of History”, in The 
Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory, Michael Donelan (ed.), 
London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 195-205.  
Schmidt, B. C. 1998, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of 
International Relations, New York: State University of New York Press.  
234 
 
Schmidt, B. C. 2002, “On the History and Historiography of International Relations”, 
in Handbook of International Relations, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth 
A. Simmons (eds), London: Sage Publications, pp. 3-22.  
Schweizer, K. W. and Sharp, P. 2007, “Introduction”, in Karl W. Schweizer and Paul 
Sharp (eds), The International Thought of Herbert Butterfield, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 1-6.  
Scipio (Watson, A.) 1965, Emergent Africa, London: Chatto and Windus.  
Shapiro, I. 2003, The Moral Foundations of Politics, New Haven: Yale University 
Press.  
Shaw, M. 1996, “Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, 
Historical and Political Limits of ‘International Society’”, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy 
Larkins (eds), International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order 
Reconsidered, London: Macmillan, pp. 47-62.  
Shore, M. 2006, Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation’s Life and Death in 
Marxism, 1918-1968, New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Shore, M. 2014, “Can we see Ideas?: On Evocation, Experience, and Empathy”, in 
Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (Eds), Rethinking Modern European 
Intellectual History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 193-211.  
Skinner, Q. 2002, Visions of Politics, Vol. 1: Regarding Method, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Smith, M. J. 1986, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press.  
Smith, S. (ed.) 1985, International Relations: British and American Perspectives, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
Smith, S. 1995, “Review: The Canadian-Italian School of International Theory”, 
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 164-166.  
Smith, S. 1996, “Positivism and Beyond”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia 
Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 11-44.  
Smith, S. 2008, “Six Wishes for a More Relevant Discipline of International 
Relations”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 725-732.  
235 
 
Smith, T. W. 1999, History and International Relations, London: Routledge.  
Snidal, D. 2002, “Rational Choice and International Relations”, in Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations, 
London: Sage Publications, pp. 73-94.  
Sorokin, P. A. 1956, “Toynbee’s Philosophy of History”, in M. F. Ashley Montagu 
(ed.), Toynbee and History, Boston [Mass.]: Porter Sargent Publisher, pp. 172-190.  
Spengler, O. 1926, The Decline of the West, Vol. 1, Form and Actuality, London: 
George Allen & Unwin. 
Spengler, O. 1928,The Decline of the West, Vol. 2,  Perspectives of World-History, 
London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Stone, L. 1981, The Past and the Present, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
Suganami, H. 1983, “The Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British 
Mainstream International Relations”, International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 5, pp. 
2363-81.  
Suganami, H. 1997, “Narratives of War Origins and Endings: A Note on the End of 
the Cold War”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 631-
649.  
Suganami, H. 1999, “Agents, Structures, Narratives”, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 365-386.  
Suganami, H. 2000, “A New Narrative, a New Subject? Tim Dunne on the ‘English 
School’”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 217-226.  
Suganami, H. 2008, “Narrative Explanation and International Relations: Back to 
Basics”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 327-356.  
Suganami, H. 2011, “The English School, History and Theory”, Ritsumeikan 
International Affairs, Vol. 9, pp. 27-50.  
Sutherland, S. 1998, “Donald Mackenzie Mackinnon 1913-1994”, Proceedings of 
the British Academy, Vol. 97, pp. 381-389.  
Sylvest, C. 2009, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress?, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Tagliacozzo, G. (ed.) 1981, Vico: Past and Present, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities 
Press.  
236 
 
Talmon, J. L. 1952, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, New York: Penguin 
Books.  
Talmon, J. L. 1960, Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase, London: Secker & 
Warburg. 
Taylor, A. J. P. 1956, “Much Learning...”, in  M. F. Ashley Montagu (ed.), Toynbee 
and History, Boston [Mass.]: Porter Sargent Publisher, pp. 115-117. 
Teschke, B. 2008, “Marxism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
163-187.  
Thomas, S. M. 2001, “Faith, History and Martin Wight: The Role of Religion in the 
Historical Sociology of the English School of International Relations”, International 
Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4, pp. 905-929. 
Thompson, E. P. 1963, The Making of the English Working Class, London: Victor 
Gollancz.  
Thompson, K. W. 1980, Masters of International Thought: Major Twentieth-Century 
Theorists and the World Crisis, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.  
Thompson, K. W. 1994, Fathers of International Thought: The Legacy of Political 
Theory, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.  
Thompson, W. 2004, Postmodernism and History, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Time: The Weekly Newsmagazine 1947, “The Challenge”, March 17, pp. 29-32.  
Toynbee, A. J. 1921, The Tragedy of Greece, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Toynbee, A. J. 1934, A Study of History, Volumes I-III, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Toynbee, A. J. 1937, “The Lessons of History”, in C. A. W. Manning (ed.), Peaceful 
Change: An International Problem, London: Macmillan, pp. 27-38.  
Toynbee, A. J. 1939, A Study of History, Volumes IV-VI, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Toynbee, A. J. 1947, “The International Outlook”, International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 
4, pp. 463-476.  
Toynbee, A. J. 1954, A Study of History, Volumes VII-X, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
237 
 
Toynbee, A. J. 1959, Hellenism: The History of a Civilization, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Toynbee, A. J. 1961, A Study of History, Volume XII, Reconsiderations, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Toynbee, A. J. 1977, “The Christian Understanding of History”, in C. T. McIntire 
(ed.), God, History, and Historians: An Anthology of Modern Christian Views of 
History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 176-190.  
Tse-tung, M. 1965, “On Contradiction”, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, 
Volume I, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, pp. 311-347.  
Tucker, A. 2011, “Introduction”, in Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the 
Philosophy of History and Historiography, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 1-6.  
Vasquez, J. A. 1983, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique, London: Frances 
Pinter.  
Vaughan-Williams, N. 2005, “International Relations and the ‘Problem of History’”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 115-136.  
Vico, G. 1982, Selected Writings, Edited and translated by Leon Pompa, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Vigezzi, B. 2005, The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics 
(1954-1985): The Rediscovery of History, Milano: Edizioni Unicopli.  
Vincent, R. J. 1990, “Order in International Politics”, in J. D. B. Miller and R. J. 
Vincent (eds), Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 38-64.  
Voegelin, E. 1952, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press.  
Voegelin, E. 1962, “World- Empire and the Unity of Mankind”, International Affairs, 
Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 170-188.  
Walker, R. B. J. 1993, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Waltz, K. N. 1954, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Waltz, K. N. 1979, Theory of International Politics, Reading [Mass.]: Addison-
Wesley.  
238 
 
Waltz, K. N. 2000, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, 
Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 5-41.  
Watson, A. 1981, “Introduction”, in Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of History, 
London: Eyre Methuen”, pp. 7-12.  
Watson, A. 1982, Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States, London: Methuen.  
Watson, A. 1992/2009, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative 
Historical Analysis, Reissue with a new Introduction by Barry Buzan and Richard 
Little, London: Routledge.  
Watson, A. 2007, Hegemony and History, London: Routledge.  
Watson, A. 2001, “Foreword” to “Forum on the English School”, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 467-470.  
Weinert, M. S. 2011, “Reframing the Pluralist-Solidarist Debate”, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 21-41. 
Wheeler, N. J. 1996, “Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: A Review of the Ethical 
Claims of International Society”, Political Studies, XLIV, pp. 123-135.  
Wheeler, N. J. 2000, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
White, H. 1973, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  
White, S. 2000, “The Soviet Carr”, in Michael Cox (ed.), E. H. Carr: A Critical 
Appraisal, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 109-124.  
Wight, M. 1936, “Christian Pacifism”, Theology, Vol. XXXIII, No. 193, pp. 12-21.  
Wight, M. 1946a, The Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945, London: 
Faber & Faber.  
Wight, M. 1946b, Power Politics, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.  
Wight, M. 1947, The Gold Coast Legislative Council, London: Faber & Faber.  
Wight, M. 1948, “The Church, Russia and the West: An Address Given at a 
Conference of Christian Politicians at the Ecumenical Institute, Bossey”, Papers of 
Martin Wight, British Library of Political and Economic Sciences, London, pp.25-45.  
Wight, M. 1949, Review of Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History, The 
Observer, October 23, p. 7. 
239 
 
Wight, M. et al. 1951a, Attitude to Africa, London: Penguin Books.  
Wight, M. 1951b, Preface to the Revised Edition of Harold J. Laski, An Introduction 
to Politics, London: George Allen &Unwin, p. 7.  
Wight, M. 1951c, Review of Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations, The 
Observer, September 2, p. 7. 
Wight, M. 1951d, Review of E. H. Carr, The New Society, The Observer, September 
23, p. 7. 
Wight, M. 1952a, “Germany”, in Arnold Toynbee and Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin 
(eds), The World in March 1939, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 293-365. 
Wight, M. 1952b, “The Balance of Power”, in Arnold Toynbee and Frank T. Ashton-
Gwatkin (eds), The World in March 1939, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 508-
531.  
Wight, M. 1952c, British Colonial Constitutions 1947, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Wight, M. 1954, “The Crux for an Historian Brought Up in the Christian Tradition”, 
Annex III and various notes to Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. VII, pp. 
737-748.  
Wight, M. 1955, Review of Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An 
Introduction, International Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 336-337.  
Wight, M. 1959, Review of A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies, The 
Observer, February 8.  
Wight, M. 1959/2003, “On the Abolition of War: Observations on a Memorandum 
by Walter Millis”, in Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi (eds), International Relations 
at LSE: A History of 75 Years, London: Millennium Publishing Group, pp. 51-60.  
Wight, M. 1962, Review of J. L. Talmon, Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase, 
International Affairs, Vol. 38, No.2, p. 224.  
Wight, M. 1966a, “Why is there no International Theory?”, in Herbert Butterfield 
and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of 
International Politics, London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 17-34. 
Wight, M. 1966b, “Western Values in International Relations”, in Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory 
of International Politics, London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 89-131.  
240 
 
Wight, M. 1966c, “The Balance of Power”, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, 
London: George Allen & Unwin, 149-175.  
Wight, M. 1969, “Arnold Toynbee at Eighty”, Radio Baden-Baden, Papers of Martin 
Wight, British Library of Political and Economic Sciences, London, pp. 1-9.  
Wight, M. 1971, “Development of Christian Thought on Violence”, Papers of Martin 
Wight, British Library of Political and Economic Sciences, London, pp. 1-9.  
Wight, M. 1973, “The Balance of Power and International Order”, in Alan James 
(ed.), The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C. A. W. Manning, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 85-115. 
Wight, M. 1976, “Arnold Toynbee: An Appreciation”, International Affairs, Vol. 52, 
No. 1, pp. 10-12.  
Wight, M. 1977, Systems of States, Leicester: Leicester University Press.  
Wight, M. 1978, Power Politics, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, 
Leicester: Leicester University Press.  
Wight, M. 1987, “An Anatomy of International Thought”, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 221-227.  
Wight, M. 1991, International Theory: The Three Traditions, Edited by Gabriele 
Wight and Brian Porter, Leicester: Leicester University Press.  
Wight, M. 2005, Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Wight M. Undated, “Christian Politics”, Papers of Martin Wight, British Library of 
Political and Economic Sciences, London.  
Wight, M. Undated, “Obituary”, Papers of Martin Wight, British Library of Political 
and Economic Sciences, London.  
Wight, M. Undated, “Personal Portrait: Arnold Toynbee”, London Calling, Papers of 
Martin Wight, British Library of Political and Economic Sciences, London, p. 13.  
Williams, H. 1989, Hegel, Heraclitus and Marx’s Dialectic, New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf.  
Williams, J. 2005, “Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in 
English School Theory”, International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 19-38. 
241 
 
Williams, J. 2006, “Order and Society”, in Richard Little and John Williams (eds), 
The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 
13-34. 
Wilson, P. 1989, “The English School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila 
Grader”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 49-58.  
Wilson, P. 1995, “Introduction: The Twenty Years’ Crisis and the Category of 
‘Idealism’ in International Relations”, in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds), 
Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 1-24.  
Wilson, P. 1996, “The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain”, in Philomena 
Murray and Paul Rich (eds), Visions of European Unity, Colorado: Westview Press, 
pp. 39-62.  
Wilson, P. 1998, “The Myth of the ‘First Great Debate’”, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 1-15.  
Wilson, P. 2000, “Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 
1939-46”, in Michael Cox (ed.), E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 165-197.  
Wilson, P. 2001a, “Radicalism for a Conservative Purpose: The Peculiar Realism of 
E. H. Carr”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 123-136. 
Wilson, P. and Economides, S. 2001b, The Economic Factor in International 
Relations: A Brief Introduction, London: I. B. Tauris.  
Wilson, P. 2003, The International Theory of Leonard Woolf: A Study in Twentieth-
Century Idealism, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Wilson, P. 2004, “Manning’s Quasi-Masterpiece: The Nature of International 
Society Revisited”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 377, pp. 755-769.  
Wilson, P. 2007, “Retrieving Cosmos: Gilbert Murray’s Thought on International 
Relations”, in Christopher Stray (ed.), Gilbert Murray Reassessed: Hellenism, 
Theatre, and International Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 239-260. 
Wilson, P. 2009, “The English School’s Approach to International Law”, in Cornelia 
Navari (ed.), Theorising International Society: English School Methods, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 167-188.  
242 
 
Wilson, P. 2011, “Gilbert Murray and International Relations: Hellenism, Liberalism, 
and International Intellectual Cooperation as a Path to Peace”, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 881-909.  
Wilson, P. 2012, “The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a 
Grounded Theory of International Institutions”, International Studies Review, Vol. 
14, No. 4, pp. 567-590.  
Wilson, P. 2013, “Power, Morality and the Remaking of International Order: E. H. 
Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis”, in Henrik Bliddal, Casper Sylvest and Peter Wilson 
(eds), Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation, 
London: Routledge, pp. 48-58.  
Wilson, P. 2016, “English School, Neo-Neo-Style”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 51, 
No. 1, pp. 109-115. 
Yost, D. S. 1979, “New Perspectives on Historical States-Systems”, World Politics, 
Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 151-168. 
Yost, D. S. 1994, “Political Philosophy and the Theory of International Relations”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 263-290.  
Zhang, Y. 2016, “Pluralism, Solidarism and the Yin-Yang of International Society”, 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 95-102.  
Zizek, S. 2004, The Parallax View, Cambridge [Mass.]: The MIT Press.  
Zizek, S. 2008, In Defence of Lost Causes, London: Verso.  
Zizek, S. 2012, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, 
London: Verso.  
Zizek, S. 2014, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical 
Materialism, London: Verso.  
 
